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

THE GIFT OF
PROF. ALEXANDER ZIWET

Grad. R.

THE GORGIAS OF PLATO

THE

GORGIAS OF PLATO

WITH ENGLISH NOTES, INTRODUCTION, AND APPENDIX

BY

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Δεῖ ἄρα, εἴ τις μέλλει ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς πρακτικὸς εἶναι, τὸ ἦθος εἶναι σπουδαῖον.—AUCTOR MAGN. MORAL.

LONDON
GEORGE BELL AND SONS
AND NEW YORK
1905

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PREFACE.

Of the more important changes adopted in the text of this edition, or suggested in the notes. the following is a list :—

1. In p. 3 (448, B) *τί* for *τίνα*.

2. In p. 14 (454, D) for *γὰρ αὖ* I give *ἄρα* with Olympiodorus, and with Dr Badham *ἐστόν* for *ἐστίν*.

3. In p. 16 (456, B) *ἐλθόντε*, at Dobree's suggestion, for *ἐλθόντα*.

4. p. 22 (460, C) for *οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν*, I add *ἀεί* after *βούλεσθαι*, and with Woolsey and Hirschig omit the words *ῥητορικόν* to *τὸν δέ* inclusive.

5. p. 53 (478, E) I ought to have received into the text the emendation of Dobree recommended in the notes, *ὁ ἔχων κακίαν* for *ὁ ἔχων ἀδικίαν*.

6. p. 56 (481) for the solecistic *ἀναλίσκηται* in transitive sense, which, strange to say, has stood in all editions hitherto, I give *ἀναλίσκῃ*.

7. p. 64 (487) for *τρία ἄρα*, I venture to suggest the stereotyped Attic *τρί' ἄττα*.

8. In pp. 69, 70 (490, C, and 491, A) the prep. *περί*, bracketed by Hirschig, should be expelled from the text.

9. p. 73 (492, E) Dr Badham's excellent emendation *ὧν* for *ὡς* is adopted, and justified in the note.

10. p. 73 (493, C) I ought to have mentioned the same critic's ingenious conjecture *ταῦτ' ἀπεικασμένὰ ἐστὶν*

ὑπό τι ἄτοπα for the received ἐπιεικῶς μέν ἐστιν ὑπό τι ἄτοπα.

11. p. 79 (496, D) I omit with Badham καὶ ἐγώ before μανθάνω.

12. p. 88 (501, c) the words τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν should cease to stand in the text.

13. p. 104 (512) for καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσειεν, I now prefer ὀνήσει.

Of these changes some, it will be seen, rest on the authority of Olympiodorus, whose lemmata are perfectly distinguishable from his commentary. In no case have his readings been adopted without regard to their intrinsic merit, as compared with those of our surviving MSS., the oldest of which is more recent than that which he used by at least four centuries. The two emendations suggested by Dobree ("criticorum princeps," as Cobet calls him) seem to need no recommendation. Students of Plato can only regret that he did not bestow on their favourite author more of the time and pains spent on the minor orators. To the suggestions of the eminent Dutch scholar Cobet, and to those of his meritorious disciple M. Hirschig, I have always given careful attention, even when they have not commended themselves to my judgment. The latter scholar published in 1859[1] an elaborate examination of the arguments contained in this dialogue and in the Philebus, with a view to removing the "non sequiturs" introduced by unintelligent or officious copyists. This book reached my hands before I had finished my commentary. The following extract gives a fair idea of its scope and method:—

"Non poenitet me investigationis et correctionis disputationum quas dixi, imprimis quod pro ineptiis

[1] Exploratio argumentationum Socraticarum in quibus scribae labefactarunt medios Platonis dialogos, Gorgiam et Philebum. Trajecti ad Rhenum ap. Kemink et fil.

genuinam disserendi subtilitatem auctori reddere mihi contigit, sed etiam quod, cum omnes de hujus generis emendationibus judicare possint, eas omnibus me probaturum spero, tam philosophis et caeteris quam grammaticis. Atque illos his lectis cautiores fore in laudandis Platonis scriptis confido, simulque in his luculentissima exempla visuros, unde liquido discant, quid possit critica et quam late pateat ejus provincia. Verum erunt fortasse qui hujusmodi emendationes minus certas esse suspicentur. Sed certo scio omnes mihi assensuros nullas esse posse certiores. Habet enim Socratica disserendi ratio mathematicam fere subtilitatem, et tantam ἀνάγκην logicam sive dialecticam (sit venia verbis) ut corrigenti ipsa quaeque disputatio certissima praebeat argumenta, et poetam emendans ne ex metro quidem evidentiora petere possit. Fieri enim potest ut metrum plures voces admittat, argumentationes autem illae partibus tam firmo et rationis et orationis vinculo connexis constant, *ut una tantum vox quemque locum occupare possit, alia, vel idem significans, omnem* ἀνάγκην *tollat.*"

Of German editions more recent than Stallbaum's latest, I know nothing but what may be learnt from Cron's "Beiträge zur Erklärung des Platonischen Gorgias[1]," which reached me a few weeks ago, and which I have cursorily inspected, long however after this book was in print. Of the older editions of the Gorgias I must not omit to speak with respect of that (published in his early manhood) of the late venerable President of Magdalen College, Oxford, Dr Routh. Ast and Heindorf have of course been consulted, and I can also speak with praise of a very useful edition by Mr Woolsey, formerly Professor of Greek in Yale College, U.S.A.

In the annotations, which in the main were written some ten years ago, I have endeavoured, as in those to the Phaedrus, to call the student's attention to the

[1] Leipzig, Teubner, 1870.

substance as well as to the words of the dialogue. In doing this I have in many cases ventured to criticize my author's premisses. This, I trust, has been done with candour, and with due allowance for the circumstances of the time and his own personal antecedents. It is certainly true that many of the arguments in this Dialogue are more logical than convincing; but it is also true that its purely ethical conclusions are as sound as they are noble and elevating. Of this, as of so many works of genius (if I may be allowed the quotation), it is the 'spirit' that 'giveth life': nor is there one of the whole series of dialogues that may be more safely recommended to beginners in the study of Plato and his philosophy.

The Introduction prefixed to the Dialogue aims only at conveying a clear and connected notion, from the Editor's standing-point, of its general drift and purpose. A much more elaborate analysis was of course possible; but in such compositions there is always a danger of the details obstructing the student's view, and making it difficult for him "to see the wood for the trees."

The fragments of Gorgias, printed in the Appendix, seemed necessary in order to enable the student to form an independent judgment of the character of his writings, and of the fairness of the treatment which the great rhetorician receives in this dialogue. The collection will be found slightly more complete than those of previous editors.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
December, 1870.

INTRODUCTION.

Of the genuine Platonic Dialogues, the majority are named after some one of the different persons who bear a part in the discussion. Sometimes this distinction is conferred on the interlocutor who contributes the greatest or next to Socrates the greatest share towards the elucidation of the subject debated, as Timaeus, Critias, Parmenides; sometimes again on the most resolute or most formidable of Socrates' opponents, as in the Protagoras, Philebus, Hippias, Euthydemus. A third set of dialogues are named after persons whose part in the discussion is subordinate, but who appear to have been singled out in testimony of the respect and affection of the author. Such is the Phaedo, such the Charmides, and probably the Lysis. It cannot be said that the Gorgias falls into any one of these three classes. The part which the great rhetorician bears in the dialogue is comparatively insignificant. As the most distinguished of the assembled group he is naturally the first object of Socrates' curiosity, and for a while, notwithstanding the intimation given at the commencement that he is exhausted by a previous display, he seems the destined victim of the philosopher's dialectical prowess. But the encounter between Socrates and Gorgias is but a preliminary skirmish. The triumph or the defeat of the master is prevented by the officious zeal of his disciple Polus; whose retreat again is covered by the impetuous advance of their eloquent and reckless host. Not only is the larger half of the dialogue devoted to the single combat between Socrates

and Callicles, but whether we regard the comparative importance of the subjects discussed, or the earnest tone assumed and maintained to the end, we are led to conclude that in this latter portion we are to look for the main scope and intended result of the entire discussion.

Such is in effect the view adopted by the Neo-Platonist Olympiodorus[1], in the introduction to his Scholia on the Gorgias, whose theory of the *σκοπός*, as he calls it, of the dialogue, though perhaps incomplete, is well worthy of attention. Some, says this philosopher, think that the purpose of the author is *περὶ ῥητορικῆς διαλεχθῆναι*,—to discuss the Art of Rhetoric,—and they accordingly prefix to the dialogue the words still found in the MSS., *Γοργίας ἢ περὶ ῥητορικῆς*. But, he justly observes, this were to characterize the whole by a part, and that not the larger part, *καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολλοὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι*. Others, he adds, conceive that Justice and Injustice form the subject of the dialogue: an account truer perhaps than the former, but still, he thinks, inadequate and partial. Much less can he admit the absurd notion of a third class of expositors, who pretend that the contemplation of the *δημιουργός* or Creator of the world, is the object to which Plato would conduct his readers. This notable explanation (a fair specimen, by the way, of the mystical interpretations of Proclus and some other later Platonists) is founded, says Olympiodorus, on the consideration that the *δημιουργός* (it may be presumed under his exoteric name Zeus) is introduced in the concluding mythus. His own account, it appears to me, is worthy of the reputation of Olympiodorus for comparative[2] good sense and insight into his master's meaning.

[1] Given by Routh, p. 561 of his ed. The entire Commentary is printed in the Supplement to Jahn's Jahrbücher, Bd xiv., from a hitherto unedited MS., a copy of what profess to be contemporary notes of the oral lectures of the master.

[2] I say "comparative"—for Olymp. is a Neo-Platonist, and repeats much of the nonsense of his predecessors. But the Greeks, even in their decline, were excellent interpreters. The commentaries of Simplicius on Aristotle are, with the single exception of those of Alexander, the best ever written; and he was a member of the Neo-Platonic brotherhood, on whom Justinian planted his armed heel. Proclus was

Φαμὲν τοίνυν, he observes, *ὅτι σκοπὸς αὐτῷ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν ἠθικῶν διαλεχθῆναι τῶν φερουσῶν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν εὐδαιμονίαν*[1]. The aim of the Gorgias is to discuss the ethical principles which conduct to political well-being. It explains, at least to a considerable extent, the later as well as the earlier discussions; whereas, if we assume that the main end of the dialogue is to bring the art of rhetoric and its professors into discredit, we can assign no sufficient motive for the importance assigned to a character like Callicles, who heartily despises the profession of a Sophist, and hates the schools and their pedantry; and who, though he makes an exception in favour of a polished and brilliant man of the world like Gorgias[2], would probably regard the frigid pedantries of his disciple Polus with a contempt as hearty as the author of the Phaedrus could himself have desired. Had Plato seriously harboured the intention of destroying the reputation of Gorgias, whether as a thinker or a speaker, it would have cost him little trouble to put words into his mouth which would have seemed to his readers sufficient for either purpose[3]. Had he wished, for instance, to impair his dialectical reputation, what expedient more obvious than to

by nature a 'weak vessel'; but even in him treasure may occasionally be found.

[1] P. 4, ed. Jahn. *πολιτικός* is often used by the later Platonists where other writers would have preferred *ἠθικός*. In such passages it is used in a semi-mystical sense, to denote the relation of the Philosopher to his true country, the *πόλις ἐν οὐρανῷ ἀνακειμένη* of which Plato sublimely speaks in the ninth book of the Republic (592 B).

[2] See Diod. § xii. 53, *τῷ ξενίζοντι τῆς λέξεως ἐξέπληξε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὄντας εὐφυεῖς καὶ φιλολόγους*. Diodorus here refers to the first visit of Gorgias to Athens, B.C. 427, as one of the Leontine embassy, which is mentioned also by Thucydides, though he seems to have considered it beneath the dignity of history to mention the names of the persons who composed it. Olymp., who repeats the account of Diodorus, adds, on what authority we know not, *εἶχε δὲ μετ' αὐτοῦ Πῶλον*. But the present interview is supposed to take place more than twenty years later.

[3] An ethical dogma of Gorgias, which is mentioned not without respect by Aristotle, is critically handled in the Menon (71 E seq.), but in this dialogue no similar opinion is attributed to him, the moral heresies refuted being those of Polus and of Callicles.

lead the veteran speculator into a discussion on the μη ὄν or "non-existent," the title of a metaphysical work of Gorgias, of which Aristotle or his epitomator has given us a careful analysis; fragments of which work, a good deal caricatured it is true, are paraded with much complacency by Gorgias' pupil Euthydemus in the dialogue which bears the name of this latter Sophist. Or if his rhetorical success had roused that spirit of envious emulation with which, according to Athenaeus and others, Plato was so strongly imbued, what was easier than to have put into his mouth an ἐπίδειξις or 'panegyrical oration,' full of pointless antitheses and glittering with meretricious ornament, like that famous Funeral Oration which is condemned by the very Scholiast[1] who quotes it, as "enunciating superficial thoughts in pompous and stilted phrase[2]"? That Plato was not afraid to let his Sophists tell their own tale in their choicest manner, is clear from the instances of the ἐπίδειξις delivered by Protagoras in the dialogue so named (p. 320), and of the epistle, assuredly a genuine work of Lysias, which is read aloud in the Phaedrus. The discourse of Protagoras meets with the unqualified approbation of an eminent modern historian, and is quite as moral in its tendency, and at least as elegant in style, as any of the polished platitudes of "the estimable Isocrates." We hear, however, nothing of this kind from Gorgias, and as if to guard against possible disappointment, we are warned at the outset of the dialogue, that the orator has already perorated, and that we are to expect no second display from the exhausted physical powers of the now elderly statesman[3]. And

[1] On Hermogenes. See Spengel, Artt. Scriptt. pp. 78, 79, 80.

[2] σεμνὰς γὰρ ἐνταῦθα συμφορήσας λέξεις ὁ Γοργίας ἐννοίας ἐπιπολαιοτέρας ὑπεξαγγέλλει, τοῖς τε παρίσοις καὶ ὁμοιοτελεύτοις καὶ ὁμοιοκατάρκτοις καλλωπίζων δι' ὅλου προσκόρως τὸν λόγον. "Sickening his readers with the lavish and continued use of ornamental figures of speech, with clauses of exactly the same length, and sentences which rhyme at the end or at the beginning." This speech, or what remains of it, will be found in the Appendix.

[3] ἤδη γηράσκοντος, according to Philostratus, p. 493, in B.C. 427, when he first came to Athens as ambassador from Leontini; and therefore a very old man at the period when the conversation is supposed to be held, viz. at or about B.C. 405; if we adopt the strict

in truth, if we examine carefully that part of the dialogue in which Gorgias takes a part, and the few incidental remarks put into his mouth in the course of the conversation with Polus and Callicles, we cannot but feel the justice of Mr Grote's observation that the treatment he receives in this dialogue is respectful rather than contumelious. It is true he is forced into certain admissions not favourable to the art he professes; true also that he shows himself no adept in the art of definition. This art, on which Greek philosophers lay so much stress, is mentioned as one of the two philosophical inventions of which Socrates was the undisputed author. It is not likely that Sophocles would have defined Poetry better than Gorgias defines Rhetoric[1]: and we know from Xenophon how poor a figure Pericles made when his irreverent ward Alcibiades, fresh from a *διατριβή* with Socrates[2], importuned him for a Socratic definition of Law. On the whole, if by any perverse fortune this dialogue had been lost, and the works of Gorgias had come down to us entire, there is reason to doubt whether his reputation would have stood so high as it does at present. However this may be, enough has been said to show that the Gorgias is not a direct attack upon the great Rhetor or his opinions: and it is still more evident that it is not, like the Phaedrus, a critical treatise on the Art of Rhetoric. Here, as in that dialogue, Plato recognizes, it must be granted, the distinction between a false rhetoric and a true: but his exposure of the former, instead of being reasoned out on sound æsthetic and psychological principles, as in the Phaedrus, is conducted in a spirit of mockery and

view of the Platonic chronology advocated by Mr Cope in a note on p. 45 of his Translation.

[1] Compare Phaedr. 269 B, *οὐ χρὴ χαλεπαίνειν εἴ τινες μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι διαλέγεσθαι ἀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο ὁρίσασθαι τί ποτ' ἔστι ῥητορική*, κ.τ.λ. This reads like a good-humoured apology for past severities; or like a caution to the reader not to exaggerate the intellectual deficiencies of the Sophists and Rhetoricians who succumb to the dialectical skill of Socrates, as he worries them with inquiries into the *τί ἐστι* of the matters on which they discourse or the arts and sciences they profess.

[2] Memorab. i. 2. 40.

caricature, skilfully covered by a show of dialectical precision. He treats Rhetoric in the Gorgias much as he treats 'Sophistic' in the Sophist: and stoops, intentionally or not, to the artifice of putting the abuse of a thing for its use. But whatever its philosophical value, this part of the conversation has not only a high dramatic propriety, but leads, as we shall see, by an easy and natural sequence to the later and more important discussions.

In the second Act[1], so to speak, of the Gorgias, the part of respondent is undertaken by Polus. Of this Rhetor we have but few and scanty notices. What little we know leads us to think that he was no unfit subject for the exercise of Plato's comic powers: and if the remark attributed to Gorgias by Athenaeus, *ὡς καλῶς οἶδε Πλάτων ἰαμβίζειν* (what a master in the art of lampooning is Plato!), was ever made, it is certainly more characteristic of this second portion of the dialogue than of the first. Gorgias himself could not have desired a better foil to set off his talents and character, than that which is afforded by the presence of his faithful famulus. The juvenile ardour of Polus[2] appears to have attracted the notice of others beside Socrates; for Aristotle[3], in enumerating various punning accusations brought against persons who had the misfortune to bear names susceptible of this species of wit, condescends to mention one of which Polus was the subject. His "coltish" humour betrays him into many misadventures in the course of the discussion. At the outset his indiscreet zeal provokes a most disparaging description of the art in which he gloried. Rhetoric, he is informed, is no art, but the counterfeit of an art. It seeks not Good but Pleasure: flattering the mental as the confectioner flatters the bodily palate. It recks no more of the health of the soul to which it serves up its highly flavoured compositions, than the cook is troubled by the vision of the dyspepsy or podagra

[1] P. 461 seq.

[2] Gorg. 463, *Πῶλος δδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς*, "This colt Polus is young and hot."

[3] Rhetoric, b. ii. c. 23, § 29, *ἀεὶ σὺ Πῶλος εἶ*, "Colt by name and colt by nature."

which lurk beneath his covers. Both alike have attained their object, so long as the taste of the consumer is gratified.

The sarcasm implied in this comparison was calculated to touch Polus in a tender part. He had himself composed a work on Rhetoric, and Socrates[1] had just read it. To that work he had prefixed the very word Τέχνη by way of title. This term, as every reader of the Phaedrus knows, was appropriated by the Rhetoricians to Rhetoric as the art *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, or *καλλίστη τῶν τεχνῶν*, as Polus and Gorgias agree in calling it. So generally was this sense recognized, that *ἡ Πώλου—ἡ Κόρακος—ἡ Τισίου τέχνη*, without the addition of *λόγων*, would have conveyed to a Greek the idea of a treatise on Rhetoric, by Polus, Corax, or Tisias, as the case might be. And as *τέχνη* meant Rhetoric, so *τεχνογράφος* meant a rhetorical teacher. Of this *τέχνη* of Polus, there can be little doubt, as indeed the Scholiast[2] relates, that Plato has preserved a characteristic fragment (perhaps the initial sentence) in the opening scene of this Dialogue[3].

This same treatise is the subject of a bantering notice in the Phaedrus, p. 267, where Polus is ridiculed for parading certain novel terms of art, diplasiology, gnomology, eiconology, and certain others not specified, which he borrowed from a brother rhetorician Licymnius "to help in the construction of an elegant style" (*ὀνομάτων Λικυμνίων ἃ ἐκείνῳ ἐδωρήσατο πρὸς ποίησιν εὐεπείας*). Polus[4] was by no means the earliest of the

[1] P. 462, *ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι δ ἐγὼ ἐναγχος ἀνέγνων*, where the Schol. observes, *ἐκ τούτου δῆλον, ὅτι οὐχ ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς Πώλου λόγος αὐτοσχέδιος ἦν ἀλλὰ σύγγραμμα.*

[2] *φασὶ μὴ ἐξ αὐτοσχεδίου τὸν Πῶλον ταῦτα εἰπεῖν, προσυγγραψάμενον δέ.*

[3] P. 448, *πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως εὑρημέναι· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην· ἑκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλως ἄλλων, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἄριστοι.*

[4] If, as seems not improbable, Polus handled rhetoric rather in an æsthetical than in a practical manner, the comparison of his *τέχνη* with that of the fancy-cook will appear more pointed and appropriate. Plato, though he had deeply studied, systematically depreciates the fine arts: poetry, painting, and music (p. 502), as well as rhetoric, he reckons among the arts that minister to Pleasure rather than to Good.

τεχνογράφοι—he had been preceded by Corax and Tisias and probably by others. As Polus and his book have both perished, and as no plea in their favour has been entered by any ancient or modern apologist of departed charlatanism, no great injustice will probably be done to his memory if we accept as sufficiently faithful the certainly life-like portrait with which Plato has presented us, and, assuming that he was a Euphuist and a coxcomb, resign ourselves without misgiving to the amusement which his maladroit proceedings are intended to afford. We have indeed the less compunction on this head, as Polus himself is thoroughly unaware of Socrates' satire. Even when informed (p. 463) that Rhetoric is "the counterfeit of a branch of the art Politic," he asks with amusing naïveté, "Very well then, is it a fine thing or the contrary?" as if Socrates had uttered a truism which he had heard a hundred times. Not so Gorgias, who is at once struck with the singularity of the remark which Polus, true to his name, "doth gambol from," and putting his disciple aside with little ceremony, calls upon Socrates for a fuller explanation of his meaning[1]. A very delicate touch

This is undoubtedly one of the shallow places in his philosophy. We may trace in his way of treating such subjects, a vestige of that Socratic utilitarianism, which, in the hands of the Cynic school, degenerated into a worship of the physically and morally hideous. Plato is, however, inconsistent with himself in this disparagement of the fine in comparison with the useful arts. In the Philebus he distinguishes between pure and impure pleasure, and censures those who, like the coarse and really sensual Antisthenes, affect to condemn all pleasure as evil. [Compare Phileb. p. 44 c, where the speaker condemns the δυσχεράσματα of those who detest pleasure in all its forms, καὶ νενομικότων οὐδὲν ὑγιές, a passage generally allowed to refer to Antisthenes.] It is indeed not a little remarkable that Plato's own writings furnish the means of completely refuting those low views of the nature and object of the fine arts which alone could justify his disparaging treatment of them in this dialogue and in the Republic. At the same time it is impossible to deny the force of this portion of the Gorgias, considered as an *argumentum ad hominem* in relation to Polus and his much-boasted τέχνη: for there is no reason to suppose that Polus was prepared with any æsthetical theory sounder or purer than that exemplified in the εὐέπεια, of which he offers us a specimen in the passage (p. 448) quoted above.

[1] ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δ' εἰπὲ πῶς λέγεις.

this, showing what was Plato's estimate of the relative powers of master and scholar.

The discussion, however, does not linger long over Rhetoric, but passes, by natural transition, into that Ethical speculation, which, as has been said, occupies the greater part of the Dialogue; the third and last Act into which the colloquial Drama resolves itself. The incautious rhetorician is speedily betrayed into a confession of his ethical faith, by the paradoxical statement of his opponent, that the public rhetors are not, as Polus thinks, the strongest, but the weakest members of the community, albeit they have the power which P. claims for them of "doing what seems them good," p. 468. "As if you yourself, Socrates," he exclaims, "would not rather have this power than be without it—as if you did not wish yourself in the rhetor's place, when you see him take the life or spoil the goods or imprison the person of any body he happens to dislike[1]." This, it may be conceded, is no theory characteristic of the Sophist. It is rather the voice of unsophisticated human nature, expressed with more than usual candour by the ingenuous Sicilian—being in effect none other than "That good old rule, that ancient plan, That those should take who have the power, And those should keep who can," of which our own philosophic poet sings. Socrates, however, promptly joins issue on this point, and proceeds to assert with equal boldness the two paradoxes "that no man wishes to do evil," and "that it is better to suffer than to inflict a wrong," inferring from both combined that the Rhetor is not only the weakest but the most miserable of his species.

The latter of these two propositions (*κρεῖττον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν*) has excited the admiration of all ages, and its close approximation to the great principle of Christian Ethics is too obvious to need remark. Socrates, moreover, was soon to give his life in testimony of his sincere belief in its truth, and, paradox as it seems to his hearers, they fail to detect a

[1] *ὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναί σοι ποιεῖν ὅ τι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μή, οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ, ἢ ἀφελόμενον χρήματα, ἢ δήσαντα.*

flaw in the reasoning on which it is built. So much can hardly be said in favour of the paradox *οὐδεὶς βούλεται κακῶς ποιεῖν*, or as it is sometimes worded, *οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κακός*. The distinction between *βούλομαι* and *δοκεῖ μοι*, between Will and Judgment, is sufficiently obvious; but Socrates' reasoning is of that *à priori* type which alternately vexes and amuses us in the early dialogues; and his conclusion that every sin is but an error of opinion is one against which the common sense of mankind rebels. The paradox is, however, too closely connected with the leading principles of the Socratical ethics, that Virtue and Knowledge are one, to allow us to doubt that it was seriously maintained by Socrates, even if we had not the independent testimonies of Xenophon and of Aristotle to appeal to[1].

Not indeed that Plato affirms this dogma, that Virtue is Knowledge, in the Gorgias. It was one of those Socratic prejudices from which he gradually emancipated himself, as his Ethical views matured; and in the present dialogue he proposes a theory of Virtue substantially the same with that which is more fully developed in the Republic. The passage in the Gorgias which contains this newer theory occurs at a later stage of the dialogue, in that long and animated discussion with Callicles in which the "exagitator omnium rhetorum" proves himself a consummate master of the art which he has been disparaging. The Virtue or Excellence, he argues, of any thing which contains a multiplicity of parts, whether such parts be vitally or only mechanically connected,—whether the thing spoken of be characterized as a *σκεῦος* or a *ζῷον*—consists in the Law, order, or arrangement proper to the organism in question[2]. In living material organizations this order or harmony of parts is called Health; in the case of the human Soul it is called Temperance, Justice or Righteousness, Goodness or Virtue; and the regulating cause bears the name of Law or Right[3]. This descrip-

[1] Aristotle, Ethics, b. iii. 6 [4]. Xen. Mem. iii. 9. 4.

[2] P. 503 E—507 C.

[3] 504 D, *ταῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσί τε καὶ κοσμήσεσι νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμιμοι γίγνονται καὶ κόσμιοι· ταῦτα δ' ἔστι δικαιοσύνη*

tion, if we compare it with those given in the purely Socratic dialogues, the Laches, for instance, the Charmides, or the Protagoras, will be seen to mark an epoch in Plato's mental growth, or, what is the same thing, in the History of Moral Science. Order or Harmony is the germinal idea of the Republic, as it gives unity and coherence to the parts, otherwise ill-connected, of the present dialogue. We shall illustrate this new standing-point by a fuller comparison of the two works and with parts of other dialogues, early and late.

First, then, every reader of the Republic knows that the Platonic *δικαιοσύνη* represents not any single feeling or faculty of the soul, but the just proportion of the whole, as shown in the correlation of its constituent parts. The same conception is expressed, as we have seen, though less completely, in the Gorgias[1]. The readers of the Republic also know how nearly the descriptions there given of these two virtues *δικαιοσύνη* and *σωφροσύνη* coincide, and we should be at a loss to account for Plato's using the former rather than the latter word to designate the virtue which is to include all other virtues, did we not know that his choice was determined by his peculiar theory of the exact parallelism between the constituent elements of the State and of the individual Man, and by the consequent necessity of denoting the corresponding virtues of each and every part of each by one and the same word. Whatever objections may be raised against the propriety of this terminology, the fact is so, that in the Republic the description given of the particular virtue of Justice is in effect a description of Virtue in general. *Ἀρετή* in that dialogue is *δικαιοσύνη*, and *δικαιοσύνη* is *ἀρετή*. In the Gorgias too, p. 506, we find the same thing predicated of *ἀρετή* which was predicated in p. 504 of *σωφροσύνη*, that it consists in *κόσμος* or *τάξις*, an order or constitution or right state of the

τε καὶ σωφροσύνη: compared with 506 E, *κόσμος τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὁ ἑκάστου οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων*, κ.τ.λ.

[1] This definition of Justice was preserved among the traditions of the Old Academy. Thus, in the so-called *Ὅροι Σπευσίππου*, we read, *Δικαιοσύνη· ὁμόνοια τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὑτήν, καὶ εὐταξία τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα.*

soul. As in the former passage δικαιοσύνη, so here σωφροσύνη is made synonymous with ἀρετή [1].

This, we repeat, is a proof that when Plato wrote the Gorgias his ethical theory had grown into something different from that of Socrates, who taught that ἀρετή and ἐπιστήμη, virtue and science, are one: all special virtues being resolved into true theories of certain external relations; courage, for instance, being but the exact knowledge of what was really to be dreaded, temperance the knowledge of what was truly pleasurable, and so on. And to this Socratic theory Plato adheres in his earlier dialogues; whereas in those of his maturity ἐπιστήμη is dethroned from the exclusive supremacy which Socrates assigned to her. At the conclusion of that abstruse and closely reasoned dialogue, the Philebus (pp. 65, 66), a passage occurs, containing in brief language a summary of the whole intricate argument, and assigning their relative precedence to three principles, μέτρον, ἐπιστήμη, and ἡδονή, which had severally claimed to be considered the ἀγαθόν or highest Good. The Philebus is indeed an ethico-metaphysical rather than, like the Gorgias, an ethico-political dialogue, and therefore the more abstract term μέτρον is preferred to κόσμος or τάξις. The same associations, however, are suggested by all three terms: for if Measure or Law is the supreme principle of the Universe, co-ordinate with the Creative Reason, it must also be the ruling principle in the microcosm called man; cognate but superior to the human intellect[2], whose noblest employment is to trace out the Law or Idea in all its varied manifestations. This theory of virtue as an Order, Constitution, or, as it is called in a parallel passage of the Republic (b. iv. 443 D), a Harmony, was probably suggested to Plato by Pythagorean teaching[3]; but as Plato handles it,

[1] ἡ ἄρα σώφρων ψυχὴ ἀγαθή. A passage by the way illustrative of Aristotle's drift, when he censures τοὺς λίαν ἑνώσαντας τὴν ἀρετήν, 'those who unified virtue overmuch.'

[2] I say the "human intellect" advisedly: for Plato in more than one passage seems to identify the Supreme Good with the divine intelligence. This side of a difficult Platonic question is well argued by Bonitz in a short treatise 'De Idea Boni,' Dresden, 1837.

[3] The passage in the Gorgias bearing on this subject is, however,

the theory is neither extravagant nor unfruitful, for both here and in the Republic he carefully avoids confusing the sign with the thing signified, an error into which the Pythagoreans, like other "dreamers in the dawn of science," seem to have been betrayed.

Enough has been said to show the substantial identity of the notions of Justice or Virtue which are briefly sketched in the Gorgias, and thoroughly worked out in the Republic. We shall now see that there is a corresponding congruity between the political ideas, and still more in the tone of political feeling and sentiment which pervades the larger and the smaller dialogue.

Plato's contempt and dislike of the Athenian democracy are notorious. In the Republic[1] he represents Democracy as but one degree better than absolute government or tyranny, and in a picture, evidently a grotesque likeness of Athens and Athenian society, he gives a description, half humorous, half contemptuous, of the results of unbridled liberty. This is followed by an equally vivid portrait of one whom he calls the *δημοκρατικὸς ἀνήρ*, the man whose principles and disposition are framed upon the democratic model. Now of this 'democratic man,' allowing for the personal traits necessary for dramatic effect, the Callicles of the Gorgias[2] may be considered a fair specimen. He is a free and enlightened citizen of the freest state in the world; one to whom his lusts are law, keen of wit and ready of speech, without prejudice and without principle, to whom virtue and its semblance are alike contemptible: he is one who "calls shame silliness, and temperance cowardice, and moderation and frugal living the attributes of hinds and mechanics[3]"; one who yields himself

hardly sufficient to support Schleiermacher's inference that the dialogue cannot have been written until after its author's return from his sojourn in Magna Graecia, i.e. 388 B.C.

[1] B. viii. p. 557 seq.

[2] Compare p. 513 A, *καὶ νῦν δὲ ἆρα δεῖ σε ὡς ὁμοιότατον γίγνεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, εἰ μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλὴς εἶναι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει.*

[3] *τὴν μὲν αἰδὼ ἠλιθιότητα ὀνομάζοντες—σωφροσύνην δὲ ἀνανδρίαν καλοῦντες—μετριότητα δὲ καὶ κοσμίαν δαπάνην ὡς ἀγροικίαν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν οὖσαν*, Rep. 560 D. Comp. Gorg. 491.

in turn to the instincts of his intellectual and his physical nature; whose life is spent in gratifying the desire that for the time is uppermost; giving one day to wine and music, another to idle pastime, a third it may be to literature and philosophy[1]. Frequently too he engages in politics, and rises on his feet in the assembly, speaking and acting with equal recklessness: *καὶ οὔτε τις τάξις οὔτε ἀνάγκη ἕπεστιν αὐτοῦ τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλ' ἡδύν τε δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ μακάριον καλῶν τὸν βίον τοῦτον, χρῆται αὐτῷ διὰ παντός*[2].

This description and its impersonation in Callicles are equally happy specimens of Plato's talent for the higher comedy. His tragic powers also are exemplified in passages of both dialogues, remarkable for their excellence and for their resemblance. Those who have once read will not easily forget that opening passage of the second book of the Republic, in which a comparison is instituted between the ideal Just Man and the ideal Unjust Man, for the purpose of ascertaining whether of the two is the happier[3]. The candidates, like statues at an exhibition, are stripped and cleaned for the inspection of the judges[4]: the unjust man is denuded of all moral scruples, the just man of all worldly prudence and of all the outward advantages which a reputation for honesty confers on a man wise in his generation. Each is endued with the intellectual qualities which will make him perfect in his own business; the unjust man with boundless cunning and perfect worldly wisdom, his rival with intelligence enough, and not more than enough, to render him perfectly just; the unjust man will consequently, by the hypothesis, have established a character for perfect justice and fair dealing, while the just man, who is to know nothing of the art of seeming, will seem to the vulgar eye as great a

[1] Compare Gorg. 484 D.

[2] Compare Gorg. 491 E, *τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας*: mox, *δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς αὑτοῦ ἐᾶν ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν, κ.τ.λ.*

[3] Rep. ii. 361 D, *ἑκάτερον ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις τοῖν ἀνδροῖν.*

[4] Rep. ii. 360 E.

scoundrel as his rival *is*[1]. This being supposed, it is no longer difficult, says Glaucon in the dialogue, to foretell the fortunes of the two. The unjust man is of course promised a career of uninterrupted enjoyment, victory over his enemies, wealth, popularity among men, and, if costly sacrifices avail with heaven, the favour of the gods. Of his opponent martyrdom is the too certain doom: he will be scourged, tormented, cast into prison, and will end a life of misery upon the cross. Whether of the two, it is asked, is the happier man[2].

This, it is clear, is but a statement in its most abstract form[3] of the question discussed with Polus in the second, and with Callicles in the third act of the Gorgias, and the prophecy in the latter passage[4] of the condemnation and death of Socrates completes the resemblance. Only, as Glaucon complains (Rep. p. 358 D), as if with reference to this dialogue, the case of the just man is not represented quite so unfavourably as it ought to be, in order to the final and irreversible decision of the suit between him and his rival. From which it would seem as if Plato himself had been dissatisfied with the too hasty decision of the question at issue which Socrates in the Gorgias pronounces, and accordingly it is much more elaborately discussed in the Republic: the arbitrator declining to adjudicate until many previous questions are disposed of; in fact until the definition of Justice, moral and political, is satisfactorily made out, and the various stages and modifications of Injustice discriminated.

[1] *μηδὲν δικῶν δόξαν ἐχέτω τὴν μεγίστην ἀδικίας*, 361 C.

[2] This passage is perhaps glanced at by Arist. Eth. N. i. 3: *τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἄν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. φαίνεται δὲ ὑποδεεστέρα καὶ αὕτη. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετήν, ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτω ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων.*

[3] P. 469 B, *ἢ που ὅ γε ἀποθνήσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεινὸς καὶ ἄθλιος. ἧττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτιννύς*, κ.τ.λ. The case of Archelaus follows, pp. 470, 471; an instance of successful wickedness to which Polus points with triumph.

[4] P. 521 B, C.

In the tenth book, however, Socrates sums up, and delivers sentence according to the evidence. And even here there is this analogy between the Gorgias and the Republic, that both end with mythical descriptions of the doom which awaits the righteous and the unrighteous after the soul shall be parted from the body. The scenery of the myth in the Gorgias is far less elaborate than that in the Republic: but the inference intended to be drawn is evidently the same in both cases.

To bring the points of resemblance between the two dialogues into yet clearer light, it may be well to quote in free translation, and with a few unimportant omissions, a passage of some length but great interest from the seventh of the thirteen Epistles attributed to Plato[1]. In this document, professing to be written when its author had reached an advanced age, Plato (if Plato it is) prefaces a detailed history of his dealings with Syracuse and her successive rulers, by a brief summary of his early political experiences in Athens[2]. "While young," he says, "I, like so many others, resolved that as soon as I became my own master I would try my fortune in public life. This resolution of mine coincided with certain changes in the state of Athens, which I shall describe. The then much-abused constitution underwent a radical change; and the government in its altered form was entrusted to a body of fifty-one magistrates, of whom eleven administered affairs in the city, and ten in Peiraeus. Over these twenty-one was set a board of Thirty with absolute powers. Among the fifty-one were several of my own kindred and acquaintance, who soon invited me to take part in carrying out a policy which they thought would

[1] The case for the Platonic Epistles has of late gained greatly from Mr Grote's masterly historical analysis of their contents; while an eminent scholar of a totally different type, Gabriel Cobet, has pronounced in favour of their genuineness on grounds purely philological. This most fastidious of critics declares that no one but Plato could have written them. But however the question of *authorship* is decided, the *authority* of the seventh Epistle, of which the eighth is properly a part, has never been impugned by any competent scholar.

[2] *νεὸς ἐγὼ ὤν*, κ.τ.λ., p. 324 C to 326 B.

suit me well. Young as I then was, who can wonder at the error into which I was betrayed? For I fondly thought, that their administration would be directed to the great end of leading their countrymen from an unrighteous to a righteous course of life and manners, and so thinking I began carefully to watch their proceedings. What was my surprise to find that faulty as was the old order of things, it was pure gold[1] in comparison with the iron rule now set up in its stead. Among their worst acts of tyranny, was one they practised on my friend Socrates, now advanced in life, who, I make bold to say, was the most righteous man then living. Him they ordered to go with certain others to fetch from Salamis one Leon, whom they had doomed to death, evidently for the purpose of compromising Socrates, and making him an enforced accomplice in their crimes. This order, however, he refused to obey, being prepared to face the consequences of disobedience rather than assist in their unhallowed proceedings. When I witnessed these and other equally infamous doings, I was filled with disgust, and withdrew myself altogether from the horrors of that evil time[2]. Ere long however the Thirty were unseated, and a counter-revolution took place; whereupon my old passion revived, though slowly, and I was again fain to take an active part in politics. Under this new regimen, affairs being still in an unsettled state, many things occurred which might justly be objected to: though on the whole the restored fugitives acted with considerable moderation. It is not wonderful that reprisals should be inflicted by political opponents in times of revolution, but it was a strange chance that led certain of the people then in power to arraign Socrates in a court of justice on an atrocious charge which fitted him less than any man. He was accused of impiety: and the judges had the ingratitude to condemn and put to death one who, when they were in trouble, had refused to perpetrate an act of unhallowed violence against one of their exiled friends. When I reflected, I say, on proceedings like these, and on the charac-

[1] χρυσὸν ἀπέδειξαν τὴν ἔμπροσθεν πολιτείαν.
[2] ἐπανήγαγον ἐμαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν τότε κακῶν.

ters of the principal public men, and the laws and customs prevalent at the time; the longer I considered and the older I grew, the more difficult it appeared to me to govern Athens on right principles. In the first place it was impossible to act without a party; which the universal corruption rendered it difficult to find ready made, and which it was not easy to construct anew; in the next place both laws and manners were degenerating with fearful rapidity. The consequence was that, full as I had once been of political enthusiasm, the spectacle of the general disorder and confusion almost turned my brain: and though I would not desist from looking out for some opportunity of mending the present state of things and was prepared to bide my time, I finally arrived at the clear conviction that all existing forms of government are radically wrong; and that their reformation will require a machinery of extraordinary power, working under unusually favourable circumstances.

"Thus I was constrained to say, that it is true philosophy alone which can enlighten us to discern the principles of justice whether in the State or in the Individual; and that accordingly the crimes and misery of mankind will never have an end, until either the highest class of philosophic thinkers shall step into the seats of power, or the existing rulers shall by some miracle become imbued with philosophic ideas."

In this passage there is scarcely an expression of which we do not hear the echo either in the Gorgias or in the Republic. The tone of political despair which pervades the former dialogue, and the equal scorn poured on the professions of the rhetor of the agora and the rhetor of the schools, as exemplified in Callicles and in Polus; all the intolerance and all the exaggeration which mark its polemical passages, find, if not their complete apology, at least their explanation and palliation in the sad tale of his political experiences which Plato unfolds to his correspondents in the letter just quoted. His hopes of serving his country had twice been blighted. The severity of the first disappointment may be inferred from the fact that among the Thirty and

their subordinates were men endeared to him by literary sympathies as well as by near relationship. Critias and Charmides are names that figure in his earliest dialogues; one was his uncle, the other his cousin by the mother's side; and of Charmides he himself says that he was *φιλόσοφος καὶ πάνυ ποιητικός*, a description also applicable to Critias. Glaucon[1] too, his maternal grandfather, was one of the Piraeic Decemvirate. Add to this, that Plato was an Eupatrid both by father's and mother's side; and his aristocratical prejudices, derived from his ancestors, and fed by a naturally nice and fastidious temper, a *δυσχέρεια φύσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς*, to use his own phrase[2], would incline him to augur well of any attempt to reform and remodel the state on Lacedaemonian principles, even had the enterprise been confided to persons less known and trusted than those friends and patrons of his youth, with whom he had spent many an hour in the society of the man who was to him the ideal of all that was wise and good in humanity. Disappointed in the hopes he had formed of the aristocratic party, he was the better prepared to take a favourable view of the proceedings of the people's friends when their hour of triumph came: and for some time their conduct was such as to encourage his reviving hopes of operating a beneficial change in public and private morality by the methods (which Socrates himself by no means despised) of the rhetor and legislator. The extensive knowledge which the author of the Phaedrus displays of the writings of the leaders of both the great schools of oratory, the Attic and the Sicilian, may lead to the conjecture that he had at one period of his life studied rhetoric with a view to its public practice: and one can hardly doubt that under moderately favourable circumstances, his success as a speaker would have been brilliant. It is even probable that the interval which elapsed between the overthrow of the Thirty and the death of Socrates—an interval of from three to four years—was employed by Plato in studies preparatory to political life. That he ever ascended the bema during this period we do not indeed learn. He

[1] So Taylor, Life of Lysias, p. xlv, note k.

[2] In Philebus, 44 c.

was not more than twenty-six years of age at its commencement, and we know that Demosthenes did not begin to speak in public until he had entered on his thirtieth year. Possibly, too, the unsettled state of parties to which he alludes in the Epistle above quoted, may have contributed to the delay. He himself says, *βραδύτερον μέν, εἴλκε δέ με ὅμως ἡ περὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ κοινὰ καὶ πολιτικὰ ἐπιθυμία.*

But whatever degree of maturity Plato's purpose may have attained, it was checked at once and for ever by the unrighteous sentence passed upon his Master and Friend. It was this that forced upon him the conviction that oligarchs and democrats were alike unprincipled, and that the task of forming a third party, sufficiently honest and sufficiently powerful to effect a radical reform of Athenian institutions, was a mere impossibility, and the hopes founded on such a contingency chimerical. We know from other authorities, that immediately after the perpetration of that great judicial crime, he retired from Athens, and took refuge in the neighbouring city of Megara, where Euclides, a native of that place, a friend and admiring disciple of Socrates, and the founder of the Megarian sect, is said to have received him under his roof. That residence, and his subsequent travels, may have contributed in more ways than one towards maturing and enlarging his philosophical views: but we have it on his own word, or the word at least of the author of that seventh Epistle, that the two most important practical convictions of his life,—the hopelessness of any attempt to amend the existing laws and practice of the Greek communities by any of the ordinary and constitutional means, and the necessity, and under given circumstances the feasibility, of an entire re-construction of the political fabric on principles of pure reason and philosophy—that these two convictions date from the death of Socrates, and were the result of conclusions deliberately drawn from that and his former experiences in Athens. Of the first of these convictions, as it seems to me, the Gorgias is the public vindication: of the latter, the Republic. Of the time and place at which these dialogues were composed, we have no distinct testimony; but it is

difficult to believe that the Gorgias could have been written anywhere but at Athens; and we cannot but incline to the conjecture that it was the first or one of the first written after his return, which according to more than one witness must have taken place about four years after the death of Socrates, that is to say not later than 395 B.C.[1] Plato's deep and passionate disapproval of Athenian institutions does not seem to have deterred him from serving in his country's armies, and bearing his part in three distinct engagements, at Tanagra, at Corinth, and at Delium. His performance of the military duties of a citizen may have encouraged his friends in Athens to hope that his quarrel with the Athenian people was now made up, and that the disposition to public life of which he had twice before shown indications, would now ripen into act. Regard for his own safety may have been one of the considerations by which his friends would urge him to cultivate the power of public or judicial speaking: for, they may have plausibly urged, it was the want of this accomplishment that sealed the doom of Socrates. *Ἀποκτενεῖ σε ὦ Πλάτων ὁ βουλόμενος, καὶ εἰσαχθήσει εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάνυ ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου*, by a vulgar leather-seller like Anytus, or a wretched scribbler for the stage such as Meletus,—may have been among the warnings given by some friendly Callicles[2]. Or, these considerations apart, what nobler end could be pursued by an Athenian of family, than the acquisition of influence and wealth and distinction in the State; or what nobler art than that of bridling and taming the multitude, and riding into power on their backs? They too, his friends and well-wishers, had philosophized in their

[1] The fabulous extent and duration assigned to Plato's travels by his later biographers need not cause any embarrassment. The accounts are so discrepant and so ill-supported as to excite our wonder at the trouble which modern scholars have taken to manufacture them into history. As usual in such cases, the later the narrative, the better informed we find the narrator. The "doctrine of development" alone could give value to the discoveries of Lactantius and other Christian Apologists who have favoured us with Platonic Itineraries; but the Pagan Apuleius, and, in a less degree, the more accurate Cicero, have lent their names to very questionable statements.

[2] See Gorg. p. 521 B, C.

time: for philosophy was doubtless an elegant amusement[1] for a young man of rank and leisure, and an excellent training for the mind, as his fellow-pupil Isocrates, now making his fortune by his pen, had substantial reasons for acknowledging.

The speech of Callicles is indeed throughout more applicable to the circumstances of a comparatively young man, who, like Plato on his first return to Athens, had his profession to choose, than to an elderly and inveterate dialectician, such as Socrates must have seemed at the time when this conversation is supposed to take place. The readers of Plato will be at no loss for parallel instances of passages in which his contemporaries would recognize the author under the mask of his hero, or in which the opinions, the parties, and the personages of his own time are antedated by some twenty or thirty years.

But the best argument in favour of our hypothesis is, that it affords a point of view from which the various divisions and subdivisions of the dialogue group themselves into unity. The Gorgias is in effect an 'Απολογία Πλάτωνος. It contains his reasons for preferring, under existing circumstances, the contemplative to the active, the philosophic to the rhetorical life. The philosopher, as Socrates says[2], is the only true master of the science of Politics. The end of that science and of the art founded upon it is not to pander to the inclinations of a people, but to make them wiser, juster, and by

[1] φιλοσοφία γάρ τοί ἐστιν ὦ Σώκρατες χαρίεν ἄν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ἅψηται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δεόντος ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πάνυ εὐφυὴς ᾖ, καὶ πόῤῥω τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῇ, ἀνάγκη πάντων ἄπειρον γεγονέναι ἐστίν, ὧν χρὴ ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα, καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων ἄπειροι γίγνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῶν λόγων, οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ ξυλλήβδην τῶν ἠθῶν παντάπασιν ἄπειροι γίγνονται. Gorg. 484 D. Ib. 485 A, ἀλλ' οἶμαι τὸ ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν, φιλοσοφίας μέν, ὅσον παιδείας χάριν, καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ ὄντι φιλοσοφεῖν.

[2] οἶμαι μετ' ὀλίγων 'Αθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ, p. 521 D.

that means happier[1]. The only true rhetoric is that of the philosopher who is able to persuade his fellow-citizens to cultivate these virtues in themselves, and to embody them in their legislation. Consequently[2], the true rhetorician must be just himself, and acquainted with the principles of justice. How then is it possible that one who holds these principles can take part in the administration of a state like that of Athens, where the statesman is but the tool, the *διάκονος*, or upper servant, of the Demus[3], hired for the purpose of supplying its outward needs, and gratifying its passions of vainglory and ambition? As the ends pursued by the ablest of the only statesmen possible in a popular government, are such as no wise man can esteem; so the means they are compelled to employ are such as no honest man can stoop to. The most approved of these means is Rhetoric, the Rhetoric taught by Gorgias and practised by Callicles, the *πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον*, or semblance of that true Rhetoric[4] which is auxiliary to the higher and only true art Politic, the art of producing justice in the souls of individual citizens, and in that aggregate of souls we call the State.

To complete this statement, it was necessary to describe the true nature of Justice, which, as we have seen, Plato expresses in terms substantially, and as far as they go, literally the same as those which he employs in the Republic.

With the same object in view, he seeks to establish the essential difference of Pleasure and Good, which is done briefly, but accurately enough for the purpose we assumed[5].

[1] *οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν, καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ συντείνοντα καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως δικαιοσύνη παρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη τῷ μακαρίῳ μέλλοντι ἔσεσθαι*, p. 507 D.

[2] *τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι δίκαιον δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων*, p. 508 B.

[3] P. 517 B.

[4] See Phaedrus, Introd. p. xvii. [in the Bibliotheca Classica].

[5] P. 500 E, *εἶναι μέν τι ἡδὺ εἶναι δέ τι ἀγαθόν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*. If we compare this with a passage in the Protagoras, we shall see that Plato's views on this subject had undergone an important change during the interval between the composition of that dialogue and the Gorgias. *εἴ πῃ ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὴν*

The question is determined on its own merits in the Philebus, which contains, as it seems to me, the most satisfactory analysis of Pleasure and its ingredients that is to be found in any Greek writer, and in which the discussion is of a more searching and speculative kind than that in the Gorgias. In the Philebus, there is little doubt that the tenets of the Cyrenaic school are attacked; but I cannot, with Schleiermacher, detect any such polemical reference in the Gorgias; where the "hedonistic" sentiments put into the mouth of Callicles are the expression of mere practical libertinism seeking arguments in defence of its own practice, and are totally unlike the scientific sensualism attributed to Aristippus.

Throughout the whole dialogue there reigns a spirit of passionate vehemence, scarcely reconcilable with a scientific or speculative purpose, but thoroughly consistent with that more practical object of justifying abstinence from political action in a depraved commonwealth which I suppose Plato to have had in view when he wrote. Bitter indeed must have been his feelings on revisiting the guilty city for the first time after his master's death: deep his abhorrence of that art whose professors, represented by the rhetor Lycon, had mainly contributed to the perpetration of that crime: not over-friendly his feelings towards the poets who had conspired with the rhetoricians in their attack upon the man whom both hated with nearly equal hatred. His dislike of public life, at least in Athens, never left him. It is expressed in the Theaetetus[1], but with more of scorn than of anger: but there is not one of his dialogues in which the public men of the best times of the Athenian History, such men as Pericles and Miltiades and Cimon, are treated with such indiscriminating severity as in the Gorgias[2].

ἡδονήν, ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἀνίαν, ἢ ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως καταβιῶναι τὸν βίον ἄνευ λυπῶν; Protag. p. 354 E, compared with the context preceding and following. As the opinion in the Gorgias was certainly that of his later life, it seems irrational to doubt that the Protagoras was the earlier production of the two.

[1] P. 172 C seq.

[2] Compare e.g. Protagoras, 319 E, 322 A, and still more the

After all, it may be said, the date here assigned to the Gorgias rests on mere hypothesis: for the dialogue itself contains no indication of the time at which it was written. This however is not exactly true. The prophecy of Socrates' death put into his own mouth (p. 521 D, *οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι*), coupled with the warning of Callicles before alluded to, compel us to place the composition of the dialogue after the year 399: and its evident applicability to Athenian life and to nothing else, almost compel us to defer its composition to the time of its author's return. It also expresses the very sentiments which, as we read in the seventh Epistle, were uppermost in the mind of Plato at that period. We are moreover told by Athenaeus, and there is no improbability in the story, that this dialogue was read by the personage after whom it was named, who assured his friends, somewhat gratuitously, one would have thought, that he never said or heard any of the things contained in it. Now Gorgias is said to have been *ἤδη γηράσκων*, already advanced in years, when he came as ambassador to Athens in the fifth year of the Peloponnesian war, B.C. 427, twenty-eight years before the death of Socrates. He is also said by Quintilian "ultra Socratem usque durasse," to have outlived Socrates; and the duration of his life is put at 105 and even 108 years, a longevity greater by ten or thirteen years than that attained by his celebrated pupil Isocrates. These and similar notices (which it would be tedious to enumerate) have induced his biographer Foss to assign the year 496 as his approximate birth-year, on which supposition he must have died not later than 388, which is the date of Plato's second return to Athens. If therefore we accept as true the story in Athenaeus, we must infer that the Gorgias was written before Plato's second departure from Athens, i.e. in the interval between 395 and 389. The date of the composition of the Republic, or at any rate of its commencement by Plato, is assigned by many scholars to the same period of time. This opinion seems a plausible inference from the concluding

Phaedrus, 270 A, in which the eloquence of Pericles is spoken of in terms of the most exalted admiration.

sentence of the passage quoted above from the seventh Epistle: *λέγειν τε ἠναγκάσθην, ἐπαινῶν τὴν ὀρθὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ὡς ἐκ ταύτης ἔστι τά τε πολιτικὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν κατιδεῖν· κακῶν οὖν οὐ λήξειν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα γένη, πρὶν ἂν ἢ τὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ὀρθῶς τε καὶ ἀληθῶς γένος εἰς ἀρχὰς ἔλθῃ τὰς πολιτικάς, ἢ τὸ τῶν δυναστευόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔκ τινος μοίρας θείας ὄντως φιλοσοφήσῃ.* These two sentiments are, as I have before observed, the texts on which the Gorgias and the Republic are respectively founded; and when Plato goes on to say, that these ideas had been formed in his mind before he first visited Sicily[1] (B.C. 389), it is difficult to avoid the inference that the Gorgias was written and the Republic at least begun at the period last specified.

It is also a general opinion that the idea of a female commonwealth exhibited by Aristophanes in the Ecclesiazusae was written by the comic poet in ridicule of the Platonic commonwealth[2]. The Ecclesiazusae was represented in the year 392; it seems therefore possible that at this date some part at least of the Republic was written, and had been publicly read, if we may not say published, in Athens.

[1] *ταύτην τὴν διάνοιαν εἰς Ἰταλίαν τε καὶ Σικελίαν ἦλθον ὅτε πρῶτον ἀφικόμην.*

[2] Meineke has even pointed out two passages, one in this play, and one in the Plutus, in which, as he supposes, Plato himself is ridiculed under the name of Aristyllus, the diminutive of Plato's original name Aristocles, which, if he ever bore it, was inherited from his grandfather. Com. Gr. i. p. 281. I confess, however, that such an allusion seems too far-fetched to have been intelligible to an Athenian or any other audience. The Aristyllus in question was probably some person notorious for low profligacy, and quite unconnected with Plato.

ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.

ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ,
ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ, ΠΩΛΟΣ.

St. p. 447

I. Πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ χρῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἦ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἑορτῆς ἥκομεν [καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν];

ΚΑΛ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας ἑορτῆς· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο.

ΣΩ. Τούτων μέντοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, αἴτιος Χαιρεφῶν ὅδε, ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρῖψαι.

B ΧΑΙ. Οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι. φίλος γάρ μοι Γοργίας, ὥστ' ἐπιδείξεται ἡμῖν, εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, εἰσαῦθις.

ΚΑΛ. Τί δ', ὦ Χαιρεφῶν; ἐπιθυμεῖ Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαι Γοργίου;

ΧΑΙ. Ἐπ' αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ' ἐμὲ ἥκειν οἴκαδε·—παρ' ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας καταλύει καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν.

ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. ἀλλ' ἆρα ἐθελήσειεν ἂν ἡμῖν διαλεχθῆναι; βούλομαι γὰρ C
πυθέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ, τίς ἡ δύναμις τῆς τέχνης
τοῦ ἀνδρός, καὶ τί ἐστιν ὃ ἐπαγγέλλεταί τε καὶ
διδάσκει. τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν εἰσαῦθις, ὥσπερ
σὺ λέγεις, ποιησάσθω.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐδὲν οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἓν τοῦτ' ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως· ἐκέλευε γοῦν νῦν δὴ ἐρωτᾶν ὅ τί τις βούλοιτο τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἔφη ἀποκρινεῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καλῶς λέγεις. Ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.

ΧΑΙ. Τί ἔρωμαι;

ΣΩ. Ὅστις ἐστίν.

ΧΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός, ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δή που σοι ὅτι σκυτο- D
τόμος. ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὡς λέγω;

ΧΑΙ. Μανθάνω καὶ ἐρήσομαι. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε, ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅ τι ἄν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ;

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ, | ὦ Χαιρεφῶν· καὶ γὰρ νῦν δὴ 448
αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπηγγελλόμην, καὶ λέγω ὅτι οὐδείς μέ
πω ἠρώτηκε καινὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν.

ΧΑΙ. Ἡ που ἄρα ῥᾳδίως ἀποκρινεῖ, ὦ Γοργία.

ΓΟΡ. Πάρεστι τούτου πεῖραν, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, λαμβάνειν.

ΠΩΛ. Νὴ Δί'· ἂν δέ γε βούλῃ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐμοῦ. Γοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι μοι δοκεῖ· πολλὰ γὰρ ἄρτι διελήλυθεν.

ΧΑΙ. Τί δαί, ὦ Πῶλε; οἴει σὲ κάλλιον ἂν Γοργίου ἀποκρίνασθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Τί δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν σοί γε ἱκανῶς;

B ΧΑΙ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ σὺ βούλει, ἀποκρίνου.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρώτα.

ΧΑΙ. Ἐρωτῶ δή. εἰ ἐτύγχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων ὢν τῆς τέχνης ἥσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἡρόδικος, τί ἂν αὐτὸν ὠνομάζομεν δικαίως; οὐχ ὅπερ ἐκεῖνον;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΧΑΙ. Ἰατρὸν ἄρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΧΑΙ. Εἰ δέ γε ἥσπερ Ἀριστοφῶν ὁ Ἀγλαοφῶντος ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἔμπειρος ἦν τέχνης, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς ἐκαλοῦμεν;

C ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι ζωγράφον.

ΧΑΙ. Νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ τίνος τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἐστί, τίνα ἂν καλοῦντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοῖμεν;

ΠΩΛ. Ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως εὑρημέναι· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην. ἑκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἄριστοι· ὧν καὶ Γοργίας ἐστὶν ὅδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν.

D ΙΙΙ. ΣΩ. Καλῶς γε, ὦ Γοργία, φαίνεται Πῶλος παρεσκευάσθαι εἰς λόγους· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὃ ὑπέσχετο Χαιρεφῶντι οὐ ποιεῖ.

ΓΟΡ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Τὸ ἐρωτώμενον οὐ πάνυ μοι φαίνεται ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰ βούλει, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.

ΣΩ. Οὔκ, εἰ αὐτῷ γε σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον σέ. δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν, ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες; Ε

ΣΩ. Ὅτι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐρομένου Χαιρεφῶντος τίνος Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἥτις δέ ἐστιν οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι εἴη ἡ καλλίστη;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα γε. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἠρώτα ποία τις εἴη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὄντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν. ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαιρεφῶν καὶ αὐτῷ καλῶς καὶ | διὰ 449
βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἰπέ, τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον δέ, ὦ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἰπέ, τίνα σε χρὴ καλεῖν ὡς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα τέχνης.

ΓΟΡ. Τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ῥήτορα ἄρα χρή σε καλεῖν;

ΓΟΡ. Ἀγαθόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὅ γε εὔχομαι εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ βούλομαι.

ΓΟΡ. Κάλει δή.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατὸν εἶναι ποιεῖν;

ΓΟΡ. Ἐπαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον Β ἐνθάδε ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐθελήσαις ἄν, ὦ Γοργία, ὥσπερ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀποκρινόμενος, τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον

καὶ Πῶλος ἤρξατο, εἰσαῦθις ἀποθέσθαι; ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ, μὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀλλ' ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

C ΓΟΡ. Εἰσὶ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνιαι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πειράσομαί γε ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἔν ἐστιν ὧν φημί, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ ταὐτὰ εἰπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Τούτου μὴν δεῖ, ὦ Γοργία· καί μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ποίησαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ εἰσαῦθις.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς φήσεις βραχυλογωτέρου ἀκοῦσαι.

IV. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ φὴς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης εἶναι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ ἄλλον

D ῥήτορα· ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει οὖσα; ὥσπερ ἡ ὑφαντικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱματίων ἐργασίαν· ἦ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποίησιν;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Γοργία, ἄγαμαί γέ σου τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, ὅτι ἀποκρίνει ὡς οἷόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων.

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις. ἴθι δή μοι ἀπόκριναι οὕτω καὶ περὶ

E τῆς ῥητορικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη;

ΓΟΡ. Περὶ λόγους.

ΣΩ. Ποίους τούτους, ὦ Γοργία; ἆρα οἳ δηλοῦσι τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὡς ἂν διαιτώμενοι ὑγιαίνοιεν;

ΓΟΡ. Οὔ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας γε τοὺς λόγους ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐστιν.

ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς.

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ ὥνπερ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν;

ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἣν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἰατρικὴ | περὶ τῶν καμνόντων ποιεῖ δυνατοὺς εἶναι φρονεῖν 450
καὶ λέγειν;

ΓΟΡ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, περὶ λόγους ἐστί.

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τούς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα;

ΓΟΡ. Μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ γυμναστικὴ περὶ λόγους ἐστὶ τοὺς περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ κακοεξίαν;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, ὦ Γοργία, οὕτως ἔχουσιν· ἑκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἐστὶ B
τούτους, οἳ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἑκάστη ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη.

ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δή ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὐ ῥητορικὰς καλεῖς, οὔσας περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταύτην ῥητορικὴν καλεῖς, ἣ ἂν ᾖ περὶ λόγους;

ΓΟΡ. Ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς

οὐδέν ἐστι τοιοῦτον χειρούργημα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ
C πρᾶξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγων ἐστί. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγώ φημι.

V. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν μανθάνω οἵαν αὐτὴν βούλει καλεῖν; τάχα δ' εἴσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλ' ἀπόκριναι. εἰσὶν ἡμῖν τέχναι. ἦ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πασῶν δέ, οἶμαι, τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ πολύ ἐστι καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνοιτο ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οἷον γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ
D ἄλλαι πολλαί· τὰς τοιαύτας μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ἃς οὐ φὴς τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι. ἢ οὔ;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἕτεραι δέ γ' εἰσὶ τῶν τεχνῶν αἳ διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργου, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἢ οὐδενὸς προσδέονται ἢ βραχέος πάνυ, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεττευτική γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι, ὧν ἔνιαι σχεδόν τι ἴσους
E τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ τὸ κῦρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων ἐστί. τῶν τοιούτων τινά μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν ῥητορικήν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὔτοι τούτων γε οὐδεμίαν οἶμαί σε βούλεσθαι ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες, ὅτι ἡ διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστι, καὶ ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις, εἰ βούλοιτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, Τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἄρα ῥητορικήν, ὦ Γοργία, λέγεις; ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶμαί σε

οὔτε τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν οὔτε τὴν γεωμετρίαν ῥητορικὴν λέγειν. |

ΓΟΡ. Ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ δικαίως 451
ὑπολαμβάνεις.

VI. ΣΩ. Ἴθι νυν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἣν ἠρόμην διαπέρανον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τυγχάνει μὲν οὖσα τούτων τις τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν τὸ πολὺ λόγῳ χρωμένων, τυγχάνουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τοιαῦται οὖσαι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἡ περὶ τί ἐν λόγοις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστιν· ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τίς με ἔροιτο ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον περὶ ἡστινοσοῦν τῶν τεχνῶν, Ὦ Σώκρατες, τίς ἐστιν ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη; εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ σὺ ἄρτι, ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ κῦρος B ἐχουσῶν. καὶ εἴ με ἐπανέροιτο Τῶν περὶ τί; εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττόν, ὅσ' ἂν ἑκάτερα τυγχάνοι ὄντα. εἰ δ' αὖ ἔροιτο, Τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην; εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶ τῶν λόγῳ τὸ πᾶν κυρουμένων. καὶ εἰ ἐπανέροιτο Ἡ περὶ τί; εἴποιμ' ἂν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἡ λογιστικὴ ἔχει· περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστι, τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν· διαφέρει δὲ C τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἔχει πλήθους ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον ἡ λογιστική. καὶ εἴ τις τὴν ἀστρονομίαν ἀνέροιτο, ἐμοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι καὶ αὕτη λόγῳ κυροῦται τὰ πάντα, Οἱ δὲ λόγοι οἱ τῆς ἀστρονομίας, εἰ φαίη, περὶ τί εἰσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φορὰν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα τάχους ἔχει.

ΓΟΡ. Ὀρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ Γοργία. τυγχάνει μὲν D

γὰρ δὴ ἡ ῥητορικὴ οὖσα τῶν λόγῳ τα πάντα διαπραττομένων τε καὶ κυρουμένων [τις] ἦ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ τῶν περὶ τί; *τί* ἐστι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων, περὶ οὗ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, οἷς ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρῆται;

ΓΟΡ. Τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄριστα.

VII. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Γοργία, ἀμφισβητήσιμον
Ε καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις καὶ οὐδέν πω σαφές. οἶομαι γάρ σε ἀκηκοέναι ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ᾀδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν, ἐν ᾧ καταριθμοῦνται ᾄδοντες ὅτι ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ, ὡς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀκήκοα γάρ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

452 ΣΩ. Ὅτι σοι αὐτίκ' ἂν | παρασταῖεν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τούτων ὧν ἐπῄνεσεν ὁ τὸ σκολιὸν ποιήσας, ἰατρός τε καὶ παιδοτρίβης καὶ χρηματιστής, καὶ εἴποι ἂν πρῶτον μὲν ὁ ἰατρὸς ὅτι Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξαπατᾷ σε Γοργίας· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τούτου τέχνη περὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐμή. εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ ἐροίμην Σὺ δὲ τίς ὢν ταῦτα λέγεις; εἴποι ἂν ἴσως ὅτι Ἰατρός. Τί οὖν λέγεις; ἡ τὸ τῆς σῆς τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν;
Πῶς γὰρ οὔ, φαίη ἂν ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑγίεια; τί
Β δ' ἐστὶ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώποις ὑγιείας; Εἰ δ' αὖ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ παιδοτρίβης εἴποι ὅτι Θαυμάζοιμί γ' ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτός, εἴ σοι ἔχει Γοργίας μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδεῖξαι τῆς αὑτοῦ τέχνης ἢ ἐγὼ τῆς ἐμῆς· εἴποιμ' ἂν αὖ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον Σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε; καὶ τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον; Παι-

δοτρίβης, φαίη ἄν, τὸ δ' ἔργον μού ἐστι καλούς τε καὶ ἰσχυροὺς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα. Μετὰ δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην εἴποι ἂν ὁ χρηματιστής, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, πάνυ καταφρονῶν ἁπάντων, Σκόπει δῆτα, C ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν σοι πλούτου φανῇ τι μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἢ παρὰ Γοργίᾳ ἢ παρ' ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν. φαῖμεν ἂν οὖν πρὸς αὐτὸν Τί δὲ δή; ἦ σὺ τούτου δημιουργός; Φαίη ἄν. Τίς ὤν; Χρηματιστής. Τί οὖν; κρίνεις σὺ μέγιστον ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πλοῦτον; φήσομεν. Πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; ἐρεῖ. Καὶ μὴν ἀμφισβητεῖ γε Γοργίας ὅδε τὴν παρ' αὑτῷ τέχνην μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν εἶναι ἢ τὴν σήν, φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτ' ἂν Καὶ τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἀποκρινάσθω Γοργίας. Ἴθι οὖν D νομίσας, ὦ Γοργία, ἐρωτᾶσθαι καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων καὶ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, ἀπόκριναι τί ἐστι τοῦτο ὃ φὴς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ.

ΓΟΡ. Ὅπερ ἔστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει ἑκάστῳ.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΓΟΡ. Τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ' οἷόν τ' εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις E καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ δικαστὰς καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστὰς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ξυλλόγῳ παντί, ὅστις ἂν πολιτικὸς ξύλλογος γίγνηται. καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἕξεις τὸν ἰατρόν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην· ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς οὗτος ἄλλῳ ἀναφανήσεται χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλήθη.

VIII. ΣΩ. Νῦν μοι δοκεῖς δηλῶσαι, ὦ Γοργία,
453 ἐγγύτατα τὴν ῥητορικὴν | ἥντινα τέχνην ἡγεῖ εἶναι,
καὶ εἴ τι ἐγὼ συνίημι, λέγεις ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργός
ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἅπασα
καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ. ἢ ἔχεις τι
λέγειν ἐπὶ πλέον τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύνασθαι ἢ πειθὼ
τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖν;

ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς
ἱκανῶς ὁρίζεσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον
αὐτῆς.

ΣΩ. Ἄκουσον δή, ὦ Γοργία. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἄλλῳ
διαλέγεται βουλόμενος εἰδέναι αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ
B ὅτου ὁ λόγος ἐστί, καὶ ἐμὲ εἶναι τούτων ἕνα· ἀξιῶ
δὲ καὶ σέ.

ΓΟΡ. Τί οὖν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ νῦν. ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς
πειθώ, ἥ τίς ποτ' ἐστὶν ἣν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ
ὧντινων πραγμάτων ἐστὶ πειθώ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ
ἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὑποπτεύω γε ἣν
οἶμαί σε λέγειν καὶ περὶ ὧν· οὐδὲν μέντοι ἧττον
ἐρήσομαί σε τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθὼ τὴν ἀπὸ
C τῆς ῥητορικῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν εἶναι. τοῦ
οὖν ἕνεκα δὴ αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σὲ ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ'
οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου,
ἵνα οὕτω προΐῃ, ὡς μάλιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς
ποιοῖ περὶ ὅτου λέγεται. σκόπει γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκῶ
δικαίως ἀνερωτᾶν σε. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε
ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστι τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἶ μοι εἶπες
ὅτι ὁ τὰ ζῷα γράφων, ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν δικαίως σε
ἠρόμην ὁ τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζῴων γράφων; [καὶ ποῦ;]

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρα διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγρά- D
φοι γράφοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῷα;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μηδεὶς ἄλλος ἦ Ζεῦξις ἔγραφε,
καλῶς ἄν σοι ἀπεκέκριτο;

ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ· πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ πειθὼ ποιεῖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόνη ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ὅστις διδάσκει ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, πότερον ὃ διδάσκει πείθει ἢ οὔ;

ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δ' εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγομεν E
ὥνπερ νῦν δή, ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς ὅσα ἐστὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἄνθρωπος;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πείθει;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πειθοῦς ἄρα δημιουργός ἐστι καὶ ἡ ἀριθμητική.

ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις ἐρωτᾷ ἡμᾶς ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ περὶ τί, ἀποκρινούμεθά που αὐτῷ ὅτι τῆς διδασκαλικῆς τῆς περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ τὸ περιττὸν ὅσον ἐστί. | καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἃς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν 454
τέχνας ἁπάσας ἔξομεν ἀποδεῖξαι πειθοῦς δημιουργοὺς οὔσας καὶ ἥστινος καὶ περὶ ὅ τι. ἢ οὔ;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικὴ μόνη πειθοῦς ἐστὶ δημιουργός.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΙΧ. ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπεργάζεται τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλαι, δικαίως ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπανεροίμεθ' ἂν τὸν λέγοντα, ποίας δὴ πειθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς
B ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐστὶ τέχνη; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι ἐπανερέσθαι;

ΓΟΡ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀπόκριναι δή, ὦ Γοργία, ἐπειδή γε καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως.

ΓΟΡ. Ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῆς ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἅ ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγώ τοι ὑπώπτευον ταύτην σε λέγειν τὴν πειθὼ καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὦ Γοργία· ἀλλ'—ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς, ἐὰν ὀλίγον ὕστερον τοιοῦτόν τί σε ἀνέρωμαι, ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν δῆλον εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ
C —ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω, τοῦ ἕξῆς ἕνεκα περαίνεσθαι τὸν λόγον ἐρωτῶ, οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἐθιζώμεθα ὑπονοοῦντες προαρπάζειν ἀλλήλων τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν βούλῃ περαίνῃς.

ΓΟΡ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖς ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα. καλεῖς τι μεμαθηκέναι;

ΓΟΡ. Καλῶ.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πεπιστευκέναι;

ΓΟΡ. Ἔγωγε.

D ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ταὐτὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι;

ΓΟΡ. Οἶομαι μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς γὰρ οἴει· γνώσει δὲ ἐνθένδε. εἰ γάρ τίς σε ἔροιτο Ἆρ' ἔστι τις, ὦ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής; φαίης ἄν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι.

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής;

ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστον.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πε- E
πεισμένοι εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες.

ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν δύο εἴδη θῶμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμην;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ποτέραν οὖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ πειθὼ ποιεῖ ἐν δικαστηρίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις περὶ τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων; ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν γίγνεται ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἢ ἐξ ἧς τὸ εἰδέναι;

ΓΟΡ. Δῆλον δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν.

ΣΩ. Ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, πειθοῦς | δημιουργός ἐστι πιστευτικῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς 455
περὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ ἄδικον.

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐστὶ δικαστηρίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων δικαίων τε πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ πειστικὸς μόνον. οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὄχλον γ' ἂν δύναιτο τοσοῦτον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα.

ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς· ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ τοι οὐδ' αὐτός πω δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι ὅ τι λέγω. ὅταν περὶ ἰατρῶν αἱρέσεως ᾖ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργικοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς οὐ συμβουλεύσει; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἑκάστῃ αἱρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἱρεῖσθαι· οὐδ' ὅταν τειχῶν περὶ οἰκοδομήσεως ἢ λιμένων κατασκευῆς ἢ νεωρίων, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀρχιτέκτονες· οὐδ' αὖ ὅταν στρατηγῶν αἱρέσεως πέρι ἢ τάξεώς τινος πρὸς πολεμίους ἢ χωρίων καταλήψεως συμβουλὴ ᾖ, ἀλλ' οἱ στρατηγικοὶ τότε συμβουλεύσουσιν, οἱ ῥητορικοὶ δὲ οὔ. ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Γοργία, τὰ τοιαῦτα; ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτός τε φῂς ῥήτωρ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλους ποιεῖν ῥητορικούς, εὖ ἔχει τὰ τῆς σῆς τέχνης παρὰ σοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι. καὶ ἐμὲ νῦν νόμισον καὶ τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν. ἴσως γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει τις τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων μαθητής σου βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὡς ἐγώ τινας σχεδὸν καὶ συχνοὺς αἰσθάνομαι, οἷ ἴσως αἰσχύνοιντ' ἄν σε ἀνερέσθαι. ὑπ' ἐμοῦ οὖν ἀνερωτώμενος νόμισον καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀνερωτᾶσθαι Τί ἡμῖν, ὦ Γοργία, ἔσται, ἐάν σοι συνῶμεν; περὶ τίνων τῇ πόλει συμβουλεύειν οἷοί τε ἐσόμεθα; πότερον περὶ δικαίου μόνον καὶ ἀδίκου ἢ καὶ περὶ ὧν νῦν δὴ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε; πειρῶ οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι πειράσομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σαφῶς ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν ἅπασαν· αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι τὰ νεώρια ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τείχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἡ τῶν λιμένων κατασκευὴ ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλῆς γέγονε, τὰ δ' ἐκ τῆς Περικλέους, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν.

ΣΩ. Λέγεται ταῦτα, ὦ Γοργία, περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους· Περικλέους δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἤκουον ὅτε συνεβούλευεν ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους.

ΓΟΡ. Καὶ ὅταν γέ τις αἵρεσις ᾖ ὧν νῦν δὴ | σὺ ἔλεγες, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς ὅτι οἱ ῥήτορές εἰσιν 456 οἱ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας περὶ τούτων.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα καὶ θαυμάζων, ὦ Γοργία, πάλαι ἐρωτῶ ἥ τίς ποτε ἡ δύναμίς ἐστι τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δαιμονία γάρ τις ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σκοποῦντι.

XI. ΓΟΡ. Εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἁπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑφ' αὑτῇ ἔχει. μέγα δέ σοι τεκμήριον ἐρῶ· B πολλάκις γὰρ ἤδη ἔγωγε μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἰατρῶν εἰσελθὼν παρά τινα τῶν καμνόντων οὐχὶ ἐθέλοντα ἢ φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἰατρῷ, οὐ δυναμένου τοῦ ἰατροῦ πεῖσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα, οὐκ ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ ἢ τῇ ῥητορικῇ. φημὶ δὲ καὶ εἰς πόλιν ὅποι βούλει ἐλθόντε ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα καὶ ἰατρόν, εἰ δέοι λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ συλλόγῳ, ὁπότερον δεῖ αἱρεθῆναι ἰατρόν, οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι C τὸν ἰατρόν, ἀλλ' αἱρεθῆναι ἂν τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατόν, εἰ βούλοιτο. καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλον γε δημιουργὸν ὁντιναοῦν ἀγωνίζοιτο, πείσειεν ἂν αὐτὸν ἑλέσθαι ὁ ῥητορικὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι περὶ ὅτου οὐκ ἂν πιθανώτερον εἴποι ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἢ ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐν πλήθει. Ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις τοσαύτη ἐστὶ καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς τέχνης. δεῖ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ D

τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ πρὸς ἅπαντας
χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔμαθέ τις πυκτεύειν τε
καὶ παγκρατιάζειν καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, ὥστε
κρείττων εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ ἐχθρῶν· οὐ τούτου
ἕνεκα τοὺς φίλους δεῖ τύπτειν οὐδὲ κεντεῖν τε καὶ
ἀποκτιννύναι. οὐδέ γε μὰ Δία ἐάν τις εἰς παλαί-
στραν φοιτήσας, εὖ ἔχων τὸ σῶμα καὶ πυκτικὸς
γενόμενος, ἔπειτα τὸν πατέρα τύπτῃ καὶ τὴν μητέρα
Ε ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἢ τῶν φίλων, οὐ τούτου
ἕνεκα δεῖ τοὺς παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις
διδάσκοντας μάχεσθαι μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ
τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ παρέδοσαν ἐπὶ τῷ
δικαίως χρῆσθαι τούτοις πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ
τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἀμυνομένους, μὴ ὑπάρχοντας· οἱ
457 δὲ μεταστρέψαντες χρῶνται τῇ ἰσχύϊ καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ
οὐκ ὀρθῶς. οὔκουν οἱ διδάξαντες πονηροί, οὐδὲ ἡ
τέχνη οὔτε αἰτία οὔτε πονηρὰ τούτου ἕνεκά ἐστιν,
ἀλλ' οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι, οἶμαι, ὀρθῶς. ὁ αὐτὸς δὴ
λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δυνατὸς μὲν γὰρ
πρὸς ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ περὶ παντὸς λέγειν,
ὥστε πιθανώτερος εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἔμβραχυ
Β περὶ ὅτου ἂν βούληται· ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον
τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ οὔτε τοὺς ἰατροὺς τὴν δόξαν
ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ὅτι δύναιτο ἂν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, οὔτε
τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς, ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ τῇ
ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ. ἐὰν δέ,
οἶμαι, ῥητορικὸς γενόμενός τις κατὰ ταύτῃ τῇ
δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῇ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ
μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνος μὲν
γὰρ ἐπὶ δικαίᾳ χρείᾳ παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ' ἐναντίως χρῆται.
C τὸν οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον καὶ ἐκ-
βάλλειν καὶ ἀποκτιννύναι, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα.

XII. ΣΩ. Οἶμαι, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεορακέναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ ῥᾳδίως δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσι διαλέγεσθαι διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες ἑαυτοὺς οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας, ἀλλ' ἐὰν περί του ἀμφισβητήσωσι καὶ μὴ φῇ ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον ὀρθῶς λέγειν ἢ μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπαίνουσί τε καὶ κατὰ φθόνον οἴονται τὸν ἑαυτῶν λέγειν, φιλονεικοῦντας ἀλλ' οὐ ζητοῦντας τὸ προκείμενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ ἔνιοί γε τελευτῶντες αἴσχιστα ἀπαλλάττονται, λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα, οἷα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἄχθεσθαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ἠξίωσαν ἀκροαταὶ γενέσθαι. Τοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα λέγω ταῦτα; ὅτι νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς σὺ οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα λέγειν οὐδὲ σύμφωνα οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς. φοβοῦμαι οὖν διελέγχειν σε, μή με ὑπολάβῃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα φιλονεικοῦντα λέγειν τοῦ καταφανὲς γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ. ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων | ὥνπερ καὶ ἐγώ, 458
ἡδέως ἄν σε διερωτῴην· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐῴην ἄν. ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων, εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, ἡδέως δ' ἂν ἐλεγξάντων, εἴ τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, οὐκ ἀηδέστερον μέντ' ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων ἢ ἐλεγξάντων· μεῖζον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦμαι, ὅσῳπερ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι τοσοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσον δόξα ψευδὴς περὶ ὧν τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὤν. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ σὺ φῂς τοιοῦτος εἶναι, διαλεγώμεθα· εἰ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἐᾶν, ἐῶμεν ἤδη χαίρειν καὶ διαλύωμεν τὸν λόγον.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ φημὶ μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷον σὺ ὑφηγεῖ· ἴσως μέντοι χρῆν ἐννοεῖν καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων. πάλαι γάρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, ἐγὼ τοῖς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπεδειξάμην, καὶ νῦν ἴσως πόρρω ἀποτε-
C νοῦμεν, ἢν διαλεγώμεθα. σκοπεῖν οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὸ τούτων, μή τινας αὐτῶν κατέχωμεν βουλομένους τι καὶ ἄλλο πράττειν.

XIII. ΧΑΙ. Τοῦ μὲν θορύβου, ὦ Γοργία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν, βουλομένων ἀκούειν ἐάν τι λέγητε· ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο τοσαύτη ἀσχολία, ὥστε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγομένων ἀφεμένῳ προὐργιαίτερόν τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο πράττειν.

D ΚΑΛ. Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς πολλοῖς ἤδη λόγοις παραγενόμενος οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ πώποτε ἥσθην οὕτως ὥσπερ νυνί, ὥστ' ἔμοιγε, κἂν τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην ἐθέλητε διαλέγεσθαι, χαριεῖσθε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει, εἴπερ ἐθέλει Γοργίας.

ΓΟΡ. Αἰσχρὸν δὴ τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται ἐμέ γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον
E ἐρωτᾶν ὅ τί τις βούλεται. ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ τουτοισί, διαλέγου τε καὶ ἐρώτα ὅ τι βούλει.

ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δή, ὦ Γοργία, ἃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ· ἴσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνω. ῥητορικὸν φὴς ποιεῖν οἷός τ' εἶναι, ἐάν τις βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μανθάνειν;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὥστ' ἐν ὄχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ διδάσκοντα ἀλλὰ πείθοντα;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 459

ΣΩ. Ἔλεγές τοι νῦν δὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ ῥήτωρ.

ΓΟΡ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἔν γε ὄχλῳ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἔν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, τοῦ εἰδότος πιθανώτερος γίγνεται;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἰατρός γε ὤν· ἦ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί. B

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ μὴ ἰατρός γε δήπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὢν ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐπιστήμων.

ΓΟΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι.

ΣΩ. Ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ᾖ. τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι;

ΓΟΡ. Τοῦτο ἐνταῦθά γε συμβαίνει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἁπάσας τέχνας ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορική; αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μη- C χανὴν δέ τινα πειθοῦς εὑρηκέναι, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων.

XIV. ΓΟΡ. Οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥᾳστώνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἢ μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγου ᾖ· νῦν δὲ

D τόδε πρότερον σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα τυγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οὕτως ἔχων ὁ ῥητορικὸς ὡς περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὧν αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς, τί ἀγαθὸν ἢ τί κακόν ἐστιν ἢ τί καλὸν ἢ τί αἰσχρὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, πειθὼ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν μεμηχανημένος, ὥστε δοκεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰδότος;

E ἢ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖ προεπιστάμενον ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τὸν μέλλοντα μαθήσεσθαι τὴν ῥητορικήν; εἰ δὲ μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς ῥητορικῆς διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενον—οὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον,—ποιήσεις δ' ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐχ οἷός τε ἔσει διδάξαι αὐτὸν τὴν ῥητορικήν, ἐὰν μὴ προειδῇ περὶ τούτων τὴν ἀλήθειαν; ἢ πῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει,

460 ὦ Γοργία; | καὶ πρὸς Διός, ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπὲ τίς ποθ' ἡ δύναμίς ἐστιν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐὰν τύχῃ μὴ εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθήσεται.

ΣΩ. Ἔχε δή· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. ἐάνπερ ῥητορικὸν σύ τινα ποιήσῃς, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἤτοι πότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ.

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

B ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκὼς τεκτονικός, ἢ οὔ;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ τὰ ἰατρικὰ ἰατρικός; καὶ τἆλλα
κ. οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκὼς ἕκαστα
τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἕκαστον ἀπεργά-
ζεται;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ
δίκαια μεμαθηκὼς δίκαιος;

ΓΟΡ. Πάντως δήπου.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δικαιά που πράττει.

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν [ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον C
εἶναι, τὸν δὲ] δίκαιον βούλεσθαι * ἀεὶ * δίκαια
πράττειν;

ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεταί γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὅ γε δίκαιος
ἀδικεῖν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου
δίκαιον εἶναι.

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς
ἀδικεῖν.

ΓΟΡ. Οὐ φαίνεταί γε.

XV. ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγῳ πρότε-
ρον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τοῖς παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλεῖν οὐδ' D
ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐὰν ὁ πύκτης τῇ πυκτικῇ
χρῆταί τε καὶ ἀδικῇ; ὡσαύτως δὲ οὕτω καὶ ἐὰν ὁ
ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἀδίκως χρῆται, μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι
ἐγκαλεῖν μηδὲ ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τῷ
ἀδικοῦντι καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρωμένῳ τῇ ῥητορικῇ;
ἐῤῥήθη ταῦτα ἢ οὔ;

ΓΟΡ. Ἐῤῥήθη.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται, ὁ
Ε ῥητορικός, οὐκ ἄν ποτε· ἀδικήσας. ἢ οὔ;

ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γε, ὦ Γοργία, λόγοις ἐλέγετο, ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ λόγους εἴη οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου. ἦ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ τοίνυν σου τότε ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον ὡς οὐδέποτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄδικον πρᾶγμα, ὅ γ' ἀεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἔλεγες ὅτι ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ
461 ῥητορικῇ κἂν ἀδίκως χρῷτο, | οὕτω θαυμάσας καὶ ἡγησάμενος οὐ συνᾴδειν τὰ λεγόμενα ἐκείνους εἶπον τοὺς λόγους, ὅτι εἰ μὲν κέρδος ἡγοῖο εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι ὥσπερ ἐγώ, ἄξιον εἴη διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν χαίρειν· ὕστερον δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπισκοπουμένων ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι αὖ ὁμολογεῖται τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδίκως χρῆσθαι τῇ ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐθέλειν ἀδικεῖν. ταῦτα οὖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει, μὰ τὸν κύνα, ὦ
Β Γοργία, οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας ἐστὶν ὥστε ἱκανῶς διασκέψασθαι.

XVI. ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δοξάζεις ὥσπερ νῦν λέγεις; ἢ οἴει ὅτι Γοργίας ᾐσχύνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογῆσαι τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδὼς παρ' αὐτόν, αὐτὸς διδάξειν; ἔπειτα ἐκ ταύτης ἴσως τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐναντίον τι συνέβη ἐν τοῖς
C λόγοις, τοῦθ' ὃ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήματα. ἐπεὶ τίνα οἴει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄλλους διδά-

ξειν; ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄγειν πολλὴ ἀγροικία ἐστὶ τοὺς λόγους.

ΣΩ. Ὦ κάλλιστε Πῶλε, ἀλλά τοι ἐξεπίτηδες κτώμεθα ἑταίρους καὶ υἱεῖς, ἵνα ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γιγνόμενοι σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπανορθοῖτε ἡμῶν τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις. καὶ νῦν εἴ τι ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σφαλλόμεθα, σὺ παρὼν ἐπανόρθου· δίκαιος δ' εἶ. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐθέλω τῶν ὡμολογημένων εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὡμολογῆσθαι, ἀναθέσθαι ὅ τι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ, ἐάν μοι ἓν μόνον φυλάττῃς.

ΠΩΛ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τὴν μακρολογίαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἣν καθέρξῃς, ᾗ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησας χρῆσθαι.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί; οὐκ ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν ὁπόσα ἂν βούλωμαι;

ΣΩ. Δεινὰ μέντ' ἂν πάθοις, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχήσαις. ἀλλ' ἀντίθες τοι· σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δεῖν' ἂν αὖ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι, εἰ μὴ ἐξέσται μοι ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου; | ἀλλ' εἴ τι κήδει 462
τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι αὐτὸν βούλει, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ἀναθέμενος ὅ τί σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ μέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ Γοργίας, ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου. φὴς γὰρ δήπου καὶ σὺ ἐπίστασθαι ἅπερ Γοργίας. ἢ οὔ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν ἑκάστοτε ὅ τι ἄν τις βούληται, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίει·
Β ἐρώτα ἢ ἀποκρίνου.

XVII. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν 5 σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φὴς εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Ἆρα ἐρωτᾷς ἥντινα τέχνην φημὶ εἶναι;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδεμία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ὥς γε πρὸς 10 σὲ τἀληθῆ εἰρῆσθαι.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Πρᾶγμα δ φὴς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ
C συγγράμματι ὃ ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἀνέγνων.

ΠΩΛ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις; 15

ΣΩ. Ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐμπειρία ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Ἔμοιγε, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.

ΠΩΛ. Τίνος ἐμπειρία;

ΣΩ. Χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας. 20

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν καλόν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἀνθρώποις;

ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; ἤδη πέπυσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ ὅ
D τι φημὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς εἰ οὐ καλή μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι; 25

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ πέπυσμαι ὅτι ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φὴς εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾷς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρόν τί μοι χαρίσασθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε. 30

ΣΩ. Ἐροῦ νῦν με, ὀψοποιία ἥτις μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ δή, τίς τέχνη ὀψοποιία;

ΣΩ. Οὐδεμία, ὦ Πῶλε.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ τί; φάθι.

ΣΩ. Φημὶ δή, ἐμπειρία τις.

ΠΩΛ. Τίνος; φάθι.

ΣΩ. Φημὶ δή, χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας, Ε
ὦ Πῶλε.

ΠΩΛ. Ταὐτὸν ἄρ' ἐστὶν ὀψοποιία καὶ ῥητορική;

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν ἐπιτη-
δεύσεως μόριον.

ΠΩΛ. Τίνος λέγεις ταύτης;

ΣΩ. Μὴ ἀγροικότερον ᾖ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν· ὀκνῶ
γὰρ Γοργίου ἕνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οἴηταί με διακωμῳδεῖν
τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ
ῥητορικὴ ἣν | Γοργίας ἐπιτηδεύει οὐκ οἶδα· καὶ γὰρ 463
ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ἐγένετο τί
ποτε οὗτος ἡγεῖται· ὃ δ' ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ῥητορικήν,
πράγματός τινός ἐστι μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν.

ΓΟΡ. Τίνος, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰπέ, μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσ-
χυνθείς.

XVIII. ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία, εἶναί
τι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὔ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστι-
κῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον
κολακείαν. ταύτης μοι δοκεῖ τῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως πολλὰ Β
μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μόρια εἶναι, ἓν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὀψοποικική· ὃ
δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὡς δ' ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστι
τέχνη, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή. ταύτης μόριον καὶ
τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐγὼ καλῶ καὶ τήν γε κομμωτικὴν καὶ
τὴν σοφιστικήν, τέτταρα ταῦτα μόρια ἐπὶ τέτταρσι
πράγμασιν. εἰ οὖν βούλεται Πῶλος πυνθάνεσθαι,
πυνθανέσθω· οὐ γάρ πω πέπυσται ὁποῖόν φημ' ἐγὼ C

τῆς κολακείας μόριον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν λέληθα οὔπω ἀποκεκριμένος, ὁ δὲ ἐπανερωτᾷ εἰ οὐ καλὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι. ἐγὼ δ' αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν, πρὶν ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅ τι ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ὦ Πῶλε· ἀλλ' εἴπερ βούλει πυθέσθαι, ἐρώτα ὁποῖον μόριον τῆς κολακείας φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ δή, καὶ ἀπόκριναι, ὁποῖον μόριον.

D ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκριναμένου; ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον.

ΠΩΛ. Τί οὖν; καλὸν ἡ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Αἰσχρὸν ἔγωγε· τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ καλῶ· ἐπειδὴ δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς ἤδη εἰδότι ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω.

ΓΟΡ. Μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδὲ

E αὐτὸς συνίημι ὅ τι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Εἰκότως γε, ὦ Γοργία· οὐδὲν γάρ πω σαφὲς λέγω, Πῶλος δὲ ὅδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δ' εἰπὲ πῶς λέγεις πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὅ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἡ ῥητορική· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὂν τοῦτο, Πῶλος ὅδε ἐλέγξει. σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχήν; |

464 ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οἴει τινὰ εἶναι ἑκατέρου εὐεξίαν;

ΓΟΡ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαν, οὖσαν δ' οὔ;

οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, οὓς οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως αἴσθοιτό τις, ὅτι οὐκ εὖ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ ἰατρός τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὃ ποιεῖ μὲν δοκεῖν εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον.

ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. B

XIX. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ λέγω. Δυοῖν ὄντοιν τοῖν πραγμάτοιν δύο λέγω τέχνας· τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν καλῶ, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ [τῷ] σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ οὔσης τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν μὲν γυμναστικήν, τὴν δὲ ἰατρικήν· τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντίστροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ τὴν νομοθετικήν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἰατρικῇ τὴν δικαιοσύνην. ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ C ἀλλήλαις, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὖσαι, ἑκάτεραι τούτων, ἥ τε ἰατρικὴ τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ· ὅμως δὲ διαφέρουσί τι ἀλλήλων. τεττάρων δὴ τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν τῶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχήν, ἡ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη, οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη, τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανείμασα, ὑποδῦσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδυ, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου οὐδὲν φροντίζει, D τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστου ἀξία εἶναι. ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἡ ὀψοποιικὴ ὑποδέδυκε, καὶ προσποιεῖται τὰ βέλτιστα σιτία τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, ὥστ' εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιόν τε καὶ ἰατρὸν ἢ ἐν ἀνδράσιν οὕτως ἀνοήτοις ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, πότερος

ἐπαίει περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὁ ἰατρὸς ἢ ὁ ὀψοποιός, λιμῷ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἰατρόν.
E κολακείαν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ, καὶ αἰσχρόν φημι
465 εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, | ὦ Πῶλε—τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ λέγω,—ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στοχάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελ- 5
τίστου· τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὔ φημι εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐμ-
πειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ὧν προσφέρει,
ὁποῖ' ἄττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου
μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ ὃ ἂν ᾖ
ἄλογον πρᾶγμα. τούτων δὲ πέρι εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς, 10
ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον.

XX. Τῇ μὲν οὖν ἰατρικῇ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἡ
B ὀψοποιικὴ κολακεία ὑπόκειται· τῇ δὲ γυμναστικῇ
κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἡ κομμωτική, κα-
κοῦργός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγεννὴς καὶ 15
ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασι καὶ χρώμασι καὶ λειότητι
καὶ ἐσθῆσιν ἀπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλότριον κάλλος
ἐφελκομένους τοῦ οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ τῆς γυμναστικῆς
ἀμελεῖν. ἵν' οὖν μὴ μακρολογῶ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν
ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι—ἤδη γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἀκολουθήσαις 20
—[ὅτι ὃ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικήν, τοῦτο ὀψο-
C ποιικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικήν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε,] ὅτι ὃ κομ-
μωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικήν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς
νομοθετικήν, καὶ [ὅτι] ὃ ὀψοποιικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικήν,
τοῦτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω, 25
διέστηκε μὲν οὕτω φύσει· ἅτε δ' ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύ-
ρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ σοφισταὶ καὶ
ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅ τι χρήσωνται οὔτε αὐτοὶ
ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τούτοις. καὶ γὰρ
ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι ἐπεστάτει, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ 30
D αὑτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖτο καὶ διε-
κρίνετο ἥ τε ὀψοποιικὴ καὶ ἡ ἰατρική, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ

τὸ σῶμα ἔκρινε σταθμώμενον ταῖς χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς αὐτό, τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ἦν, ὦ φίλε Πῶλε —σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἔμπειρος,—ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀκρίτων ὄντων τῶν τε ἰατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ ὀψοποικῶν. ὃ μὲν οὖν ἐγώ φημι τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι, ἀκήκοας· ἀντίστροφον ὀψοποιίας ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι. Ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἄτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἐῶν μακροὺς E λόγους λέγειν αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα. ἄξιον μὲν οὖν ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστί· λέγοντος γάρ μου βραχέα οὐκ ἐμάνθανες, οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἧν σοι ἀπεκρινάμην οὐδὲν οἷός τ' ἦσθα, ἀλλ' ἐδέου διηγήσεως. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου μὴ ἔχω ὅ τι χρήσωμαι, | ἀπότεινε 466 καὶ σὺ λόγον, ἐὰν δὲ ἔχω, ἔα με χρῆσθαι· δίκαιον γάρ. καὶ νῦν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἴ τι ἔχεις χρῆσθαι, χρῶ.

XXI. ΠΩΛ. Τί οὖν φής; κολακεία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἡ ῥητορική;

ΣΩ. Κολακείας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἶπον μόριον. ἀλλ' οὐ μνημονεύεις τηλικοῦτος ὤν, ὦ Πῶλε; τί τάχα δράσεις;

ΠΩΛ. Ἆρ' οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες;

ΣΩ. Ἐρώτημα τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς ἢ λόγου τινὸς B ἀρχὴν λέγεις;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν;

ΣΩ. Οὔκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαί γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ λέγω γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες.

C ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτιννύασί τε ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;

ΣΩ. Νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐφ' ἑκάστου ὧν λέγεις, πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ γνώμην σαυτοῦ ἀποφαίνει, ἢ ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾷς.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε σὲ ἐρωτῶ.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν, ὦ φίλε· ἔπειτα δύο ἅμα με ἐρωτᾷς;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς δύο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες, ὅτι ἀποκτινύασιν οἱ ῥήτορες οὓς ἂν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οἱ
D τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματ' ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

XXII. ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν σοι ὅτι δύο ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἐρωτήματα, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαί γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν
E ὧν βούλονται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν· ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι;

ΣΩ. Οὔχ, ὥς γέ φησι Πῶλος.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγὼ οὔ φημι; φημὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Μὰ τὸν οὐ σύ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι φὴς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.

ΠΩΛ. Φημὶ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἴει εἶναι, ἐάν τις ποιῇ ταῦτα

ἃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς μέγα δύνασθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ῥήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ τέχνην τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀλλὰ | μὴ κολα- 467
κείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας. εἰ δέ με ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοι οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο κεκτήσονται, εἰ δὴ δύναμίς ἐστιν, ὡς σὺ φής, ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἄνευ νοῦ ἃ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς κακὸν εἶναι. ἢ οὔ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιντο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πώλου ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;

ΠΩΛ. Οὗτος ἀνήρ—

ΣΩ. Οὔ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βούλονται· ἀλλά B
μ' ἔλεγχε.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι[, τούτου πρόσθεν];

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται.

ΣΩ. Οὔ φημι.

ΠΩΛ. Ποιοῦντες δὲ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς;

ΣΩ. Φημί.

ΠΩΛ. Σχέτλιά γε λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Μὴ κατηγόρει, ὦ λῷστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον ὅτι ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ μή, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου. C

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅ τι λέγεις.

XXIII. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἑκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσι τοῦθ' ὃ πράττουσιν; οἷον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὅπερ ποιοῦσι, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἕνεκα πίνουσιν;

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν[, οὗ ἕνεκα πίνουσιν].

D ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλέοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἑκάστοτε· τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ πράγματ' ἔχειν; ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, οἶμαι, οὗ ἕνεκα πλέουσι, πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν.

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων; ἐάν τίς τι πράττῃ ἕνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράττει;

E ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἔστι τι τῶν ὄντων, ὃ οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθόν γ' ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν;

ΠΩΛ. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τἀναντία τούτων;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ἆρα τοιάδε
468 λέγεις, ἃ ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, | ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους

καὶ ξύλα καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλ' ἅττα καλεῖς τὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακά;

ΠΩΛ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἕνεκεν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράττουσιν, ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τἀγαθὰ τῶν μεταξύ;

ΠΩΛ. Τὰ μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν, B ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσταμεν, ὅταν ἑστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ οὔ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτιννυμεν, εἴ τινα ἀποκτίννυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἕνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες.

ΠΩΛ. Φημί.

XXIV. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἕνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὗ C ἕνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν;

ΠΩΛ. Μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ᾖ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὡς φὴς σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὰ κακά. ἦ γάρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ οὔ; Τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνει;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀληθῆ.

D ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὂν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ. ἦ γάρ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα; Τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνει;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' οὔ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος μέγα δύναται
E ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι μηδὲ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.

ΠΩΛ. Ὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναί σοι ποιεῖν ὅ τι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μή, οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμενον χρήματα ἢ δήσαντα.

ΣΩ. Δικαίως λέγεις ἢ ἀδίκως;

469 ΠΩΛ. Ὁπότερ' | ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἐστιν;

ΣΩ. Εὐφήμει, ὦ Πῶλε.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐ χρὴ οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε τοὺς ἀθλίους, ἀλλ' ἐλεεῖν.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί; οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω τῶν ἀνθρώπων;

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΠΩΛ. Ὅστις οὖν ἀποκτίννυσιν ὃν ἂν δόξῃ

αὐτῷ, δικαίως ἀποκτιννύς, ἄθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεινός;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἄρτι ἄθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεινόν γε πρός· τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον. B

ΠΩΛ. Ἦ που ὅ γε ἀποθνήσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεινός τε καὶ ἄθλιός ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἧττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτιννύς, ὦ Πῶλε, καὶ ἧττον ἢ ὁ δικαίως ἀποθνήσκων.

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὕτως, ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

ΠΩΛ. Ἦ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μεῖζον;

ΣΩ. Ἥκιστά γε.

ΠΩΛ. Σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν;

ΣΩ. Βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ' C ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἑλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.

ΠΩΛ. Σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο;

ΣΩ. Οὔκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτιννύντι καὶ ἐκβάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ δόξαν.

XXV. ΣΩ. Ὦ μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ. εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ D λαβὼν ὑπὸ μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον λέγοιμι πρὸς σὲ ὅτι Ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύναμίς τις καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν· ἐὰν γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ δόξῃ τινὰ

τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ ὁρᾷς αὐτίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει οὗτος ὃν ἂν δόξῃ· κἂν τινα δόξῃ μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεαγέναι δεῖν, κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα μάλα, κἂν θοιμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, Ε διεσχισμένον ἔσται· οὕτω μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν ὅτι Ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναιντο, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐμπρησθείη οἰκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἥντιν' ἄν σοι δοκῇ, καὶ τά γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ αἱ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἴδια. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ. ἢ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα οὕτω γε. |

470 ΣΩ. Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν δι' ὅ τι μέμφει τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δή; λέγε.

ΠΩΛ. Ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα ζημιοῦσθαί ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ζημιοῦσθαι οὐ κακόν;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, [τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι] πάλιν αὖ σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἃ δοκεῖ ἕπηται τὸ ὠφελίμως πράττειν, ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, Β κακὸν καὶ σμικρὸν [δύνασθαι]. Σκεψώμεθα δὲ καὶ τόδε. ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐνίοτε μὲν ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτιννύναι τε καὶ ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὔ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πότε οὖν σὺ φὴς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπὲ τίνα ὅρον ὁρίζει.

ΠΩΛ. Σὺ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι ταὐτὸ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν φημί, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴ σοι C παρ' ἐμοῦ ἥδιόν ἐστιν ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικαίως τις ταῦτα ποιῇ, ἄμεινον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως, κάκιον.

XXVI. ΠΩΛ. Χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἀλλ' οὐχὶ κἂν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἕξω, ἴσην δὲ καὶ σοί, ἐάν με ἐλέγξῃς καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃς φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴ κάμῃς φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλ' ἔλεγχε.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεῖ παλαιοῖς πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ D πρώην γεγονότα ταῦτα ἱκανά σε ἐξελέγξαι ἐστὶ καὶ ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι εὐδαίμονές εἰσιν.

ΣΩ. Τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀρχέλαον δήπου τοῦτον τὸν Περδίκκου ὁρᾷς ἄρχοντα Μακεδονίας;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἀκούω γε.

ΠΩΛ. Εὐδαίμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἄθλιος;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐ γάρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί; συγγενόμενος ἂν γνοίης, ἄλλως E δὲ αὐτόθεν οὐ γιγνώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαιμονεῖ;

ΣΩ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτα.

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα γιγνώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί; ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν;

ΣΩ. Ὡς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὦ Πῶλε· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν κἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα εὐδαίμονα εἶναί φημι, τὸν δὲ ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον. |

471 ΠΩΛ. Ἄθλιος ἄρα οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Ἀρχέλαος κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον;

ΣΩ. Εἴπερ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἄδικος.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος, ᾧ γε προσῆκε μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν ἦν νῦν ἔχει, ὄντι ἐκ γυναικὸς ἣ ἦν δούλη Ἀλκέτου τοῦ Περδίκκου ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον δοῦλος ἦν Ἀλκέτου, καὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ἐδούλευεν ἂν Ἀλκέτῃ καὶ ἦν εὐδαίμων κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον· νῦν δὲ θαυμασίως ὡς ἄθλιος γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μέγιστα
B ἠδίκηκεν· ὃς γε πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον μεταπεμψάμενος ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο, ξενίσας καὶ καταμεθύσας αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀνεψιὸν αὑτοῦ, σχεδὸν ἡλικιώτην, ἐμβαλὼν εἰς ἅμαξαν νύκτωρ ἐξαγαγὼν ἀπέσφαξέ τε
C καὶ ἠφάνισεν ἀμφοτέρους. καὶ ταῦτα ἀδικήσας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν ἀθλιώτατος γενόμενος καὶ οὐ μετεμέλησεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον τὸν ἀδελφὸν τὸν γνήσιον, τοῦ Περδίκκου υἱόν, παῖδα ὡς ἑπτέτη, οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐγίγνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐβουλήθη εὐδαίμων γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐκθρέψας καὶ ἀποδοὺς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' εἰς φρέαρ ἐμβαλὼν ἀποσπείξας

πρὸς τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ Κλεοπάτραν χῆνα ἔφη διώκοντα ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀποθανεῖν. τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἅτε μέγιστα ἠδικηκὼς τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, ἀθλιώτατός ἐστι πάντων Μακεδόνων ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐδαιμονέστατος, καὶ ἴσως ἔστιν ὅστις Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρξάμενος δέξαιτ' ἂν ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν Μακεδόνων γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ Ἀρχέλαος. D

XXVII. ΣΩ. Καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὦ Πῶλε, ἔγωγέ σε ἐπῄνεσα ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὖ πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν πεπαιδεῦσθαι, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἠμεληκέναι· καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ᾧ με κἂν παῖς ἐξελέγξειε, καὶ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν, ὡς σὺ οἴει, ἐξελήλεγμαι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, φάσκων τὸν ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι; πόθεν, ὦ 'γαθέ; καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γέ σοι τούτων ὁμολογῶ ὧν σὺ φής.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὡς E ἐγὼ λέγω.

ΣΩ. Ὦ μακάριε, ῥητορικῶς γάρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούμενοι ἐλέγχειν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἕτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὰν τῶν λόγων ὧν ἂν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχωνται καὶ εὐδοκίμους, ὁ δὲ τἀναντία λέγων ἕνα τινὰ παρέχηται ἢ μηδένα. οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἔλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν | ἀλήθειαν· 472 ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδομαρτυρηθείη τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναί τι. καὶ νῦν περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσι ταὐτὰ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι, ἐὰν βούλῃ κατ' ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω. μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ, ὧν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἑστῶτές εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίου,

οὗ αὖ ἔστιν †ἐν Πυθοῖ† τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθημα,
Β ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περικλέους ὅλη οἰκία ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια ἥντιν' ἂν βούλῃ τῶν ἐνθένδε ἐκλέξασθαι. ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι εἰς ὢν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ· οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις, ἀλλὰ ψευδομάρτυρας πολλοὺς κατ' ἐμοῦ παρα- 5
σχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἕνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν
C ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ ἐγώ σοι 10
μαρτυρῶ εἷς ὢν μόνος, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας τούτους χαίρειν ἐᾷς. ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὗτός τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου, ὡς σύ τε οἴει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι. παραβαλόντες οὖν παρ' ἀλλήλους σκεψώμεθα, εἴ τι διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων. καὶ γὰρ 15
τυγχάνει περὶ ὧν· ἀμφισβητοῦμεν οὐ πάνυ σμικρὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ταῦτα περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι τε κάλλιστον μὴ εἰδέναι τε αἴσχιστον· τὸ γὰρ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἢ γιγνώσκειν ἢ ἀγνοεῖν ὅστις τε
D εὐδαίμων ἐστὶ καὶ ὅστις μή. αὐτίκα πρῶτον, περὶ 20
οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστί, σὺ ἡγεῖ οἷόν τε εἶναι μακάριον ἄνδρα ἀδικοῦντά τε καὶ ἄδικον ὄντα, εἴπερ Ἀρχέλαον ἄδικον μὲν ἡγεῖ εἶναι, εὐδαίμονα δέ. ἄλλο τι ὡς οὕτω σου νομίζοντος διανοώμεθα;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. 25

XXVIII. ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δέ φημι ἀδύνατον. ἓν μὲν τουτὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν. εἶεν· ἀδικῶν δὲ δὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσται ἆρ' ἂν τυγχάνῃ δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας;

ΠΩΛ. Ἥκιστά γε, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γ' ἂν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη. 30

Ε ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὁ ἀδικῶν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εὐδαίμων ἔσται;

ΠΩΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Κατὰ δέ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ ἄδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι, ἐὰν μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνῃ τιμωρίας ἀδικῶν, ἧττον δὲ ἄθλιος, ἐὰν διδῷ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων. |

ΠΩΛ. Ἄτοπά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς 473
λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Πειράσομαι δέ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταὐτὰ ἐμοὶ λέγειν· φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἃ διαφερόμεθα ταῦτ' ἐστί· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ. εἶπον ἐγώ που ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι.

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἀθλίους ἔφην εἶναι ἐγώ, καὶ ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ.

ΠΩΛ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία.

ΣΩ. Ὡς σύ γε οἴει, ὦ Πῶλε. B

ΠΩΛ. Ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Σὺ δέ γε εὐδαίμονας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἐὰν μὴ διδῶσι δίκην.

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φημί, τοὺς δὲ διδόντας δίκην ἧττον. βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτ' ἐκείνου χαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξελέγξαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Πῶλε, ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται.

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος ληφθῇ τυραννίδι ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς στρεβλῶται C

καὶ ἐκτέμνηται καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκάηται, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ παντοδαπὰς λώβας αὐτός τε λωβηθεὶς καὶ τοὺς αὑτοῦ ἐπιδὼν παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκα τὸ ἔσχατον ἀνασταυρωθῇ ἢ καταπιττωθῇ, οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστερος ἔσται ἢ ἐὰν διαφυ- 5
D γὼν τύραννος καταστῇ καὶ ἄρχων ἐν τῇ πόλει διαβιῷ ποιῶν ὅ τι ἂν βούληται, ζηλωτὸς ὢν καὶ εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων; ταῦτα λέγεις ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἐξελέγχειν;

XXIX. ΣΩ. Μορμολύττει αὖ, ὦ γενναῖε Πῶλε, 10 καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγχεις· ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου. ὅμως δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με σμικρόν· ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι, εἶπες;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν τοίνυν οὐδέποτε ἔσται 15 οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὁ κατειργασμένος τὴν τυραννίδα ἀδίκως οὔτε ὁ δίκην διδούς· δυοῖν γὰρ ἀθλίοιν
E εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ὁ διαφυγὼν καὶ τυραννεύσας. Τί τοῦτο, ὦ Πῶλε; γελᾷς; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου ἐστίν, ἐπειδάν 20 τίς τι εἴπῃ, καταγελᾶν, ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ οἴει ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα λέγῃς ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τινὰ τουτωνί.

ΣΩ. Ὦ Πῶλε, οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ 25
πέρυσι βουλεύειν λαχών, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε
474 καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιψηφίζειν, γέλωτα παρεῖχον | καὶ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ νῦν με κέλευε ἐπιψηφίζειν τοὺς παρόντας, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔχεις τούτων βελτίω ἔλεγχον, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἐμοὶ ἐν τῷ 30 μέρει παράδος, καὶ πείρασαι τοῦ ἐλέγχου οἷον ἐγὼ οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὧν ἂν λέγω ἕνα μὲν

παρασχέσθαι μάρτυρα ἐπίσταμαι, αὐτὸν πρὸς ὃν ἄν μοι ὁ λόγος ᾖ, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἐῶ χαίρειν, καὶ ἕνα ἐπιψηφίζειν ἐπίσταμαι, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. ὅρα οὖν εἰ ἐθελήσεις ἐν τῷ μέρει B διδόναι ἔλεγχον ἀποκρινόμενος τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οἶμαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ διδόναι.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγὼ δέ γε οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. ἐπεὶ σὺ δέξαι ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ σύ γ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.

ΠΩΛ. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἐγὼ οὔτε σὺ οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδείς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινεῖ; C

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὅ τί ποτ' ἐρεῖς.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δή μοι, ἵν' εἰδῇς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς σε ἠρώτων· πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Πῶλε, κάκιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ αἴσχιον; πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; Ἀποκρίνου.

ΠΩΛ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

XXX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, εἴπερ αἴσχιον;

ΠΩΛ. Ἥκιστά γε.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· οὐ ταὐτὸν ἡγεῖ σύ, ὡς ἔοικας, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. D

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἷον καὶ σώματα καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἑκάστοτε

καλά; οἷον πρῶτον τὰ σώματα τὰ καλὰ οὐχὶ ἤτοι κατὰ τὴν χρείαν λέγεις καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾖ, πρὸς τοῦτο, ἢ κατὰ ἡδονήν τινα, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς θεωροῦντας; ἔχεις Ε τι ἐκτὸς τούτων λέγειν περὶ σώματος κάλλους;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔχω.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα πάνθ' οὕτω καὶ σχήματα καὶ χρώματα ἢ δι' ἡδονήν τινα ἢ δι' ὠφέλειαν ἢ δι' ἀμφότερα καλὰ προσαγορεύεις;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν πάνθ' ὡσαύτως;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τά γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οἱ δήπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστὶ [τὰ] καλά, τοῦ ἢ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι ἢ ἡδέα ἢ ἀμφότερα.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

475 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ | τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὁρίζει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὁριζόμενος τὸ καλόν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπῃ τε καὶ κακῷ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἄρα δυοῖν καλοῖν θάτερον κάλλιον ᾖ, ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτοιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλον κάλλιόν ἐστιν, ἤτοι ἡδονῇ ἢ ὠφελείᾳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις.

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ ἕτερον Β αἴσχιον ᾖ, ἤτοι λύπῃ ἢ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἔσται. ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πῶς ἐλέγετο νῦν δὴ περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι; οὐκ ἔλεγες τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔλεγον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἤτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστι καὶ λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἂν εἴη ἢ κακῷ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις; οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

XXXI. ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ ὁ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἀδικούμενοι;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα λύπῃ γε ὑπερέχει.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπῃ, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὑπερβάλλοι.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ λείπεται.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τῷ κακῷ.

ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώ- D πων καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὡμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἴσχιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε κάκιον ἐφάνη.

ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Δέξαι' ἂν οὖν σὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ

τὸ αἴσχιον ἀντὶ τοῦ ἧττον; Μὴ ὄκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὦ Πῶλε—οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσει,—ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, καὶ ἢ φάθι ἢ μὴ ἃ ἐρωτῶ.

Ε ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλος δέ τις ἀνθρώπων;

ΠΩΛ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὔτ' ἂν ἐγὼ οὔτ' ἂν σὺ οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ τυγχάνει ὄν.

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον παραβαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ ἐξαρκεῖς εἷς ὢν μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυ-
476 ρῶν, | καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ μόνον ἐπιψηφίζων τοὺς ἄλλους ἐῶ χαίρειν. Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτως ἐχέτω· μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ περὶ οὗ τὸ δεύτερον ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν, σκεψώμεθα· τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην ἆρα μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν, ὡς σὺ ᾤου, ἢ μεῖζον τὸ μὴ διδόναι, ὡς αὖ ἐγὼ ᾤμην. σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῇδε· τὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα ἆρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

Β ΣΩ. Ἔχεις οὖν λέγειν ὡς οὐχὶ τά γε δίκαια πάντα καλά ἐστι, καθ' ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ διασκεψάμενος εἰπέ.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XXXII. ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε· ἆρ' εἴ τίς τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιοῦντος; There must be something acted upon by the agent

ΠΩΛ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἆρα τοῦτο πάσχον ὃ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον οἷον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἢ ταχὺ ὁ τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι; C

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτον ἄρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἂν τὸ τύπτον ποιῇ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ κάει τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε κάει ἢ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτω κάεσθαι τὸ καόμενον ὡς ἂν τὸ καῦον κάῃ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τέμνει τις, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; τέμνεται γάρ τι.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἢ βαθὺ τὸ τμῆμα ἢ ἀλγεινόν, τοιοῦτον τμῆμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον, οἷον τὸ D τέμνον τέμνει;

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Συλλήβδην δὴ ὅρα εἰ ὁμολογεῖς ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον περὶ πάντων· οἷον ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιοῦν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πάσχον πάσχειν.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ὁμολογῶ.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον πάσχειν τί ἐστιν ἢ ποιεῖν;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάσχειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὑπό τινος ποιοῦντος;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ὑπό γε τοῦ κολάζοντος.

Ε ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων δικαίως κολάζει.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δίκαια ποιῶν ἢ οὔ;

ΠΩΛ. Δίκαια.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ κολαζόμενος δίκην διδοὺς δίκαια πάσχει;

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ δίκαιά που καλὰ ὡμολόγηται;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τούτων ἄρα ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ καλά, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, ὁ κολαζόμενος.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

477 XXXIII. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλά, ἀγαθά; | ἢ γὰρ ἡδέα ἢ ὠφέλιμα.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην διδούς;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ὠφελεῖται ἄρα;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρα ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφέλειαν; βελτίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἴπερ δικαίως κολάζεται;

ΠΩΛ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην διδούς;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου ἀπαλλάττεται κακοῦ;

Β Ὧδε δὲ σκόπει. ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου κακίαν ἄλλην τιν' ἐνορᾷς ἢ πενίαν;

ΠΩΛ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πενίαν.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ; κακίαν ἂν φήσαις ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἶσχος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν ἡγεῖ τινὰ εἶναι;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ταύτην οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρημάτων καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν ὄντων, τριττὰς εἴρηκας πονηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, C
ἀδικίαν;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν πονηριῶν αἰσχίστη; οὐχ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία;

ΠΩΛ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὴ αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὧδί. ἀεὶ τὸ αἴσχιστον ἤτοι λύπην μεγίστην παρέχον ἢ βλάβην ἢ ἀμφότερα αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν.

ΠΩΛ. Μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Αἴσχιστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία νῦν δὴ ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν; D

ΠΩΛ. Ὡμολόγηται γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἀνιαρότατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνίᾳ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιστον τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ βλάβῃ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστι τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμνειν τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε.

ΣΩ. Ὑπερφυεῖ τινὶ ἄρα ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ καὶ κακῷ θαυμασίῳ ὑπερβάλλουσα τἆλλα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς
Ε πονηρία αἴσχιστόν ἐστι πάντων, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀλγηδόνι γε, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος.

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν που τό γε μεγίστῃ βλάβῃ ὑπερβάλλον μέγιστον ἂν κακὸν εἴη τῶν ὄντων.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἡ ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακόν ἐστιν;

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

XXXIV. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὐ χρηματιστική;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ νόσου; οὐκ ἰατρική;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

478 ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ | ἀδικίας; Εἰ μὴ οὕτως εὐπορεῖς, ὧδε σκόπει· ποῖ ἄγομεν καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς κάμνοντας τὰ σώματα;

ΠΩΛ. Παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας;

ΠΩΛ. Παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δίκην δώσοντας;

ΠΩΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ τινὶ χρώμενοι κολάζουσιν οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες;

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δή.

ΣΩ. Χρηματιστικὴ μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει,
Β ἰατρικὴ δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας.

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;

ΠΩΛ. Τίνων λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, δίκης

ΠΩΛ. Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ἤτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ ἢ ὠφέλειαν ἢ ἀμφότερα, εἴπερ κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί. C

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι ἡδύ ἐστι, καὶ χαίρουσιν οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμουγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὠφέλιμόν γε. ἢ γάρ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖ ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ὑγιεῖ εἶναι.

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως ἂν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἰατρευόμενος, ἢ μηδὲ κάμνων ἀρχήν;

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι μηδὲ κάμνων.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν εὐδαιμονία, ὡς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγή, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις.

ΠΩΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀθλιώτερος πότερος δυοῖν ἐχόντοιν D κακὸν εἴτ' ἐν σώματι εἴτ' ἐν ψυχῇ; ὁ ἰατρευόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ἢ ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος, ἔχων δέ;

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεταί μοι ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἦν, πονηρίας;

ΠΩΛ. Ἦν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

Ε ΣΩ. Εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων κακίαν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη.

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δή.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερος δήπου ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.

ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὗτος δ' ἦν ὁ νουθετούμενός τε καὶ ἐπιπληττόμενος καὶ δίκην διδούς.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ὁ ἔχων †ἀδικίαν† καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν ὃς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικῶν καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστῃ ἀδικίᾳ διαπράξηται ὥστε μήτε νουθετεῖσθαι | μήτε κολάζεσθαι 479 μήτε δίκην διδόναι, ὥσπερ σὺ φὴς Ἀρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυράννους καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυνάστας;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν.

XXXV. ΣΩ. Σχεδὸν γάρ που οὗτοι, ὦ ἄριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ διαπεπραγμένοι εἰσὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις νοσήμασι συνισχόμενος διαπράξαιτο μὴ διδόναι δίκην τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἁμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς μηδὲ ἰατρεύεσθαι, φοβούμενος, ὡσπερανεὶ Β παῖς, τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι ἀλγεινόν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ σοὶ οὕτως;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀγνοῶν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀρετὴ σώματος. κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὡμολογημένων τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες, ὦ Πῶλε, τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ

ἀγνοεῖν ὅσῳ ἀθλιώτερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιοῦς σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ συνοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρᾷ καὶ ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίῳ. ὅθεν καὶ πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὥστε δίκην μὴ C διδόναι μηδ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ ὅπως ἂν ὡσιν ὡς πιθανώτατοι λέγειν. εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀληθῆ ὡμολογήκαμεν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἆρ' αἰσθάνει τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ βούλει συλλογισώμεθα αὐτά;

ΠΩΛ. Εἰ μὴ σοί γε ἄλλως δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακὸν ἡ ἀδικία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν;

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεταί γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγή γε ἐφάνη τούτου τοῦ D κακοῦ τὸ δίκην διδόναι;

ΠΩΛ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε μὴ διδόναι ἐμμονὴ τοῦ κακοῦ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον ἄρα ἐστὶ τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν πέφυκεν.

ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ περὶ τούτου, ὦ φίλε, ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν, σὺ μὲν τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστ' ἀδικοῦντα δίκην οὐδεμίαν διδόντα, ἐγὼ E δὲ τοὐναντίον οἰόμενος, εἴτ' Ἀρχέλαος εἴτ' ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ὁστισοῦν μὴ δίδωσι δίκην ἀδικῶν, τούτῳ προσήκειν ἀθλίῳ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀεὶ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ ἀδικουμένου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ διδόντα δίκην τοῦ διδόντος; οὐ ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγόμενα;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐλέγετο;

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

480 XXXVI. ΣΩ. Εἶεν. εἰ οὖν δὴ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ Πῶλε, τίς ἡ μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς; δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὡμολογημένων αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα φυλάττειν ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσει, ὡς ἱκανὸν κακὸν ἕξοντα. οὐ γάρ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐὰν δέ γε ἀδικήσῃ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις ὧν ἂν κήδηται, αὐτὸν ἑκόντα ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε ὅπου ὡς τάχιστα δώσει δίκην, παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν, ὥσπερ
Β παρὰ τὸν ἰατρόν, σπεύδοντα ὅπως μὴ ἐγχρονισθὲν τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἀδικίας ἕλκος τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσει καὶ ἀνίατον· ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴπερ τἀληθῆ πρότερον μένει ἡμῖν ὁμολογήματα; οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα ἐκείνοις οὕτω μὲν συμφωνεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ μή;

ΠΩΛ. Τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδικίας τῆς αὑτοῦ ἢ γονέων ἢ ἑταίρων ἢ παίδων ἢ πατρίδος ἀδικούσης οὐ χρήσιμος οὐδὲν ἡ ῥητορικὴ
Ο ἡμῖν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις ὑπολάβοι ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον, κατηγορεῖν δεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἑαυτοῦ, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὃς ἂν ἀεὶ τῶν φίλων τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ φανερὸν ἄγειν τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δῷ δίκην καὶ ὑγιὴς γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ ἀποδειλιᾶν ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα καὶ ἀνδρείως, ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κάειν ἰατρῷ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν διώκοντα, μὴ ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεινόν,
D ἐὰν μέν γε πληγῶν ἄξια ἠδικηκὼς ᾖ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δεσμοῦ, δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας, ἀποτίνοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φυγῆς, φεύγοντα, ἐὰν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνή-

σκοντα, αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὄντα κατήγορον καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χρώμενον τῇ ῥητορικῇ, ὅπως ἂν καταδήλων τῶν ἀδικημάτων γιγνομένων ἀπαλλάττωνται τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας. φῶμεν οὕτως ἢ μὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Πῶλε;

ΠΩΛ. Ἄτοπα μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται. Ε

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ κἀκεῖνα λυτέον ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί, τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχει.

ΣΩ. Τοὐναντίον δέ γε αὖ μεταβαλόντα εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινὰ κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἴτ' ἐχθρὸν εἴτε ὁντινοῦν, ἐὰν μόνον μὴ αὐτὸς ἀδικῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εὐλαβητέον· ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῇ ὁ ἐχθρός, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον καὶ πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα, | ὅπως μὴ δῷ δίκην μηδὲ ἔλθῃ παρὰ τὸν 481
δικαστήν· ἐὰν δὲ ἔλθῃ, μηχανητέον ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δῷ δίκην ὁ ἐχθρός, ἀλλ' ἐάν τε χρυσίον ἡρπακὼς ᾖ πολύ, μὴ ἀποδιδῷ τοῦτο ἀλλ' ἔχων ἀναλίσκῃ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, ἐάν τε θανάτου ἄξια ἠδικηκὼς ᾖ, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε, ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος ἔσται πονηρὸς ὤν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπως ὡς πλεῖστον Β
χρόνον βιώσεται τοιοῦτος ὤν. ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τῷ γε μὴ μέλλοντι ἀδικεῖν οὐ μεγάλη τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἡ χρεία αὐτῆς εἶναι, εἰ δὴ καὶ ἔστι τις χρεία, ὡς ἔν γε τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδαμῇ ἐφάνη οὖσα.

XXXVII. ΚΑΛ. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει;

ΧΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυῶς σπουδάζειν· οὐδὲν μέντοι οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.

C ΚΑΛ. Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμῶ. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερόν σε φῶμεν νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα ἢ παίζοντα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι [ἢ] ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἃ δεῖ;

ΣΩ. Ὦ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μή τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι, τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλά τις ἡμῶν ἴδιόν τι ἔπασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, D οὐκ ἂν ἦν ῥᾴδιον ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθημα. λέγω δ' ἐννοήσας ὅτι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταὐτόν τι πεπονθότε, ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυεῖν ἑκάτερος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους. αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου ἑκάστοτε, καίπερ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι ὁπόσ' ἂν φῇ σου τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῇ, ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' E ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου. ἔν τε [γὰρ] τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἐάν τι σοῦ λέγοντος ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων μὴ φῇ οὕτως ἔχειν, μεταβαλλόμενος λέγεις ἃ ἐκεῖνος βούλεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πυριλάμπους νεανίαν τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα πέπονθας. τοῖς γὰρ τῶν παιδικῶν βουλεύμασί τε καὶ λόγοις οὐχ οἷός τ' εἶ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὥστε, εἴ τίς σου λέγοντος ἑκάστοτε ἃ διὰ τούτους λέγεις θαυμάζοι ὡς ἄτοπά ἐστιν, ἴσως εἴποις ἂν αὐτῷ, εἰ βούλοιο ταληθῆ λέγειν, ὅτι, εἰ μή
482 τις παύσει | τὰ σὰ παιδικὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ σὺ παύσει ποτὲ ταῦτα λέγων. νόμιζε τοίνυν καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ χρῆναι ἕτερα τοιαῦτ' ἀκούειν, καὶ μὴ θαύμαζε ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τἀμὰ παιδικά, παῦσον ταῦτα λέγουσαν. λέγει γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ἀεὶ ἃ νῦν ἐμοῦ ἀκούεις, καί μοί ἐστι

τῶν ἑτέρων παιδικῶν πολὺ ἧττον ἐμπλεκτος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κλεινίειος οὗτος ἄλλοτ' ἄλλων ἐστὶ λόγων, ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία ἀεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. λέγει δὲ ἃ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρῆσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένοις. ἦ οὖν B ἐκείνην ἐξέλεγξον, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μὴ διδόναι ἁπάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν· ἢ εἰ τοῦτ' ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, μὰ τὸν κύνα, τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, οὔ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφωνήσει ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ. καίτοι ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀναρμοστεῖν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοίην, καὶ πλείστους C ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ' ἐναντία λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἕνα ὄντα ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν.

XXXVIII. ΚΑΛ. Ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὤν· καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς ταὐτὸν παθόντος Πώλου πάθος, ὅπερ Γοργίου κατηγόρει πρὸς σὲ παθεῖν. ἔφη γάρ που Γοργίαν ἐρωτώμενον ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἐὰν ἀφίκηται παρ' αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος τὰ δίκαια ὁ τὴν ῥητορικὴν βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξοι αὐτὸν ὁ Γοργίας, αἰσχυνθῆναι αὐτὸν καὶ φάναι διδάξειν D διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἂν εἴ τις μὴ φαίη· διὰ δὴ ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἀναγκασθῆναι ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν, σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶν. καί σου κατεγέλα, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, ὀρθῶς τότε. νῦν δὲ πάλιν αὐτὸς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἔπαθε, καὶ ἔγωγε κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἄγαμαι Πῶλον, ὅτι σοι συνεχώρησε τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὖ τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπε- E

στομίσθη, αἰσχυνθεὶς ἃ ἐνόει εἰπεῖν. σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν, ἃ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστι καλά, νόμῳ δέ. ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἥ τε φύσις καὶ ὁ νόμος. ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ
483 λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία λέγειν. δ δὴ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκὼς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου. ὥσπερ αὐτίκα ἐν τούτοις, τῷ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι, Πώλου τὸ κατὰ νόμον αἴσχιον λέγοντος σὺ τὸν νόμον ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν. φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς
B τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶ τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνδραπόδου τινός, ᾧ κρεῖττόν ἐστι τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, ὅστις ἀδικούμενος καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος μὴ οἷός τ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ βοηθεῖν μηδὲ ἄλλῳ οὗ ἂν κήδηται. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς
C ἄνθρωποί εἰσι καὶ οἱ πολλοί. πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τούς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ τοὺς ψόγους ψέγουσιν, ἐκφοβοῦντές τε τοὺς ἐρρωμενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλέον ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν πλέον ἔχωσι, λέγουσιν, ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο ἔστι τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων ζητεῖν ἔχειν· ἀγαπῶσι γάρ, οἶμαι, αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ ἴσον ἔχωσι φαυλότεροι ὄντες.

XXXIX. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ αἰσχρὸν λέγεται, τὸ πλέον ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν· ἡ δέ γε, οἶμαι,

φύσις αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει αὖ ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸν D
ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώ-
τερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ
ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ τῶν
5 ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν,
ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ
ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δικαίῳ
χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ
ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας; ἢ ἄλλα μυρί' ἄν τις E
10 ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οὗτοι κατὰ φύσιν
[τὴν τοῦ δικαίου] ταῦτα πράττουσι, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία
κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως κατὰ
τοῦτον ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτί-
στους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων
15 λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπάδοντές τε καὶ
γοητεύοντες καταδουλούμεθα | λέγοντες ὡς τὸ ἴσον 484
χρὴ ἔχειν καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον.
ἐὰν δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνήρ,
πάντα ταῦτα ἀποσεισάμενος καὶ διαῤῥήξας καὶ
20 διαφυγών, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέτερα γράμματα καὶ
μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπῳδὰς καὶ νόμους τοὺς παρὰ
φύσιν ἅπαντας, ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης ἡ-
μέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξέλαμψε τὸ τῆς
φύσεως δίκαιον. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος ἅπερ B
25 ἐγὼ λέγω ἐνδείκνυσθαι ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι ἐν ᾧ λέγει ὅτι
Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν τε καὶ
ἀθανάτων· οὗτος δὲ δή, φησίν, ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ
βιαιότατον ὑπερτάτᾳ χερί· τεκμαίρομαι ἔρ-
γοισιν Ἡρακλέος, ἐπεὶ ἀπριάτας—λέγει οὕτω
30 πως· τὸ γὰρ ᾆσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι. λέγει δ' ὅτι
οὔτε πριάμενος οὔτε δόντος τοῦ Γηρυόνου ἠλάσατο
τὰς βοῦς, ὡς τούτου ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου φύσει, καὶ C

βοῦς καὶ τἆλλα κτήματα εἶναι πάντα τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ κρείττονος τὰ τῶν χειρόνων τε καὶ ἡττόνων.

XL. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς οὕτως ἔχει, γνώσει δέ, ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω ἔλθῃς ἐάσας ἤδη φιλοσοφίαν. φιλοσοφία γάρ τοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἄν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ἅψηται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πάνυ εὐφυὴς ᾖ καὶ πόῤῥω τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῇ, ἀνάγκη πάντων ἄπειρον
D γεγονέναι ἐστίν, ὧν χρὴ ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα. καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων ἄπειροι γίγνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῶν λόγων οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήβδην τῶν ἠθῶν παντάπασιν
E ἄπειροι γίγνονται. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἔλθωσιν εἴς τινα ἰδίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν πρᾶξιν, καταγέλαστοι γίγνονται, ὥσπερ γε, οἶμαι, οἱ πολιτικοί, ἐπειδὰν αὖ εἰς τὰς ὑμετέρας διατριβὰς ἔλθωσι καὶ τοὺς λόγους, καταγέλαστοί εἰσι. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου· λαμπρός τ' ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἐν τούτῳ,

καὶπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται,
νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος,
ἵν' αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὤν. |

485 ὅπου δ' ἂν φαῦλος ᾖ, ἐντεῦθεν φεύγει καὶ λοιδορεῖ τοῦτο, τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἐπαινεῖ, εὐνοίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἡγούμενος οὕτως αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, τὸ ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων μετασχεῖν. φιλοσοφίας μέν, ὅσον παιδείας χάριν, καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ ὄντι φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ὢν ἄνθρωπος ἔτι φιλοσοφῇ,

καταγέλαστον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ χρῆμα γίγνεται, καὶ B
ἔγωγε ὁμοιότατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας
ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ψελλιζομένους καὶ παίζοντας.
ὅταν μὲν γὰρ παιδίον ἴδω ᾧ ἔτι προσήκει δια-
λέγεσθαι οὕτω ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παῖζον, χαίρω τε
καὶ χαρίεν μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ πρέπον
τῇ τοῦ παιδίου ἡλικίᾳ· ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλεγομένου
παιδαρίου ἀκούσω, πικρόν τί μοι δοκεῖ χρῆμα εἶναι
καὶ ἀνιᾷ μου τὰ ὦτα καί μοι δοκεῖ δουλοπρεπές τι
εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἀκούσῃ τις ψελλιζομένου ἢ
παίζοντα ὁρᾷ, καταγέλαστον φαίνεται καὶ ἄνανδρον C
καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον. ταὐτὸν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο πάσχω
καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας. παρὰ νέῳ μὲν γὰρ
μειρακίῳ ὁρῶν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, καὶ πρέπειν μοι
δοκεῖ, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ἐλεύθερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν
ἄνθρωπον, τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀνελεύθερον καὶ
οὐδέποτε οὐδενὸς ἀξιώσοντα ἑαυτὸν οὔτε καλοῦ οὔτε
γενναίου πράγματος· ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω D
ἔτι φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν
μοὶ δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ ἀνήρ.
ὃ γὰρ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ,
κἂν πάνυ εὐφυὴς ᾖ, ἀνάνδρῳ γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ
μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη ὁ
ποιητὴς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀριπρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι, κατα-
δεδυκότι δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν βίον βιῶναι μετὰ μειρακίων
ἐν γωνίᾳ τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ψιθυρίζοντα, ἐλεύθερον
δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ ἱκανὸν μηδέποτε φθέγξασθαι. E

XLI. Ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ ἐπιεικῶς
ἔχω φιλικῶς. κινδυνεύω οὖν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ
ὁ Ζῆθος πρὸς τὸν Ἀμφίονα ὁ Εὐριπίδου, οὗπερ
ἐμνήσθην. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐπέρχεται
πρὸς σὲ λέγειν οἷάπερ ἐκεῖνος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν,

ὅτι ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὧν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι,
καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ὧδε γενναίαν μειρακιώδει τινὶ
486 διαπρέπεις μορφώματι, | καὶ οὔτ' ἂν δίκης βουλαῖσι
προθεὶς ἂν ὀρθῶς λόγον, οὔτ' εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν
λάβοις, οὔθ' ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βούλευμα βου- 5
λεύσαιο. καίτοι, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες—καί μοι μηδὲν
ἀχθεσθῇς· εὐνοίᾳ γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ—οὐκ αἰσχρὸν
δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ σὲ οἶμαι ἔχειν
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πόρρω ἀεὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύ-
νοντας; νῦν γὰρ εἴ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου 10
ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀπαγάγοι,
B φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν
ἔχοις ὅ τι χρήσαιο σαυτῷ, ἀλλ' ἰλιγγιᾷης ἂν καὶ
χασμῷο οὐκ ἔχων ὅ τι εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον
ἀναβάς, κατηγόρου τυχὼν πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχ- 15
θηροῦ, ἀποθάνοις ἄν, εἰ βούλοιτο θανάτου σοι
τιμᾶσθαι. καίτοι πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες, εἴ τις εὐφυᾶ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτα ἔθηκε
χείρονα, μήτε αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν μηδ'
ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε ἑαυτὸν 20
C μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλᾶσθαι
πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἄτιμον ζῆν ἐν τῇ
πόλει; τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον
εἰρῆσθαι, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι
δίκην. ἀλλ' ὦ 'γαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου, παῦσαι δ' ἐλέγχων, 25
πραγμάτων δ' εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν
δόξεις φρονεῖν, ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείς, εἴτε
ληρήματα χρὴ φάναι εἶναι εἴτε φλυαρίας, ἐξ ὧν
κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις· ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας
ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' οἷς ἔστι καὶ βίος καὶ 30
D δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθά.

XLII. ΣΩ. Εἰ χρυσῆν ἔχων ἐτύγχανον τὴν

ψυχήν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἂν οἴει με ἄσμενον εὑρεῖν τούτων τινὰ τῶν λίθων ἢ βασανίζουσι τὸν χρυσόν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἥντινα ἔμελλον προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, εἰ μοι ὁμολογήσειεν ἐκείνη καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, εὖ εἶσεσθαι ὅτι ἱκανῶς ἔχω καὶ οὐδέν μοι δεῖ ἄλλης βασάνου;

ΚΑΛ. Πρὸς τί δὴ τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες; E

ΣΩ. Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ νῦν. οἶμαι ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐντετυχηκὼς τοιουτῳ ἑρμαίῳ ἐντετυχηκέναι.

ΚΑΛ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἄν μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσῃς περὶ ὧν ἡ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ δοξάζει, ταῦτ' ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τἀληθῆ. ἐννοῶ γὰρ ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα | βασανιεῖν 487
ἱκανῶς ψυχῆς πέρι ὀρθῶς τε ζώσης καὶ μὴ τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν, ἃ σὺ πάντα ἔχεις, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὔνοιαν καὶ παῤῥησίαν. ἐγὼ γὰρ πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω οἳ ἐμὲ οὐχ οἷοί τε εἰσὶ βασανίζειν διὰ τὸ μὴ σοφοὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ σύ· ἕτεροι δὲ σοφοὶ μέν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐθέλουσι δέ μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὸ μὴ κήδεσθαί μου ὥσπερ σύ· τὼ δὲ ξένω τώδε, Γοργίας τε καὶ Πῶλος, σοφὼ μὲν καὶ φίλω ἐστὸν ἐμώ, B
ἐνδεεστέρω δὲ παῤῥησίας καὶ αἰσχυντηροτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος· πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ὦ γε εἰς τοσοῦτον αἰσχύνης ἐληλύθατον, ὥστε διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἐναντία λέγειν ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων. σὺ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχουσι· πεπαίδευσαί τε γὰρ ἱκανῶς, ὡς πολλοὶ ἂν φήσαιεν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐμοὶ εἶ εὔνους. τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι; ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα ὑμᾶς ἐγώ, C
ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τέτταρας ὄντας κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας, σέ τε καὶ Τίσανδρον τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον καὶ

Ἄνδρωνα τὸν Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ Ναυσικύδην τὸν Χολαργέα. καί ποτε ὑμῶν ἐγὼ ἐπήκουσα βουλευομένων μέχρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητέον εἴη, καὶ οἶδ' ὅτι ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλα-
D βεῖσθαι παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλοις ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι γενόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες. ἐπειδὴ οὖν σου ἀκούω ταῦτα ἐμοὶ συμβουλεύοντος, ἅπερ τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἑταιροτάτοις, ἱκανόν μοι τεκμήριόν ἐστιν ὅτι ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι εὔνους εἶ. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε οἷος παῤῥησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι, αὐτός τε φὴς καὶ ὁ λόγος ὃν ὀλίγου πρότερον ἔλεγες ὁμολογεῖ σοι. ἔχει δὴ οὑτωσὶ δῆλον ὅτι τούτων
E περὶ νυνί· ἐάν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογήσῃς μοι, βεβασανισμένον τοῦτ' ἤδη ἔσται ἱκανῶς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐκέτι αὐτὸ δεήσει ἐπ' ἄλλην βάσανον ἀναφέρειν. οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸ συνεχώρησας σὺ οὔτε σοφίας ἐνδείᾳ οὔτ' αἰσχύνης περιουσίᾳ· οὐδ' αὖ ἀπατῶν ἐμὲ συγχωρήσαις ἄν· φίλος γάρ μοι εἶ, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς φῄς. τῷ ὄντι οὖν ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ σὴ ὁμολογία τέλος ἤδη ἕξει τῆς ἀληθείας. πάντων δὲ καλλίστη ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, περὶ τούτων ὧν σὺ δή μοι ἐπετίμησας, ποῖόν τινα
488 χρὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τί ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ | μέχρι τοῦ, καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα. ἐγὼ γὰρ εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττω κατὰ τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ, εὖ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι οὐχ ἑκὼν ἐξαμαρτάνω ἀλλ' ἀμαθίᾳ τῇ ἐμῇ. σὺ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἤρξω νουθετεῖν με, μὴ ἀποστῇς, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς μοι ἔνδειξαι τί ἔστι τοῦτο ὃ ἐπιτηδευτέον μοι, καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτησαίμην ἂν αὐτό. καὶ ἐάν με λάβῃς νῦν μέν σοι ὁμολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ μὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα ἅπερ

ὡμολόγησα, πάνυ με ἡγοῦ βλᾶκα εἶναι καὶ μηκέτι B
ποτέ με νουθετήσῃς ὕστερον, ὡς μηδενὸς ἄξιον ὄντα.
ἐξ ἀρχῆς δέ μοι ἐπανάλαβε, πῶς φὴς τὸ δίκαιον
ἔχειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; ἄγειν
βίᾳ τὸν κρείττω τὰ τῶν ἡττόνων καὶ ἄρχειν τὸν
βελτίω τῶν χειρόνων καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἀμείνω
τοῦ φαυλοτέρου; μή τι ἄλλο λέγεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι,
ἢ ὀρθῶς μέμνημαι;

XLIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἔλεγον καὶ τότε,
καὶ νῦν λέγω.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν βελτίω καλεῖς σὺ C
καὶ κρείττω; οὐδὲ γάρ τοι τότε οἷός τ' ἦ μαθεῖν
σου τί ποτε λέγεις. πότερον τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους
κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ δεῖ ἀκροᾶσθαι τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου
τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρους, οἷόν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ τότε ἐν-
δείκνυσθαι ὡς αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τὰς σμικρὰς
κατὰ τὸ φύσει δίκαιον ἔρχονται, ὅτι κρείττους εἰσὶ
καὶ ἰσχυρότεραι, ὡς τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον
καὶ βέλτιον ταὐτὸν ὄν, ἢ ἔστι βελτίω μὲν εἶναι,
ἧττω δὲ καὶ ἀσθενέστερον, καὶ κρείττω μὲν εἶναι,
μοχθηρότερον δέ· ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς ὅρος ἐστὶ τοῦ βελτίονος D
καὶ τοῦ κρείττονος; τοῦτό μοι αὐτὸ σαφῶς διόρισον,
ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον
καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι σαφῶς λέγω ὅτι ταὐτόν
ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶ
κατὰ φύσιν; οἳ δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ
τῷ ἑνί, ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες.

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα τὰ τῶν
κρειττόνων ἐστίν.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

E ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ τῶν βελτιόνων; οἱ γὰρ κρείττους βελτίους πολὺ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ τούτων νόμιμα κατὰ φύσιν καλά, κρειττόνων γε ὄντων;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὡς ἄρτι αὖ σὺ ἔλεγες, δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν
489 καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; | ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὔ; καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀλώσει ἐνταῦθα σὺ αἰσχυνόμενος. νομίζουσιν, ἢ οὔ, οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πλέον δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; Μὴ φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἵν', ἐάν μοι ὁμολογήσῃς, βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ, ἅτε ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγνῶναι ὡμολογηκότος.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' οἵ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐ νόμῳ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν,
B ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει· ὥστε κινδυνεύεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ ὀρθῶς ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγων ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς κακουργῶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων, ἐὰν δέ τις κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν.

take an unfair o vantage

XLIV. ΚΑΛ. Οὗτοσὶν ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνει, τηλικοῦτος ὤν, ὀνόματα θηρεύων, καὶ ἐάν τις ῥήματι
C ἁμάρτῃ, ἔρμαιον τοῦτο ποιούμενος; ἐμὲ γὰρ οἴει ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρείττους εἶναι ἢ τὸ βελτίους; οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω ὅτι ταὐτόν φημι εἶναι τὸ βέλτιον

καὶ τὸ κρεῖττον; ἢ οἴει με λέγειν, ἐὰν συρφετὸς συλλεγῇ δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς ἀξίων πλὴν ἴσως τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα;

ΣΩ. Εἶεν, ὦ σοφώτατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις; D

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τοπάζω τοιοῦτόν τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ γλιχόμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅ τι λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο βελτίους ἡγεῖ τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίους σοῦ, ὅτι ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰπέ, τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους; καὶ ὦ θαυμάσιε πραότερόν με προδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ.

ΚΑΛ. Εἰρωνεύει, ὦ Σώκρατες. E

ΣΩ. Μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ᾧ σὺ χρώμενος πολλὰ νῦν δὴ εἰρωνεύου πρός με· ἀλλ' ἴθι εἰπέ, τίνας λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. Τοὺς ἀμείνους ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς ἄρα ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ὀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν. οὐκ ἐρεῖς, τοὺς βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλους τινάς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Πολλάκις ἄρα εἷς φρονῶν μυρίων | μὴ 490
φρονούντων κρείττων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ τοῦτον ἄρχειν δεῖ, τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἀρχομένων. τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖς βούλεσθαι λέγειν—καὶ οὐ ῥήματα θηρεύω—, εἰ ὁ εἷς τῶν μυρίων κρείττων.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἃ λέγω. τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι ἐγὼ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίω ὄντα
B καὶ φρονιμώτερον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν φαυλοτέρων.

XLV. ΣΩ. Ἔχε δὴ αὐτοῦ. τί ποτε αὖ νῦν λέγεις; ἐὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἀθρόοι ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἢ ἐν κοινῷ πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, ὦμεν δὲ παντοδαποί, οἱ μὲν ἰσχυροί, οἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς, εἷς δὲ ἡμῶν ἢ φρονιμώτερος περὶ ταῦτα ἰατρὸς ὤν, ἢ δέ, οἷον εἰκός, τῶν μὲν ἰσχυρότερος, τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος, ἄλλο τι οὗτος φρονιμώτερος ἡμῶν ὢν βελτίων καὶ κρείττων ἔσται εἰς ταῦτα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

C ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων πλέον ἡμῶν ἑκτέον αὐτῷ, ὅτι βελτίων ἐστίν, ἢ τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν πάντα ἐκεῖνον δεῖ νέμειν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ καταχρῆσθαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα οὐ πλεονεκτητέον, εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν πλέον, τῶν δ' ἔλαττον ἑκτέον· ἐὰν δὲ τύχῃ πάντων ἀσθενέστατος ὤν, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις; οὐχ οὕτως, ὦ ἰγαθέ;

ΚΑΛ. [Περὶ] Σιτία λέγεις καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἰατροὺς
D καὶ φλυαρίας· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὸν φρονιμώτερον βελτίω λέγεις; Φάθι ἢ μή.

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν βελτίω πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σιτίων γε οὐδὲ ποτῶν.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱματίων, καὶ δεῖ τὸν ὑφαντικώτατον μέγιστον ἱμάτιον ἔχειν καὶ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀμπεχόμενον περιιέναι.

ΚΑΛ. Ποίων ἱματίων; cloths indeed!

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰς ὑποδήματα δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸν φρονιμώτατον εἰς ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστον. τὸν σκυτοτόμον ἴσως μέγιστα δεῖ ὑποδήματα καὶ πλεῖστα ὑποδεδεμένον περιπατεῖν. E

ΚΑΛ. Ποῖα ὑποδήματα φλυαρεῖς ἔχων;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεις, ἴσως τὰ τοιάδε· οἷον γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα περὶ γῆν φρόνιμόν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, τοῦτον δὴ ἴσως δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν σπερμάτων καὶ ὡς πλείστῳ σπέρματι χρῆσθαι εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ γῆν.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΚΑΛ. Νὴ | τοὺς θεούς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας 491
τε καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει, ὥσπερ περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὄντα τὸν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν σὺ ἐρεῖς [περὶ] τίνων ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ φρονιμώτερος πλέον ἔχων δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὔτε ἐμοῦ ὑποβάλλοντος ἀνέξει οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐρεῖς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω. πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς κρείττους οἵ εἰσιν, οὐ σκυτοτόμους λέγω B οὐδὲ μαγείρους, ἀλλ' οἳ ἂν εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι ὦσιν, ὄντινα ἂν τρόπον εὖ οἰκοῖτο, καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἃ ἂν νοήσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν τῆς ψυχῆς.

XLVI. ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς, ὦ βέλτιστε Καλλίκλεις, ὡς οὐ ταὐτὰ σύ τ' ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ φὴς ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγειν, καὶ μέμφει μοι· ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τοὐναντίον ὅτι οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ λέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν τοὺς βελτίους C

τε καὶ κρείττους τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους ὡρίζου, αὖθις δὲ τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους, νῦν δ' αὖ ἕτερόν τι ἥκεις ἔχων· ἀνδρειότεροί τινες ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγονται οἱ κρείττους καὶ οἱ βελτίους. ἀλλ', ὦ γαθέ, εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι τίνας ποτὲ λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους καὶ εἰς ὅ τι.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' εἴρηκά γε ἔγωγε τοὺς φρονίμους εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα καὶ ἀνδρείους. τούτους
D γὰρ προσήκει τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστί, πλέον ἔχειν τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; αὑτῶν, ὦ ἑταῖρε;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἕνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα. ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σώφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν
E ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ! τοὺς ἠλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας.

ΣΩ. Πῶς γάρ; οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνοίη ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγω.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων ὁτῳοῦν; ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃ ἐγώ σοι νῦν παῤῥησιαζόμενος λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἐᾶν ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν,
492 ταύταις δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὔσαις ἱκανὸν | εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι

ὧν ἂν ἀεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ', οἶμαι, τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατόν· ὅθεν ψέγουσι τοὺς τοιούτους δι' αἰσχύνην ἀποκρυπτόμενοι τὴν αὑτῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ αἰσχρὸν δή φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, δουλούμενοι τοὺς βελτίους τὴν φύσιν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐκπορίζεσθαι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς πλήρωσιν B ἐπαινοῦσι τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἀνανδρίαν. ἐπεί γε οἷς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρξεν ἢ βασιλέων υἱέσιν εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς τῇ φύσει ἱκανοὺς ἐκπορίσασθαι ἀρχήν τινα ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ δυναστείαν, τί τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον εἴη σωφροσύνης τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; οἷς ἐξὸν ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδὼν ὄντος, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς δεσπότην ἐπαγάγοιντο τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον; ἢ πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἄθλιοι γεγονότες εἴησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ C τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης, μηδὲν πλέον νέμοντες τοῖς φίλοις τοῖς αὑτῶν ἢ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἄρχοντες ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν πόλει; ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἣν φὴς σὺ διώκειν, ὧδ' ἔχει· τρυφὴ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετή τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα, ἀνθρώπων φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια.

XLVII. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, D ἐπεξέρχει τῷ λόγῳ παῤῥησιαζόμενος· σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μέν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι. δέομαι οὖν ἐγώ σου μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνεῖναι, ἵνα τῷ ὄντι κατάδηλον γένηται πῶς βιωτέον. καί μοι λέγε· τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φὴς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἷον δεῖ εἶναι, ἐῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς

μεγίστας πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν ἐτοι-
Ε μάζειν, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν;

ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ ταῦτα ἐγώ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται οἱ μηδενὸς δεό-
μενοι εὐδαίμονες εἶναι.

ΚΑΛ. Οἱ λίθοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ
εὐδαιμονέστατοι εἶεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὧν γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς
ὁ βίος. οὐ γάρ τοι θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν, εἰ Εὐριπίδης
ἀληθῆ ἐν τοῖσδε λέγει, λέγων

τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;

καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἴσως τέθναμεν· ὅπερ ἤδη του |
493 ἔγωγε καὶ ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν, ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν,
καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς
τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶ τυγχάνει ὂν οἷον ἀνα-
πείθεσθαι καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἄνω κάτω. καὶ τοῦτο
ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνήρ, ἴσως Σικελός τις
ἢ Ἰταλικός, παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι διὰ τὸ πιθανόν
τε καὶ πιστικὸν ὠνόμασε πίθον, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους
Β ἀμυήτους· τῶν δ' ἀμυήτων τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ αἱ
ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν,
ὡς τετρημένος εἴη πίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπει-
κάσας. τοὐναντίον δὴ οὗτος σοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις,
ἐνδείκνυται ὡς τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου—τὸ ἀειδὲς δὴ λέγων—
οὗτοι ἀθλιώτατοι ἂν εἶεν οἱ ἀμύητοι, καὶ φοροῖεν
εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὕδωρ ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ
τετρημένῳ κοσκίνῳ. τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς
ἔφη ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι· τὴν δὲ
C ψυχὴν κοσκίνῳ ἀπείκασε τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὡς
τετρημένην, ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δι' ἀπιστίαν
τε καὶ λήθην. ταῦτ' ἐπιεικῶς μέν ἐστιν ὑπό τι

ἄτοπα, δηλοῖ μὴν ὃ ἐγὼ βούλομαί σοι ἐνδειξάμενος, ἐάν πως οἷός τε ὦ, πεῖσαι μεταθέσθαι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἁπλήστως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος βίου τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐξαρκούντως ἔχοντα βίον ἑλέσθαι. ἀλλὰ πότερον πείθω τί σε καὶ μετατίθεσαι εὐδαιμονεστέρους εἶναι τοὺς κοσμίους τῶν ἀκολάστων, ἢ οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἂν καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μυθολογῶ, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον μεταθήσει; D

ΚΑΛ. Τοῦτ' ἀληθέστερον εἴρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XLVIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἄλλην σοι εἰκόνα λέγω ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν. σκόπει γὰρ εἰ τοιόνδε λέγεις περὶ τοῦ βίου ἑκατέρου τοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οἷον εἰ δυοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἑκατέρῳ πίθοι πολλοὶ εἶεν, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἑτέρῳ ὑγιεῖς καὶ πλήρεις, ὁ μὲν οἴνου, ὁ δὲ μέλιτος, ὁ δὲ γάλακτος E καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πολλῶν, νάματα δὲ σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ ἑκάστου τούτων εἴη καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκποριζόμενα· ὁ μὲν οὖν ἕτερος πληρωσάμενος μήτ' ἐποχετεύοι μήτε τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τούτων ἡσυχίαν ἔχοι· τῷ δ' ἑτέρῳ τὰ μὲν νάματα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκείνῳ, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι, χαλεπὰ δέ, τὰ δ' ἀγγεῖα τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά, καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτο ἀεὶ καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν πιμπλάναι | αὐτά, ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας· ἆρα τοιούτου 494 ἑκατέρου ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ ἀκολάστου εὐδαιμονέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὸν τοῦ κοσμίου; πείθω τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κόσμιον βίον τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀμείνω εἶναι, ἢ οὐ πείθω;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ πείθεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πληρωσαμένῳ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν ἡδονὴ οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν, ἐπειδὰν πληρώσῃ, μήτε χαίροντα ἔτι

B μήτε λυπούμενον. ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶ τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὡς πλεῖστον ἐπιῤῥεῖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γ', ἂν πολὺ ἐπιῤῥέῃ, πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἀπιὸν εἶναι καὶ μεγάλ' ἄττα τὰ τρήματα εἶναι ταῖς ἐκροαῖς;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Χαραδριοῦ τιν' αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ' οὐ νεκροῦ οὐδὲ λίθου. καί μοι λέγε, τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις οἷον πεινῆν καὶ πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

C ΣΩ. Καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν;

ΚΑΛ. Λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἁπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν.

XLIX. ΣΩ. Εὖγε, ὦ βέλτιστε· διατέλει γὰρ ὥσπερ ἤρξω, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχυνεῖ. δεῖ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, μηδ' ἐμὲ ἀπαισχυνθῆναι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰπὲ εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα καὶ κνησιῶντα, ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνῆσθαι, κνώμενον διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως ἔστι ζῆν.

D ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος.

ΣΩ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ ἐξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῇς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνθῇς· ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ εἶ. ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου μόνον.

ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ τοίνυν καὶ τὸν κνώμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιῶναι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἡδέως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

E ΣΩ. Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιῷ, ἢ ἔτι τί σε ἐρωτῶ; ὅρα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἀποκρινεῖ,

ἐάν τίς σε τὰ ἐχόμενα τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἅπαντα ἐρωτᾷ. καὶ τούτων τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον, ὁ τῶν κιναίδων βίος, οὗτος οὐ δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος; ἢ τούτους τολμήσεις λέγειν εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, ἐάν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ αἰσχύνει εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς λόγους;

ΣΩ. Ἡ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὦ γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκεῖνος ὃς ἂν φῇ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν, εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, | καὶ μὴ διορίζηται 495
τῶν ἡδονῶν ὁποῖαι ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί; ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε, πότερον φὴς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναί τι τῶν ἡδέων ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἵνα δή μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος ᾖ ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν ἕτερον φήσω εἶναι, τὸ αὐτό φημι εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Διαφθείρεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ' ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς.

ΚΑΛ. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὔτ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο, οὔτε σύ. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ἄθρει μὴ οὐ Β
τοῦτο ᾖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ πάντως χαίρειν· ταῦτά τε γὰρ τὰ νῦν δὴ αἰνιχθέντα πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται συμβαίνοντα, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς σύ γε οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἰσχυρίζει;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

L. ΣΩ. Ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ ὡς σοῦ C
σπουδάζοντος;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ, διελοῦ τάδε. ἐπιστήμην που καλεῖς τι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ ἀνδρείαν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ ἐπιστήμης;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔλεγον γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὡς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες;

ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡδονὴν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον;

D ΚΑΛ. Ἕτερον δήπου, ὦ σοφώτατε σύ.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἑτέραν ἡδονῆς;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλικλῆς ἔφη ὁ Ἀχαρνεὺς ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕτερον.

ΚΑΛ. Σωκράτης δέ γ' ἡμῖν ὁ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ ταῦτα. ἢ ὁμολογεῖ;

E ΣΩ. Οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ· οἶμαι δέ γ' οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς, ὅταν αὐτὸς αὑτὸν θεάσηται ὀρθῶς. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τοὐναντίον ἡγεῖ πάθος πεπονθέναι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶ ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγιείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου; οὐ γὰρ ἅμα δήπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ἅμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγιείας τε καὶ νόσου.

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οἷον περὶ ὅτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπο-

λαβὼν σκόπει. νοσεῖ | που ἄνθρωπος ὀφθαλμούς, 496
ᾧ ὄνομα ὀφθαλμία;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐ δήπου καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε ἅμα τοὺς αὐτούς;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττηται, ἆρα τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τελευτῶν ἅμα ἀμφοτέρων ἀπήλλακται;

ΚΑΛ. Ἥκιστά γε.

ΣΩ. Θαυμάσιον γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ ἄλογον γίγνεται. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐν μέρει, οἶμαι, ἑκάτερον καὶ λαμ- Β
βάνει καὶ ἀπολλύει;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀσθένειαν ὡσαύτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτῆτα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τἀναντία τούτων, κακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἑκατέρου;

ΚΑΛ. Πάντως δήπου.

ΣΩ. Ἐὰν εὕρωμεν ἄρ' ἄττα ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλ- C
λάττεται ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; Καὶ εὖ μάλα σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ.

LI. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολογημένα. τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον ἡδὺ ἢ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἡδύ.

D ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· ἀλλ' οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν. ἢ οὐχί;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν;

ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. Ὁμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν. διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡδὺ φὴς εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτου οὗ λέγεις τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δήπου ἐστίν;

E ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἡδονή;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις;

ΚΑΛ. Μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Διψῶντά γε;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Λυπούμενον;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Αἰσθάνει οὖν τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἅμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς; ἢ οὐχ ἅμα τοῦτο γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος βούλει; οὐδὲν γάρ, οἶμαι, διαφέρει. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εὖ γε πράττοντα κακῶς πράττειν ἅμα ἀδύνατον †ἔφης† εἶναι.

ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἀνιώμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυνατὸν ὠμο- 497
λόγηκας.

ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἄττα σοφίζει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα, ἀλλ' ἀκκίζει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. καὶ πρόϊθί γ' ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν, [ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς,] ἵν' εἰδῇς ὡς σοφὸς ὢν με νουθετεῖς. οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν τε ἕκαστος ἡμῶν πέπαυται καὶ ἅμα ἡδόμενος διὰ Β
τοῦ πίνειν;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδα ὅ τι λέγεις.

ΓΟΡ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν ἕνεκα, ἵνα περανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστι Σωκράτης, ὦ Γοργία· σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια ἀνερωτᾷ καὶ ἐξελέγχει.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἀλλ' ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι ὅπως ἂν βούληται.

ΚΑΛ. Ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ τὰ σμικρά τε καὶ στενὰ C
ταῦτα, ἐπείπερ Γοργίᾳ δοκεῖ οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ᾤμην θεμιτὸν εἶναι. ὅθεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες, ἀποκρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἅμα παύεται διψῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος.

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

D ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἅμα παύεται, ὡς σὺ ὡμολόγεις· νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε, τί οὖν δή;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐ ταὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὦ φίλε, τἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἡδέσιν οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιαροῖς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα παύεται, τῶν δὲ οὔ, ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων. πῶς οὖν ταὐτὰ ἂν εἴη τὰ ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ τοῖς κακοῖς; Ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, καὶ τῇδ' ἐπίσκεψαι·

E οἶμαι γάρ σοι οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ὁμολογεῖσθαι. ἄθρει δέ· τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ δειλούς; οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους ἔλεγες. ἢ οὐ τούτους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; παῖδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα ἤδη εἶδες;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἄνδρα δὲ οὔπω εἶδες ἀνόητον χαίροντα;

ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο;

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου.

ΚΑΛ. Εἶδον. |

498 ΣΩ. Τί δέ; νοῦν ἔχοντα λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες;

ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρειν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη εἶδες ἄνδρα δειλόν;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν μᾶλλον χαίρειν, οἱ δειλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε μᾶλλον· εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε. B

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν διαφέρει. χαίρουσι δ' οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί;

ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὡς ἔοικεν.

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται ἢ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀμφότεροι.

ΣΩ. Ἆρα ὁμοίως;

ΚΑΛ. Μᾶλλον ἴσως οἱ δειλοί.

ΣΩ. Ἀπιόντων δ' οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσι καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως, ὡς σὺ φής, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων; C

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοί;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί τε καὶ οἱ κακοί; ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοί εἰσιν οἱ κακοί;

D ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φὴς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθούς, κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρουσι πάρεστι τἀγαθά, αἱ ἡδοναί, εἴπερ χαίρουσι;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοί εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστι τὰ κακά, αἱ λῦπαι;

ΚΑΛ. Πάρεστι.

E ΣΩ. Κακῶν δέ γε παρουσίᾳ φὴς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακούς. ἢ οὐκέτι φής;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθοὶ ἄρα οἳ ἂν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἳ ἂν ἀνιῶνται;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οἱ μέν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἱ δ' ἧττον ἧττον, οἱ δὲ παραπλησίως παραπλησίως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φὴς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τοὺς φρονίμους καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ

τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλούς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ, τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων· καὶ δὶς γάρ τοι καὶ τρὶς φασι καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ | ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. Ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ 499 ἀνδρεῖόν φαμεν. ἢ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιώμενον;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ἀνιᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ χαίρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὁμοίως, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακόν;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός; οὐ ταῦτα B συμβαίνει καὶ τὰ πρότερα ἐκεῖνα, ἐάν τις ταὐτὰ φῇ ἡδέα τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι; οὐ ταῦτ' ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;

LIV. ΚΑΛ. Πάλαι τοί σου ἀκροῶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι, κἂν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῷ ὁτιοῦν, τούτου ἄσμενος ἔχει ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια. ὡς δὴ σὺ οἴει ἐμὲ ἢ καὶ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους.

ΣΩ. Ἰοὺ ἰού, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς πανοῦργος εἶ, καὶ μοι ὥσπερ παιδὶ χρῇ, τοτὲ μὲν ταῦτα φάσκων C οὕτως ἔχειν, τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρως, ἐξαπατῶν με. καίτοι

οὐκ ᾤμην γε κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἑκόντος εἶναι ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι, ὡς ὄντος φίλου· νῦν δὲ ἐψεύσθην, καὶ ὡς ἔοικεν ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ. ἔστι δὲ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ νῦν λέγεις, ὅτι ἡδοναί τινές εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ βλαβεραί;

D ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὠφέλιμοι δέ γε αἱ ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ κακόν τι;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέγεις, οἷον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἃς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς· εἰ ἄρα τούτων αἱ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιοῦσιν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ τἀναντία τούτων κακαί;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

E ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ λῦπαι ὡσαύτως αἱ μὲν χρηστοί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πονηραί;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ αἱρετέον ἐστὶ καὶ πρακτέον;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δή.

ΣΩ. Ἕνεκα γάρ που τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἔδοξε πρακτέον εἶναι, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ἐμοί τε καὶ Πώλῳ. ἆρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι

ἁπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκεν
δεῖν πάντα τἆλλα πράττεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο | τῶν 500
ἄλλων; σύμψηφος ἡμῖν εἶ καὶ σὺ ἐκ τρίτων;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα ἕνεκα δεῖ καὶ τἆλλα καὶ
τὰ ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι
ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖα κακά, ἢ
τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον;

ΚΑΛ. Τεχνικοῦ.

LV. ΣΩ. Ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὧν αὖ ἐγὼ πρὸς
Πῶλον καὶ Γοργίαν ἐτύγχανον λέγων. ἔλεγον γάρ,
εἰ μνημονεύεις, ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαὶ αἱ μὲν μέχρι B
ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον παρασκευάζουσαι, ἀγνο-
οῦσαι δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον, αἱ δὲ γιγνώσκου-
σαι ὅ τί τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅ τι κακόν· καὶ ἐτίθην τῶν
μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν μαγειρικὴν ἐμπειρίαν, ἀλλ'
οὐ τέχνην, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰατρικὴν
τέχνην. καὶ πρὸς φιλίου, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, μήτε αὐτὸς
οἷόν δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν μηδ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃς παρὰ
τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτ' αὖ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ οὕτως
ἀποδέχου ὡς παίζοντος· ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τούτου C
εἰσὶν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι, οὗ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ τις
καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων ἄνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο, ὁντινα
χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν, πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ,
τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν
τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ῥητορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον
τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν ὑμεῖς νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ [ἐπὶ]
τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν
οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων. ἴσως οὖν βέλτιστόν ἐστιν,
ὡς ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαιρεῖσθαι, διελομένους D

δὲ καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλοις, εἰ ἔστι τούτω διττὼ τὼ βίω, σκέψασθαι τί τε διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν καὶ ὁπότερον βιωτέον αὐτοῖν. ἴσως οὖν οὔπω οἶσθα τί λέγω.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. ἐπειδὴ ὡμολογήκαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μέν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι δέ τι ἡδύ, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἑκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν μελέτην τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως, τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἡδέος θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ
E ἀγαθοῦ—αὐτὸ δέ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἢ σύμφαθι ἢ μή· σύμφης;

ΚΑΛ. Οὕτω φημί.

LVI. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή, ἃ καὶ πρὸς τούσδε ἐγὼ ἔλεγον διομολόγησαί μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἔδοξα τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν. ἔλεγον δέ που ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὀψοποικὴ οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία, ἡ δ' ἰατρική,
501 λέγων ὅτι | ἡ μὲν τούτου οὗ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὧν πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἑκάστου δοῦναι, ἡ ἰατρικὴ· ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς, πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἅπασα, κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σκεψαμένη τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν διαριθμησαμένη, τριβὴ καὶ ἐμπειρία, μνήμην μόνον σωζομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι, ᾧ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται τὰς ἡδονάς.
B ταῦτ' οὖν πρῶτον σκόπει εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ἱκανῶς λέγεσθαι, καὶ εἶναί τινες καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν τοιαῦται ἄλλαι πραγματεῖαι, αἱ μὲν τεχνικαί, προμήθειάν τινα ἔχουσαι τοῦ βελτίστου περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, αἱ δὲ τούτου μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσαι, ἐσκεμμέναι δ' αὖ, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς, τίνα ἂν αὐτῇ τρόπον γίγ-

νοιτο, ἥτις δὲ ἡ βελτίων ἢ χείρων τῶν ἡδονῶν, οὔτε σκοπούμεναι, οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς ἄλλο ἢ χαρίζεσθαι μόνον, εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε χεῖρον. ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ, ὦ C Καλλίκλεις, δοκοῦσί τε εἶναι, καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι τὸ τοιοῦτον κολακείαν εἶναι καὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ ἄλλο ὅτου ἄν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύῃ ἀσκέπτως ἔχων τοῦ ἀμείνονός τε καὶ τοῦ χείρονος· σὺ δὲ δὴ πότερον συγκατατίθεσαι ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων [τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν] ἢ ἀντίφης;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ ὁ λόγος καὶ Γοργίᾳ τῷδε χαρίσωμαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν μίαν ψυχὴν ἔστι D τοῦτο, περὶ δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς οὐκ ἔστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ περὶ πολλάς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀθρόαις ἅμα χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι μηδὲν σκοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον;

ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

LVII. ΣΩ. Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν αἵτινές εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιτηδεύσεις αἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι; Μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, ἡ μὲν ἄν σοι δοκῇ τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἢ δ' ἂν μή, μὴ φάθι. πρῶτον δὲ σκεψώμεθα τὴν αὐλητικήν. οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοιαύτη τις εἶναι, E ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡμῶν μόνον διώκειν, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν φροντίζειν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε ἅπασαι, οἷον ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις οὐ τοιαύτη τίς σοι καταφαίνεται; ἢ ἡγεῖ τι φροντίζειν Κινησίαν τὸν Μέλητος, ὅπως ἐρεῖ τι τοιοῦτον ὅθεν ἂν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίους

γίγνοιντο, | ἢ ὅ τι μέλλει χαριεῖσθαι τῷ ὄχλῳ τῶν θεατῶν;

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κινησίου γε πέρι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μέλης; ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον βλέπων ἐδόκει σοι κιθαρῳδεῖν; ἢ ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον; ἡνία γὰρ ἄδων τοὺς θεατάς. ἀλλὰ δὴ σκόπει· οὐχὶ ἥ τε κιθαρῳδικὴ δοκεῖ σοι πᾶσα καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις ἡδονῆς χάριν εὑρῆσθαι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ θαυμαστή, ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις, ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακε; πότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδή, ὡς σοὶ δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ διαμάχεσθαι, ἐάν τι αὐτοῖς ἡδὺ μὲν ᾖ καὶ κεχαρισμένον, πονηρὸν δέ, ὅπως τοῦτο μὲν μὴ ἐρεῖ, εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ λέξει καὶ ἄσεται, ἐάν τε χαίρωσιν ἐάν τε μή; ποτέρως σοι δοκεῖ παρεσκευάσθαι ἡ τῶν τραγῳδιῶν ποίησις;

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν μᾶλλον ὥρμηται καὶ τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νῦν δὴ κολακείαν εἶναι.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, εἴ τις περιέλοιτο τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι λόγοι γίγνονται τὸ λειπόμενον;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον οὗτοι λέγονται οἱ λόγοι.

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Δημηγορία ἄρα τίς ἐστιν ἡ ποιητική.

ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ῥητορικὴ δημηγορία ἂν εἴη. ἢ οὐ D
ῥητορεύειν δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς εὑρήκαμεν ῥητορικήν τινα πρὸς δῆμον τοιοῦτον οἷον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἣν οὐ πάνυ ἀγάμεθα· κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτήν φαμεν εἶναι.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

LVIII. ΣΩ. Εἶεν. τί δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ῥητορικὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι E
δήμους τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, τί ποτε ἡμῖν αὖτη ἐστί; πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσι πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεὶ λέγειν οἱ ῥήτορες, τούτου στοχαζόμενοι ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται διὰ τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους, ἢ καὶ οὗτοι πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις ὡρμημένοι, καὶ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὑτῶν ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὥσπερ παισὶ προσομιλοῦσι τοῖς δήμοις, χαρίζεσθαι αὐτοῖς πειρώμενοι μόνον, εἰ δέ γε βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ χείρους διὰ ταῦτ', οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν; |

ΚΑΛ. Οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς· εἰσὶ 503
μὲν γὰρ οἳ κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν ἃ λέγουσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οἵους σὺ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐξαρκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν ἕτερόν που τούτου κολακεία ἂν εἴη καὶ αἰσχρὰ δημηγορία, τὸ δ' ἕτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ ἀεὶ διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε ἀηδέστερα ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλ' B

οὐ πώποτε σὺ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν ῥητορικήν· ἢ εἴ τινα ἔχεις τῶν ῥητόρων τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν ἔφρασας τίς ἐστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγέ σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε νῦν ῥητόρων οὐδένα.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινὰ εἰπεῖν δι' ὅντινα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος ἤρξατο δημηγορεῖν, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χείρους ὄντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν οὗτος.

C ΚΑΛ. Τί δέ; Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας;

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἔστι γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἣν πρότερον σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετήν, ἀληθής, τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι καὶ τὰς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ λόγῳ ἠναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν πλη-
D ρούμεναι βελτίω ποιοῦσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ταύτας μὲν ἀποτελεῖν, αἱ δὲ χείρω, μή· τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι· τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τούτων τινὰ γεγονέναι ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε πῶς εἴπω.

LIX. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐὰν ζητῇς καλῶς, εὑρήσεις· ἴδωμεν δὴ οὑτωσὶν ἀτρέμα σκοπούμενοι εἴ τις τούτων τοιοῦτος γέγονε. φέρε γάρ, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων ἃ ἂν λέγῃ, ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῇ
E ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων πρός τι; ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ βλέποντες πρὸς τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὑτοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἂν εἶδός τι αὐτῷ σχῇ τοῦτο ὃ ἐργάζεται. οἷον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν

τοὺς ζωγράφους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, ὁντινα βούλει αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ ἕκαστος ἕκαστον τίθησιν ὃ ἂν τιθῇ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἁρμόττειν, ἕως | ἂν τὸ ἅπαν 504
συστήσηται τεταγμένον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον πρᾶγμα, καὶ οἵ τε δὴ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὓς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, οἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα παιδοτρίβαι τε καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦσί που τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντάττουσιν. ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τάξεως ἄρα καὶ κόσμου τυχοῦσα οἰκία χρηστὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀταξίας δὲ μοχθηρά;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πλοῖον ὡσαύτως; B

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν τὰ ἡμέτερα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἡ ψυχή; ἀταξίας τυχοῦσα ἔσται χρηστή, ἢ τάξεώς τε καὶ κόσμου τινός;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ τοῦτο συνομολογεῖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνομένῳ;

ΚΑΛ. Ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν ἴσως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἔγωγε. τί δὲ αὖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνομένῳ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου; πειρῶ C
εὑρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὄνομα.

ΚΑΛ. Τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἴ σοι ἥδιόν ἐστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. σὺ δέ, ἂν μέν σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι· εἰ δὲ

μή, ἔλεγχε καὶ μὴ ἐπίτρεπε. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ τοῦ σώματος. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ταῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσι καὶ κοσμήσεσι νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμιμοι γίγνονται καὶ κόσμιοι· ταῦτα δ' ἔστι δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φὴς ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω.

LX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς ψυχαῖς οὓς ἂν λέγῃ καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας, καὶ δῶρον ἐάν τι διδῷ, δώσει, καὶ ἐάν τι ἀφαιρῆται, ἀφαιρήσεται, πρὸς τοῦτο ἀεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολίταις δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνηται, ἀκολασία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται, κακία δὲ ἀπίῃ. συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Συγχωρῶ.

ΣΩ. Τί γὰρ ὄφελος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, σώματί γε κάμνοντι καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ σιτία πολλὰ διδόναι καὶ τὰ ἥδιστα ἢ ποτὰ ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν, ὃ μὴ ὀνήσει αὐτὸ ἔσθ' ὅτε πλέον ἢ τοὐναντίον κατά γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἔστι ταῦτα;

505 ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, λυσιτελεῖ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος ζῆν ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι,

οἷον πεινῶντα φαγεῖν ὅσον βούλεται ἢ διψῶντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν ἐῶσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ ὡς τὰ πολλά, κάμνοντα δέ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδέποτ' ἐῶσιν ἐμπίπλασθαι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ; συγχωρεῖς τοῦτό γε καὶ σύ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Περὶ δὲ ψυχήν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς B τρόπος; ἕως μὲν ἂν πονηρὰ ᾖ, ἀνόητός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος, εἴργειν αὐτὴν δεῖ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἄλλ' ἄττα ποιεῖν ἢ ἀφ' ὧν βελτίων ἔσται; φὴς ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὕτω γάρ που αὐτῇ ἄμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ εἴργειν ἐστὶν ἀφ' ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἄρα τῇ ψυχῇ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν C ἢ ἡ ἀκολασία, ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ ᾤου.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἄλλον τινὰ ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. Οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάσχων περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐδέ γέ μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ὧν σὺ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτά σοι Γοργίου χάριν ἀπεκρινάμην.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν. τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν;

ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς γνώσει.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξὺ θέμις D εἶναι καταλείπειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιθέντας κεφαλήν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ κεφαλῆς περιΐῃ. ἀπόκριναι οὖν καὶ τὰ λοιπά, ἵνα ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος κεφαλὴν λάβῃ.

LXI. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς βίαιος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ἐάσεις χαίρειν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἢ καὶ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαλέξει.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; μὴ γάρ τοι ἀτελῆ γε τὸν λόγον καταλίπωμεν.

ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναιο διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον, ἢ λέγων κατὰ σαυτὸν ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος σαυτῷ;

Ε ΣΩ. Ἵνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, ἃ πρὸ τοῦ δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἷς ὢν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι. ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι οὕτως. εἰ μέντοι ποιήσομεν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονείκως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστι περὶ ὧν λέγομεν καὶ τί ψεῦδος· κοινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἅπασι φανερὸν γενέσθαι αὐτό. δίειμι μὲν οὖν τῷ
506 λόγῳ ἐγὼ ὡς ἄν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν· | ἐὰν δέ τῳ ὑμῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοκῶ ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαυτῷ, χρὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν. οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ' ὑμῶν, ὥστε, ἄν τι φαίνηται λέγων ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν ἐμοί, ἐγὼ πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι. λέγω μέντοι ταῦτα, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι διαπεραν θῆναι τὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλεσθε, ἐῶμεν δὴ χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίωμεν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες,
Β χρῆναί πω ἀπιέναι, ἀλλὰ διεξελθεῖν σε τὸν λόγον· φαίνεται δέ μοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖν. βούλομαι γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαί σου αὐτοῦ διιόντος τὰ ἐπίλοιπα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἡδέως μὲν ἂν Καλλικλεῖ τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμην, ἕως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος ἀπέδωκα ῥῆσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλεις

συνδιαπεραῖναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων
ἐπιλαμβάνου, ἐάν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν.
καί με ἐὰν ἐξελέγξῃς, οὐκ ἀχθέσομαί σοι ὥσπερ σὺ C
ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀναγε-
γράψει.

ΚΑΛ. Λέγε, ὦ 'γαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέραινε.

LXII. ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοῦ ἀναλα-
βόντος τὸν λόγον. Ἆρα τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ
αὐτό ἐστιν; Οὐ ταὐτόν, ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς
ὡμολογήσαμεν. Πότερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
πρακτέον, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕνεκα τοῦ ἡδέος; Τὸ ἡδὺ
ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Ἡδὺ δέ ἐστι τοῦτο οὗ παρα-
γενομένου ἡδόμεθα, ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὗ παρόντος ἀγαθοί D
ἐσμεν; Πάνυ γε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γέ ἐσμεν καὶ
ἡμεῖς καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσα ἀγαθά ἐστιν, ἀρετῆς
τινὸς παραγενομένης; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι,
ὦ Καλλίκλεις. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἥ γε ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου,
καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὖ καὶ ζῴου
παντός, οὐχ οὕτως εἰκῇ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται,
ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἥτις ἑκάστῳ
ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν. Ἆρα ἔστι ταῦτα; Ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ
φημι. Τάξει ἄρα τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἐστὶν
ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου; Φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε. Κόσμος τις E
ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὁ ἑκάστου οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν
παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Καὶ
ψυχὴ ἄρα κόσμον ἔχουσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἀμείνων τῆς
ἀκοσμήτου; Ἀνάγκη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε κόσμον
ἔχουσα κοσμία; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ μέλλει; Ἡ δέ γε
κοσμία σώφρων; | Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Ἡ ἄρα σώφρων 507
ψυχὴ ἀγαθή. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλα
φάναι, ὦ φίλε Καλλίκλεις· σὺ δ' εἰ ἔχεις, δίδασκε.

ΚΑΛ. Λέγ', ὦ 'γαθέ.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ ὅτι, εἰ ἡ σώφρων ἀγαθή ἐστιν, ἡ τοὐναντίον τῇ σώφρονι πεπονθυῖα κακὴ ἐστιν. ἦν δὲ αὕτη ἡ ἄφρων τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὅ γε σώφρων τὰ προσήκοντα πράττοι ἂν καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπους; οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοίη τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα πράττων; ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη ταῦτ' εἶναι οὕτως. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοὺς ὅσια· τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια πράττοντα ἀνάγκη δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον εἶναι; ΠΩΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν γε ἀνάγκη; οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώφρονος ἀνδρός ἐστιν οὔτε διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ἃ μὴ προσήκει, ἀλλ' ἃ δεῖ καὶ πράγματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν, καὶ ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ. ὥστε πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σώφρονα, ὥσπερ διήλθομεν, δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅσιον ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττῃ, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον. οὗτος δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων τῷ σώφρονι, ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ὃν σὺ ἐπῄνεις.

LXIII. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὕτω τίθεμαι καὶ φημι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, τὸν βουλόμενον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐδαίμονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἀσκητέον, ἀκολασίαν δὲ φευκτέον ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, καὶ παρασκευαστέον μάλιστα μὲν μηδὲν δεῖσθαι τοῦ κολάζεσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ δεηθῇ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων, ἢ ἰδιώτης ἢ πόλις, ἐπιθετέον δίκην καὶ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει εὐδαίμων εἶναι. οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι, πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν, καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο καὶ

τὰ αὐτοῦ συντείνοντα καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως δικαιοσύνη παρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη τῷ μακαρίῳ μέλλοντι ἔσεσθαι, οὕτω πράττειν, οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας E ἐῶντα ἀκολάστους εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα πληροῦν, ἀνήνυτον κακόν, λῃστοῦ βίον ζῶντα. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ προσφιλὴς ἂν εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος οὔτε θεῷ· κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἔνι κοινωνία, φιλία οὐκ ἂν εἴη. φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν | συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ 508 κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιότητα, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὤν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέ σε ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται. σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἴει δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. Εἶεν· ἢ ἐξελεγκτέος δὴ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐστίν, ὡς οὐ δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης κτήσει εὐδαί- B μονες οἱ εὐδαίμονες, κακίας δὲ ἄθλιοι οἱ ἄθλιοι· ἢ εἰ οὗτος ἀληθὴς ἐστι, σκεπτέον τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα. τὰ πρόσθεν ἐκεῖνα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, συμβαίνει πάντα, ἐφ' οἷς σύ με ἤρου εἰ σπουδάζων λέγοιμι, λέγοντα ὅτι κατηγορητέον εἴη καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ υἱέος καὶ ἑταίρου, ἐάν τι ἀδικῇ, καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρηστέον. καὶ ἃ Πῶλον αἰσχύνῃ ᾧου συγχωρεῖν, ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἦν, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅσῳπερ αἴσχιον, τοσούτῳ κάκιον· καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς C ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι δίκαιον ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων, ὃ αὖ Γοργίαν ἔφη Πῶλος δι' αἰσχύνην ὁμολογῆσαι.

LXIV. Τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων, σκεψώμεθα

τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ σὺ ἐμοὶ ὀνειδίζεις, ἆρα καλῶς λέγεται
ἢ οὔ, ὡς ἄρα ἐγὼ οὐχ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ βοηθῆσαι οὔτε
ἐμαυτῷ οὔτε τῶν φίλων οὐδενὶ οὐδὲ τῶν οἰκείων,
οὐδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων, εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ
τῷ βουλομένῳ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτιμοι τοῦ ἐθέλοντος, ἄν τε
D τύπτειν βούληται, τὸ νεανικὸν δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ
λόγου, ἐπὶ κόρρης, ἐάν τε χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐάν
τε ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἐάν τε, τὸ ἔσχατον,
ἀποκτεῖναι· καὶ οὕτω διακεῖσθαι πάντων δὴ αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος. ὁ δὲ δὴ ἐμός, ὅστις
πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη εἴρηται, οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει καὶ ἔτι
λέγεσθαι· οὔ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι
ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀδίκως αἴσχιστον εἶναι, οὐδέ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλλάντιον,
E ἀλλὰ τὸ τύπτειν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ἀδίκως καὶ
τέμνειν καὶ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον, καὶ κλέπτειν γε ἅμα
καὶ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι καὶ τοιχωρυχεῖν καὶ συλλήβδην
ὁτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ
κάκιον καὶ αἴσχιον εἶναι ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ.
ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθε λόγοις οὕτω
509 φανέντα, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δέδεται, | καὶ
εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἐστί, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις, ὡς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν οὑτωσίν, οὓς σὺ εἰ
μὴ λύσεις ἢ σοῦ τις νεανικώτερος, οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄλλως
λέγοντα ἢ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω καλῶς λέγειν· ἐπεὶ
ἔμοιγε ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ἀεί, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐκ
οἶδα ὅπως ἔχει, ὅτι μέντοι ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα, ὥσπερ
νῦν, οὐδεὶς οἵός τ' ἐστὶν ἄλλως λέγων μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὖ τίθημι ταῦτα οὕτως
B ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν
ἐστὶν ἡ ἀδικία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἔτι τούτου μεῖζον
μεγίστου ὄντος, εἰ οἷόν τε, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι

δίκην, τίνα ἂν βοήθειαν μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ καταγέλαστος ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἴη; ἆρ' οὐ ταύτην ἥτις ἀποτρέψει τὴν μεγίστην ἡμῶν βλάβην; ἀλλὰ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν μήτε αὐτῷ μήτε τοῖς αὐτοῦ φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκείοις, δευτέραν δὲ C τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ καὶ τρίτην τὴν τοῦ τρίτου καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως, ὡς ἑκάστου κακοῦ μέγεθος πέφυκεν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐφ' ἕκαστα βοηθεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνη τοῦ μή. ἆρα ἄλλως ἢ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἄλλως.

LXV. ΣΩ. Δυοῖν οὖν ὄντοιν, τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μεῖζον μέν φαμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. τί οὖν ἂν παρασκευασάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθήσειεν αὐτῷ, ὥστε ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὠφελείας ταύτας ἔχειν, τήν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ D ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι; πότερα δύναμιν ἢ βούλησιν; ὧδε δὲ λέγω· πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται, ἢ ἐὰν δύναμιν παρασκευάσηται τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται;

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ἐὰν δύναμιν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖν, ἱκανὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν—οὐ γὰρ ἀδικήσει,—ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο δεῖ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην E παρασκευάσασθαι, ὡς, ἐὰν μὴ μάθῃ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσῃ, ἀδικήσει; Τί οὐκ αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, πότερόν σοι δοκοῦμεν ὀρθῶς ἀναγκασθῆναι ὁμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ Πῶλος ἢ οὔ, ἡνίκα ὡμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄκοντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω σοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως, |
510 ἵνα διαπεράνῃ τὸν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, παρασκευαστέον ἐστὶ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσομεν.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶ τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ὡς ὀλίγιστα; σκέψαι εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἥπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἥδε· ἢ αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ τυραννεῖν, ἢ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας ἑταῖρον εἶναι.

B ΚΑΛ. Ὁρᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγὼ ἕτοιμός εἰμι ἐπαινεῖν, ἄν τι καλῶς λέγῃς; τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖς πάνυ καλῶς εἰρηκέναι.

LXVI. ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐάν σοι δοκῶ 15 εὖ λέγειν. φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἑκάστῳ εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, ὅνπερ οἱ παλαιοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. οὐ καὶ σοί;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἄρχων ἄγριος 20 καὶ ἀπαίδευτος, εἴ τις τούτου ἐν τῇ πόλει πολὺ
C βελτίων εἴη, φοβοῖτο δήπου ἂν αὐτὸν ὁ τύραννος καὶ τούτῳ ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ νοῦ οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο φίλος γενέσθαι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. 25

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε εἴ τις πολὺ φαυλότερος εἴη, οὐδ' ἂν οὗτος· καταφρονοῖ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῦ ὁ τύραννος καὶ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὡς πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσειεν.

ΚΑΛ. Καὶ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Λείπεται δὴ ἐκεῖνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου 30 φίλος τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃς ἂν ὁμοήθης ὤν, ταὐτὰ ψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν, ἐθέλῃ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ

ἄρχοντι. οὗτος μέγα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται, τοῦτον οὐδεὶς χαίρων ἀδικήσει. οὐχ οὕτως D
ἔχει;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τις ἐννοήσειεν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν νέων, Τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδείς με ἀδικοίη, αὕτη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτῷ ὁδός ἐστιν, εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ἐθίζειν αὐτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὅ τι μάλιστα ὅμοιος ἔσται ἐκείνῳ. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ E μέγα δύνασθαι, ὡς ὁ ὑμέτερος λόγος, ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεπράξεται.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν; ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ, εἴπερ ὅμοιος ἔσται τῷ ἄρχοντι ὄντι ἀδίκῳ καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ μέγα δυνήσεται; ἀλλ' οἶμαι ἔγωγε, πᾶν τοὐναντίον οὑτωσὶ ἡ παρασκευὴ ἔσται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ οἴῳ τε εἶναι ὡς πλεῖστα ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται. |

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ κακὸν ὑπάρξει, 511
μοχθηρῷ ὄντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λελωβημένῳ διὰ τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ δεσπότου καὶ δύναμιν.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ στρέφεις ἑκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι οὗτος ὁ μιμούμενος τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκεῖνον ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ἀφαιρήσεται τὰ ὄντα;

ΣΩ. Οἶδα, ὦ 'γαθὲ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός B γ' εἰμί, καὶ σοῦ ἀκούων καὶ Πώλου ἄρτι πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγου πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει.

ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐμοῦ ἄκουε, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ μέν, ἂν βούληται, ἀλλὰ πονηρὸς ὢν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν ὄντα.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν;

ΣΩ. Οὐ νοῦν γε ἔχοντι, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. ἢ οἴει δεῖν τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον ζῇν, καὶ μελετᾶν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας C αἳ ἡμᾶς ἀεὶ ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων σώζουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἣν σὺ κελεύεις ἐμὲ μελετᾶν τὴν ῥητορικὴν τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις διασώζουσαν;

ΚΑΛ. Ναὶ μὰ Δί' ὀρθῶς γέ σοι συμβουλεύων.

LXVII. ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε; ἡ καὶ ἡ τοῦ νεῖν ἐπιστήμη σεμνή τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν σώζει γε καὶ αὕτη ἐκ θανάτου τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅταν εἰς τοιοῦτον ἐμπέσωσιν οὗ δεῖ ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης. εἰ δ' αὕτη σοι δοκεῖ σμικρὰ D εἶναι, ἐγώ σοι μείζονα ταύτης ἐρῶ, τὴν κυβερνητικήν, ἣ οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς σώζει ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων κινδύνων, ὥσπερ ἡ ῥητορική. καὶ αὕτη μὲν προσεσταλμένη ἐστὶ καὶ κοσμία, καὶ οὐ σεμνύνεται ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραττομένη, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ διαπραξαμένη τῇ δικανικῇ, ἐὰν μὲν ἐξ Αἰγίνης δεῦρο σώσῃ, οἶμαι δύ' ὀβολοὺς ἐπράξατο, ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου, ἐὰν πάμπολυ ταύτης τῆς μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας, E σώσασ' ἃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ παῖδας καὶ χρήματα καὶ γυναῖκας, ἀποβιβάσασ' εἰς τὸν λιμένα δύο δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἔχων τὴν τέχνην καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξάμενος ἐκβὰς παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν καὶ τὴν ναῦν περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι. λογίζεσθαι γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐπίσταται ὅτι ἄδηλόν ἐστιν οὕστινάς τε ὠφέλησε τῶν συμπλεόντων οὐκ ἐάσας

καταποντωθῆναι καὶ οὕστινας ἔβλαψεν, εἰδὼς ὅτι
οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς βελτίους ἐξεβίβασεν ἢ οἷοι | ἐνέβησαν, 512
οὔτε τὰ σώματα οὔτε τὰς ψυχάς. λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι
οὐκ, εἰ μέν τις μεγάλοις καὶ ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασι κατὰ
τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος μὲν ἄθλιός
ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανε, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὠφέ-
ληται· εἰ δέ τις ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώματος τιμιωτέρῳ,
τῇ ψυχῇ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνίατα, τούτῳ
δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσειεν, ἄν τε ἐκ θαλάτ-
της ἄν τε ἐκ δικαστηρίου ἄν τε ἄλλοθεν ὁποθενοῦν
σώσῃ, ἀλλ' οἶδεν ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινόν ἐστι ζῆν τῷ μοχθη-
ρῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· κακῶς γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ ζῆν. B

LXVIII. Διὰ ταῦτα οὐ νόμος ἐστὶ σεμνύνεσθαι
τὸν κυβερνήτην, καίπερ σώζοντα ἡμᾶς. οὐδέ γε, ὦ
θαυμάσιε, τὸν μηχανοποιόν, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ
ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίοτε
δύναται σώζειν· πόλεις γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε ὅλας σώζει.
μή σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι; καίτοι εἰ
βούλοιτο λέγειν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἅπερ ὑμεῖς, σεμνύ-
νων τὸ πρᾶγμα, καταχώσειεν ἂν ὑμᾶς τοῖς λόγοις, C
λέγων καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίγνεσθαι μη-
χανοποιούς, ὡς οὐδὲν τἆλλά ἐστιν· ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ
ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ σὺ οὐδὲν ἧττον αὐτοῦ καταφρονεῖς
καὶ τῆς τέχνης τῆς ἐκείνου, καὶ ὡς ἐν ὀνείδει ἀποκα-
λέσαις ἂν μηχανοποιόν, καὶ τῷ υἱεῖ αὐτοῦ οὔτ' ἂν
δοῦναι θυγατέρα ἐθέλοις, οὔτ' ἂν αὐτὸς τῷ σαυτοῦ
λαβεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου. καίτοι ἐξ ὧν τὰ σαυτοῦ ἐπαινεῖς,
τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ τοῦ μηχανοποιοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ
τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον; οἶδ' ὅτι φαίης ἂν D
βελτίων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων. τὸ δὲ βέλτιον εἰ
μὴ ἔστιν ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετή, τὸ
σώζειν αὑτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ὄντα ὁποῖός τις ἔτυχε,

καταγέλαστός σοι ὁ ψόγος γίγνεται καὶ μηχανοποιοῦ καὶ ἰατροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, ὅσαι τοῦ σώζειν ἕνεκα πεποίηνται. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ᾖ τοῦ σώζειν τε καὶ σώζεσθαι. μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μέν, τὸ ζῆν ὁποσονδὴ χρόνον, τόν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἐατέον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ
E φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ καὶ πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξὶν ὅτι τὴν εἱμαρμένην οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἐκφύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ σκεπτέον τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν μέλλοι χρόνον βιῶναι ὡς ἄριστα βιώῃ, ἆρα ἐξομοιῶν αὑτὸν τῇ πολιτείᾳ
513 ταύτῃ | ἐν ᾗ ἂν οἰκῇ, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἆρα δεῖ σὲ ὡς ὁμοιότατον γίγνεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, εἰ μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλὴς εἶναι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει; τοῦθ' ὅρα εἰ σοὶ λυσιτελεῖ καὶ ἐμοί, ὅπως μή, ὦ δαιμόνιε, πεισόμεθα ὅπερ φασὶ τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας, τὰς Θετταλίδας· σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἡ αἵρεσις ἡμῖν ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει. εἰ δέ σοι οἴει ὁντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων παραδώσειν τέχνην τινὰ τοιαύτην, ἥτις σε ποιήσει
B μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇδε ἀνόμοιον ὄντα τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλεύει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ εἶναι ἀλλ' αὐτοφυῶς ὅμοιον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρός. ὅστις οὖν σε τούτοις ὁμοιότατον ἀπεργάσεται,
C οὗτός σε ποιήσει, ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικὸς εἶναι, πολιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικόν· τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἤθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἄχθονται. εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, ὦ φίλη κεφαλή. Λέγομέν τι πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;

LXIX. ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δήμου γὰρ ἔρως, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνὼν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ σῇ ἀντιστατεῖ μοι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν πολλάκις D ἴσως καὶ βέλτιον ταὐτὰ ταῦτα διασκοπώμεθα, πεισθήσει. ἀναμνήσθητι δ' οὖν, ὅτι δύο ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ ἕκαστον θεραπεύειν καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχήν, μίαν μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν, τὴν ἑτέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ καταχαριζόμενον ἀλλὰ διαμαχόμενον. οὐ ταῦτα ἦν ἃ τότε ὡριζόμεθα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα, ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν, ἀγεννὴς καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κολακεία τυγχάνει οὖσα. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω, εἰ βούλει, σοὶ οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δέ γε ἑτέρα, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἔσται E τοῦτο, εἴτε σῶμα τυγχάνει ὂν εἴτε ψυχή, ὃ θεραπεύομεν;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν, ὡς βελτίστους αὐτοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιοῦντας; ἄνευ γὰρ δὴ τούτου, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εὑρίσκομεν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄλλην εὐεργεσίαν οὐδεμίαν προσφέρειν, ἐὰν | μὴ 514 καλὴ κἀγαθὴ ἡ διάνοια ᾖ τῶν μελλόντων ἢ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἢ ἀρχήν τινων ἢ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡντινοῦν. θῶμεν οὕτως ἔχειν;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε, εἴ σοι ἥδιον.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, δημοσίᾳ πράξοντας τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά, ἢ τειχῶν ἢ νεωρίων ἢ ἱερῶν

ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα οἰκοδομήματα, πότερον ἔδει ἂν ἡμᾶς
B σκέψασθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐξετάσαι, πρῶτον μὲν
εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα τὴν τέχνην ἢ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, τὴν
οἰκοδομικήν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμάθομεν; ἔδει ἂν ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δεύτερον αὖ τόδε, εἴ τι πώποτε
οἰκοδόμημα ᾠκοδομήκαμεν ἰδίᾳ ἢ τῶν φίλων τινὶ ἢ
ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ οἰκοδόμημα καλὸν ἢ
αἰσχρον ἐστι. καὶ εἰ μὲν εὑρίσκομεν σκοπούμενοι
διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἐλλογίμους γεγο-
νότας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα πολλὰ μὲν καὶ καλὰ μετὰ
C τῶν διδασκάλων ᾠκοδομημένα ἡμῖν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ
ἴδια ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάγημεν,
οὕτω μὲν διακειμένων, νοῦν ἐχόντων ἦν ἂν ἰέναι ἐπὶ
τὰ δημόσια ἔργα· εἰ δὲ μήτε διδάσκαλον εἴχομεν
ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιδεῖξαι οἰκοδομήματά τε ἢ μηδὲν ἢ
πολλὰ καὶ μηδενὸς ἄξια, οὕτω δὴ ἀνόητον ἦν δήπου
ἐπιχειρεῖν τοῖς δημοσίοις ἔργοις καὶ παρακαλεῖν
ἀλλήλους ἐπ' αὐτά. φῶμεν ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι
ἢ οὔ;

D ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

LXX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα, τά τε ἄλλα,
κἂν εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκαλοῦμεν
ἀλλήλους ὡς ἱκανοὶ ἰατροὶ ὄντες, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα
δήπου ἂν ἐγώ τε σὲ καὶ σὺ ἐμέ, Φέρε πρὸς θεῶν,
αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς ἔχει τὸ σῶμα πρὸς ὑγίειαν;
ἢ ἤδη τις ἄλλος διὰ Σωκράτην ἀπηλλάγη νόσου,
ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος; Κἂν ἐγώ, οἶμαι, περὶ σοῦ
ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐσκόπουν. καὶ εἰ μὴ ηὑρίσκομεν δι'
E ἡμᾶς μηδένα βελτίω γεγονότα τὸ σῶμα, μήτε τῶν
ξένων μήτε τῶν ἀστῶν, μήτε ἄνδρα μήτε γυναῖκα,
πρὸς Διός, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἂν ἦν τῇ

ἀληθείᾳ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀνοίας ἐλθεῖν ἀνθρώπους, ὥστε, πρὶν ἰδιωτεύοντας πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθῶσαι καὶ γυμνάσασθαι ἱκανῶς τὴν τέχνην, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν, καὶ αὐτούς τε δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους παρακαλεῖν; οὐκ ἀνόητόν σοι δοκεῖ ἂν εἶναι οὕτω πράττειν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ, | ὦ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐπειδὴ σὺ 515
μὲν αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἄρχει πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἐμὲ δὲ παρακαλεῖς καὶ ὀνειδίζεις ὅτι οὐ πράττω, οὐκ ἐπισκεψόμεθα ἀλλήλους, Φέρε, Καλλικλῆς ἤδη τινὰ βελτίω πεποίηκε τῶν πολιτῶν; ἔστιν ὅστις πρότερον πονηρὸς ὤν, ἄδικός τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄφρων, διὰ Καλλικλέα καλός τε κἀγαθὸς γέγονεν, ἢ ξένος ἢ ἀστός, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος; Λέγε μοι, Β
ἐάν τίς σε ταῦτα ἐξετάζῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἐρεῖς; τίνα φήσεις βελτίω πεποιηκέναι ἄνθρωπον τῇ συνουσίᾳ τῇ σῇ; Ὀκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον σὸν ἔτι ἰδιωτεύοντος, πρὶν δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν;

ΚΑΛ. Φιλόνεικος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

LXXI. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ φιλονεικίᾳ γε ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς βουλόμενος εἰδέναι ὄντινά ποτε τρόπον οἴει δεῖν πολιτεύεσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν, εἰ ἄλλου του C
ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῖν ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα ἢ ὅπως ὅ τι βέλτιστοι οἱ πολῖται ὦμεν. ἢ οὐ πολλάκις ἤδη ὡμολογήκαμεν τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα; Ὡμολογήκαμεν ἢ οὔ; ἀποκρίνου. Ὡμολογήκαμεν· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σοῦ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. Εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα παρασκευάζειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει, νῦν μοι ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπὲ περὶ

ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὧν ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἰ
D ἔτι σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται γεγονέναι, Περικλῆς
καὶ Κίμων καὶ Μιλτιάδης καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς.

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι ἕκαστος
αὐτῶν βελτίους ἐποίει τοὺς πολίτας ἀντὶ χειρόνων.
ἐποίει ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐποίει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε Περικλῆς ἤρχετο λέγειν ἐν
τῷ δήμῳ, χείρους ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἢ ὅτε τὰ τελευ-
ταῖα ἔλεγεν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἴσως δή, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη
E ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων, εἴπερ ἀγαθός γ' ἦν ἐκεῖνος
πολίτης.

ΚΑΛ. Τί οὖν δή;

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν. ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἰπὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ
λέγονται Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίους γεγονέναι,
ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. ταυτὶ
γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀκούω, Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους
ἀργοὺς καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς
μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον καταστήσαντα.

ΚΑΛ. Τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγότων ἀκούεις ταῦτα,
ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τάδε οὐκέτι ἀκούω, ἀλλὰ οἶδα σα-
φῶς καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σύ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ηὐδοκίμει
Περικλῆς καὶ οὐδεμίαν αἰσχρὰν δίκην κατεψηφί-
σαντο αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἡνίκα χείρους ἦσαν· ἐπειδὴ
516 δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἐγεγόνεσαν | ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τε-
λευτῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Περικλέους, κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ
κατεψηφίσαντο, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἐτίμησαν,
δῆλον ὅτι ὡς πονηροῦ ὄντος.

LXXII. ΚΑΛ. Τί οὖν; τούτου ἕνεκα κακὸς ἦν Περικλῆς;

ΣΩ. Ὄνων γοῦν ἂν ἐπιμελητὴς καὶ ἵππων καὶ βοῶν τοιοῦτος ὢν κακὸς ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰ παραλαβὼν μὴ λακτίζοντας [ἑαυτὸν] μηδὲ κυρίττοντας μηδὲ δάκνοντας ἀπέδειξε ταῦτα ἅπαντα ποιοῦντας δι' ἀγριότητα. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι κακὸς εἶναι ἐπιμελητὴς ὁστισοῦν ὁτουοῦν ζῴου, ὃς ἂν παραλαβὼν ἡμερώτερα ἀποδείξῃ ἀγριώτερα ἢ παρέλαβε; Δοκεῖ ἢ οὔ; B

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε, ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τόδε τοίνυν μοι χάρισαι ἀποκρινάμενος, πότερον καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἓν τῶν ζῴων ἐστὶν ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων Περικλῆς ἐπεμέλετο;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔδει αὐτούς, ὡς ἄρτι ὡμολογοῦμεν, δικαιοτέρους γεγονέναι ἀντὶ ἀδικωτέρων ὑπ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ ἐκεῖνος ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸς ὢν C τὰ πολιτικά;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἵ γε δίκαιοι ἥμεροι ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος. σὺ δὲ τί φῄς; οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγριωτέρους γε αὐτοὺς ἀπέφηνεν ἢ οἵους παρέλαβε, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς αὐτόν, ὃν ἥκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο.

ΚΑΛ. Βούλει σοι ὁμολογήσω;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δοκῶ γέ σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω δὴ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγριωτέρους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ χείρους;

D ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ Περικλῆς ἦν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σύ γε φής.

ΣΩ. Μὰ Δί' οὐδέ γε σὺ ἐξ ὧν ὡμολόγεις. Πάλιν δὲ λέγε μοι περὶ Κίμωνος· οὐκ ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτὸν οὗτοι οὓς ἐθεράπευεν, ἵνα αὐτοῦ δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς φωνῆς; καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ προσεζημίωσαν; Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν [ἐν] Μαραθῶνι εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσ- E σαντο, καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν πρύτανιν, ἐνέπεσεν ἄν; Καίτοι οὗτοι, εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, ὡς σὺ φής, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ταῦτα ἔπασχον. οὔκουν οἵ γε ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν ζευγῶν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ θεραπεύσωσι τοὺς ἵππους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμείνους γένωνται ἡνίοχοι, τότ' ἐκπίπτουσιν. οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτ' οὔτ' ἐν ἡνιοχείᾳ οὔτ' ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ οὐδενί. ἢ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθεῖς ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι ἦσαν, ὅτι οὐδένα ἡμεῖς | ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν 517 γεγονότα τὰ πολιτικὰ ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. σὺ δὲ ὡμολόγεις τῶν γε νῦν οὐδένα, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ προείλου τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας. οὗτοι δὲ ἀνεφάνησαν ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς νῦν ὄντες, ὥστε, εἰ οὗτοι ῥήτορες ἦσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐχρῶντο— οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέπεσον—οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ.

LXXIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, B ὦ Σώκρατες, μή ποτέ τις τῶν νῦν ἔργα τοιαῦτα ἐργάσηται οἷα τούτων ὃς βούλει εἴργασται.

ΣΩ. Ὦ δαιμόνιε, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλά μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε

νῦν διακονικώτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἷοί τε
ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐπεθύμει. ἀλλὰ γὰρ μετα-
βιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες
καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὅθεν ἔμελλον ἀμείνους
ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν τούτων
διέφερον ἐκεῖνοι· ὅπερ μόνον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ
πολίτου. ναῦς δὲ καὶ τείχη καὶ νεώρια καὶ ἄλλα C
πολλὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐγώ σοι ὁμολογῶ δεινοτέρους
εἶναι ἐκείνους τούτων ἐκπορίζειν. Πρᾶγμα οὖν
γελοῖον ποιοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. ἐν
παντὶ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ ὃν διαλεγόμεθα οὐδὲν παυόμεθα
εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ περιφερόμενοι καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλή-
λων ὅ τι λέγομεν. ἐγὼ γοῦν σε πολλάκις οἶμαι D
ὡμολογηκέναι καὶ ἐγνωκέναι ὡς ἄρα διττὴ αὖτη τις
ἡ πραγματεία ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὴν
ψυχήν, καὶ ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα διακονική ἐστιν, ᾗ δυνατὸν
εἶναι ἐκπορίζειν, ἐὰν μὲν πεινῇ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν,
σιτία, ἐὰν δὲ διψῇ, ποτά, ἐὰν δὲ ῥιγῷ, ἱμάτια,
στρώματα, ὑποδήματα, ἄλλ' ὧν ἔρχεται σώματα εἰς
ἐπιθυμίαν. καὶ ἐξεπίτηδές σοι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰκό- E
νων λέγω, ἵνα ῥᾷον καταμάθῃς. τούτων γὰρ πορισ-
τικὸν εἶναι ἢ κάπηλον ὄντα ἢ ἔμπορον ἢ δημιουργόν
του αὐτῶν τούτων, σιτοποιὸν ἢ ὀψοποιὸν ἢ ὑφάντην
ἢ σκυτοτόμον ἢ σκυτόδεψον, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν ἐστιν,
ὄντα τοιοῦτον δόξαι καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότι ὅτι
ἔστι τις παρὰ ταύτας ἁπάσας τέχνη γυμναστική τε
καὶ ἰατρική, ἣ δὴ τῷ ὄντι ἐστὶ σώματος θεραπεία,
ἥνπερ καὶ προσήκει τούτων ἄρχειν πασῶν τῶν
τεχνῶν καὶ χρῆσθαι τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις διὰ τὸ
εἰδέναι ὅ τι χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν τῶν σιτίων ἢ
ποτῶν ἐστὶν εἰς ἀρετὴν | σώματος, τὰς δ' ἄλλας 518

πάσας ταύτας ἀγνοεῖν· διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς τε καὶ διακονικὰς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι περὶ σώματος πραγματείαν, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας· τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεσποίνας εἶναι τούτων. ταὐτὰ οὖν ταῦτα ὅτι ἔστι καὶ περὶ ψυχήν, τοτὲ μέν μοι δοκεῖς μανθάνειν, ὅτι λέγω, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς ὡς εἰδὼς ὅ τι ἐγὼ λέγω· ἥκεις δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον λέγων ὅτι ἄνθρωποι καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασι πολῖται ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἐγὼ
B ἐρωτῶ οἵτινες, δοκεῖς μοι ὁμοιοτάτους προτείνεσθαι ἀνθρώπους περὶ τὰ πολιτικά, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ περὶ τὰ γυμναστικὰ ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος οἵτινες ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν ἢ εἰσὶ σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ἔλεγές μοι πάνυ σπουδάζων, Θεαρίων ὁ ἀρτοκόπος καὶ Μίθαικος ὁ τὴν ὀψοποιίαν συγγεγραφὼς τὴν Σικελικὴν καὶ Σάραβος
C ὁ κάπηλος, ὅτι οὗτοι θαυμάσιοι γεγόνασι σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν ἄρτους θαυμαστοὺς παρασκευάζων, ὁ δὲ ὄψον, ὁ δὲ οἶνον.

LXXIV. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἠγανάκτεις, εἴ σοι ἔλεγον ἐγὼ ὅτι Ἄνθρωπε, ἐπαίεις οὐδὲν περὶ γυμναστικῆς· διακόνους μοι λέγεις καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους, οὐκ ἐπαΐοντας καλὸν κἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν, οἵ, ἂν οὕτω τύχωσιν, ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ παχύναντες τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπαινούμενοι ὑπ'
D αὐτῶν, προσαπολοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας σάρκας. οἱ δ' αὖ δι' ἀπειρίαν οὐ τοὺς ἐστιῶντας αἰτιάσονται τῶν νόσων αἰτίους εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἀποβολῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων σαρκῶν, ἀλλ' οἳ ἂν αὐτοῖς τύχωσι τότε παρόντες καὶ συμβουλεύοντές τι, ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἥκῃ ἡ τότε πλησμονὴ νόσον φέρουσα συχνῷ ὕστερον χρόνῳ, ἅτε ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ γεγονυῖα, τούτους αἰτιάσονται καὶ ψέξουσι καὶ κακόν

τι ποιήσουσιν, ἂν οἷοί τ' ὦσι, τοὺς δὲ προτέρους ἐκείνους καὶ αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν ἐγκωμιάσουσι. καὶ E
σὺ νῦν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὁμοιότατον τούτῳ ἐργάζει· ἐγκωμιάζεις ἀνθρώπους οἳ τούτους εἰστιάκασιν εὐω-
χοῦντες ὧν ἐπεθύμουν. καί φασι μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτούς· ὅτι δὲ οἰδεῖ καὶ ὕπουλός ἐστι δι' ἐκείνους τοὺς παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται.| ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ 519
νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυα-
ριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν πόλιν· ὅταν οὖν ἔλθῃ ἡ καταβολὴ αὕτη τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς τότε παρόντας αἰτιάσονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ Κί-
μωνα καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσι, τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ ἴσως ἐπιλήψονται, ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῇ,
καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὅταν καὶ τὰ ἀρχαῖα προσαπολλύωσι πρὸς οἷς ἐκτήσαντο, οὐκ B
αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν ἀλλ' ἴσως συναιτίων. καίτοι ἔγωγε ἀνόητον πρᾶγμα καὶ νῦν ὁρῶ γιγνό-
μενον καὶ ἀκούω τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν πέρι. αἰσ-
θάνομαι γάρ, ὅταν ἡ πόλις τινὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν μεταχειρίζηται ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, ἀγανακτούντων καὶ σχετλιαζόντων ὡς δεινὰ πάσχουσι· πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες ἄρα ἀδίκως ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται, ὡς ὁ τούτων λόγος. τὸ δὲ ὅλον ψεῦδός
ἐστι. προστάτης γὰρ πόλεως οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ποτὲ C
ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως ἧς προστατεῖ. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ὅσοι τε πολιτικοὶ προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ ὅσοι σοφισταί. καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφισταί, τἆλλα σοφοὶ ὄντες, τοῦτο ἄτοπον
ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα· φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσ-
καλοι εἶναι πολλάκις κατηγοροῦσι τῶν μαθητῶν ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς [αὐτούς,] τούς τε μισθοὺς ἀποστε-

ροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες, εὖ πα-
D θόντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου τί ἂν
ἀλογώτερον εἴη πρᾶγμα, ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ
δικαίους γενομένους, ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ
τοῦ διδασκάλου, σχόντας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν
τούτῳ ᾧ οὐκ ἔχουσιν; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο ἄτοπον
εἶναι, ὦ ξἐταῖρε; Ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν με ἠνάγκα-
σας, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

LXXV. ΚΑΛ. Σὺ δ' οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ' εἴης λέγειν,
εἰ μή τίς σοι ἀποκρίνοιτο;

E ΣΩ. Ἔοικά γε· νῦν γοῦν συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν
λόγων, ἐπειδή μοι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἀλλ'
ὦ 'γαθέ, εἰπὲ πρὸς φιλίου, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον
εἶναι ἀγαθὸν φάσκοντα πεποιηκέναι τινὰ μέμφεσθαι
τούτῳ ὅτι ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθὸς γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν
ἔπειτα πονηρός ἐστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων τῶν
φασκόντων παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν; |

520 ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων
πέρι οὐδενὸς ἀξίων;

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέγοις οἳ φάσκοντες
προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὅπως ὡς
βελτίστη ἔσται πάλιν αὐτῆς κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν
τύχωσιν, ὡς πονηροτάτης; οἴει τι διαφέρειν τούτους
ἐκείνων; ταὐτόν, ὦ μακάρι', ἐστὶ σοφιστὴς καὶ
ῥήτωρ, ἢ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ
B ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον. σὺ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν τὸ μὲν
πάγκαλόν τι οἴει εἶναι, τὴν ῥητορικήν, τοῦ δὲ κατα-
φρονεῖς· τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κάλλιόν ἐστι σοφιστικὴ
ῥητορικῆς ὅσῳπερ νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς καὶ γυμ-
ναστικὴ ἰατρικῆς. μόνοις δ' ἔγωγε καὶ ᾤμην τοῖς

δημηγόροις τε καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι ὃ αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν, ὡς πονηρόν ἐστιν εἰς σφᾶς, ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἅμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελήκασιν οὓς φασιν ὠφελεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; C

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ προέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον. ἄλλην μὲν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις εὐεργετηθείς, οἷον ταχὺς γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ἴσως ἂν ἀποστερήσειε τὴν χάριν, εἰ προοῖτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος αὐτῷ μισθὸν ὅ τι μάλιστα ἅμα μεταδιδοὺς τοῦ τάχους λαμβάνοι τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐ γὰρ τῇ βραδυτῆτι, οἶμαι, ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ D ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' ἀδικίᾳ. ἢ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἀσφαλὲς ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι δύναιτό τις ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

LXXVI. ΣΩ. Διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλὰς συμβουλεύειν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἷον οἰκοδομίας πέρι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν.

ΚΑΛ. Ἔοικέ γε. E

ΣΩ. Περὶ δέ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὅντιν' ἄν τις τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ. ἢ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι μόνη αὕτη τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν, ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ' εὖ πείσεται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα; |

521 ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως; διόρισόν μοι· τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἰατρόν, ἢ ὡς διακονήσοντα καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλήσοντα; Ταληθῆ μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· δίκαιος γὰρ εἶ, ὥσπερ ἤρξω παῤῥησιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, διατελεῖν ἃ νοεῖς λέγων. καὶ νῦν εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ.

Β ΚΑΛ. Λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι ὡς διακονήσοντα.

ΣΩ. Κολακεύσοντα ἄρα με, ὦ γενναιότατε, παρακαλεῖς.

ΚΑΛ. Εἴ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτά γε ποιήσεις—

ΣΩ. Μὴ εἴπῃς ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με ὁ βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι πονηρός γε ὢν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· μηδ' ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται ἐάν τι ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ αὖ ἐγὼ εἴπω ὅτι Ἀλλ' ἀφελόμενος

C οὐχ ἕξει ὅ τι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ με ἀδίκως ἀφείλετο, οὕτω καὶ λαβὼν ἀδίκως χρήσεται· εἰ δὲ ἀδίκως, αἰσχρῶς· εἰ δὲ αἰσχρῶς, κακῶς.

LXXVII. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μηδ' ἂν ἓν τούτων παθεῖν, ὡς οἰκῶν ἐκποδὼν καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθεὶς εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάνυ ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου!

ΣΩ. Ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἴομαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ὁντινοῦν

ἄν, ὅ τι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν. τόδε μεντοι εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἐάνπερ εἰσίω εἰς δικαστήριον περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων ὧν σὺ λέγεις, πονηρός τίς με ἔσται ὁ εἰσάγων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν χρηστὸς μὴ ἀδικοῦντ' ἄνθρωπον εἰσαγάγοι. καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι. βούλει σοι εἴπω δι' ὅ τι ταῦτα προσδοκῶ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οἶμαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν. ἅτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὓς λέγω ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ παραινεῖς, τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα, οὐχ ἕξω ὅ τι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. ὁ αὐτὸς δέ μοι ἥκει λόγος ὅνπερ πρὸς Πῶλον ἔλεγον· κρινοῦμαι γὰρ ὡς ἐν παιδίοις ἰατρὸς ἂν κρίνοιτο κατηγοροῦντος ὀψοποιοῦ. σκόπει γάρ, τί ἂν ἀπολογοῖτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος ἐν τούτοις ληφθείς, εἰ αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῖ τις λέγων ὅτι Ὦ παῖδες, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὅδε εἴργασται ἀνὴρ καὶ αὐτούς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν διαφθείρει τέμνων τε καὶ κάων, καὶ ἰσχναίνων | καὶ πνίγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, πικρότατα πώματα διδοὺς καὶ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν ἀναγκάζων, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ παντοδαπὰ εὐώχουν ὑμᾶς. τί ἂν οἴει ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα ἰατρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν; ἢ εἰ εἴποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὅτι Ταῦτα πάντα ἐγὼ ἐποίουν, ὦ παῖδες, ὑγιεινῶς, πόσον οἴει ἂν ἀναβοῆσαι τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς; οὐ μέγα;

ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως· οἴεσθαί γε χρή.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἴει ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ ἂν αὐτὸν ἔχεσθαι ὅ τι χρὴ εἰπεῖν;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

LXXVIII. ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτον μέντοι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδ' ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικαστήριον. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονὰς ἃς ἐκπεπόρικα ἔξω αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἃς οὗτοι εὐεργεσίας καὶ ὠφελείας νομίζουσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ζηλῶ οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται· ἐάν τέ τίς με ἢ νεωτέρους φῇ διαφθείρειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κακηγορεῖν λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔξω
C εἰπεῖν, ὅτι Δικαίως πάντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν. ὥστε ἴσως, ὅ τι ἂν τύχω, τοῦτο πείσομαι.

ΚΑΛ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς ἔχειν ἄνθρωπος ἐν πόλει οὕτω διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὢν ἑαυτῷ βοηθεῖν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε [ἐν] αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ πολλάκις ὡμολόγησας· εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς
D εἴη αὐτῷ, μήτε περὶ ἀνθρώπους μήτε περὶ θεοὺς ἄδικον μηδὲν μήτε εἰρηκὼς μήτε εἰργασμένος. αὕτη γάρ τις βοήθεια ἑαυτῷ πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐμέ τις ἐξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν ἀδύνατον ὄντα ἐμαυτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βοηθεῖν, αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις ἐξελεγχόμενος καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου, καὶ εἰ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνήσκοιμι, ἀγανακτοίην ἄν. εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδείᾳ τελευτῴην ἔγωγε, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἴδοις ἂν μὲ φέροντα
E τὸν θάνατον. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, ὅστις μὴ παντάπασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἀνανδρός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν φοβεῖται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφικέσθαι πάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, σοὶ ἐγώ, ὡς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον λέξαι.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἐπείπερ γε καὶ τἆλλα ἐπέρανας, καὶ τοῦτο πέρανον. |

LXXIX. ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δή, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ 523
λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσει μῦθον, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ
λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν.
Ὥσπερ γὰρ Ὅμηρος λέγει, διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ
Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν καὶ ὁ Πλούτων, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ
τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον. ἦν οὖν νόμος ὅδε περὶ
ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου, καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν ἐν
θεοῖς, τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον B
διελθόντα καὶ ὁσίως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς μακά-
ρων νήσους ἀπιόντα οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς
κακῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε
καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον, ὃ δὴ τάρταρον καλοῦσιν,
ἰέναι. τούτων δὲ δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ ἔτι νεωστὶ
τοῦ Διὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων,
ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ δικάζοντες ᾗ μέλλοιεν τελευτᾶν.
κακῶς οὖν αἱ δίκαι ἐκρίνοντο. ὅ τε οὖν Πλούτων
καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἰόντες ἔλεγον
πρὸς τὸν Δία ὅτι φοιτῷέν σφιν ἄνθρωποι ἑκατέρωσε C
ἀνάξιοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ζεύς, Ἀλλ' ἐγώ, ἔφη, παύσω
τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ κακῶς αἱ δίκαι δικά-
ζονται. ἀμπεχόμενοι γάρ, ἔφη, οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνον-
ται· ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται. πολλοὶ οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς,
ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες ἠμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά
τε καλὰ καὶ γένη καὶ πλούτους, καί, ἐπειδὰν ἡ κρίσις
ᾖ, ἔρχονται αὐτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες
ὡς δικαίως βεβιώκασιν. οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπό τε
τούτων ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ ἅμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχό- D
μενοι δικάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὑτῶν ὀφθαλ-
μοὺς καὶ ὦτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκαλυμμένοι.
ταῦτα δὴ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰ

αὐτῶν ἀμφιέσματα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινομένων. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, παυστέον ἐστὶ προειδότας αὐτοὺς τὸν θάνατον· νῦν γὰρ προΐσασι. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ αὐτῶν. Ε ἔπειτα γυμνοὺς κριτέον ἀπάντων τούτων· τεθνεῶτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι. καὶ τὸν κριτὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἑκάστου, ἔρημον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ᾖ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς ἐποιησάμην δικαστὰς υἱεῖς ἐμαυτοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, Μίνω 524 τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυν, | ἕνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης, Αἰακόν· οὗτοι οὖν ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι, δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἐξ ἧς φέρετον τὼ ὁδώ, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ' εἰς τάρταρον. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Ῥαδάμανθυς κρινεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Αἰακός· Μίνῳ δὲ πρεσβεῖα δώσω, ἐπιδιακρίνειν, ἐὰν ἀπορῇτόν τι τὼ ἑτέρω, ἵνα ὡς δικαιοτάτη ἡ κρίσις ᾖ περὶ τῆς πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

LXXX. Ταῦτ' ἔστιν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἃ ἐγὼ Β ἀκηκοὼς πιστεύω ἀληθῆ εἶναι· καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων τοιόνδε τι λογίζομαι συμβαίνειν. Ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὤν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτοιν διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλοιν. ἐπειδὰν δὲ διαλυθῆτον ἄρα ἀπ' ἀλλήλοιν, οὐ πολὺ ἧττον ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει τὴν ἕξιν τὴν αὑτοῦ ἥνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἔζη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τό τε σῶμα τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ τὰ θεραπεύματα καὶ τὰ παθήματα, ἔνδηλα πάντα. οἷον εἴ τινος μέγα ἦν C τὸ σῶμα φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφότερα ζῶντος, τούτου

καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ νεκρὸς μέγας· καὶ εἰ παχύς, παχὺς καὶ ἀποθανόντος, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως. καὶ εἰ αὖ ἐπετήδευε κομᾶν, κομήτης τούτου καὶ ὁ νεκρός. μαστιγίας αὖ εἴ τις ἦν καὶ ἴσχνη εἶχε τῶν πληγῶν οὐλὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ὑπὸ μαστίγων ἢ ἄλλων τραυμάτων ζῶν, καὶ τεθνεῶτος τὸ σῶμα ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον. κατεαγότα τε εἴ του ἦν μέλη ἢ διεστραμμένα ζῶντος, καὶ τεθνεῶτος ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐνδηλα. ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, οἷος εἶναι παρεσκεύαστο τὸ D σῶμα ζῶν, ἔνδηλα ταῦτα καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπί τινα χρόνον. ταὐτὸν δή μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' ἄρα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἔνδηλα πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὰν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τά τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἑκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἀφίκωνται παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας παρὰ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν, ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυς ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας E θεᾶται ἑκάστου τὴν ψυχήν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν βασιλέως ἢ δυνάστου κατεῖδεν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὂν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ ἐπιορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας, ἃ | ἑκάστῳ ἡ πρᾶξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο εἰς τὴν 525 ψυχήν, καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθὺ διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι· καὶ ὑπὸ ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ὕβρεως καὶ ἀκρατίας τῶν πράξεων ἀσυμμετρίας τε καὶ αἰσχρότητος γέμουσαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδεν. ἰδὼν δὲ ἀτίμως ταύτην ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθὺ τῆς φρουρᾶς, οἷ μέλλει ἐλθοῦσα ἀνατλῆναι τὰ προσήκοντα πάθη.

LXXXI. Προσήκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ

B ὄντι, ὑπ' ἄλλου ὀρθῶς τιμωρουμένῳ, ἢ βελτίονι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὀνίνασθαι ἢ παραδείγματι τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα ἄλλοι ὁρῶντες πάσχοντα ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ φοβούμενοι βελτίους γίγνωνται. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην διδόντες ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὗτοι οἳ ἂν ἰάσιμα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμάρτωσιν· ὅμως δὲ δι' ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ὀδυνῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἡ ὠφέλεια καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Ἅιδου· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν C τε ἄλλως ἀδικίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. οἳ δ' ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται οὐδέν, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται οἱ τούτους ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Ἅιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νου- D θετήματα. ὧν ἐγώ φημι ἕνα καὶ Ἀρχέλαον ἔσεσθαι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει Πῶλος, καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις ἂν τοιοῦτος τύραννος ᾖ. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς εἶναι τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἐκ τυράννων καὶ βασιλέων καὶ δυναστῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πραξάντων γεγονότας· οὗτοι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώτατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνουσι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις καὶ Ὅμηρος· βασιλέας γὰρ καὶ δυνάστας ἐκεῖνος πε- E ποίηκε τοὺς ἐν Ἅιδου τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον τιμωρουμένους, Τάνταλον καὶ Σίσυφον καὶ Τιτυόν. Θερσίτην δέ, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος πονηρὸς ἦν ἰδιώτης, οὐδεὶς πεποίηκε μεγάλαις τιμωρίαις συνεχόμενον ὡς ἀνίατον· οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐξῆν αὐτῷ· διὸ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ἦν ἢ οἷς ἐξῆν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐκ τῶν δυνα-
526 μένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ | γιγνόμενοι

ἄνθρωποι· οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα γε ἄξιον ἄγασθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· χαλεπὸν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ πολλοῦ ἐπαίνου ἄξιον ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν γενόμενον δικαίως διαβιῶναι. ὀλίγοι δὲ γίγνονται οἱ τοιοῦτοι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλοθι γεγόνασιν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἔσονται καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίως διαχειρίζειν ἃ ἄν τις ἐπιτρέπῃ· εἰς δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονε καὶ εἰς B τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου. οἱ δὲ πολλοί, ὦ ἄριστε, κακοὶ γίγνονται τῶν δυναστῶν.

LXXXII. Ὅπερ οὖν ἔλεγον, ἐπειδὰν ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυς ἐκεῖνος τοιοῦτόν τινα λάβῃ, ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδέν, οὔθ' ὅστις οὔθ' ὧντινων, ὅτι δὲ πονηρός τις· καὶ τοῦτο κατιδὼν ἀπέπεμψεν εἰς τάρταρον, ἐπισημηνάμενος, ἐάν τε ἰάσιμος ἐάν τε ἀνίατος δοκῇ εἶναι· ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος τὰ προσήκοντα πάσχει. ἐνίοτε δ' ἄλλην εἰσιδὼν ὁσίως C βεβιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας, ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἢ ἄλλου τινός, μάλιστα μέν, ἔγωγέ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, φιλοσόφου τὰ αὑτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἠγάσθη τε καὶ ἐς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψε. ταὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Αἰακός. ἑκάτερος δὲ τούτων ῥάβδον ἔχων δικάζει. ὁ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν κάθηται μόνος ἔχων χρυσοῦν σκῆπτρον, ὥς φησιν Ὀδυσσεὺς ὁ Ὁμήρου ἰδεῖν D αὐτὸν

χρύσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσιν.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχήν. χαίρειν οὖν ἐάσας

τὰς τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀλήθειαν
σκοπῶν πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος
ὢν καὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθνήσκω ἀποθνήσκειν.
Ε παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας ἀνθρώπους,
καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ 5
τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, ὃν ἐγώ φημι
ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀγώνων εἶναι, καὶ ὀνειδίζω σοι
ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι
ᾖ καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἣν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ ἐλθὼν
παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης υἱόν, ἐπειδάν 10
527 σου | ἐπιλαβόμενος ἄγῃ, χασμήσει καὶ ἰλιγγιάσεις
οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε σὺ ἐκεῖ, καί σε ἴσως
τυπτήσει τις καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀτίμως καὶ πάντως
προπηλακιεῖ.

Τάχα δ' οὖν ταῦτα μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, 15
ὥσπερ γραός, καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν. καὶ οὐδέν
γ' ἂν ἦν θαυμαστὸν καταφρονεῖν τούτων, εἴ πῃ
ζητοῦντες εἴχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα
εὑρεῖν· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οἵπερ
σοφώτατοί ἐστε τῶν νῦν Ἑλλήνων, σύ τε καὶ Πῶλος 20
Β καὶ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔχετε ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς δεῖ ἄλλον
τινὰ βίον ζῆν ἢ τοῦτον ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖσε φαίνεται
συμφέρων, ἀλλ' ἐν τοσούτοις λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων
ἐλεγχομένων μόνος οὗτος ἠρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλα-
βητέον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ 25
παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι
ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ· ἐὰν δέ
τις κατά τι κακὸς γίγνηται, κολαστέος ἐστί, καὶ
C τοῦτο δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν μετὰ τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ
γίγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον διδόναι δίκην· καὶ πᾶσαν 30
κολακείαν καὶ τὴν περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς
ἄλλους, καὶ περὶ ὀλίγους καὶ περὶ πολλούς, φευκτέον·

καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον, ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει.

LXXXIII. Ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος ἀκολούθησον ἐνταῦθα, οἳ ἀφικόμενος εὐδαιμονήσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. καὶ ἔασόν τινά σου καταφρονῆσαι ὡς ἀνοήτου καὶ προπηλακίσαι, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία σύ γε θαῤῥῶν πατάξαι D τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην πληγήν· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσει, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι ᾖς καλὸς κἀγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρετήν. κἄπειτα οὕτω κοινῇ ἀσκήσαντες, τότε ἤδη, ἐὰν δοκῇ χρῆναι, ἐπιθησόμεθα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἢ ὁποῖον ἄν τι ἡμῖν δοκῇ, τότε βουλευσόμεθα, βελτίους ὄντες βουλεύεσθαι ἢ νῦν. αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἔχοντάς γε ὡς νῦν φαινόμεθα ἔχειν, ἔπειτα νεανιεύεσθαι ὥς τι ὄντας, οἷς οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ δοκεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων· εἰς τοσοῦτον ἥκομεν ἀπαιδευσίας. E ὥσπερ οὖν ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ χρησώμεθα τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὃς ἡμῖν σημαίνει ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἄριστος τοῦ βίου, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντας καὶ ζῆν καὶ τεθνάναι. τούτῳ οὖν ἑπώμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρακαλῶμεν, μὴ ἐκείνῳ ᾧ σὺ πιστεύων ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς· ἔστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄξιος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις.

NOTES.

Page 1. **1** Πολέμου] "First at a feast, last at a fray," is the corresponding English saw. **3** κατόπιν ἑορτῆς] Olymp., τὰς ἡμέρας ἐν αἷς ἐπεδείκνυτο ὁ Γοργίας ἑορτὰς ἐκάλουν. Moeris, κατόπιν Ἀττικοί, ὄπισθεν Ἕλληνες. 'Are we come the day after the feast?' **4** καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν] These words are apparently a mere interpretation of the foregoing proverb, the point of which is blunted by their retention. Olympiodorus quotes only as far as ἥκομεν. I have bracketed the words, thinking with Cobet (De Arte Interpret. p. 141) that they ought to be ejected from the text. A similar interpolation is detected by Cob. in the Axiochus, p. 366 C, διὰ παντὸς δὲ ἔθος ἐστὶν αὐτῷ φωνεῖν τὸ Ἐπιχάρμειον· ἃ δὲ χεὶρ τὰν χεῖρα νίζει [δός τι καὶ λαβέ τι], where it is impossible to adapt the words in brackets to the trochaic metre. **8** μέντοι] The force of the particle is this: 'You may think it my fault; you are mistaken, however; Chaerephon is the person to be blamed.' **10** ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι] 'for I *who have done the mischief* will repair it.' Such is the force of καί, Schol., ἀπὸ Τηλέφου καὶ τοῦ τρώσαντος Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ τοῦ χρηστηρίου ἀνελόντος ὅτι ὁ τρώσας καὶ ἰάσεται. Observe the special use of ἐπιδείξεται, = ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσεται, i.e. after the manner of the Sophists. Such an ἐπίδειξις, or exhibition of literary skill, according to Xenophon, was the celebrated apologue of Prodicus, called the Judgment of Hercules (Mem. ii. 1. 21). ὅπερ δὴ (Πρόδικος ὁ σοφός) καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιδείκνυται. So after the long speech of Protagoras in the dialogue bearing his name, Socr. observes, Πρωταγόρας μὲν τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἐπιδειξάμενος ἀπεπαύσατο τοῦ λόγου (p. 328 D). The active form of the verb has the sense 'indicare,' 'demonstrare,' as below, p. 464 B, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ λέγω. **14** Τί δ'] So Olymp.; vulg. τί δέ; Zür. τί δαί; **17** Οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε] Supply ἀκούσεσθε from the foregoing ἀκούσας. 'You

shall hear him then, when you think proper to pay me a visit at my house; for Gorgias is my guest, and will exhibit to you.' Schleiermacher infers from this, that the scene of the conversation is not the house of Callicles, as commonly supposed, but a gymnasium or other place of public resort. The ὅταν, which "marvellously offends" Stallbaum, may thus be defended, and the εἰσαῦθις ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις ποιησάσθω of Socr. explained. I cannot believe with Ast that ἥκειν is here used imperatively, or with Schleierm. that the καί before ἐπιδείξεται is *in apodosi*. Hemsterhuis conjectured ὦ ᾽ταν for ὅταν, retaining the vulg. βούλεσθε, but has found no follower among the edd.

Page 2. 2 διαλεχθῆναι] Resigning himself to the loss of the formal ἐπίδειξις, Socr. hopes that Gorgias will not at any rate be indisposed for a conversation. The words τὴν ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν are equivalent to τὴν ἐπίδειξιν, ἄλλην οὖσαν. This use of ἄλλος is familiar to readers of Plato, and will be found illustrated in the note on p. 473 C. 7 Οὐδὲν οἷον] "Nothing like inquiring at head-quarters." "Best go to the fountain-head." "Il n'y a rien tel que de parler à lui mesme" (Steph.). "Nichts besser als ihn selbst fragen" (Schl.). In Demosth. Mid. 529, we find, οὐδὲν οἷον ἀκούειν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου, the art. before the infin. being omitted; as it is likewise in Aristoph. Aves 966, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν οἷόν ἐστ' ἀκούειν τῶν ἐπῶν. On the other hand τό is inserted both here and below, p. 481 B, as well as in Xen. Oec. 3. 14 adduced by Matth. (Gr. Gr. § 541, q.v.). In Lysistr. 135, οὐδὲν γὰρ οἷον ὦ φίλη Λυσιστράτη, the inf., or word answering to the inf., is suppressed. The Schol. on the last passage erroneously explains the phrase by οὐδὲν κωλύει. 8 ἐκέλευε γοῦν] Comp. Philostratus, Vitt. Soph. p. 487, σχεδίου λόγου Γοργίας ἦρξεν . . . παρελθὼν γὰρ ἐς τὸ Ἀθηναίων θέατρον ἐθάρρησεν εἰπεῖν, προβάλλετε . . . ἐνδεικνύμενος δήπου πάντα μὲν εἰδέναι, περὶ παντὸς δ' ἂν εἰπεῖν ἐφιεὶς τῷ καιρῷ. 17 ἀπεκρίνατο] One MS. has ἀπεκρίθη, an aorist inadmissible in this sense, in an Attic writer. ἀποκριθῆναι occurs in the sense of 'answering' in the 2nd Alcib. 149 B, and is one among many indications of the spuriousness of that dialogue. 25 ἀποκρινεῖ] So the Bodl. The other MSS. and edd. except Hermann's have ἀποκρίνει. Chaerephon means to say, 'If such has been your past success, you will have no difficulty in answering any question I may propose

Page 3. 7 Ἡρόδικος] The Schol. cautions us against confounding *this Herodicus* with Herodicus the Selymbrian, also a phy-

sician, of whom see an amusing notice in Republ. iii. 406. The brother of Aristophon presently mentioned was no less a person than the famous Polygnotus, who painted the Lesche at Delphi. This is proved by an epigram quoted by the Schol.:—

γράψε Πολύγνωτος, Θάσιος γένος, Ἀγλαοφῶντος
υἱός, περθομένην Ἰλίου ἀκρόπολιν.

Also by a passage in the Ion, p. 532 E. τί ἂν αὐτόν] The MSS. have τίνα. Olymp. reads τί, which had been conjectured by Buttmann, in consideration of the following ὅπερ. **19** Ὦ Χαιρεφῶν] This speech of Polus was a part of his τέχνη, or treatise on Rhetoric, of which we hear below, p. 462 C. So the Schol. on Hermogenes, p. 18 (Rhetores Graeci Walz. iv. 44), ὅθεν καὶ Πῶλος ὁ Γοργίου μαθητὴς ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ φησίν· πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπειρίας (L. ἐμπείρως) εὑρημέναι. Comp. Arist. Metaph. i. 1, ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ὥς φησι Πῶλος, ὀρθῶς λέγων, κ.τ.λ. **25** τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν] Compare Philebus, p. 58, ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἑκάστοτε Γοργίου λέγοντος πολλάκις, ὡς ἡ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέροι πασῶν τεχνῶν· πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὑτῇ δοῦλα δι' ἑκόντων ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῖτο, καὶ μακρῷ πασῶν ἀρίστη εἴη τῶν τεχνῶν.

Page 4. **1** σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστίν] This sufficiently common idiom is illustrated in all the Grammars, as in Donaldson, § 458 *gg*. It is imitated in Latin by Sallust and Tacitus. **2** δῆλος γάρ μοι] This construction (for δῆλόν μοί ἐστιν ὅτι Πῶλος), which is illustrated by Stallb., is especially frequent in the case of the words δῆλος and δίκαιος. Soph. Ant. 400, δίκαιός εἰμι τῶνδ' ἀπηλλάχθαι κακῶν. δῆλος, and δηλοῦν in its intrans. sense, are more frequently used with participles, as ib. v. 20, δηλοῖς γάρ τι καλχαίνουσ' ἔπος. Stallb. quotes three instances from Plato in which ἀναγκαῖος is similarly used, among these the passage below, 449 C. **14** ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο] "Chéréphon t'a mis sur la voie par des exemples" (Cousin). ὑποτ. is used similarly in Theaet. 179 D, σκεπτέον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται. The active is found in like sense in Clitoph. 408 D. It is nearly equivalent to ὑφηγεῖσθαι (*praeire, praemonstrare*), as Heindorf remarks. Comp. 455 D, αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω, 'have shown me the way.' The allusion here is to the examples of the physician and painter above proposed by Chaerephon. Observe the hendiadys, for ὥσπερ,...ὑποτειναμένου Χαιρεφῶντος, αὐτῷ καλῶς... ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἰπέ. Comp. ὑπεγράψαμεν, Theaet. 171 E. The οὖν which used to stand after νῦν, though patronized by

Heind., is now properly omitted by the edd. It is absent from the Bodl. **26** *Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους*] Olymp. in l., *ἔν ἐστι τῶν χαρακτηριζόντων τὸν ἐπιστήμονα τὸ καὶ ἄλλους δύνασθαι ποιεῖν ἐπιστήμονας, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ εἴρηται.* "Ad v. ἄλλους int. *ῥήτορας.* Plene infra C, *ῥητορικῆς γὰρ φὴς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης εἶναι, καὶ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ ἄλλον ῥήτορα.* Conviv. 196 E, *ποιητὴς ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς οὕτως ὥστε καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι*" (Ast). **32** *οἷον καὶ Πῶλος ἤρξατο*] 'such as was the exordium of Polus,' as if he had said *οἵαν ἀρχὴν ἤρξατο*, as in Soph. 242 B, *τίνα ἀρχήν τις ἂν ἄρξαιτο λόγου;* Tim. 36 E, *θείαν ἀρχὴν ἤρξατο.*

Page 5. 1 *ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ*] Sup. 447 D, *εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε, ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅ τι ἄν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ;* Ἀληθῆ, *ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, καὶ γὰρ νῦν δὴ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπηγγελλόμην.* After *ἀποθέσθαι* some few codd. give *ναί.* Buttmann would receive this into the text, as the answer of Gorgias to the request made by Socr. He urges that the general *ἐπάγγελμα* of Gorgias did not imply all that Socr. here requires of him. To evade the difficulty Ast proposes *εἴπερ* for *ὅπερ.* It is, I think, conceivable that Socr. refers to a boast which he regards as notorious, and which Gorgias presently repeats, *μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις, κ.τ.λ. ὑπισχνεῖ* will thus have its natural meaning—'the profession you habitually make.' I hesitate between this view and the expedient proposed by Buttm. Sext. Empir. (adv. Matth. ii. 7) gives a well-known anecdote in illustration of the contrast between dialectical brevity and rhetorical diffuseness: *Ζήνων ὁ Κιττιεὺς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὅτῳ διαφέρει διαλεκτικὴ ῥητορικῆς, συστρέψας τὴν χεῖρα καὶ πάλιν ἐξαπλώσας ἔφη "τούτῳ," κατὰ μὲν τὴν συστροφὴν τὸ στρόγγυλον καὶ βραχὺ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς τάττων ἰδίωμα, διὰ δὲ τῆς ἐξαπλώσεως καὶ ἐκτάσεως τῶν δακτύλων τὸ πλατὺ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δυνάμεως αἰνιττόμενος.* **4** *Εἰσὶ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες*] Olymp., *ὑπάρχουσι μέν τινες τῶν ἐρωτησέων καὶ μακροῦ λόγου χρῄζουσαι.* Rightly as regards the sense. For the use of *ἀναγκαῖαι* comp. Legg. i. 643 C; Soph. 242 B, and the note on 448 D above. Tr., 'There are answers, Socr., which cannot choose but be diffuse. Not but what I will try to be as brief as possible.' **7** *καὶ γὰρ αὖ*] This boast was common to Gorgias and his master Tisias. See Phaedr. 267 B. **9** *Τούτου μήν*] Olymp. reads *τούτου μέντοι*, which is perhaps better. **23** *ἄγαμαί γέ σου*] So Heind. Some MSS. have *γε* only, some *σου* only, but both are required by usage. Hirschig in a recent tract insists on expelling *τὰς ἀποκρίσεις*, reading *ἄγαμαί γέ σου ὅτι ἀποκρίνει κ.τ.λ.* So Hipp. Maj. 291 E,

ἄγαμαί σου ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς κ.τ.λ. **22** ὡς ἂν διαιτώμενοι ὑγιαίνοιεν] 'how they must live in order to get well': or more literally, 'by observing what rules of diet they will get well.'

Page 6. **10** περὶ τῶν καμνόντων ποιεῖ] ποιεῖ, which some of the best MSS. omit, seems to me indispensable. **18** ἡ γυμναστική] Olympiodorus makes a curious remark on this passage. He says, "Socr. is not speaking of the trainers (παιδοτρίβων) of the present day, but of ancient times, when it was the task of the physician to restore health, and of the trainer to preserve it" (ἡ δὲ γυμναστικὴ ἐφύλαττε). "In our day," he says, "the two functions are confounded"—συγκέχυνται ταῦτα.

Page 7. **1** χειρούργημα] This word and the following κύρωσις are pronounced Sicelisms by the Schol. κύρωσις is found in Thucyd. vi. 103, and perhaps may be set down as an instance of the Gorgiasm of which the ancient rhetoricians accuse him. κῦρος is presently used by Socr. in the same sense. Later writers do not scruple to employ both the words objected to. Olymp. quotes the Boeotism ἴττω Ζεύς put into the mouth of the Theban Cebes in Phaedo 62 A as a proof that Plato sometimes indulges his characters in the use of their native provincialisms. **5** Ἆρ' οὖν μανθάνω] 'I am not sure that I understand what art you mean to call it: but I shall presently' &c. ἆρα is frequently used when the speaker questions himself. See below, 463 D, ἆρ' οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκρινομένου; 'I should like to know whether you will understand my answer when I have given it.' τάχα = αὐτίκα, as freq. in Plato and Xenophon. Below, 466 A, τί τάχα δράσεις; where the gloss πρεσβύτης γενόμενος used to stand in the text but is now ejected. In Phaedr. 228 C τάχ' ἐπειδάν = ἐπειδὰν τάχιστα. With εἴσομαι, τάχα has nearly always this sense, but there is a seeming exception in the Minos, p. 314 C, καὶ ἴσως μὲν καλῶς λέγεις, τάχα δὲ ὧδε ἄμεινον εἰσόμεθα. **9** Πασῶν δέ, οἶμαι, τῶν τεχνῶν] 'of the various arts there are some in which work is the principal ingredient, and they require little or perhaps no discourse.' **18** ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν] 'paene dixerim,' opposed to ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ in Rep. i. 341 B, and to ὄντως in Legg. ii. 656 B, in which passages tr. 'in popular language,' 'in vulgar parlance,' or the like. **21** σχεδόν τι ἴσους] Schol., ὡς ἡ πεττευτικὴ καὶ κιθαρῳδία. It is hard to see how the game of draughts should require speech and action in equal proportion. Olympiodorus's explanation, which is somewhat obscure, shows, however, that a

mixed game of chance and skill, like our backgammon, is to be understood by *πεττευτική*. The 'speech' consisted in calling out the number of each throw of the dice; the action in moving the pieces to the best advantage under the circumstances. *ἐξ ἴσου ἔχει τό τε ἔργον καὶ τὸν λόγον· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ῥίπτειν τὰς ψήφους καὶ ἐπιλέγουσί τινα· οἷον ς' ε' δ' ἢ τρίεκτα* (sc. *τρὶς ἓξ*, Aesch. Ag. init.) *ἤ τι τοιοῦτον*. By *ψήφους* I imagine that he means *κύβους*, for the draughtmen can hardly have been made to serve a double purpose even though they were, as he says, like a split die (*διεστηκὼς κύβος ἐκ τριῶν τριγώνων περιεχόμενος*). **28** *οὐχ ὅτι*] 'not but what, taken at your word, you did say as much as that' &c. Protag. 336 D, *οὐχ ὅτι παίζει καὶ φησιν ἐπιλήσμων εἶναι*, 'though he does make believe and protest that he has no memory.' **30** *καὶ ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις*] 'and a captious opponent, if so disposed, might reply, "Oh, so it is arithmetic you mean when you say rhetoric."' *δυσχεραίνειν, φιλονεικεῖν* (Olymp.).

Page 8. **5** *Ἴθι νυν*] Most MSS. have *νῦν*. Bekker reads *οὖν* on the authority of one or two. I have restored the enclitic, which Dindorf replaces likewise in Sophist. p. 224 C, *Ἴθι δή νυν συναγάγωμεν αὐτό* for the vulg. *δὴ νῦν* (Ad Steph. Thes. ii. p. 1049). So in Xen. Hell. v. 1. 32, *ἴτε νυν καὶ ἐρωτᾶτε*. "Non est enim cur poeticum putetur *νυν* encliticum, quod prosae quoque tribuere videtur Schol. ad Eur. Hec. 975 Matth." (Dind. ibid. tom. v. p. 1613). The temporal adverb is out of place here, and the reading *οὖν* was probably a gloss on the original *νυν* or *νῦν*. The same account may be given of *δή*, which is found in another MS. On the quantity of the enclitic *νυν* see the accurate remarks of Mr J. Wordsworth in the Philological Museum, i. p. 226. **15** *περιττόν*] After this word *γνῶσις* stands in the MSS. Bekker and all subsequent edd. have bracketed it. It is so palpably a gloss that it is better removed. *ὅσ' ἂν ἑκάτερα τυγχάνοι ὄντα*] *ὅσα* here and in 453 E is used for *πόσα* or *ὁπόσα*. Soph. Oed. R. 1271, *ὀθούνεκ' οὐκ ὄψοιντό νιν Οὔθ' οἵ' ἔπασχεν οὔθ' ὁποῖ' ἔδρα κακά*. Xen. Cyr. v. 29, *ἤγαγον συμμάχους οὐχ ὅσους σὺ ἔπεισας ἀλλ' ὁπόσους ἐγὼ πλείστους ἐδυνάμην*. For *τυγχάνοι* the Bodl. and others give *τυγχάνῃ*, and so the Zür. edd. But this could only mean, 'as many as there may be of either sort,' whereas the meaning required is, 'how many either may be'; i.e. how many units there are, or 'may be,' in any particular odd or even number. The potential *ἂν τυγχάνοι* will give this sense, but we *should have* expected to find *ὅσα...τυγχάνει*, as in the passage of

this dial. just referred to we have *ὅσα ἐστίν* and *ὅσον ἐστίν*, and in Theaet. 198 C *σκοπεῖσθαι πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὢν*. One MS. has *τυγχάνει*, though apparently retaining *ἄν*.—Arithmetic, in its popular acceptation among the Greeks, was limited to Notation or Numeration: speculative or scientific Arithmetic took a much wider range, including the science of the forms and properties of numbers, as developed for instance in the four books of Euclid succeeding the sixth. Logistic in like manner was both popular and philosophical, the former being confined to the "four rules" and their applications. It is evident that Socr. is here speaking only of the *popular* Arithmetic and Logistic: Olympiodorus is therefore wide of the mark when he says, *ἡ μὲν ἀριθμητικὴ περὶ τὸ εἶδος αὐτῶν* (sc. *τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ τοῦ περιττοῦ*) *ἡ δὲ λογιστικὴ περὶ τὴν ὕλην*—for his statement, if true, is inapplicable to the passage before us. Those who are interested in the history of Greek mathematics may consult upon this point Klügel's Mathematisches Wörterbuch, i. 174 fol., comparing Plat. Politic. 299 E, and Phileb. 56 C fol. The theorem given in Theaet. 147 D is an elegant specimen of the higher Arithmetic. **18** *κυρουμένων*] 'which accomplish' or 'achieve': nearly=*διαπραττομένων*, with which it is coupled below (D). *κυροῦν*=to give validity to the will or act of another. **19** *οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι*] 'those who frame amendments in the assembly,' i.e. upon the *probouleumata* brought down from the Council. The force of the following words will be at once evident from an inscription in Boeckh (No. 84): *τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ τῇ βουλῇ, ἀναγράψαι δὲ Φανόκριτον τὸν Παρίανον πρόξενον καὶ εὐεργέτην αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους ἐν στήλῃ λιθίνῃ*. The honours decreed by the Council to this Phanocritus had been more limited, and the orator Cephalus adds this 'rider.' In Aesch. c. Ctes. p. 71, § 127, we find *σύγγραμμα* used in the corresponding sense of a clause in a bill: *καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ψηφίσματι πολὺ καὶ σαφέστερον καὶ πικρότερον σύγγραμμα γράφει*, 'he inserts a much harsher provision.' **22** *τυγχάνει*—[*τις*] For this *τις* the Bodl. and some other MSS. have *τινῶν*, possibly, as Herm. thinks, a relic of *τεχνῶν*, which may have been itself a gloss. I have followed his example in bracketing *τις*, which though harmless is unnecessary.

Page 9. **4** **τί**] This second *τί* was introduced by Heind. Some MSS. omit *τῶν περί*, which Ast inclines to do. **12** *τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν*] This ran thus, as edited by Bergk:—

ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ,
δεύτερον δὲ φυὰν καλὸν γενέσθαι,
τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως,
καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων.

Anth. Lyr. p. 408.

"These Scolia were a kind of lyric composition sung either in concert or successively, by all the guests after a banquet: the subjects of them were either the praises of some Attic Divinity, or moral precepts, or reflections on life, or gay exhortations to mirth or wine, or to love. There were some scolia of great antiquity; the most esteemed were those of Alcaeus, of Praxilla, and of Anacreon" (T. Gray). Olympiodorus says that the σκολιά were so called because the myrtle-branch held by the singer *inter cantandum* was not handed to his next neighbour, but to the person opposite him on the other side of the table: καὶ σκολιὰ ἡ μετάδοσις ἐγίνετο. This particular scolium is quoted by Athen. (xv. p. 694) and attributed by Clemens Alex. to Simonides. **19** καὶ εἴποι ἄν] I have followed Hirschig in inserting ἄν. παρασταῖεν ἄν...καὶ εἴποιεν would have been agreeable to usage, but the change in the subject of the verb requires the repetition of the particle.

Page 10. 16 ὃ φὴς σὺ—καὶ σέ] The same kind of anacoluthia occurs inf. 454 B, ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν δῆλον εἶναι ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ. **28** ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει] 'armed with this power you will hold in thraldom both physician and gymnast, while your great capitalist will be seen to be heaping up riches for another rather than himself, even for you who are able to move the masses by your eloquence.' For the use of ἐν comp. Xen. Cyr. viii. 6. 20, ταύτην τὴν στρατιὰν ἔχων ἐν ᾗ λέγεται καταστρέψασθαι πάντα τὰ ἔθνη. For that of ἀλλά see below, 454 C.

Page 11. 3 πειθοῦς δημιουργὸς—ἡ ῥητορική] This definition was not invented by Plato for the occasion. It appears to have been an heirloom in the schools of rhetoric, originating, according to the author of the Prolegomena to Hermogenes (p. 8), with Corax and Tisias, or, according to Quintilian, with Isocrates (Inst. Or. ii. c. 15, § 4): "Haec opinio originem ab Isocrate, si tamen revera ars quae circumfertur ejus est, duxit, qui cum longe sit a voluntate infamantium oratoris officia, finem artis temere comprehendit, dicens esse rhetoricen *persuadendi opificem*, id est, πειθοῦς δημιουργόν." The circumstance that it proceeds from the *mouth* of Socr. rather than of Gorgias, is an intimation that the *definition was* current in Athens when this dialogue was written.

An amended definition is given by Socr. in Phaedr. 271 A: ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων. **11** ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι—εἶναι τούτων ἕνα] An anacoluthon. The regular constr. would have been καὶ ἐγώ εἰμι τούτων εἷς, both εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι and ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω being parenthetical. The phrase εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι is sometimes in construction and sometimes independent, as δῆλον ὅτι. In B, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα, its use is ambiguous. Socr. alludes in this passage to his invariable practice of seeking a definition of the terms of an argument—the τί ἔστιν, in the language of Greek dialectic. **17** Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. νῦν. ἐγώ] The first ἐγώ is absent from the older edd. but is found in the Bodl. and elsewhere. The repetition is, however, harsh, and one would gladly dispense with the second ἐγώ, which is omitted in one of the less important Paris MSS. **20** οὐ μὴν ἀλλ'] 'not but what I have my suspicions as to its nature and its province.' **26** ὡς μάλιστ' ἂν—ποιοῖ] In this clause ὡς is relative. Tr., 'so as it shall leave no doubt in our minds what we are talking about.' Lat., 'quo maxime modo.' **31** [καὶ ποῦ] These two little words have greatly embarrassed the interpreters. It is, however, clear from the next speech of Socr. (ἆρα...ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῷα;) that the sentence closed with γράφων, for otherwise καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ or something equivalent must have occurred after ζῷα. This consideration may relieve us from the trouble of discussing the merits, or rather perhaps demerits, of the various conjectures (πῶς, πόσου &c.) which have been made or adopted by various interpreters from Ficinus downwards. How the words forced their way into the text it is hard to understand. They were read by one Scholiast, who adds the gloss, ἐν τῇ ποικίλῃ στοᾷ, which besides being irrelevant, is untrue, for the portico in question was painted by Polygnotus, not by Zeuxis. Ast defends the vulgate, translating thus: "welche Thiere malt er, und von welcher Seite malt er sie, d.h. was stellt er an ihnen dar?" Another interpretation is 'whether he painted on walls (in fresco) or on panel' &c.; but if Plato had meant this, he would certainly have expressed it differently. The clause, it seems to me, can have no relevant meaning, nor is any other clause needed in its stead. Hirschig leaves the text untouched, retaining the old interpretation of Ficinus, "quo pacto," as if he had read καὶ πῶς; Olympiodorus quotes only as far as γράφων, and ignores the καὶ ποῦ in his paraphrase, which he could hardly have done had he found the words in his copy.

Page 12. **7** *Ἴθι δή*] Socr. objects to the definition that its terms are ambiguous. For there are two kinds of *πειθώ*, that which imparts knowledge with belief, and that which creates belief only. Below, p. 455 A. **12** *Οὐ δῆτα*] Not the negative of *πείθει*, but of *οὐ πείθει*. 'Nay, he persuades unquestionably.' So inf. 501 C, *πότερον συγκατατίθεσαι ἡμῖν...ἢ ἀντίφῃς;* K. *Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ.*

Page 13. **12** *περὶ τούτων ἃ ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα*] This definition applies in strictness only to *δικανικοὶ λόγοι*. The province of deliberative oratory (*συμβουλευτική*) is *τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά*. See Phaedr. 261 C D, and the notes. **15** *ἀλλ'—ἵνα μὴ—ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω*] "Sed ut ne mirere.....scito me interrogare" &c. (Heind.) The particle *γάρ* is here in apodosi, as frequently after a parenthesis. See by all means Demosth. de F. L. § 107, and Mr Shilleto's accurate remarks in the Vv. Ll. The idiom has escaped Stallb. *ὅπερ λέγω* is explained by 453 C, *οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα, κ.τ.λ.* **18** *τοῦ ἑξῆς*] The order is, *ἐρωτῶ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἑξῆς περαίνεσθαι τὸν λόγον*. 'I ask in order that the argument may move towards its completion in regular order, by due steps.' *περαίνεσθαι* is *passive*, as below, 497 D, *ἵνα περανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι*. Stallb. translates as if it were transitive and governed *λόγον*, which can hardly be the case, though the comp. *διαπεραίνεσθαι* is not unfrequently used in the middle, as Phaedr. 263 E, *λόγον διεπεράνατο*. **19** *ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἐθιζώμεθα*] 'that we may not contract a habit of forestalling or taking for granted each other's statements from vague suspicions of what they are likely to be; but that you may rather develop your own views in your own way in accordance with the premisses assumed.'

Page 14. **8** *Δῆλον ἄρα—ἐστον*] Vulg. *δῆλον γὰρ αὖ...ἐστιν*. An illative particle being evidently needed here, I have not scrupled to adopt the excellent reading of Olympiodorus, *ἄρα*. The *ἐστόν* was suggested by Dr Badham, who had also acutely conjectured *γ' ἄρα* for *γὰρ αὖ*. Olymp. reads *ταὐτά εἰσιν*, but *ταὐτόν*, 'the same thing,' is commonly used in such cases, as in 462 E. The received *γὰρ αὖ* converts an inference into a reason. *ἐστόν* is frequently replaced by *ἐστίν*, as in Politicus 263 A, where the vulg. has *ἐστίν* for the *ἐστόν* of the Bodl. and other MSS. **29** *πειστικός*] *πιστικός* is the reading of the Bodl. and the majority of MSS., the rest giving *πειστικός*. Sext. Emp. (adv. Math. ii. §§ 2, 75) seems to have read *πειστικός* here and *πειστικῆς* for *πιστευτικῆς* paul. sup. In the latter case he is doubtless wrong,

but both Buttm. and Heind. seem with reason to question the legitimacy of the form πιστικός. There is the same confusion in the readings of Aristot. Rhet. i. 2. 1, where πειστική is now accepted by the edd. instead of the old πιστική.

Page 15. **3** ὅταν περὶ ἰατρῶν αἱρέσεως] "There were public physicians elected in most of the Greek cities, who received a salary from the commonwealth, and seem to have taken no fees of particular people. Those physicians who exercised this office were said δημοσιεύειν. See Aristoph. in Avibus 584, Εἰθ' ὁ γ' Ἀπόλλων ἰατρὸς γ' ὢν ἰάσθω, μισθοφορεῖ δέ: Acharn. 994, Τράλειψον εἰρήνη με τὠφθαλμὼ ταχύ. ΔΙ. Ἀλλ' ὦ πονήρ' οὐ δημοσιεύων τυγχάνω. But this custom seems to have been laid aside before Ol. 97. 4. Arist. Plut. 407, Τίς δῆτ' ἰατρὸς ἐστι νῦν ἐν τῇ πόλει; Οὔτε γὰρ ὁ μισθὸς οὐδέν ἐστ' οὔθ' ἡ τέχνη. Gorg. 514. Politic. 259, εἰ τῷ τις τῶν δημοσιευόντων ἰατρῶν ἱκανὸς ξυμβουλεύειν ἰδιωτεύων αὐτός, ἆρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ προσαγορεύεσθαι τοὔνομα τῆς τέχνης ταὐτὸν ὅπερ ᾧ ξυμβουλεύει;" (T. Gray). Hesych., δημοσιεύειν τὸ δημοσίᾳ ὑπηρετεῖν ἐπὶ μισθῷ. Suid. v. δημοσιεύω. οἱ δημοσίᾳ χειροτονούμενοι ἰατροὶ καὶ δημοσίᾳ προῖκα ἐθεράπευον. Comp. Hom. Od. xvii. 382, Τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος ἐπελθών, Ἄλλον γ' εἰ μὴ τῶν οἱ δημιοεργοὶ ἔασι; Μάντιν ἢ ἰητῆρα κακῶν, ἢ τέκτονα δούρων, Ἦ καὶ θέσπιν ἀοιδόν, ὁ κεν τέρπῃσιν ἀείδων. These passages explain the origin of the oft-recurring distinction of δημιουργός and ἰδιώτης, equivalent in the time of Plato to that between professional and unprofessional, clerk and layman, the learned and the vulgar.

4 ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περί] Understand αἱρέσεως, unless with Hirschig we suppose the prepositions to have been imported into the text. ἔθνους is used as the Lat. *natio* in Cic. pro Murena 33, "tota natio candidatorum." So Ast, who refers to Rep. i. 351 c, &c.

6 ἄλλο τι τότε] So Bekk. after a few MSS. Vulg. ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε. Here ἄλλο τι is equiv. to ἆρ' οὐ, *nonne;* as inf. 495 c. It corresponds to the Germ. *nicht wahr*, as Ast observes. I do not deny that there are cases in which ἤ is to be retained, as in Phaedo 79, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἢ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι τὸ δὲ ψυχή; to which the answer is, Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

Page 16. **2** Περικλέους—τείχους] "The μακρὰ τείχη which joined Athens to the Piraeus were begun on the motion of Pericles, Ol. 80. 4, B.C. 457. Socr. at that time was about twelve years old. See Plutarch in Vitt. Pericl. et Cimon. Harpocration tells us that of the two walls which extended from the city to Piraeus, the southern only, or the innermost, was called τὸ διὰ μέσου, as lying

between the innermost, τὸ βόρειον, and τὸ Φαληρικόν, which was a third wall drawn from Athens to the Port Phalerum, and he cites this very passage" (T. Gray). This statement is substantially correct, but Gray is mistaken in supposing that the intermediate or southern Peiraic wall was projected at the same time with the two mentioned in Thuc. i. 107, 108. It was not built until a later period, when the northern Peiraic and the Phaleric wall were finished, i.e. after B.C. 456. We thus get rid of the difficulty, such as it is, of supposing Socr. a hearer of Pericles at the early age of twelve. The two Peiraic Long Walls ran parallel to each other, enclosing an oblong space of four or five miles in length (40 stades) and 550 feet in width. That to Phalerum was built at an angle to the other two. Since the appearance of the work of Ulrichs on the subject, most topographers have agreed to place Phalerum on the spot called Trispyrgi, rather than on that now appropriated as the site of Munychia, and distant from the former by the whole extent of the Phaleric bay. See Leake (Topog. Ath. i. 422), who differs however in regard of the situation of Phalerum. This latter question is probably not yet definitively settled. **4** ὧν νῦν δή] One MS. has νῦν αὖ. The rest omit νῦν. Heind. properly insists on retaining it. See note to p. 462. **12** Εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης] 'well it might, Socr., if you knew all—if you were aware that Rhetoric includes in her domain—I may say *all* the faculties:' **21** ἐλθόντε] Vulg. ἐλθόντα, corr. Dobree. **23** οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι] Tr., 'would be entirely distanced,' as we say of a beaten horse, 'he is nowhere.' Soph. Ant. 183, τοῦτον οὐδαμοῦ λέγω. For ὁπότερον δεῖ αἱρεθῆναι ἰατρόν, which is the reading of the Bodl. and several codd., the edd. retain the inferior, ὁπότερον δεῖ αἱρεθῆναι, ῥήτορα ἢ ἰατρόν, which destroys the point of the example. The rhetor will persuade the people to elect him state-physician in preference to a regularly trained practitioner. See above, 455 B, ὅταν περὶ ἰατρῶν αἱρέσεως ἢ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος.

Page 17. **2** ἔμαθέ τις] The Bodl. omits τις. So the Ald., which Heind. was disposed to follow. I retain it, with Bekk. and the majority of MSS. **15** μεταστρέψαντες] "Vern. *es umkehrend*, h. e. *umgekehrt*, i. q. ἐναντίως (ut c) Latinor. ex contrario. Polit. ix. 587 D, ἐάν τις μετάστρεψας...λέγῃ, κ.τ.λ." (Ast). Participles are frequently used thus adverbially, of which usage τελευτῶν, 'tandem,' is a familiar instance. See not. on Phaedr. 228. **21** ἔμβραχυ περὶ ὅτου ἂν βούληται] "Vox ἔμβραχυ, quam veteres συντόμως vel ἁπλῶς explicant, eodem fere modo, quo formula illa

ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, orationi modeste restringendae inservit, nisi quod illa fere ante οὐδέν et πάντες inferri solent, hoc ante ὅστις ἄν, ὅστις βούλει, ὅπουπερ et talia. V. Tim. Lex. v. ἔμβραχυ ibique Ruhnk. imprimisque Schol. Plat. ad Theagem, p. 88" (Heind.). The Schol. in question quotes a line of Cratinus thus: ἔδει παρέχειν ὅ τι τις εὔξαιτ' ἔμβραχυ, where read, with Cobet, ἔδει παρασχεῖν. The use of the formula is restricted, in good authors, to the cases noted by Heind., though later writers do not scruple to use it generally in the sense of ἁπλῶς, συντόμως, as Dion Chrys. (p. 446 C), ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος ἔμβραχυ ἐσπούδακε ξυναρμόσαι τῷ θεῷ τὸ ἀνθρωπεῖον γένος. I quote this from Cobet's Varr. Lectt., p. 208, where ἔμβραχυ is shown to be frequently altered by copyists into ἐν βραχεῖ, as in Plat. Sympos. 217 A, ὥστε ποιητέον εἶναι ἐν βραχεῖ ὅ τι κελεύοι Σωκράτης. Cobet adds, "Apparebit nunc quam infeliciter Stallbaum in Platonis Hippia minore, 365 D, pro ἐρώτα ἔμβραχυ ὅ τι βούλει ex deterioribus receperit ἐν βραχεῖ." Cobet justly observes that ἐν βραχεῖ is not synonymous with ἔμβραχυ, but means rather 'briefly' (as in Soph. El. 637, ἐν βραχεῖ συνθεὶς λέγω). Ast in his Lexicon correctly renders ἔμβραχυ by the Latin 'cunque' (Germ. *was nur immer*). The form of the word is illustrated by ἔμπας, ἔμπαν, ἔμπα. **27** κᾆτα] κᾆτα and κἄπειτα not unfrequently occur after participles, where we should have expected εἶτα and ἔπειτα. Of this usage Heind. quotes two instances from Aristophanes: Equit. 391, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὗτος τοιοῦτος ὢν ἅπαντα τὸν βίον Κᾆτ' ἀνὴρ ἔδοξεν εἶναι: Nub. 623, ἀνθ' ὧν λαχὼν Τπέρβολος Τῆτες ἱερομνημονεῖν κἄπειθ' ὑφ' ὑμῶν τῶν θεῶν Τὸν στέφανον ἀφῃρέθη. Add Xen. Mem. i. 1. 5, εἰ προαγορεύων ὡς ὑπὸ θεοῦ φαινόμενα κᾆτα ψευδόμενος ἐφαίνετο: and the reff. in Kühner's note.

Page 18. **16** οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα] Olymp., ὅρα ἦθος θεῖον τοῦ Σωκράτους· οὐκ εἶπε γὰρ ὅτι ἀνακόλουθα ἢ ψευδῆ λέγεις, ἀλλ' οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα, τῷ μετρίῳ κολάζων τὸ δριμὺ τῆς ἐγκλήσεως. This use of οὐ πάνυ as a qualified negative is common, if not universal, in the Atticists of the Empire, as in Lucian according to Cobet (Vv. Ll. p. 222), who at the same time denies that this sense was known to the Attics themselves. Mr Cope, in a carefully-written and candid Excursus to his Translation of this dialogue, strenuously maintains the view expressed by Olympiodorus, and I observe that the late Mr Riddell, in the "Digest of Idioms," attached to his edition of the Apology, held the same opinion. On the other hand, see among Greek authorities, the Scholiast on Phaedo 57 A (οὐδεὶς πάνυ τι ἐπιχωριάζει.....), who writes ἀντὶ τοῦ

οὐδαμῶς· ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ ἑξῆς οὕτως· πάνυ οὐδεὶς ἐπιχωριάζει. It seems also difficult to explain Lysis 204 E, οὐ γὰρ πάνυ τι αὐτοῦ τοῦνομα λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ἔτι πατρόθεν ἐπονομάζεται—except as an unqualified negation. The same remark applies to Legg. iv. 704 C, γείτων δὲ αὐτῆς πόλις ἆρ' ἔσται τις πλήσιον; K. Οὐ πάνυ· διὸ καὶ κατοικίζεται, to Aristot. Eth. N. x. 5. 4, χαίροντες ὀτῳοῦν σφόδρα οὐ πάνυ δρῶμεν ἕτερον, to Menander, frag. 198, οὐ πάνυ Εἴωθ' ἀληθὲς οὐδὲ ἓν γύνη λέγειν—and, as Mr Cope seems to admit, to οὐδὲν πάνυ wheresoever it occurs. In Plat. Rep. 549 D, ἑαυτὴν δὲ μήτε πάνυ τιμῶντα μήτε ἀτιμάζοντα—we should perhaps adopt the variant of Cod. D and two others, μήτε πάντη ἀτιμάζοντα. If πάνυ be retained, the passage makes unequivocally in favour of Mr Cope's view, and we shall have to admit that the same negative is sometimes used in the qualified, and sometimes in the unqualified sense by the same authors.

Page 19. 11 ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν] γοῦν Olymp., and for τοσαύτη, τοιαύτη. 'And for my own part, God forbid that my hands should ever be so full, that I must abandon a discussion so interesting and so ably conducted, in favour of any other employment however profitable.' **21** Αἰσχρὸν δὴ—βούλεται] 'After my voluntary challenge to all questioners I cannot for very shame refuse henceforth.' αὐτόν = 'ultro.' After ἐθέλειν formerly stood καὶ ταῦτα, now omitted by the edd. in conformity with the Bodl. and some other MSS.

Page 20. 22 αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα] This was distinctly maintained by Tisias, according to Phaedr. 272 D, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀληθείας μετέχειν δέοι.....τὸν μέλλοντα ἱκανῶς ῥητορικὸν εἶναι. Presently in p. 460, Gorgias seems disposed to qualify this broad statement of his master. His disciple Polus is less scrupulous, as we shall find below, 461 B. **26** Οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥᾳστώνη] 'And is it not a great comfort, Socr., to find yourself fully a match for the professors of any other art, without having had the trouble of learning any but this one?' **32** πρὸς λόγου] C. F. Herm. proposes πρὸς λόγον, on the ground that πρὸς λόγου is found nowhere else. Phileb. 33 C, ἐὰν πρὸς λόγον τι ᾖ. So πρὸς ἔπος, ibid. 18 D. But πρὸς λόγου is supported by πρὸς τρόπου, Phaedr. 252 D, and Theophr. Char. xxx., to which the antitheton is ἀπὸ τρόπου. Comp. οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἴρηκεν, Theaet. 179 C. Olymp. gives πρὸ λόγου, which, if not a copyist's error, has the analogy of πρὸ ὁδοῦ and προὔργου in its favour. Tr., 'If it should answer our purpose'; 'if it be in the interest of our discussion to do so.' After τυγχάνει *in the next line* Olymp. inserts καί.

Page 21. 18 *ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀποκαλύψας*] Above, 455 D, *ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι πειράσομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σαφῶς ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν.* **21** *Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν—μαθήσεται*] Perhaps the cloud of quotations collected by Stallb. may be sufficient to protect this reading of the MSS. against Stephen, who alters *μαθήσεται* into *μαθήσεσθαι*. I confess that the position of *ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι* in the sentence seems to me to distinguish it from cases in which *οἶμαι δέ, δοκῶ δέ, δοκῶ μέν, δοκεῖ δέ μοι*, and the like are placed in parenthesi. Heind. reads *μαθήσεσθαι* with Steph. Stallb.'s argument, "quod indicativus longe accommodatior est Sophistae confidentiae quam oratio aliunde suspensa," is characteristic. **23** *Ἔχε δή*] This phrase occurs again 490 B, *ἔχε δὴ αὐτοῦ*, evidently in the sense of *ἐπίσχες*, 'hold,' a meaning however which it will not always bear. The grammarians explain it by *πρόσεχε, ἄγε δή, ὅρα δή*, and the like: but the parallel passage in this dialogue justifies Heind.'s version, "subsiste," with which Stallb. quarrels. Compare Protag. 349 D, and Heind.'s note. The argument which follows is to our notions sophistical enough. Not so, however, from the Socratic point of view, according to which every virtue is a form of knowledge, and every vice the result of ignorance. Comp. Xen. Mem. iii. 9. 4, 5. It may seem that Gorgias might have turned the tables upon Socr. by simply substituting *ἄδικος* for *δίκαιος* in the premisses, as indeed Olymp. remarks (p. 49), *ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι δυνατὸν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου συμπεραίνειν καὶ εἰπεῖν· Ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐπιστήμων τοῦ ἀδίκου· ὁ ἐπιστήμων τοῦ ἀδίκου ἄδικα βούλεται· ὁ ἄδικα βουλόμενος ἄδικα διαπράττεται· ὁ διαπραττόμενος ἄδικα οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ δίκαιος· ὁ ἄρα ῥήτωρ οὐδέποτε δίκαιός ἐστιν. Ἀλλὰ φαμέν*, he adds, *ὅτι δύναται ὁ ῥήτωρ εἰδέναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐχ ἵνα χρήσηται ἀλλ' ἵνα φύγῃ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν περιπέσῃ*. The objection however is fallacious, for, according to the doctrine of Socr., the *ἄδικος* is not *ὁ τὰ ἄδικα εἰδώς*, but *ὁ τὰ δίκαια*, and (as a consequence) *τὰ ἄδικα μὴ εἰδώς*.

Page 22. 11 *Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη*] Quintilian adverts to this passage in terms which prove that he read it nearly as it now stands, but in a different position, at the end, namely, of the argument, after *φαίνεταί γε*. "Disputatio illa contra Gorgiam *ita claudituɾ: οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν*" (Inst. ii. 15. 27). From this it is pretty evident that the text had been disturbed before his time, and the sequence of the reasoning interrupted. The mention of *ῥητορικός* in the sentence as it stands in our copies is clearly premature, *his* turn coming after the *δίκαιος* has been disposed of. Another fault is,

that the proposition *οὐδέποτε βουλήσεται ὁ δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν* is more than the premiss, as it stands, can support. If we insert *ἀεί*, which may easily have been absorbed by the last syllable of *βούλεσθαι*, the reasoning becomes consequent, as, by expelling the clause I have bracketed, it is made regular in its form. 'The just man performs just actions, does he not?' 'He does.' 'In fact he *wills* to do just actions *always*.' 'Apparently.' 'If so, the just man will never will to act unjustly.' 'That follows of necessity.' 'But from the premisses it follows of necessity that the rhetorical man is just' (sc. *ὅτι τὰ δίκαια μεμάθηκεν*, sup. A and B). 'Yes.' 'If so, the rhetorical man will be incapable of willing to act unjustly.' [Of these alterations the first was anticipated by Professor Woolsey of Boston, U.S., in his edition, p. 147. The second (the insertion of *ἀεί*) occurred to me some years ago. All three have, I now see, occurred independently to M. Hirschig (Exploratio Argumentationum Socraticarum, &c., 1859). I mention this by way of external evidence in favour of the emendations proposed, which, however, need no recommendation beyond their intrinsic necessity. In defence of *ἀεί*, which Hirschig places *before* *βούλεσθαι*, he justly appeals to 460 E, *οὐδέποτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄδικον πρᾶγμα, ὃ γ' ἀεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται.*] **27** *ὡσαύτως δὲ οὕτω*] So Protag. 351 C, *τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὡσαύτως οὕτως οὐ καθ' ὅσον ἀνιαρὰ κακά.*

Page 23. 20 *μὰ τὸν κύνα*] A choice specimen of Neoplatonic trifling is the following scholium of Olympiodorus: *μὰ τὸν κύνα. συμβολικῶς τοῦτο. ὁ γὰρ κύων σύμβολόν ἐστι τῆς λογικῆς ζωῆς, ὡς εἴρηται ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις· ἔχει τι ὁ κύων φιλόσοφον, τὸ διακριτικόν,* κ.τ.λ. He alludes to Rep. ii. 376 A. The Socratic oaths, not however peculiar to Socr., *νὴ* or *μὰ τὸν κύνα*, or *τὸν χῆνα*, find an odd counterpart in the old Engl. "by cock and pye." **25** *ἦ οἶει ὅτι*] Stallb. stops before and after *οἶει*, and interprets *ὅτι* by "propterea quod," quoting Theaet. 147 A, *ἦ, οἶει, τίς τι συνίησί τινος ὄνομα,* κ.τ.λ. The 2nd Zürich ed. agrees with him and with Hirschig in placing the interrog. after *λόγοις*. I am not sure that this is any improvement on the punctuation of the first ed., which I have retained. Professor Woolsey conceives that the sentence ends abruptly at *διδάξειν*, and that Polus meant to have added 'that therefore his inconsistency is to be charged to rhetoric,' or something to that effect. And certainly the clause *ἔπειτα* κ.τ.λ. would be no just apodosis to the causal clause *ὅτι τὴν ὀργὴν* κ.τ.λ. *The passage* however seems to me to make sense without resorting

to either supposition. 'Do you who maintain these paradoxes yourself believe them? or do you think (with me) that Gorgias was ashamed, &c.? And then, in consequence of this unlucky admission of his, I dare say a contradiction did occur in the reasoning—the thing we know you dearly love—for it was you, not he, who gave the conversation this interrogative turn.' In *οὕτω καὶ σύ* the *καί* does not belong to *δοξάζεις*, as Ast strangely supposes, but to *σύ*: 'Do even you think as you say—to say nothing of your audience?'

Page 24. **3** *Ὦ κάλλιστε* Πῶλε] It is possible that this homœoteleuton was intentional, and by way of parody of the Sicilian practice. In sense it is much the same as *ὦ λῷστε* Πῶλε, inf. 467 B. See note to Phaedr. 278 E. *ἀλλά τοι*] A Paris MS. (C) gives *τι*, perhaps a relic of an old reading *ἄλλο τι*. But *τοί* and *τί* are perpetually confounded in the MSS. **6** *ἐπανορθοῖτε*] Heind. reads, with one MS., *ἐπανορθῶτε*, adding, "Vulgo *ἐπανορθοῖτε*, quod soloece infertur post praegressum tempus *κτώμεθα*. V. Dawes, Misc. Cr. p. 85." See however Porson on Eur. Ph. l. 68, "Hanc regulam (sc. Dawesianam) non videntur per omnia servasse Tragici: cf. Hec. 1121, 1131"; and Gram. Meerm. ap. Schaef. Greg. Cor. p. 647, *τὰ εὐκτικὰ ἀντὶ ὑποτακτικῶν λαμβάνουσιν* (*οἱ Ἀττικοί*). Comp. also Rep. iii. 410 C. "Hoc dicit, *ut nos*, id quod optamus, *sustentetis et erigatis*" (Stallb.). **7** *καὶ νῦν*] Tr., 'and if in the present discussion Gorgias and I are in danger of breaking down, pray come and help us up again, as it is but fair you should. On my part too I am prepared to cancel any of the premisses you may disapprove of, if you will oblige me by observing one condition.' *ἀναθέσθαι* is properly to revoke a move in a game of draughts. Hipparch. 229 E, *ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὥσπερ πεττεύων ἐθέλω σοι ἀναθέσθαι ὅ τι βούλει τῶν εἰρημένων.* **18** *καθέρξῃς*] Vulg. *καθείρξῃς*: St. *καθέξῃς* with one MS., an impossible tense. The older form *καθέρξῃς* is preserved by Olymp. and the Bodl. and seven other MSS. Baiter, who has changed the *καθείρξῃς* of the first into *καθέρξῃς* in the second ed. of the Zürich, gives the following passages in justification: Rep. v. 461 B, *ξυνέρξαντος*: Tim. 34 C, *ξυνέρξας*: Polit. 285 B, *ἔρξας*: Tim. 18 D, *σύνερξιν*: Rep. v. 460 A, *συνέρξεως*: Thuc. v. 11, *περιέρξαντες*: Soph. Aj. 593, *ξυνέρξετε*: Oed. T. 890, 894, *ἔρξεται*. He might have added *καθέργνυται* in Cratin. ap. Polluc. 10. 160. As the tendency of the scribes would be to alter the older form into the more modern, I have adopted *καθέρξῃς*, which, as Baiter observes, is further

confirmed by the corrupt reading καθέξῃς. **20** ἀτυχήσαις] Bas. 2 ἀποτυχήσαις: "bene" (Findeisen). Rather *male*, for Plato would have written ἀποτύχοις, an objection which seems to have escaped Ast.. ἀτυχῶ occurs with the *gen.* in Isocr. Nicocl. p. 20, St., ἐὰν.....μηδενὸς τούτων ἀτυχῇς. ἀλλ' ἀντίθες τοι] This reading of the Bodl. and many other MSS. was restored by Bekk. in place of the vulg. τό or τί. Comp. Soph. El. 298, ἀλλ' ἴσθι τοι τἰσουσά γ' ἀξίαν δίκην, as one instance among many of the separation of ἀλλά and τοι. The meaning is, 'as a set-off to this, think what a hard case mine will be, if *you* are to hold forth without deigning to answer my questions, while *I* am not to be at liberty to leave the room, and get out of hearing.'

Page 25. **2** Καὶ νῦν δή] νῦν δή, it is scarcely necessary to observe, has usually the sense of 'modo,' 'but now,' 'a short time ago' (ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν, as the grammarians explain it), and takes an imperf. and sometimes an aorist. It is so used a few lines above, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, and in this sense is occasionally *opposed* to νῦν, as in a passage of the Laws (iii. 683 E), ἢ νῦν δὴ μὲν [ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν] τούτοις περιτυχόντες τοῖς λόγοις οὕτω ταῦτ' ἐτίθεμεν, νῦν δ' ἐπιλελήσμεθα, whence Cobet ejects the palpable gloss ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν. Magnes Comicus (ap. Meineke ii. p. 10), εἰπέ μοι, νῦν δὴ μὲν ὤμυυς μὴ γεγονέναι, νῦν δὲ φής, where, as well as in Eurip. Hipp. 233, Cobet reads νυνδή (following the analogy of ἐπειδή, δηλαδή, &c.). Compare by all means his Vv. Lectt. p. 233, "Confirmat hanc observationem et veram esse demonstrat quod νυνδή non dirimitur interposita particula, et dicitur νυνδὴ μέν, non νῦν μὲν δή, quod sicubi legitur videbis ad νῦν δή referendum, et cum praesenti tempore et futuro conjungi." In the passage before us, however, νῦν δή is used as τότε δή, αὐτίκα δή, &c., each adverb and particle retaining its ordinary sense. Stallb. has collected instances in his note: which perhaps are hardly called for. **18** Πρᾶγμα ὃ φὴς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην] 'a thing which you say created Art.' See the quotation from his own book given by Polus, sup. 448 C, ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην.

Page 26. **12** Μὴ ἀγροικότερον ᾖ] 'I fear it may be somewhat uncivil to say the truth; for I shrink from speaking, out of deference to Gorgias, lest he should think that I am caricaturing his special pursuit.' **21** Δοκεῖ τοίνυν] This entire passage, as far as δικαιοσύνην, 466 C, is quoted by Aristides Rhetor in his spirited but *verbose* treatise De Rhetorica (p. 6, Dind.). I have noted many

and adopted some of his various readings. **22** *τι*] Om. A. Rh. *ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς*] Isocr. c. Soph. 294, *ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι, καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς* (f. *στοχαστικῆς*, Hirschig) *ἔργον εἶναι*,—as here, an enumeration of the qualities required in a rhetor. The coincidence between this passage and that in the text cannot be thought fortuitous; and as Isocrates wrote the speech against the Sophists at an early period (see Antid. § 7, p. 280, Zür.), it is probably Plato who is the borrower. There is some malice in the substitution of *στοχαστικῆς*, 'shrewd,' for the *δοξαστικῆς* of Isocr., who meant to describe a person, *δοξάσαι περὶ ἑκάστου τὴν ἀλήθειαν μᾶλλον δυνάμενον τῶν εἰδέναι φασκόντων*, which he boasts to have been his own case (Panath. 234 D). These considerations should, I think, prevent the acceptance of Hirschig's plausible conjecture noted above. **26** *ἡ ὀψοποική*] A qualitative adj. derived directly from *ὀψοποιός*. The art of the fancy-cook or *cuisinier*. Stephen injudiciously adopts *ὀψοποιητική* on inferior MS. authority. In A. Rh. the article *ἡ* is omitted. **27** *ὡς δ' ὁ*] So A. Rh.; vulg. *ὡς δὲ ὁ*. **32** *φημ' ἐγώ*] So A. Rh.; vulg. *φημὶ ἐγώ*.

Page 27. **3** *ἐγὼ δ'*] A. Rh.; vulg. *ἐγὼ δέ*. **4** *εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρόν*] A. Rh. *εἴτε αἰσχρὸν εἴτε καλόν*. **5** *ὅ τι ἐστίν*] A. Rh. *ὅ ἐστιν*. **6** *πυθέσθαι*] A. Rh. *πυνθάνεσθαι*. **9** *ἀπόκριναι*] A. Rh. *ἀπόκρ. μοι*. With the entire passage which follows, and its tabulation of sciences and pseudo-sciences, the reader may compare a passage in the Antidosis of Isocrates, possibly suggested by the present. *βούλομαι δὲ περὶ τῆς τῶν λόγων παιδείας ὥσπερ οἱ γενεαλογοῦντες πρῶτον διελθεῖν...ὁμολογεῖται μὲν γὰρ τὴν φύσιν ἡμῶν ἔκ τε τοῦ σώματος συγκεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς...οὕτω δὲ τούτων ἐχόντων ὁρῶντές τινες περὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων πολλὰς τέχνας συνεστηκυίας, περὶ δὲ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον συντεταγμένον, εὑρόντες διττὰς ἐπιμελείας κατέλιπον ἡμῖν, περὶ μὲν τὰ σώματα τὴν παιδοτριβικὴν ἧς ἡ γυμναστικὴ μέρος ἐστί, περὶ δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν περὶ ἧς ἐγὼ μέλλω ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους, ἀντιστρόφους καὶ σύζυγας καὶ σφίσιν αὐταῖς ὁμολογουμένας, κ.τ.λ.* Antid. § 193, Bekk. Observe the expressions *ὥσπερ οἱ γενεαλογοῦντες* and *σύζυγας*, as illustrative of those tabular arrangements of which Plato is so fond; and of which we have elaborate specimens in the Sophistes and Politicus. **21** *Πῶλος δὲ δδε*] Of course a play upon the name Polus. See Introd. and the passage there quoted from Aristotle's Rhet. The *ὀξύτης* of Polus arose from his failing to perceive the importance of knowing the *τί ἐστι* of the thing discoursed of. He inverts the

natural order by asking for the ποιόν before he knows the τί. In fact he was ignorant of the first elements of the dialectic art. Gorgias is better instructed, and exclaims, with something of impatience, 'Oh! never mind *him*. Tell *me* what you mean by saying that Rhetoric is the image or counterfeit of a branch of the art Politic.'

Page 28. **8** ἀλλ' ἤ] So A. Rh.; vulg. ἄλλος ἤ. **6** ὃ ποιεῖ] So A. Rh.; vulg. ὅ τι. **11** τὴν μέν] A. Rh. τὴν μὲν οὖν. Bekk. καὶ τὴν μέν, with one MS. τῷ before σώματι omitted in Bodl. **12** μίαν μὲν οὕτως] Of this idiomatic use of οὕτως see exx. Phaedr. 235 C, 'I cannot invent a single name on the instant.' **15** ἀντίστροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ] So A. Rh.; vulg. ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς. The repetition of ἀντίστροφον seems to me more forcible. The word is used with a dative Rep. x. 616 B; with a gen. Phileb. 40 D and elsewhere, as below, 465 D. It denotes a relation like that of 'strophe' and 'antistrophe' in poetry; or between the two wings of a regular façade in architecture, or a picture and its 'pendant,' &c. **17** δικαιοσύνην] I have retained δικαιοσύνην in preference to the rival reading δικαστικήν, which has the support of two inferior MSS., and is confirmed by the authors of the Prolegomena to Hermogenes, p. 9 (Rhett. Graeci, p. 22. 15, ed. Walz). But Quintilian certainly read δικαιοσύνην (Inst. Or. ii. c. 15, "duas partes civilitatis...animo assignet, legalem atque justitiam"), which is also found in Aristides Rh., in the Schol. on this passage, and in Olympiodorus, who has the gloss, πρὸς δικαιοσύνην ἀντὶ τοῦ πρὸς δικαστικήν. Socr. is entitled to assume the identity of justice and dicastic, for he has just proved ὅτι ὁ μεμαθηκὼς τὰ δίκαια δίκαιος. He 'who has learnt all about justice' is the ideal dicast, and it is of his art that Socr. now speaks under the name of justice. A passage in the Politicus is illustrative of the present: λείπεσθαι δὲ τὰ τίμια καὶ ξυγγενῆ (πολιτικῆς ἐπιστήμης), τούτων δ' ἐστί που στρατηγία καὶ δικαστική (303 B). So inf. 520 B, we read, κάλλιόν ἐστι σοφιστικὴ ῥητορικῆς ὥσπερ νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς, where however we find in the text quoted by Arist. Rh., as here, δικαιοσύνης. The passage of Rep. i. 332 D, where δικαιοσύνη is for the sake of the argument virtually identified with δικαστική, is not really in point, as the opinion is only advanced for the purpose of being refuted: nor is it safe to build upon a passage in a doubtful dialogue like the Clitophon (408 B), where δικαιοσύνη is identified with both πολιτική and δικαστική. But the passage from the Politicus proves that Plato could use δικαστική in a good sense, as the art of

the model δικαστής, who, as we have seen, has been shown to be δίκαιος. **23** ἡ κολακευτική] Olymp. p. 62, ἰστέον ὅτι τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, ὡς φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης, φίλος κόλακος ὅσον τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἡδέος, alluding perhaps to Eth. N. ii. 7. 13. **24** τέτραχα—διανείμασα] The following scheme will assist the reader :—



26 ὑπέδυ] Arist. Met. iii. 2. 19, οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ταὐτὸν ὑποδύονται σχῆμα τῷ φιλοσόφῳ. Id. Rhet. i. 2. 7, διὸ καὶ ὑποδύεται ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡ ῥητορική. The metaphor seems taken from the stage : Luc. Pisc. c. 33, ὑποδύεσθαι τὸν Δία, 'to personate Jupiter'; Tim. Lex., κομψὸς λόγος. καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς δὲ καὶ ὁ πιθανότητι ὑποδυόμενος τὴν ἀλήθειαν. (In Xen. Oec. 14. 3, ἢ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ὑποδύει διδάσκειν, used for ὑποδέχει.) **28** ὥστε δοκεῖ—ἀξία] Ar. Rh. has δοκεῖν and ἀξίαν.

Page 29. **16** λειότησι καὶ ἐσθῆσιν] Vulg. λειότητι καὶ αἰσθήσει. Ar. Rh. has ἐσθῆτι, which confirms the (as it seems to me) certain emendation adopted by Bekker from three MSS., two of which give λειότησι and the other ἐσθῆσιν, which is also recommended by Heind. Tim. 65 C, τραχύτησί τε καὶ λειότησι. Hirschig gives ἐσθήσει, a word of doubtful note, to say nothing of the inelegance of the change from a significant plural to singular. **21** [ὅτι ὁ κομμωτική] The brackets in the text include the words omitted by Ar. Rh. μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε sound to me like a gloss, introducing a duplicate reading. Certainly the terms of the proportion which Aristides retains are all that are necessary for Socr.'s purpose. The word κομμοῦν is of somewhat uncertain lineage. A scholiast derives it from κόμμι, *gummi*, which can hardly be true. Modern lexicographers connect it with κομεῖν, *comere*, or, still better, with κόσμος, κομψός. The arts of the κομμώτης or κομμωτρία are vividly described in a passage of the comic poet Alexis, quoted by Athen. xiii. p. 568 (Meineke iii. p. 422, Ἰσοστάσιον), and more briefly by Philostratus, Ep. 39, as ὀφθαλμῶν ὑπογραφαί, καὶ κομῶν προσθῆκαι

καὶ ζωγραφίαι παρειῶν καὶ χειλέων βαφαί. The corresponding Latin terms are *mango, mangonizare*, as in Plin. N. H. xxiii. 1, "Succus radicis vitis nigrae cum ervo laetiore quodam colore et cutis teneritate *mangonizat* corpora," a passage which illustrates λειότητσι in the text. κομῶν προσθέσεις would come under the head of σχήμασι, which would *not* include ἐσθῆσι. Other σχήματα were the paddings with which lean persons eked out their figures, and the thick soles with which the dwarfish supplied their lack of stature, as set forth by Alexis in the edifying passage referred to. This use of σχήματα is analogous to its rhetorical sense. Illustrative of this analogy of the decorative and rhetorical art is likewise the following passage of Photius quoted by Jacobs (ap. Steph. Lex. ed. Dind.): ἐπανθεῖ τοῖς λόγοις (τοῦ Ἰσοκράτους) οὐ μόνον ἔμφυτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κομμωτικὸν κάλλος. **25** ὅπερ—ῥήτορες] This passage seems to be correctly explained by Stallb., who understands ταῦτα after διέστηκε, and retains σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες as absolutely necessary to the sense, though omitted in one MS. and by Bekker at Schleiermacher's instigation. ὄντων refers apparently to rhetoric and sophistic. Tr., 'However, though as I say, there is this essential difference between the arts in question, yet as they are near neighbours, their professors, the sophist and the rhetor, are apt to be confounded as occupying common ground and employed upon the same subject-matter, insomuch that they know not what to make of each other (αὐτοῖς for ἀλλήλοις as freq.), nor indeed does the rest of the world know what to make of them.' Invectives against 'Sophists,' it may be observed, are as frequent in some of Isocrates's orations as in the Platonic dialogues (see esp. Isocr. c. Sophistas, Busiris, Helenes Encomium), and the Eristics entertained doubtless an equal contempt for the more popular accomplishments of the professed rhetor, while both were in disrepute with the simple citizens, the ἰδιῶται of the day.

Page 30. **2** τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ἦν] "Late pateret ac frequens esset illud Anaxagorae dictum" (Stallb.). The "dictum" occurred at the commencement of his celebrated treatise. See the authorities in Ritt. and Preller, Hist. Ph. § 61. Anaxagoras was the first to give to νοῦς or ψυχή the pre-eminence of which Socr. has just spoken. **7** ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι] i.e. ὡς ἡ ὀψοποιία ἀντίστροφόν ἐστι τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐν σώματι. Rhetoric is a spiritual cookery, as cookery is a corporeal rhetoric. Each is the pendant or counterpart of the other. **20** Κολακείας μὲν οὖν—δράσεις] 'No! I called it a branch of Flattery. Is your memory failing,

Polus, and you so young? What will you do presently?' He had understood Socr. to identify Rhetoric with Flattery, as if they had been co-extensive terms. *πρεσβύτης γενόμενος* formerly stood in the edd. after *δράσεις*, but some of the best MSS., including the Bodl., omit the words. That they are a gloss appears from another v. l., *νέος ὢν πρεσβύτης γενόμενος*—an interpretation of *τηλικοῦτος* as well as *τάχα*. There is certainly some difficulty about the use of *τάχα*, but perhaps Stallb.'s defence is satisfactory, "*τάχα* nunc facete et jocose de longiore temporis spatio dicitur." Comp. Ar. Ran. 528, *οὐ τάχ' ἄλλ' ἤδη ποιῶ*.

Page 31. **8** *Νὴ τὸν κύνα*] 'I swear to you, Polus, that I am really in doubt, each time you speak, whether you are stating your own views, or asking my opinion.' **10** *ἀποφαίνει*] So Protag. 336 D, *τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι*: ib. 340 B. Stallb., following Bekk., places a colon after *νὴ τὸν κύνα*, thus making Socr. answer Polus's question in the affirmative, though he immediately afterwards declines to reply to it, as involving two questions instead of one. It seems to me that the position of *μέντοι* in the sentence is sufficiently justified by the passages adduced by Ast, viz. Gorg. 481 B, *νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμῶ*: Arist. Nub. 652, *νὴ τὸν Δί' ἀλλ' οἶδα*. Clearly *μέντοι* could not *precede* *ἀμφιγνοῶ*, as *ἀλλά* could not have followed it. I do not therefore perceive the force of Stallb.'s objection. **26** *Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι*] In illustration of this use of the article in the predicate, compare Mr Shilleto's note on Dem. F. L. § 130, *τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ λαμπρόν*, where he refers to the expression of Callicles (492 C), *τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα*. Tr., 'Is not this what I called' (above, B) 'having great power?' **28** *Ἐγὼ οὔ φημι*] '*I* say no? I tell you I say yes!' **29** *Μὰ τόν*] Olymp., *διδάσκει ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ ἐθίζεσθαι κρατεῖν τῶν ὅρκων*. A similar pious motive is assigned by the Greek interpreters for Socr.'s habit of swearing 'by the dog' and 'by the goose.' This however, it is to be feared, arose as much from whim as from piety, for in this dialogue (449 D) we find him swearing *νὴ τὴν Ἥραν*, and adjuring *πρὸς Διός*, in cases which hardly require the interposition of a deity. As to the *μὰ τόν*, we find a like aposiopesis in Arist. Ran. 1374, *μὰ τόν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδ' ἂν εἷς, κ.τ.λ.*, where no such motive can be assigned. See however the Schol. on that passage and Routh's learned note on this place. Compare also the sixth Platonic Epistle, *ad fin.*, where the writer's friends are bid to swear "at once with scholarly seriousness, and with that sportiveness, of which

seriousness is twin-sister"—no inapt description, by the way, of the true Socratic temperament. **30** *φής*] Vulg. *ἔφης*, corr. Baiter.

Page 32. **8** *κεκτήσονται*] 'will have herein no advantage—nothing to congratulate themselves on': a future distinguished from *κτήσομαι* as *κέκτημαι* 'to have' from *κτῶμαι* 'to acquire.' **16** *Οὗτος ἀνήρ*—] Schol., *ὡσανεὶ ἔλεγεν, ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος τί πάσχει;* Socr. finishes the sentence for him. Comp. Rep. 506 B, *οὗτος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀνὴρ καλός.* **20** [*τούτου πρόσθεν*] There can be no doubt that these words are a mere interpretation of *ἄρτι*, as Bekk. perceived. Stallb. defends them on the remarkable ground that they are "agreeable to the genius of the man," namely of Polus. See the note on *νῦν δή*, 462 A, and the passage there quoted from the Laws. **26** *Σχέτλιά γε λέγεις*] Vulg. *σχέτλια λέγεις.* The *γέ* is added from Olymp., as freq. in quasi exclamatory passages like the present. So, from Stobaeus, Heind. also; who refers to p. 473, *ἄτοπά γε...ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν.* **28** *ὦ λῷστε Πῶλε*] "A jingle of sounds, such as Polus had prescribed in his art of Rhetoric. So in the Symp. (p. 185), *Παυσανίου δὲ παυσαμένου (διδάσκουσι γάρ με ἴσα λέγειν οἱ σοφοί)*, and Hipparch. p. 225, *καὶ χώρᾳ καὶ ὥρᾳ*" (T. Gray). So also Olymp. p. 70, and Philostr. Vitt. Soph. § 13, who observe the same jingle in the foll. *ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ.* Here again possibly Plato casts a side glance at Isocrates, who, as a pupil of Gorgias, frequently sins in this way.

Page 33. **1** *Πότερον οὖν—πράττουσιν*] "He is proving that fundamental principle of his doctrine, viz. that the wicked man is doing he knows not what, and sins only through ignorance: and that the end of his actions, like that of all other men, is good, but he mistakes the nature of it, and uses wrong means to attain it" (T. Gray). Compare Arist. Eth. Nic. iii. 6, *ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστίν, εἴρηται, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὸ βουλητὸν τἀγαθὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι βουλητὸν ὃ βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἱρούμενος (εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλητόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἦν δ', εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν), τοῖς δ' αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν τὸ βουλητὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλητόν, ἀλλ' ἑκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δ' ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, τἀναντία, κ.τ.λ.* Also Meno, pp. 77, 78; Protag. 357 C. Gray refers his readers also to Locke's celebrated chapter on Power (Essay on Human Understanding, b. ii. c. xxi. §§ 41, 42), which is interesting from its coincidence with the Socratic view. **8** *Δῆλον ὅτι—*[*πίνουσιν*]

This second οὗ ἕνεκα πίνουσιν is omitted in two MSS., and in Stobaeus, as it seems to me, rightly. **21** Ἆρ' οὖν ἔστι τι] This theory of ἀδιάφορα is put forward more hesitatingly in the Lysis, p. 216 D: δοκεῖ μοι ὡσπερεὶ τρί' ἅττα εἶναι γένη, τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακόν, τὸ δ' οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν. τί δὲ σοί;—Καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη. The terms of Polus's reply are to be understood κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον. "*Necesse est omnino*, sc. *omne quod sit unum ex his tribus esse*" (Buttm.). In the Lysis the theory is worked out in considerable detail, not, as here, assumed as self-evident: which we may take, with Schleierm., as an indication of the later date of the Gorgias. For Plato will often be found to take for granted in a later what he has been at great pains to prove in some earlier dialogue. In the Philebus (p. 43) we find an analogous distribution of ἡδέα, λυπηρά and μηδέτερα, which Plato employs in refutation of a well-known Cynical paradox.

Page 34. **26** ἁπλῶς οὕτως] In the abstract; out of mere wantonness and without any ulterior view. Or, as we should say, 'we do not will murder for murder's sake,' &c.

Page 36. **2** ἐλεινός] Vulg. ἐλεεινός. See Porson's Pref. ad Hec. p. vi: "Atticae linguae analogia hanc scripturam flagitat. Ut enim a δέος formatur δεινός, ut a κλέος κλεινός, sic ab ἔλεος formatur ἐλεινός." The circumstance that the form ἐλεεινός is almost universally found in the tragedians, where the metre requires ἐλεινός, is a proof that the authority of the MSS. may be safely set aside in prose writers also. The Attic form is preserved in the case of the derivative adverb in Arist. Thesm. 1063, κλάειν ἐλεινῶς, and by one MS. in Soph. Phil. 870. **28** τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ] Inf. 506 B, ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων ἐπιλαμβάνου, ἐάν τί σοι δυκῶ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν. **29** ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ] h. e. in the forenoon. Herod. ii. 173; Athen. p. 279. 2. Xenophon says of Socr., πρωΐ εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἤει, καὶ πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερὸς ἦν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἀεὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἦν ὅπου πλείστοις μέλλοι συνέσεσθαι. **30** ὑπὸ μάλης] Schol., ἐπὶ τοῦ κρυφίως τι πράττειν, ὡς Δημοσθένης ἐν Ἀφόβῳ (p. 848. 12), 'ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπὸ μάλης ἡ πρόκλησις γέγονεν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ.' πληθυντικῶς δὲ οὐ μάλας λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ μασχάλας. Λυσίας—'καὶ τὴν μὲν κόμην ψιλὴν ἔχεις, τὰς δὲ μασχάλας δασείας.' As synonymous phrases he mentions ὑπὸ κόλπον or ὑπὸ κόλπου. Comp. Aesch. Choeph. 73, δακρύω δ' ὑφ' εἱμάτων, and the vern. 'in the sleeve'; Fr., *sous cape*. Olymp. seems to have read, ὑπὸ μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον καὶ λύχνον, and below, εἰ οὖν...δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον καὶ τὸν

λύχνον. The λύχνος may have been a bright thought of his own, to account for the burning of the arsenal, for which purpose a dagger would be an unsuitable implement. Or he may have really found the words in his copy. That ὑπὸ μάλης needs not to be interpreted literally here, we see from the following passage of the Laws (vii. 789 c), where, speaking of the mania for cock or quail fighting prevalent in Athens, Plato says, πρὸς τούτοις λαβόντες ὑπὸ μάλης ἕκαστος, τοὺς μὲν ἐλάττονας εἰς τὰς χεῖρας, μείζους δ' ὑπὸ τὴν ἀγκάλην ἐντός, πορεύονται περιπατοῦντες σταδίους παμπόλλους ἕνεκα τῆς εὐεξίας οὗ τι τῆς τῶν αὐτῶν σωμάτων ἀλλὰ τῆς τούτων τῶν θρεμμάτων, where Ast observes justly, "ὑπὸ μάλης λαβόντες generale est—de omnibus usurpatur quae occultantur et omnino teguntur, ne cadant vel effugiant, vel omnino conspiciantur." Arist. Lys. 985, κἄπειτα δόρυ δῆθ' ὑπὸ μάλης ἥκεις ἔχων, where the literal sense is equally excluded.

Page 37. 3 τῆς κεφαλῆς—κατεαγέναι] A sufficiently familiar use of the gen. of the part or place. Arist. Acharn. 1180, τῆς κεφαλῆς κατέαγε περὶ λίθον πεσών: ib. Vesp. 1428. Herodian ap. Dind. ad Steph. Lex., κατεαγὼς τῆς κεφαλῆς, οὐ μὴν πᾶσαν τὴν κεφαλήν, ἀλλὰ μέρος τί αὐτῆς. Εὔπολις. Οὐ γὰρ κατάξεις τῆς κεφαλῆς τὰ ῥάμματα. But κατεαγέναι τὴν κεφαλήν is equally good Attic: Lysias, p. 99. 43. So τὰ ὦτα κατεαγότων, inf. 515 E. Here tr., 'If I resolve that any one of them should have his head broken, broken it shall be,' &c. 23 Οὐκοῦν, ὦ θαυμάσιε] The frequent repetition of δύνασθαι is at least unpleasing. In Olympiodorus's copy, the sentence plainly ended with σμικρόν (Comm. p. 78, Jahn), and I cannot but think that the first τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι was added in the margin by an interpreter who did not perceive that the subject of εἶναι is the clause ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι...ὠφελίμως πράττειν. The student will observe that ἐὰν μέν is followed in apodosi by εἰ δὲ μή, not by ἐὰν δὲ μή. This usage is universal, where no second verb follows, εἰ δὲ μή having the force of ἄλλως δέ, alioqui. See Sympos. 185 D, ἐὰν μέν σοι ἐθέλῃ παύεσθαι ἡ λύγξ,... εἰ δὲ μή, ὕδατι ἀνακογχυλίασον (for ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐθέλῃ).

Page 38. 19 τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην] 'yesterday or the day before—the other day.' Hom., χθιζά τε καὶ πρωιζά: Thuc. iii. 113, οὐδένι ἐμαχόμεθα χθὲς ἀλλὰ πρώην. "As the time of this dialogue plainly appears (from that passage in p. 473, καὶ πέρυσι βουλεύειν Λαχών, which is taken notice of by Athenaeus, v. 217) to be Ol. 93. 4 (B.C. 405), the year after the sea-fight at Arginusae, these words must be taken in a larger sense, as we say of a thing long past, 'It

happened but the other day,' when we compare it with more ancient times: for Archelaus had now reigned at least nine years" (say eight years—see Clinton, F. H. ii. an. 414. 2, ib. p. 223), "and continued on the throne about six years longer. So in p. 503 in these words, Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, we must understand νεωστί in the same manner, for Pericles had been dead twenty-three years, but the time is there compared with that of Cimon, Themistocles, &c., who died many years before. Socr. indeed might have seen and remembered Cimon, the other two he could not. These particulars of Archelaus's history are curious and not to be met with elsewhere. Athenaeus (xi. 506) is absurd enough to question the truth of these particulars, or, supposing them to be true, he says that they are instances of Plato's ingratitude, who was much in favour with Archelaus. The passage which he cites immediately after from Carystius of Pergamus disproves all this, for it shows Plato's connexion to have been with Perdiccas *the Third*, who began to reign thirty-five years after Archelaus's death, and was elder brother to the famous Philip of Macedon. We have an epistle of Plato to that prince still remaining. At the time of Archelaus's death, Plato was under thirty years of age" (T. Gray). The blunder of Athenaeus is almost incredible. It may serve as a criterion of the value of other malignant accusations of Plato and his school which we have no direct means of refuting. Archelaus is the king who entertained Euripides, and at whose court the poet died. His talent as a ruler is highly extolled by Thucydĭdēs (ii. 100). According to Aelian (V. H. xii. 43), δούλης υἱὸς ἦν τῆς Σιμίχης. The author of the Second Alcib. alludes to his death and its circumstances as χθιζά τε καὶ πρωιζὰ γεγενημένα (141 D). This anachronism hardly needs the elaborate apology of Mr Clinton (l.l. p. 224, not. k), for the dialogue in which it occurs is the work of a later and probably an ignorant imitator. Anachronisms differ in kind and degree, and it is hardly possible to conceive that Plato or Xenophon (to whom the Alcib. ii. is by some attributed) would have represented Alcibiades, who died at a mature age in 404, as still young in B.C. 399; still less would either of these authors have introduced Socr. conversing with his young friend at least two years after his own death. Ibid. E, and Buttmann's note. The hand of an imitator is betrayed by the χθιζά τε καὶ πρωιζά, as compared with the ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην of the passage before us. **81** αὐτόθεν οὐ γιγνώσκεις] 'don't you know already,' i. e. from the facts men-

tioned; as if he had said ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἄρχειν αὐτὸν Μακεδονίας. Arist. Eq. 330, δῆλός ἐστιν αὐτόθεν. The passage from οὐκ οἶδα to ἄδικος is thus rendered by Cicero: "Haud scio, nunquam enim cum eo collocutus sum.—Ain' tu? an aliter id scire non potes?—Nullo modo.—Tu igitur ne de Persarum quidem rege magno potes dicere, beatusne sit?—An ego possim, quum ignorem, quam sit doctus, quam vir bonus?—Quid? tu in eo sitam vitam beatam putas?—Ita prorsus existimo: bonos beatos, improbos miseros.—Miser ergo Archelaus?—Certe, si injustus" (Tusc. Quaest. v. 12 [35]). The object of the chapter is to claim for Plato the credit of a sentiment afterwards maintained by Zeno of Citium, who is called "advena quidam et ignobilis verborum artifex." Cicero proceeds to translate a kindred passage from the Menexenus, p. 248, ὅτῳ γὰρ ἀνδρί, κ.τ.λ.

Page 39. **29** ἑπτέτη] Vulg. ἑπταετῆ. I have restored the undoubtedly Attic form. Comp. Arist. Ran. 421, ὃς ἑπτέτης ὢν οὐκ ἔφυσε φράτορας. So ἐξέτει in Nub. 862; ἑπτέτων, Thesm. 480. The genuine form is preserved by the transcribers in Alcib. i. p. 121 E, ἐπειδὰν ἑπτέτεις γένωνται οἱ παῖδες, and in δεκέτης wherever it occurs in the text of Plato. On the other hand the vicious form δεκαέτηρος occurs Legg. 772 B, where δεκετήρης is found in one MS. and is probably the true reading. See Lobeck on Phrynichus, p. 406 foll., whose authority, supported by the unvarying practice of the Attic poets as well as by the testimony of the grammarians, outweighs that of "Bremius on Aeschines," to which Stallb. appeals in defence of the vulgate reading.

Page 40. **5** ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρξάμενος] "nec te excepto" (Ast); "tuque imprimis s. interque eos tu primus" (Heind., who compares Rep. ii. 336 D; ib. vi. 498 C, &c.). Tr., 'And I dare say there are those in Athens who, with you at their head (following your lead), would rather change places with any Macedonian you could name than with King Archelaus.' **9** δοκεῖς] We should rather have expected ἐδόκεις, which at any rate is better than Heind.'s conj. δοκοῖς. He alludes to p. 448 D, δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος...ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, a remark here ironically called a compliment. **23** ἕνα τινὰ—ἢ μηδένα] Xen. Cyr. v. 5. 45, τούτων δὲ τῶν περιεστηκότων ἢ τινα ἢ οὐδένα οἶδα. Pers. Sat. i. init., "vel duo vel nemo." **26** δοκούντων εἶναί τι] Equivalent of course to εὐδοκίμων. So Euthyd. 303 C, τῶν σεμνῶν καὶ δοκούντων τι εἶναι. Sometimes the εἶναί τι is omitted, as in Eur. Hec. 294, λόγος γὰρ ἔκ τ' ἀδοξούντων

ἰών Κἀκ τῶν δοκούντων αὐτὸς οὐ ταὐτὸν σθένει: and by St Paul in his Epistle to the Galatians (ii. 2), κατ' ἰδίαν δὲ τοῖς δοκοῦσιν, where he alludes to his fellow-apostles "James, Peter, and John," the στῦλοι of the church, as they are presently called (ib. ver. 9). **27** ταὐτά] Van Heusde's emendation, accepted by Stallb. for the vulg. ταῦτα, which Ast defends. But the passage from Rep. iv. 432 A, παρεχομένη ξυνᾴδοντας ταὐτὸν καὶ ἰσχυροτάτους καὶ τοὺς μέσους, makes in favour of the change, or at any rate justifies the pleonasm, which is idiomatic. The Zürich punctuation of the sentence—a full stop after λέγω—is evidently right. There is great force in the asyndeton with which the following sentence commences. **30** Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου] The famous Nicias. "The tripods mentioned here as dedicated in the temple of Bacchus, must be the prizes which he and his family must have gained in their frequent χορηγίαι....The brother of Nicias was named Eucrates: he outlived his brother, and was this very year Trierarch at Aegos Potami (Lysias, Orat. contra Poliorchum, p. 320 [149]); and soon after was put to death with Niceratus his nephew, by order of the Thirty Tyrants, in the number of which he refused to be" (T. Gray). Plut. Vit. Nic. c. 3, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους χορηγίαις ἀνελάμβανε...ὑπερβαλλόμενος πολυτελείᾳ καὶ χάριτι τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἅπαντας. ἐστήκει δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀναθημάτων αὐτοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς τό τε Παλλάδιον ἐν ἀκροπόλει, τὴν χρύσωσιν ἀποβεβληκός, καὶ ὁ τοῖς χορηγικοῖς τρίποσιν ὑποκείμενος ἐν Διονύσου νεώς. ἐνίκησε γὰρ πολλάκις χορηγήσας, ἐλείφθη δ' οὐδέποτε. It appears from this passage, as Col. Leake observes, that Nicias built a temple to support his tripods: larger, no doubt, than the surviving choragic monuments of Lysicrates and Thrasyllus, but, like them, situated within the peribolus of Bacchus (for so we must interpret ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ), not in the theatre itself, τῷ ἐν Διονύσου θεάτρῳ (Athens and Attica, i. p. 185, note 3). **32** Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίου] "A principal man in the oligarchy of Four Hundred (Ol. 92. 1), and of the same party with Theramenes. See Thucyd. L. viii. (c. 89) and Lysias contra Eratosth. (§ 66), Aristoph. in Av. 125 et Schol." (T. Gray). "This is the person mentioned by Xenophon, Hellen. i. 4. 21; 5. 16; 7. 2. He perished with five others of the generals, by the result of the famous trial which followed the battle of Arginusae" (Arnold on Thuc. l.l.). The same Aristocrates is extolled by the author of the speech against Theocrines attributed to Demosthenes, for the part he took in destroying the fort of Eetionea (B.C. 411), and

restoring the popular party to power: a passage in which the orator commits the singular blunder of identifying the destruction of the power of the Four Hundred with that of the Thirty Tyrants. See Grote, H. G. viii. p. 93, note 2.

Page 41. 1 † *ἐν Πυθοῖ* †] One MS. gives *ἐν Πυθίου*, i.e. *ἱερῷ*, meaning the sanctuary of Apollo Pythius, called *τὸ Πύθιον*, which was adjacent to the celebrated Olympicum, in the southern quarter of Athens. This, I confess, appears to me the more probable reading, for several reasons. In the first place it is more probable that Aristocrates should have made the dedication in question at home, and in a place which we know from Suidas (v. *Πύθιον*) was appropriated to the reception of the tripods consecrated by *οἱ τῷ κυκλίῳ χόρῳ νικήσαντες τὰ Θαργήλια*, than that he should have presented at Delphi an offering so distinguished among the splendours of that sanctuary, as to have won for him a Hellenic reputation (*τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθ.*, "pulcrum illud donarium quod satis notum et celebratum est" [Stallb.]). Secondly, *Πυθοῖ* rather than *ἐν Πυθοῖ* is the stereotyped form in such cases. Plat. Lys. 205 c, *Πυθοῖ καὶ Ἰσθμοῖ καὶ Νεμέᾳ*: Axioch. 367 c, *τὸ Πυθοῖ τέμενος*: Arist. Lys. 1131, *Ὀλυμπίασιν, ἐν Πύλαις, Πυθοῖ, πόσους, κ.τ.λ.*: Lysias de Bonis Arist. § 63, *ἐνίκησεν Ἰσθμοῖ καὶ Νεμέᾳ*. Thirdly, as Pytho was a shrine better known than the Pythium, *Πυθοῖ* is more likely to have been substituted for *Πυθίου* than vice versa, not to mention the elliptical construction *ἐν Πυθίου*, which might puzzle an ignorant scribe. 4 *οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις*] 'I am not compelled by any argument of yours,' *σύ* being emphatic. Olymp., *ἰδοὺ ἀνάγκην καλεῖ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν πίστιν.* 6 *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς*] 'from my patrimony, the truth.' If *καί* is to be retained it must be understood as epexegetic. I much doubt the double reference in *οὐσίας* which Stallb. suggests: "Ludit in ambiguitate vocis *οὐσίας* quae et de bonis ac facultatibus dicitur, et de eo quod re vera est." Compare the boast of Polus, p. 466 c, *ἀποκτιννύασί θ' ὃν ἂν βούλωνται καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ.* 9 *οὐδὲν οἶμαι*] Between these two words Hirschig inserts *ἄν*, *ex conj.*, so that the sense shall be, 'I conceive nothing *will have been* accomplished, unless I can secure your testimony and your assent in the course of our subsequent discussion.' I doubt, however, the admissibility of this construction here. The irregularity is in the use of *οἶμαι*, for which we should expect *ἡγήσομαι*. 'I shall not think that any thing has been done.' But

the text as it stands is defensible. An analogous case is Isocr. Evag. § 36, *ἡγοῦμαι μὲν οὖν, εἰ καὶ μηδενὸς ἄλλου μνησθείην, ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα καταλείποιμι τὸν λόγον, ῥᾴδιον ἐκ τούτων εἶναι γνῶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν Εὐαγόρου*, for *ἠγησαίμην ἄν*. **14** *ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι*] Supply *δεῖν*, as below, p. 474, *τοῦ ἐλέγχου οἷον ἐγὼ οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι*. *δεῖν* is not unfrequently omitted after *οἶμαι*, as in Xen. Hell. iv. 7. 4, *ᾤοντο ἀπιέναι*, and after *ἡγήσατο* in Protag. 346 B. **20** *αὐτίκα*] 'for instance.' See Ruhnk. in Tim. Lex. Plat. v. *αὐτίκα*. Hirschig brackets *πρῶτον*, as an "interpretamentum." But see inf. 474 D, *οἷον πρῶτον*, a phrase exactly equivalent. **27** *ἀδικῶν—ἆρ' ἄν*] 'You say that a wrongdoer may be happy: good—but I want to know whether he will be so if he obtains his deserts and is punished.' Something like this is implied by the position of *ἆρα* in the middle of the sentence. It occurs in a similar position, p. 476 A, *τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην ἆρα μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν;* And so perhaps we ought to read Hipp. ii. 366 B, *δυνατὸς δ' ἐστὶν ἑκάστοτ' ἄρ' ὃς ἂν ποιῇ τότε ὃ ἂν βούληται, ὅταν βούληται;* for the vulg. *ἕκαστος ἄρα*.

Page 42. **3** *πάντως—μέντοι*] These two words are supplied from Stobaeus in place of the old readings of the MSS., *ἀπάντων... μὲν τοίνυν* (ed. Gaisf. vol. iii. p. 352). *μέντοι* in apodosi to *μέν* is noted by the grammarians as a peculiarly Attic usage. The emendation *πάντως* had been anticipated by Stephen.

Page 43. **1** *ἐκτέμνηται*] "*ἐκτέμνειν*, absolute positum, est Latinorum *exsecare*, h. e. *castrare*. Euthyphr. 6 A, *κἀκεῖνόν γε τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα ἐκτεμεῖν δι' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα*. Xen. Cyrop. v. 2. 28; vii. 5. 62 al. Unde *ἐκτομαί* Conviv. 195 C" (Ast, who quotes in illustration of *ἐκκάηται* Herod. vii. 18, *θερμοῖσι σιδηρίοισι ἐκκαίειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς*). **3** *ἐπιδών*] 'having lived to see.' So used, whether the spectacle is gratifying, or, as here, distressing. Hom. Il. xxii. 61, *κακὰ πόλλ' ἐπιδόντα, Τίδός τ' ὀλλυμένους ἐλκηθείσάς τε θύγατρας*. But Xen. Cyr. viii. 7. 7, *τοὺς φίλους ἐπεῖδον δι' ἐμοῦ εὐδαίμονας γενομένους*, where the dying Cyrus speaks: Thuc. vii. 77, *τευξόμενοι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖτέ που ἐπιδεῖν*: Aristoph. Acharn. 1156, *ὃν ἔτ' ἐπίδοιμι τευθίδος δεόμενον*: Soph. Trach. 1027, *τὰν ὦδ' ἐπίδοιμι πεσοῦσαν*. After *παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκα* we may understand *ταὐτὰ πάσχοντας*, which however is elegantly omitted. **4** *κατα-πιττωθῇ*] The usual euphemism for burning alive, as appears from a passage of Heraclides Ponticus (ap. Athen. xii. 524) quoted by Gray: *τοίγαρτοι πάλιν οἱ πλούσιοι κρατήσαντες* [*τοῦ δήμου*] *ἅπαντας ὧν κύριοι κατέστησαν μετὰ τῶν τέκνων κατεπίττωσαν, ὧν*

καιομένων φασὶν ἄλλα τε πολλὰ γενέσθαι τέρατα καὶ ἐλαίαν ἱερὰν αὐτομάτην ἀναφθῆναι. Every one remembers the lines of Juvenal, "taeda lucebis in illa, Qua stantes ardent," &c. (Sat. i. 155). Many other parallel passages are accumulated by the comm. **8** ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων] 'by citizens: and foreigners as well,' a well-known idiom: 480 D, αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων: Isocr. de Permut. § 103, ἔκ τε τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συνουσιῶν διαβεβλημένοις. **10** Μορμολύττει αὖ] 'Now you are trying to frighten, instead of refuting me.' Olymp., ἀντὶ τοῦ ὡς παιδίον φοβεῖς. Crit. 46 C, ἂν...ὥσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται. μορμώ or μορμολυκεῖον answers to our 'bugbear' or 'hobgoblin.' **24** ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ] 'If you doubt me, ask one of the company present,' or 'you have only to ask,' &c. This rhetorical use of ἐπεί with the imperative or with an interrogation is common. Soph. El. 352, ἐπεὶ δίδαξον ἢ μάθ' ἐξ ἐμοῦ, τί μοι Κέρδος γένοιτ' ἄν, τῶνδε ληξάσῃ γόων; cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 519. "Elliptice ἐπεί ponitur cum Imperativo cum res videtur certa et minime dubia, adeo ut tuto adversarius ad objiciendum provocari possit" (G. Hermann). **26** πέρυσι βουλεύειν λαχών] 'Last year when I was drawn for the Council, and when my tribe succeeded to the Prytany and it became my duty (as their ἐπιστάτης or chairman—Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 2) to take the votes of the assembly, I exposed myself to ridicule, because I knew not how to collect the suffrages'—an ironical description, *more suo*, of one of the noblest acts of his life, his refusing to put to the vote the illegal proposition of Callixenus against the generals who had fought at Arginusae. Compare Xen. Hellen. i. 7. 14, 15 with Memor. i. 1. 18 (ἐπιστάτης ἐν τῷ δήμῳ γενόμενος, ἐπιθυμήσαντος τοῦ δήμου παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐννέα στρατηγοὺς μιᾷ ψήφῳ...ἀποκτεῖναι πάντας, οὐκ ἠθέλησεν ἐπιψηφίσαι, κ.τ.λ.; and both passages with Plat. Apol. p. 32, ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἦρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ· καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχὶς πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλεσθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε. τότ' ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἠναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην, κ.τ.λ. The author of the Axiochus (368 D) tells the tale differently, and with embellishments. Mr Grote, in the course of his able and searching discussion of this event and its circumstances, takes occasion (H. G. viii. p. 271, note) to question the accuracy *of* Xenophon's statement in the first book of the Memorabilia,

that Socr. was ἐπιστάτης on the day referred to: but it seems to me difficult to understand the language of Plato in the text, without supposing that Socr. was individually responsible in the matter of taking the suffrages, and not merely entitled to a vote as one of ten Proedri upon the question whether the suffrages were to be taken or not. How could he else have betrayed his 'ignorance' of the proper mode of proceeding—in other words, his invincible repugnance to the act required of him? If this view be correct, it is not a little bold to call in question a statement resting on the consilient testimony of two such authors as Xenophon and Plato. The passage in the Apology does not confirm, but surely does not contradict it. **32** ἕνα μὲν—ἐπίσταμαι] Olymp. has the following interesting scholium on this passage: οὕτω καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ἔλεγεν. εἷς ἐμοὶ ἀντὶ πολλῶν, καὶ λέγω τοῦτο καὶ παρὰ Περσεφόνῃ ἐών, a fragment which, so far as I know, exists nowhere else, and is highly characteristic of its author.

Page 44. **27** οὐ ταὐτὸν ἡγεῖ σύ] Cic. de Off. iii. 3. 11, "Socratem accepimus exsecrari solitum eos qui primum honestum et utile, natura cohaerentia, opinione distraxissent." Throughout the whole of this reasoning the ἀγαθόν is assumed to be synonymous with the ὠφέλιμον and the κακόν with the βλαβερόν. But this utilitarianism is, it must be confessed, of a very transcendental order. **30** τὰ καλὰ πάντα] This little "theory of the beautiful" is an improvement upon that of Xenophon's Socrates, Mem. iii. 8. 4, and Conv. c. 5, where utility is represented as the *sole* test of beauty. At the same time we must conceive Socr. in the passage before us to be arguing 'ad hominem,' and it would be unsafe to infer that Plato really regarded Pleasure apart from Good, as sufficient to constitute an object beautiful. Compare esp. Philebus, p. 64 fol. The steps in the present argument are these:—

τὸ καλόν implies either utility or pleasure, or both.
τὸ αἰσχρόν either hurtfulness or pain, or both.
But Polus had said ὅτι τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
τὸ ἀδικεῖν is therefore either more painful or more hurtful than τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
But it is not more painful, by Polus's admission.
Nor, consequently, is it more painful *and* more hurtful.
Therefore it is more hurtful, or, in other words, *worse* than τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

A similar disjunctive syllogism occurs inf. 477 c. There is a

locus classicus concerning the relation of καλόν and ἀγαθόν, κακόν and αἰσχρόν, in the Fifth Book of the Republic, p. 452. In the last clause of the passage referred to, an obvious but necessary emendation has escaped the edd.: μάταιος δὲ γελοῖον ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖται ἢ τὸ κακόν, καὶ ὁ γελωτοποιεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν πρὸς ἄλλην τιν' ὄψιν ἀποβλέπων ὡς γελοίου ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἄφρονός τε καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ αὖ σπουδάζει πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν στησάμενος ἢ τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (ib. D). Who ever said πρὸς σκοπὸν στήσασθαι? or how can στήσασθαι mean "se convertere," as Ast renders it? *Dele* πρός, and compare Critias, Eleg. i. 2 (ap. Athen.), ὃν σκοπὸν εἰς λατάγων τόξα καθιστάμεθα. The sense will thus be, 'He is a fool who in his serious compositions proposes to himself any other standard of beauty than that of Good.' The πρός is a mere repetition of the πρός which stands before ἄλλην in the clause preceding.

Page 45. 18 οὐ δήπου—καλά] The τά before καλά is omitted in one MS. Though defensible, it seems better absent. 'Laws and Institutions surely are not beautiful irrespectively of their utility, or pleasantness, or both'; or, if we retain τά, 'The beauty which resides in laws, &c., is not independent of utility,' &c.; or, more literally, 'The instances in laws and institutions—of beauty, I mean,' so that τὰ καλά shall be explanatory of τὰ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, κ.τ.λ. 20 Καὶ ὅταν—ἔσται] This proposition ought evidently to correspond to the foregoing, substituting αἰσχρόν, λύπῃ, and κακῷ for their antitheta. Hence it seems impossible to dispense with ἢ ἀμφοτέροις, which Hirschig accordingly would insert after κακῷ. 30 λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον] The participle is of course causal. 'If the doing injustice is more ugly or offensive than the suffering it, either it is more painful, and it is *because* it exceeds in pain that it is more ugly, or (because it exceeds) in evil, or in both,' i.e. it owes its greater ugliness either to its exceeding in pain or to its exceeding in evil, &c.

Page 47. 2 τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχων] 'submitting to the argument as a patient to the surgeon.' παρέχειν='copiam facere.' See above, 456 B, τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἰατρῷ: and 480 C. If any thing is to be "understood" it is probably τὸ σῶμα, which is expressed in Arist. Nub. 440, τουτὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν σῶμ' αὐτοῖσιν παρέχω τύπτειν πεινῆν διψῆν, κ.τ.λ. Similarly Aesch. Pers. 210, πτήξας δέμας παρεῖχε, and with ψυχήν Protag. 312 C. On the other hand we have ἐμαυτὸν π. in Phaedr. 228 E, a combination very frequently followed by an adjective as secondary predicate, as

Euthyph. 3 D, *δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν*, "rarissime tui copiam facis"; and by an adverb, as here and in Arist. Lys. 162, 227. Similar is the use of *παραδοῦναι* in Phaedr. 250 E, *ἡδονῇ παραδούς*. **3** *ἢ φάθι ἢ μὴ ἃ ἐρωτῶ*] 'Say yes or no (*φημί* or *οὔ φημι*) to my questions.' **14** *οὐδὲν ἔοικεν*] "Intell., *ὁ ἔλεγχος τῷ ἐλέγχῳ*" (Ast). The context proves that this is the right interpretation, and that Heind. is mistaken in supplying *εἶναι* as if *οὐδέν* meant "res nihili." **19** *ἡμφεσβητήσαμεν*] This form alternates in the MSS. with *ἠμφισβ*. The second augment is in principle indefensible, implying as it does that the word is compounded of *ἀμφί* and *σβητῶ*. "Augmentum mire interpositum, quod cadentis jam linguae vitio similius et recentioribus, quorum in libris apparet relinquendum" (L. Dindorf). In this passage the Bodl. and all the best codd. seem to have *ἠμφεσβ*. **80** *Σκόπει*] The tenses of this verb used by Attic writers *sensu transitivo* are the following: *σκοπῶ, σκοποῦμαι, ἐσκόπουν, ἐσκοπούμην, σκέψομαι, ἐσκεψάμην, ἔσκεμμαι*. They never say *σκέπτομαι* (far less *σκέπτω*), *σκοπήσομαι* or *ἐσκοπησάμην* (Elmsl. on Eur. Heracl. 148, who adds, "*προύσκεπτο* pro *προὐσκέπτετο* restituendum Thucydidi viii. 66"). One exception is found in a genuine dialogue of Plato, the Laches, 185 B, *βουλευόμεθα καὶ σκεπτόμεθα*, and another in the spurious Second Alcib. 140 A, *σκεπτομένω*. In the former passage the last two words, *καὶ σκεπτόμεθα*, are unnecessary and inelegant (comp. ib. 185 A), and have the air of a gloss. With the latter dial. it is not necessary to take any trouble, as this is not the only instance of vicious phraseology which it contains. See note 447 D.

Page **49.** **27** *ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου*] In the frame or fabric of a man's fortune. So *ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ* presently—'in his bodily frame or constitution.'

Page **50.** **17** *ἀεὶ τὸ αἴσχιστον*] The steps of the argument are the following:—

1. That which exceeds in ugliness always does so, because it is either the most painful or the most hurtful or both (by the *ὁμολόγημα* 475 B).
2. But Injustice exceeds in ugliness (*ex concessis*).

Therefore Injustice is either the most painful or the most hurtful, or both.

ἀεί means, in any list of uglinesses, whatever they may be: the major proposition is universal, the minor and conclusion particular. In comparing *any* set of ugly things, if there be one uglier than the rest, it is always because it is either the most painful or most

harmful of the set, or both. But Injustice is ugliest of a *certain* set of ugly things. Therefore, it is so because of that set it is either most painful or most harmful. From this, I think, it will appear that Hirschig is mistaken in proposing the expulsion of τούτων in the last ῥῆσις. It had also offended Heind., who proposed πάντων instead. But this would make the conclusion a 'non-sequitur.' It has only been granted that ἀδικία is uglier than πενία and νόσος (τούτων τῶν πονηριῶν, paul. sup.).

24 Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἀνιαρότατόν ἐστι—ἀμφοτέροις] This sentence is framed on the same model as that in 475 B, οὐκοῦν...τὸ ἀδικεῖν...ἦτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστι καὶ λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχιον ἂν εἴη ἢ κακῷ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις; In the present passage ἀμφότερα stands in the MSS., though ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλειν is the unvarying construction elsewhere, as l.l. and ib. A. I believe that the ἀμφότερα (παρέχον) of the last proposition but one misled the scribe, and therefore do not hesitate to accept Hirschig's emendation, though the quasi-adverbial ἀμφότερα is common enough elsewhere.

Page 51. **1** Τ'περφυεῖ—λόγος] If, as you say, it is not pain which causes the vice or badness of the soul to be of all things foulest, how extraordinarily great must be the hurtfulness, how astonishing the evil effects—far beyond those of aught besides—which entitle it to this bad eminence. Such is the meaning of this very closely packed sentence, which without some such dilution would perhaps be scarcely intelligible in English. It is a necessary conclusion from the alternatives accepted by Polus, ἢ ἀνίᾳ ἢ βλάβῃ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις.

Page 52. **15** εὐδαιμονέστατος] 'Is this then the highest physical happiness of which a man is capable, to be under medical treatment, or never to have been sick at all?' The reason of the preference of μηδέ to οὐδέ here is evident, if we resolve the participles into their equivalents, εἰ ἰατρεύοιτο, ἢ εἰ μηδ' ἀρχὴν κάμνοι. A few lines farther on we have τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις, which may be similarly analysed. As regards the latter, observe the absence of the article, which is usually prefixed in such cases: Ar. Eccles. 115, δεινὸν δ' ἐστὶν ἡ μὴ 'μπειρία: but omitted in Eur. Bacch. 455, πλόκαμός τε γάρ σου ταναὸς οὐ πάλης ὕπο, a line which Porson was the first to explain (οὐ πάλης ὕπο = ὑπ' ἀγυμνασίας). In the present passage symmetry requires its omission. Tr., 'For *this* was not happiness—the getting rid of a malady—but the not having caught it originally.' ἦν = 'in the case supposed above.' τὴν ἀρχήν or ἀρχήν are used indiscriminately in the sense, 'from

the first,' 'in the first instance,' and with neg. 'not at all.' Theaet. 185 D, *τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον.* **30** *Σωφρονίζει—δίκη*] 'For justice, I conceive, sobers men and makes them more honest, and thus acts upon crime medicinally': or 'as a moral medicine.'

Page 53. 10 *ὁ ἔχων †ἀδικίαν†*] "Lege *ὁ ἔχων κακίαν*. Alias *προαρπάζει τὸν λόγον* Socrates" (Dobree). The emendation seems to me certain. Compare the context, *εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων κακίαν ἐν ψυχῇ.....δεύτερος δήπου ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος* (sc. *τῆς κακίας*). As the text stands, the conclusion is a *non-sequitur*. The identity of *κακία* with *ἀδικία* is first acknowledged in the question and answer which follow.

Page 54. 29 *τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ ἀδικουμένου ἀθλιώτερον*] Also a Stoical doctrine. Seneca Ep. Mor. xv. 3. 52, "Ex illius (sc. Naturae) constitutione miserius est nocere quam laedi"; surely a deep moral truth, though in the guise of a paradox. But another passage in Seneca goes beyond the modesty of nature and the Academy: "Brevem tibi formulam dabo, qua te metiaris, qua perfectum esse jam sentias: tunc habebis tuum, cum intelleges infelicissimos esse felices." Ibid. xx. 7. 24.

Page 55. 12 *ὅπως μὴ ἐγχρονισθὲν—ἀνίατον*] 'lest the disease of injustice become chronic, and render his soul gangrenous and past cure.' *ὕπουλος* is said of a sloughing sore. Comp. Plut. Qu. Plat. 1000 C, *οὐ γὰρ σώματος ἡ Σωκράτους ἰατρεία, ψυχῆς δὲ ἦν ὑπούλου καθαρμός.* **14** *εἴπερ—ὁμολογήματα*] 'if our premisses still hold good.' **18** *Ἐπὶ μὲν ἄρα—ἀλγεινόν*] 'It follows that as a means of defending our own misdeeds or those of parent or friend, child or country, rhetoric is of no real value to us: unless indeed we adopt the contrary view—that it is our duty to denounce first ourselves, then our kindred, and finally any one of our friends who may be guilty of injustice—not, I say, to screen the delinquent, but rather to drag his offence to the light, that he may be punished and made whole. We should even force ourselves and our neighbours not to shrink from the ordeal, but like brave men, with closed eyes, to invite the physician to operate upon us with knife or searing-iron, pursuing an end which is good and noble without weighing the attendant pain.' After *ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον* Heind. understands *χρησίμην εἶναι*, but it seems rather equivalent to *εἰς τοὐναντίον* in Soph. 221, or *κατὰ τοὐναντίον*, Tim. 36 D, or to *ἐξ ἐναντίας*, which is the most common. *ἀποκρύπτεσθαι* is frequently transitive, as inf. 492, *ἀποκρυπτόμενοι τὴν αὑτῶν ἀδυναμίαν*. It

seems indifferent whether *τὸν αὐτοῦ φίλον* or *τὸ ἀδίκημα τοῦ αὐτοῦ φίλου* be regarded as the object of the action here, as the middle form is applicable in either case. For *μύσαντα* Olymp. reads *μύσαντας*, but the vulg. is preferable. He adds the explanation, *ἵνα μὴ ὁρῶσι πῶς τέμνονται*—as patients are now blindfolded on the operating-table. For *τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν* the Bodl. gives *τυγχάνοι*, which Heind. ('quod mireris') endeavours to defend. The formula *εἰ μὴ εἴ τις* p. supr., of which there are many instances, may support the Bodl. reading of Phaedrus 279, *εἴτε εἰ αὐτῷ μὴ ἀποχρήσαι ταῦτα*, where perhaps I ought not to have bracketed the following *δέ*.

Page 56. **11** *Τοὐναντίον, κ.τ.λ.*] "This," says Gray, "is a conclusion so extravagant, that it seems to be only a way of triumphing over Polus after his defeat, or perhaps in order to irritate Callicles, who had heard with great impatience the concessions which Polus had been forced to make, and now breaks out with warmth, and enters into the dispute." The dramatic intention is not to be mistaken, still the extravagance is not so great as Gray supposed. He did not sufficiently attend to the important condition, *εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινὰ κακῶς ποιεῖν*. *If* it is our duty 'to do evil to our enemy,' as written in the popular Greek code, Socr.'s conclusion is perfectly sound. We cannot really hurt a man more than by promoting his growth in wickedness. If revenge is lawful, this is its most perfect form. But in assuming that 'it is our duty to do harm to any body, so long as we can do it without being injured ourselves,' Socr. is obviously ironical, as one wonders that so acute a critic as Gray did not perceive. Socr. is assuming the premisses of his opponents in order to lead them to a conclusion from which their common sense will revolt. **20** *ἀναλίσκῃ*] Codd. and edd. *ἀναλίσκηται*. A similar solecism of the kind known to grammarians by the word 'Datismus,' has hitherto held its ground in Rep. viii. 563 D, *κἂν ὁτιοῦν δουλείας τις προσφέρηται* (sc. *τοῖς πολίταις*), where read of course *προσφέρῃ*. **22** *ἀθάνατος ἔσται πονηρὸς ὤν*] Live through an immortality of wickedness. Hyperides pro Lycoph. c. 3, *ὅπως ἂν ᾖ ἀθάνατος συκοφάντης*: Shaksp. Othello, iv. 2, "I will be hanged if some eternal villain," &c. Observe the variety in the constructions with *ὅπως—ὅπως μὴ δῷ—ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δῷ* (V. *δῴη*, an inadmissible form for *δοίη*: v. Lobeck ad Phryn. p. 345)—*μὴ ἀποδῖδῳ ἀλλ'—ἀναλίσκῃ—ὅπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται—ἀλλ'—ἔσται—ὅπως βιώσεται.* **32** *οὐδὲν—ἐρωτᾶν*] See note on p. 447 C.

Page 57. **4** ἄλλο τι [ἢ]] Bekk. omits the ἢ, though found in all the MSS. I think rightly, if only on the ground of euphony. ἄλλο τι, as a formula of interrogation, needs no defence. **7** εἰ μή τι] 'Were it not that mankind had feelings in common,' some being the subjects of one kind of emotion, others of another, i.e. some sharing the passion of love, others that of ambition, &c. εἰ μή τι ἦν = 'nisi forte accidisset ut': εἰ μή τι being taken together, as one particle, like εἰ μή που, or as εἴ τι μή is sometimes used. Rep. vi. 509 C, καὶ μηδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, παύσῃ· εἰ μή τι, ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητ' αὖ διεξιών. So inf. 513 C, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, 'nisi forte,' &c. In the sequel ἴδιον is constructed with ἤ as if ἕτερον had been used. So paulo sup. ἐναντίον...ἢ δεῖ. 'Were one or other of us capable of any feeling in which the rest of mankind had no part, it would in that case have been difficult to make our own experiences intelligible to our neighbours.' Routh thinks that Socr. alludes to the Protagorean doctrine ὡς ἴδιαι αἰσθήσεις ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν γίγνονται (Theaet. 166 C); but this seems questionable, though the suggestion is ingenious. Before τὸ αὐτό all the codd. without exception interpolate ἤ, thus inverting the meaning. **14** καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους] Sc. Δήμου, the son of Pyrilampes being so called. "It is possible too that there may be a secret allusion to the Equites of Aristophanes, where the Athenian people is introduced as a person, under the name of Demus," &c. (T. Gray). This seems a needless refinement. Demus was in his bloom when the Vespae was acted (B.C. 422): Καὶ νὴ Δι' ἦν ἴδῃ γέ που γεγραμμένον Τὸν Πυριλάμπους ἐν θυρᾷ, Δῆμον καλόν (v. 98), where the Schol. remarks, ἦν δὲ καὶ εὔμορφος ὁ Δῆμος· ἐπέγραφον δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ τῶν καλῶν ὀνόματα οὕτως· Δῆμος καλός. Demus was also mentioned by Eupolis in his play named Πόλεις: καὶ τῷ Πυριλάμπους ἆρ' ἐν ὠσὶ κυψέλη, as Meineke corrects the line quoted by the Schol. l.l. κυψέλη ἐν ὠσί, 'sordes in auribus,' was a figurative expression for dulness (compare the "purgatas aures" of Persius v. 63, and Bekk. Anecd. p. 425) which agrees well enough with the description of the character of Demus in the text. He is also noted as effeminate (θηλυδρίας) by Libanius (Pro Salt. xix. p. 500 D), and by Athen. (ix. 397 C) he is said to have kept peacocks, inheriting this taste from his father Pyrilampes, according to Plutarch (Per. c. 13), who speaks of the ὀρνιθοτροφίαι τοῦ Πυριλάμπους ὃς ἑταῖρος ἦν Περικλέους. Gray adds, "Demus is mentioned as a Trierarch in the expedition to Cyprus (as I imagine) about Ol. 98. 1, under Chabrias (Lysias de Bonis

Aristoph. p. 340 [154])." If we assume 405 as the date of this dialogue, Demus is too old to be the *παιδικά* of Callicles. Comp. Protag. init. It is curious that the clauses relating to Demus and Alcibiades are entirely passed over in the version of Ficinus, which in other points also disagrees with the received text. In 513 B the clause, *καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρός*, is translated thus: "ac per Jovem insuper Pyrilampi," this being the only passage in which the name of Pyrilampes occurs in this version. **15** *αἰσθάνομαι—σου—ὅτι—οὐ δυναμένου*] The blending of two constructions—(1) *αἰσθάνομαί σου οὐ δυναμένου*, (2) *αἰσθάνομαι ὅτι οὐ δύνασαι*—is sufficiently justified by the passage quoted by Heind. from Thuc. iv. 37, *γνοὺς δὲ ὁ Κλέων...ὅτι, εἰ καὶ ὁποσονοῦν μᾶλλον ἐνδώσουσι, διαφθαρησομένους αὐτούς.* **16** *ὅτι ὁπόσ' ἂν φῇ*] Some MSS. give *ὅπως*, others *ἀντιφῇ*. Here *ὁπόσα* refers to the number, *ὅπως ἔχειν* to the nature of his assertions. 'Let him say a thousand things in a day and all different.' I once suspected that the original reading was *ὅπως ἂν φῇ σου τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἂν μὴ φῇ ἔχειν*, comparing E, *ἐὰν ὁ δῆμος...μὴ φῇ οὕτως ἔχειν*. In the next sentence *ἔν τε γὰρ*, κ.τ.λ., *γὰρ* is not found in the Bodl. nor in many other codd. The asyndeton might, I think, be tolerated. **28** *βουλεύμασι*] *βουλήμασι* is also found, and agrees better with the foregoing *ἃ ἐκεῖνος βούλεται*. It is in Ald. and Steph. and perhaps ought not to have been altered, even in deference to overwhelming MS. authority. The words in question are perpetually interchanged in the codd., as few can fail to have observed.

Page **58**. **1** *πολὺ ἧττον ἔμπληκτος*] 'she is far less flighty and fickle than her rival in my affections.' *ἔκβλητος*, mentioned as a v. l. by Olymp., is possibly a corruption of *ἔκπληκτος*, with which *ἔμπληκτος* is perpetually confounded. Comp. Hesych., *ἐμπλήκτους μεμηνότας, εὐμεταθέτους*: Soph. Aj. 1358, *τοιοῖδε μέντοι φῶτες ἔμπληκτοι βροτῶν*, where the Schol. int. *κοῦφοι*: Eur. Tro. 1205, *αἱ τύχαι, Ἔμπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοσε Πηδῶσι, κούδεὶς ἀὐτὸς εὐτυχεῖ ποτε*: Plat. Lys. 214 D, *ἐμπλήκτους τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους* (speaking of fickleness in friendship): Thuc. iii. 82 has *τὸ ἐμπλήκτως ὀξύ*, where see Arnold, who compares Aeschines, F. L. p. 327 R. (§ 164), where *πολιτείας ἐμπληξία* means little more than 'political inconsistency.' In Hom. Od. xx. 132, *ἐμπλήγδην*, which is commonly interpreted 'insanely,' will better bear the meaning 'capriciously.' Later writers use these compounds to denote madness or folly in general, except in a few passages written in imitation of Attic models. *ὁ—Κλεινίειος*] "Alci-

biades had now left Athens, and taken refuge in Thrace, and the year after he was murdered" (T. Gray). The *ἐστί* seems to imply that Plato had forgotten this circumstance, or at any rate disregarded it. **12** *χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοίην*] For *ᾧ ἂν χορηγῶ*, an irregular use of the optative after a leading verb in the indic. pres. Comp. Soph. Oed. R. 979, *εἰκῇ κράτιστον ζῆν ὅπως δύναιτο τις*. In this passage *οἶμαι—εἶναι* is equivalent to *οἶμαι ὅτι—εἴη ἄν*, the case supposed being an imaginary one. The reading *ἀναρμοστεῖν* was first proposed by Van Heusde for the vulg. *ἀνάρμοστον*. The verb is found Soph. 253 A, and elsewhere in Plato. Tr., 'I cannot but think it better that my lyre should be out of order and give discordant notes, or that any chorus I had to lead should sing out of tune, or that great masses of men should disagree with and contradict me,—than that I, who am but one, should be out of harmony with myself and contradict my own assertions.' **16** *Ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι*] 'you seem to me, Socr., to be reckless in your talk, like an arrant declaimer, as you are.' The word *δημηγόρος* is equally applicable to a 'stump-orator' and a fashionable preacher, to one who rants and to one who cants. Compare Theaet. 162 D, *ὦ γενναῖοι παῖδές τε καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε ξυγκαθεζόμενοι...καὶ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ἂν ἀποδέχοιντο ἀκούοντες, λέγετε ταῦτα*, where the latter clause explains *δημηγορεῖτε*. In Demosth. Olynth. iii. § 3, *πρὸς χάριν δημηγορεῖν*='to speak *ad captandum*.' **18** *καὶ νῦν, κ.τ.λ.*] 'and if you now hold forth in this strain, it is because Polus has made the very mistake for which he blamed Gorgias'—the mistake of giving way to false shame. Presently *εἰ διδάξοι* depends on *ἐρωτώμενον*, according to the strict use of the fut. optat. in the obliqua oratio after a past tense. The MSS., as usual in this case, vacillate between *διδάξει* and *διδάξοι*. **26** *σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶν*] Supr. 461 C, *τοῦθ' ὃ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήματα*. **27** *ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν*] Meno 81, *ἀληθῆ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν, καὶ καλόν*. Soph. El. 410, *ἐκ δείματός του νυκτέρου, δοκεῖν ἐμοί*. Herod. ii. 124, *ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκέειν*. **32** *ἐπεστομίσθη*] 'gagged,' i.e. silenced and put down.

Page 59. **1** *σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι*] 'For it is you, in point of fact, Socr., who, under pretence of pursuing the truth, lead your hearers to adopt (pass off upon your audience) a set of stale popular fallacies, grounded on legal (conventional) notions of the fair and comely, which have no foundation in nature.' Schol., *φορτικὰ τὰ βάρος ἐμποιοῦντα* (*molesta, putida*). *δημηγορικὰ τὰ πρὸς*

τὴν τῶν πολλῶν βλέποντα δόξαν. **7** *ὃ δὴ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο*] "Verba *τοῦτο τὸ σοφόν* epexegeseos instar praegressi *ὅ* interposita sunt usu satis trito...Soph. Ant. 404, *Ταύτην γ' ἰδὼν θάπτουσαν, ὃν σὺ τὸν νεκρὸν Ἀπεῖπας*: ubi Schol., *τὸν νεκρὸν ὃν σὺ ἀπεῖπας θάπτειν· οὕτως δὲ χρῶνται οἱ παλαιοὶ...Κρατῖνος, Ὅνπερ Φιλοκλέης τὸν λόγον διέφθορεν*" (Heind.). To the numerous examples he gives from Rep. 579 C, 583 E, &c., may be added Hyperides pro Euxenippo, Col. 19, *ὧν οὐδεμία δήπου τῶν αἰτιῶν τούτων οὐδὲν κοινωνεῖ τῷ εἰσαγγελτικῷ νόμῳ.* For *κακουργεῖς ἑ. τ. λόγοις* compare inf. 489 B, *ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς κακουργῶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.* Routh has seized the point of the clause, *τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκώς*, which contains an allusion to Socr.'s early training under the Ionic philosopher Archelaus, to whom was assigned the credit of having invented the antithesis between *τὰ νόμῳ καλά* and *τὰ φύσει.* The passage Routh quotes from Aristotle is highly illustrative of this portion of the dialogue: *πλεῖστος δὲ τόπος ἐστὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν παράδοξα λέγειν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Καλλικλῆς ἐν τῷ Γοργίᾳ γέγραπται λέγων, καὶ οἱ ἀρχαῖοί γε πάντες ᾠοντο συμβαίνειν, παρὰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸν νόμον. ἐναντία γὰρ εἶναι φύσιν καὶ νόμον, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κατὰ νόμον μὲν εἶναι καλὸν κατὰ φύσιν δ' οὐ καλόν. δεῖν οὖν πρὸς μὲν τὸν εἰπόντα κατὰ φύσιν κατὰ νόμον ἁπαντᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν κατὰ νόμον ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν ἄγειν· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ εἶναι λέγειν παράδοξα. ἦν δὲ τὸ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῖς τὸ ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκοῦν· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι κἀκεῖνοι, καθάπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν, ἢ ἐλέγξαι ἢ παράδοξα λέγειν τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐπεχείρουν ποιεῖν* (Soph. Elench. c. 12, § 6). Comp. Diog. Laert. ii. 4, *Ἀρχέλαος, μαθητὴς Ἀναξαγόρου, διδάσκαλος Σωκράτους...ἔοικε δὲ καὶ οὗτος ἅψασθαι τῆς ἠθικῆς. καὶ γὰρ περὶ νόμων πεφιλοσόφηκε καὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων· παρ' οὗ λαβὼν Σωκράτης τῷ αὐξῆσαι αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν ὑπελήφθη. ἔλεγε δὲ...τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ.* In the sequel *ὑπερωτῶν* is explained by Ast, "interrogans ita ut aliud quid subjiciat"; but probably *ὑπό* has the same force as in *ὑπολαβεῖν*, so that *ὑπερωτῶ* shall be equivalent to *ὑπολαβὼν ἐρωτῶ.* The sense will thus be: 'meeting your opponent with a question framed in accordance with the *natural* sense of the terms employed,' he having employed the same or similar terms, *τὸ αἰσχρόν, τὸ καλόν, τὸ δίκαιον*, in their *conventional* sense. The word *ὑπερωτῶν* is not found in any other classical writer. **8** *ἐδιώκαθες*] "urgebas" (Ast in Lex. v. *διωκάθω*). But *ἐδιώκαθες* is an aorist, not an imperfect, nor is there such a word as *διωκάθω.* *This point* seems to be proved by Elmsley (Annot. in Eurip. Med.

p. 113, not. y): "Rectius ἀμυναθεῖν, διωκαθεῖν, εἰκαθεῖν, εἰργαθεῖν, ut ἀγαγεῖν": cet. Dind. assents (H. Steph. Lex. Gr. in v. διωκαθεῖν). Tr., 'when Polus meant that which was legally or conventionally fouler, you dealt with his conventionalism as if he had been speaking the language of nature,' i.e. you made his conventional to include a natural deformity. **14** φύσει μὲν γὰρ—τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι] Dobree proposes the ejection of τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. As a milder remedy Stallb. suggests πᾶσιν for πᾶν. Steph. would have read οἷον τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, which does not much mend the matter. I had bracketed the clause, but am now disposed to leave it untouched, not because I think Dobree's conjecture "inane," but because the context seems to require either these or other equivalent words. Olympiodorus remarks on this passage, εἰ δὲ ἀδικεῖταί τις περὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἢ τὸ σῶμα, οὐκ ἔστι κακόν. οὐδὲ γὰρ συνεγεννήθημεν τούτοις, ὥστε τὰ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἀπολλύντες οὐκ ὀφείλομεν ἀχθέσθαι· εἰ δὲ ἀδικοῖτο ἡ ψυχή, κάκιστον· καὶ δεῖ τότε σπεύδειν ταύτης ἀπαλλαγῆναι τῆς ἀδικίας. φροντίσωμεν οὖν τοῦ σωθῆναι τὴν ψυχήν, εἰδότες ὡς τὰ χρήματα καὶ τὸ σῶμα οὐδὲν συμβάλλονται. ποιήσωμεν οὖν ὃ εἶπεν ἐκεῖνος. Αὐτὸν μέν μ' ἐσάωσα· τί μοι μέλει; ἀσπὶς ἐκείνη Ἐρρέτω. The words quoted are from Archilochus, and are generally cited thus: αὐτὸς δ' ἐξέφυγον θανάτου τέλος· ἀσπὶς ἐκείνη Ἐρρέτω· ἐξαῦτις κτήσομαι οὐ κακίω. But in Aristoph. Pac. 1267, the former line begins, ψυχὴν δ' ἐξεσάωσα. It would therefore seem that there were several readings of this celebrated Elegy. Possibly the Aristophanic included the τί μοι μέλει; of Olymp.

Page 60. **1** ἀποφαίνει αὖ] Restored by Bekk. from one MS. in place of αὐτό, which Stallb. defends. Vulg. δν ἀποφαίνοι ἄν, which he rejects as "lenius ac modestius quam pro Calliclis superbia et confidentia." **3** δηλοῖ] This verb may be in construction with φύσις, but it is better to regard it as intransitive, either in construction with ταῦτα, or, better still, as impersonal: 'That such is the case may be seen in a variety of instances; both among the inferior animals, and in the great civic communities of the human race, as well as in whole families.' The sentiments of Callicles, though differing somewhat in terms, are substantially the same with the doctrine attributed to Thrasymachus in the first book of the Republic, p. 338 C fol., τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον. **7** ἐπεί] 'what right for instance had Xerxes to invade Greece?' ἐπεί is frequently thus used with the imp. or an interrog. Comp. Protag. 319 E, ἐπεὶ Περικλῆς,

κ.τ.λ.: sup. 473 E, ἐπεὶ ἑροῦ τινὰ τουτωνί, where see the note. **9** ἢ ἄλλα μυρί' ἄν] Routh quotes Apol. 41 B, ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἄν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας. **11** [τὴν τοῦ δικαίου] Schleierm. first cast suspicion on these words, which have evidently crept in from the margin. **18** τιθέμεθα πλάττοντες] Explained as equiv. to τιθέμενοι πλάττομεν, 'the laws we model in our legislation.' πλάττειν is joined with νόμος. Also in Legg. 712 B, πειρώμεθα, καθάπερ παῖδα πρεσβῦται, πλάττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς νόμους. So with πόλιν, Rep. 374, in the sense of shaping an ideal commonwealth. The word, of course, originally meant to mould in wax or clay, as the sculptor his models, but in its metaphorical sense it is far more frequently applied to persons or parts of persons, as σῶμα or ψυχήν, than to inanimate things, as indeed appears from the passage quoted from the Laws. On this account, I know not whether Ast's punctuation is not better than that in the text: τιθέμεθα. πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες (i.e. οὕσπερ ἐκ νέων λαμβάνομεν), κ.τ.λ. The asyndeton may be compared with that in Protag. 325 C, ἐκ παίδων σμικρῶν ἀρξάμενοι, κ.τ.λ., and the passage may be thus translated: 'in bringing into shape (educating) the best and most vigorous of our youth, we take them in hand at an early age, and tame them as men tame lions, plying them with spells and sorceries, and telling them,' &c. The art of beast-taming was brought to great perfection at Athens, according to Isocrates, Antid. § 228: καθ' ἕκαστον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν θεωροῦντες ἐν τοῖς θαύμασι τοὺς μὲν λέοντας πρᾳότερον διακειμένους πρὸς τοὺς θεραπεύοντας ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔνιοι πρὸς τοὺς εὖ ποιοῦντας, τὰς δ' ἄρκτους καλινδουμένας καὶ παλαιούσας καὶ μιμουμένας τὰς ἡμετέρας ἐπιστήμας. Juvenal too speaks of a tame lion as one of the domestic pets of a Roman gentleman (vii. 75). Aesch. Ag. 696, ἔθρεψεν δὲ λέοντος Ἰνιν δόμοις ἀγάλακτον, κ.τ.λ. **18** ἐὰν δέ γε] 'Ay, but if there come a thoroughly strong-minded man, he, methinks, will shake off from him and tear asunder and escape from these trammels; he will tread under foot our prescriptions, our witcheries and spells, in a word, every ordinance that is at variance with nature; until, rising in open rebellion, he, the sometime slave, appears in a new character as our master; and herein does Nature's Justice shine forth in full lustre.' **21** μαγγανεύματα] Legg. 933 C, μαγγανεύμασι καὶ φίλτροις: Arist. Plut. 309, οὐκοῦν σε τὴν Κίρκην γε τὴν τὰ φάρμακ' ἀνακυκῶσαν Καὶ μαγγανεύουσαν μολύνουσάν τε τοὺς ἑταίρους. Hesych., μάγγανα, φάρμακα, δίκτυα, γοητεύματα.

The form *μαγγανεία* is found twice in the Laws—908 D, and 933 A—coupled in the latter passage with *φαρμακεία*, *ἐπῳδαί*, and *καταδέσεις*. The alleged etymology is *μάσσω*, whence *μαγ-ις*, *μάγ-ειρος*. Sanscr. Masg, to soak—*feuchtmachen* (Benfey, Würz. Lex. i. p. 515). Others derive the word from *μάγος* directly.

26 Νόμος ὁ *πάντων βασιλεύς*] This remarkable fragment is thus restored and interpreted by Boeckh, Frag. Pind. 151:...*κατὰ φύσιν*...Νόμος ὁ *πάντων βασιλεὺς* Θνατῶν *τε καὶ ἀθανάτων* Ἄγει *δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον* Ὑπερτάτῳ *χερί· τεκμαίρομαι* Ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλέος, *ἐπεὶ* Γηρυόνα *βόας* Κυκλωπίων *ἐπὶ προθύρων* Εὐρυσθέος Ἀναιτήτας *τε καὶ ἀπριάτας ἤλασεν*: "Secundum rerum naturam...Lex omnium dominus mortalium et immortalium affert vim maximam, justam eam efficiens, potentissima manu. Id assero ex Herculis facinoribus: quippe Geryonae boves ad Cyclopia Eurysthei vestibula neque prece nec pretio adeptus egit." Of the words not found in the text *κατὰ φύσιν* are restored by comparison of p. 488 B of this dial. with Legg. 690 B, with a gloss in Hesych. (Νόμος. *πάντων ὁ βασιλεὺς κατὰ τὴν φύσιν*), and some other passages; Γηρυόνα...*καὶ* and *ἤλασεν*, from a Scholion on Aristides Rhet. ii. 52, to which Boeckh was the first to call attention. *ἀναιτήτας*, 'unbegged,' though a *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον*, is a probable emendation of the unmeaning *ἀναιρεῖτον* of the Schol. referred to. For *δικαιῶν* in the text of Plato h. l. the MSS. give *βιαίων* and *βιαιῶν*, whence the vulg. *βιαίως*. But *δικαιῶν* is found both in the text of Aristides, l.l., and in the Schol. to Pind. Nem. ix. 35; also in Plat. Legg. iv. 714 E. On the whole, the restoration may be considered satisfactory, as it is certainly most skilful. But to Boeckh's interpretation of *ἄγει* Ast demurs, and with apparent reason, for *βίαν* or *τὸ βιαιότατον ἄγειν* can hardly mean "vim" or "*vim maximam afferre.*" His own interpretation is better: "Abigit (ut Hercules boves) *s.* rapit. Sic 488 B, *ἄγειν βίᾳ τὸν κρείττω τὰ τῶν ἡττόνων.*" At the same time it is not impossible that the dependent noun to *ἄγει* is lost with the context. Provisionally the words may be rendered, 'carries all with a high hand, justifying the extreme of violence'; i.e. turning might into right; and the entire fragment may be thus paraphrased: 'There is a law of nature, the law of the stronger, to which all in heaven and earth must submit, and which overrides at times all positive enactments, justifying deeds of violence which are condemned by human codes. This law sanctioned many of the exploits of Hercules, otherwise indefensible: as in particular, that in which

he seized without money paid or leave asked, the cows of Geryones, and drove them from the far-west away to the palace of Eurystheus, at Argos.' The same thought is expressed in homelier language by Wordsworth, in his poem on Rob Roy's Grave:—

> "For why? because the good old rule,
> Sufficeth them; the simple plan,
> That they should take who have the power,
> And they should keep who can."

The phrase *νόμος πάντων βασιλεύς*, detached from the context, very soon became proverbial; and was used by Herodotus and many after him, to signify the 'tyranny of custom,' a sense nearly the reverse of that in which Pindar uses it. See Herod. iii. 38, *καὶ ὀρθῶς μοι δοκέει Πίνδαρος ποιῆσαι, νόμον πάντων βασιλέα φήσας εἶναι.* When Boeckh speaks of a law of fate, "fatalis lex," he introduces an idea equally foreign to Pindar's drift. The Law spoken of is that which the Greeks understood by *χειρῶν νόμος* (Aeschines c. Tim. § 5), the Germans by 'Faust-recht,' and we by 'Club-law,' or the 'law of the stronger,' as I have paraphrased it. This sense alone agrees with the context in Plato, who in the Legg. (690 c) contrasts, with a reference to this passage, *τὴν τοῦ νόμου ἑκόντων ἀρχήν* with *βίαιον*. Ast takes *τὸ βιαιότατον* adverbially, translating *ἄγει δικαιῶν* "rapit ex suo jure agens"; but I cannot agree with him. The Schol. on Aristides has by way of interpretation *τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἰσχυροτάτῃ χερὶ ἀνύει.* Did he read *ἄνει* for *ἄγει* in Pindar's text? **30** *ἐπίσταμαι*] This verb is frequently used in the sense of knowing by rote, as in Phaedo 61 B, *οὓς προχείρους εἶχον καὶ ἠπιστάμην μύθους τοὺς Αἰσώπου*, and other passages quoted by Ast. It is also used to denote personal acquaintance: as by Aristoph. Equit. 1278, *νῦν δ' Ἀρίγνωτον γὰρ οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἐπίσταται.*

Page 61. **5** *φιλοσοφία γάρ τοι*] This view of the use and abuse of philosophy was doubtless very generally adopted by men of quality and education, in Athens as elsewhere, and it is a proof of Plato's dramatic impartiality, distinguishing him favourably from most writers of dialogues, that he should have put words into the mouth of Callicles which to the majority of his contemporaries would seem the perfection of good sense and political wisdom. Isocrates, a much more decorous character than Callicles, indeed a model of conventional propriety, speaks *precisely to the* same effect in more than one of his orations.

For instance, in the Panathenaicus (p. 238 B) he observes, *τῆς μὲν οὖν παιδείας τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν προγόνων καταλειφθείσης τοσούτου δέω καταφρονεῖν, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ἐφ' ἡμῶν κατασταθεῖσαν ἐπαινῶ, λέγω δὲ τήν τε γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν καὶ τοὺς διαλόγους τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς καλουμένους, οἷς οἱ μὲν νεώτεροι μᾶλλον χαίρουσι τοῦ δέοντος, τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὅστις ἂν ἀνεκτοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι φήσειεν. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐγὼ τοῖς ὡρμημένοις ἐπὶ ταῦτα παρακελεύομαι πονεῖν καὶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν ἅπασι τούτοις, λέγων ὡς εἰ καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο δύναται τὰ μαθήματα ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἀποτρέπει γε τοὺς νεωτέρους πολλῶν ἄλλων ἁμαρτημάτων. τοῖς μὲν οὖν τηλικούτοις οὐδέποτ' ἂν εὑρεθῆναι νομίζω διατριβὰς ὠφελιμωτέρας τούτων οὐδὲ μᾶλλον πρεπούσας. τοῖς δὲ πρεσβυτέροις καὶ τοῖς εἰς ἄνδρας δεδοκιμασμένοις οὐκέτι φημὶ τὰς μελέτας ταύτας ἁρμόττειν. ὁρῶ γὰρ ἐνίους τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς μαθήμασι τούτοις οὕτως ἀπηκριβωμένων ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους διδάσκειν, οὔτ' εὐκαίρως ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις αἷς ἔχουσι χρωμένους, ἔν τε ταῖς πραγματείαις ταῖς περὶ τὸν βίον ἀφρονεστέρους ὄντας τῶν μαθητῶν, ὀκνῶ γὰρ εἰπεῖν τῶν οἰκετῶν.* The appositeness of this quotation must excuse its length. More to the same effect will be found in Antid. § 280 fol. (Bekker), in the Helenes Encom. init. and other speeches: some of which contain obvious polemical insinuations aimed at Plato and his school. The Xenophontic Socrates will be found also to agree with Callicles in his sentiments on this subject, better at least than with his Platonic self. Comp. Mem. iv. 7. 2 fol.—Socr., as a philosopher, argues Callicles, might naturally doubt the truth of these doctrines: but let him take part in the serious affairs of life, and his doubts will disappear. 'For Philosophy is doubtless a pretty thing—a nice amusement—if studied in youth, and within reasonable bounds: but it is absolute ruin to those who remain at their studies too long: in fact, let a man be ever so highly gifted, if he philosophize to an advanced period of life, it is impossible he can be versed in those accomplishments which every gentleman, every man of consideration, should possess.' *ἐν ἡλικίᾳ* means, strictly speaking, 'at the proper age,' according to the original sense of the word *ἡλίκος*. It may therefore denote youth, or manhood, or mature life, according to circumstances. In Charm. 154 B, *ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ* is applied to boys who are old enough and not too old to have lovers, and so means 'in early youth,' as it does here. But *πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας* does not necessarily mean "ultra juventutem," as Stallb. translates: but rather 'far into life,' as in such phrases as *πόρρω σοφίας ἐλαύνειν* (inf. 486 A), *πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ*

τοῦ βίου (Apol. 38 c), which is in fact the more idiomatic use of πόρρω with the genitive. Comp. Xen. Apol. Soc. 30, προβήσεσθαι πόρρω μοχθηρίας: Arist. Vesp. 192, πονηρὸς εἶ πόρρω τέχνης. **11** καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων] The ignorance of pedants like these extends not merely to the laws of their country, and to those principles which enter into all covenants between man and man, or between one country and another; they are equally ignorant of human pleasures and passions; in short, of human character in the aggregate. τῶν λόγων, 'the arguments and considerations. ὁμιλεῖν is to be constructed with τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, as if he had said, οἷς δεῖ χρῆσθαι ἐν τῷ ὁμιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρ. συμβόλαια is explained by the Schol., αἱ ἀσφάλειαι καὶ συγγραφαὶ καὶ συνθῆκαι πόλεων, καθ' ας τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλήλαις ἔνεμον. **12** ὥσπερ γε, οἶμαι] 'as I suppose men of the world are when they are admitted to your reunions and the discussions that take place there.' διατριβή is either the place in which, or the matter about which διατρίβει τις. Of the former we have an example in Charm. 153 A, ᾗα ἐπὶ τὰς ξυνήθεις διατριβάς, 'I was proceeding to my accustomed haunts': of the latter *passim*. διατριβαὶ καὶ λόγοι are found together Apol. 37 c. διατριβή is used for 'ludus,' a *school* of rhetoric or philosophy, by Isocr. Panath. 237 A, τοὺς ἐσχηκότας τῆς ἐμῆς διατριβῆς. So by later writers in such phrases as ἡ Πλάτωνος, ἡ Ζήνωνος διατριβή. A. Gell. xviii. 13, "Sophisma a quodam dialectico ex Platonis diatriba propositum." Ibid. xvii. 20 al. **21** τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου] These lines, and those which follow presently, are quoted from the Antiopa of Euripides, a drama, which, if we may judge from the number of fragments preserved by Clemens, Stobaeus, and others, was a favourite in the schools. Zethus and Amphion were twins, born to Zeus by the beautiful Antiopa, and whom she was constrained to leave on Mount Cithaeron, under the care of a faithful shepherd. In this seclusion Amphion, to whom Hermes had given the lyre, devoted himself to music and other liberal pursuits, while the ruder Zethus led the life of a shepherd and huntsman. In the animated dialogue, of which these lines form a part, and of which some eighty or ninety survive, each brother extols his own pursuits; Zethus twitting his brother with effeminacy, unbusiness-like habits, &c., while Amphion dilates on the superiority of intelligence to brute force, and similar topics. The three verses in the text are said by the Scholiast to have formed part of the ῥῆσις of Zethus: but from their tenour they seem more appropriate to the character of the gentler and more reasonable

Amphion, and to him accordingly Hartung gives them (Euripides Restitutus ii. p. 420). However this be, Hartung is probably right in regarding the words λαμπρός and ἕκαστος as belonging to the text of Euripides: λαμπρός θ' (δ' Hart.) ἕκαστος κἀπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται. The second verse is quoted twice by Aristotle, once with a slight variation, unimportant as regards the sense (Rhet. i. 11. 28); the third by Plutarch (Mor. pp. 514 A, and 630 B), whose MSS. in the latter passage give τυγχάνῃ, in the former τυγχάνει. The reading τυγχάνῃ is also that of the MSS. of Plato here and Alc. ii. 146 A, where only one codex gives τυγχάνει. This latter is however more legitimate with ἵνα in the sense of ὅπου or ἐν ᾧ, and Buttm., Bekk., and the Zür. Edd. adopt it. Stallb. defends the vulg. τυγχάνῃ on the ground that πρίν, ὅπου, ὅθεν, and similar adverbs of time or place, are by the tragic poets frequently constructed with the conjunctive alone, in cases where a prose author would have added ἄν. He appeals to two well-known notes of Porson, on Med. 222 and Orest. 141, where however there is no mention of ἵνα. Some colour is lent to his opinion by the succeeding ὅπου δ' ἄν, and Ast accordingly approves, though he had given τυγχάνει in his text. I have never seen an instance of ἵνα in its local sense with the conj., and the ambiguity which would arise from such use, between the final and topical use of the particle, may have caused it to be exempted from the licence taken in the case of ὅπου, &c. Probably, for a similar reason, ἵν' ἄν is never used in a final sense, as ὡς ἄν and ὅπως ἄν frequently are. I have therefore not hesitated to retain Bekker's τυγχάνει, and the less so as the confusion of ει and η or ηι is of perpetual occurrence in ordinary MSS. In the degenerate pronunciation of later times, η, ει, οι, ι, υ had all precisely the same sound, as they have in modern Greece at the present day, the sound namely of our long *e* or of the Italian *i*. This confusion is well known to scholars by the term 'itacism,' and has naturally been the cause of much vicious orthography in the MSS. The general sense of the passage is this: 'every man will most distinguish himself in those pursuits for which he has a natural turn: to these he will apply himself with the greatest zeal and assiduity.' **22** λαμπρός] 'eminent,' 'shining,' as Eur. Supp. 902, οὐκ ἐν λόγοις ἦν λαμπρός, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀσπίδι Δεινὸς σοφιστής. **25** ἵν'—βέλτιστος ὤν] 'in which he is at his best,' or, 'in which his forte lies.' The idiom is sufficiently common, and is illustrated in all the grammars. **29** φιλοσοφίας μέν] 'It is good, I know, to have just such a

tincture of philosophy as may serve the ends of a liberal training, and it is therefore no discredit to a mere lad to philosophize.' This comparative liberality is more in harmony with the notions prevalent in the fourth than in the fifth century, B.C. Aristophanes at least makes no such concessions. Isocrates, on the other hand, though he had no head for abstruse philosophy, and indeed thoroughly hated it, acknowledges very freely its educational uses. After informing us that mathematics and such-like sciences are of no value whatever to those who profess them, except as a means of getting their bread, he admits that they are exceedingly valuable to the pupils of such persons: *τοὺς δὲ μανθάνοντας ὀνίνησι· περὶ γὰρ τὴν περιττολογίαν καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τῆς ἀστρολογίας καὶ γεωμετρίας διατρίβοντες, καὶ δυσκαταμαθήτοις πράγμασιν ἀναγκαζόμενοι προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ἔτι δὲ συνεθιζόμενοι λέγειν καὶ πονεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ δεικνυμένοις, καὶ μὴ πεπλανημένην ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν, ἐν τούτοις γυμνασθέντες καὶ παροξυνθέντες ῥᾷον καὶ θᾶττον τὰ σπουδαιότερα καὶ πλέονος ἄξια τῶν πραγμάτων ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ μανθάνειν δύνανται* (Antid. 3, § 283, Bkk.). We seem to hear some modern apologist for "University studies."

Page 63. 1 *ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες*] Critics cannot be said to have succeeded in integrating the text of Euripides satisfactorily. Nauck gives the following:—

.....*ἀμελεῖς ὧν* [*σε φροντίζειν ἐχρῆν*]
ψυχῆς [*ἔχων γὰρ*] *ὧδε γενναίαν φύσιν*
[*γυναικομίμῳ*] *διαπρέπεις μορφώματι*
.....*κοὔτ' ἂν ἀσπίδος κύτει*
[*ὀρθῶς*] *ὁμιλησείας, οὔτ' ἄλλων ὕπερ*
νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιό [*τι*]. (Frag. Eur. 185.)

Of these the second line is poor, though not unmetrical, as Valckenaer's: *Αἰσχρῶς τε ψυχῆς ὧδε γενναία φύσις*. The first may probably have begun with the voc. *Ἄμφιον*. Nauck's *φροντίζειν* is perhaps better than the more prosaic *ὧν ἐπιμελεῖσθαί σε δεῖ* of other edd., nor is it unlike Plato to change a word in a quotation. For *γυναικομίμῳ* we have the authority of Philostratus: *γυναικομίμῳ δὲ μορφώματι κατὰ τὸν Εὐριπίδην αἰσχρῶς διαπρέπον* (Vit. Apoll. iv. 160). Olymp. by a slip of memory, aided by ignorance of metre, says that Euripides wrote *γυναικώδει*. He adds, *καὶ οὔτ' ἂν δίκαις* (sic) *βουλαῖσι*: *ὁ Εὐριπ. εἶπε 'καὶ οὔτ' ἂν ἀσπίδος κύτει προσομιλήσειεν.'* We are not therefore to force the former words into the text, as Hartung and former critics have done; reading, *οὔτ' ἐν δίκης βουλαῖσιν ὀρθῶς ἂν λόγον Προθεῖο πιθανόν*. The vicious pause con-

demns the former line: we must therefore presume that Callicles paraphrases Euripides here, as subsequently he puts *πραγμάτων* for *πολεμίων*. It is difficult to account for the apparent construction of *φύσιν* with *διαπρέπειν* in Plato's text, but it appears from the passage of Philostr. that Euripides did not intend his words to be so taken, and that *φύσιν* depends on some participle, *ἔχων*, *τρέφων*, *βλαστών* or the like, which Callicles or the copyists have omitted. **9** *πόρρω ἀεὶ—ἐλαύνοντας*] The phrase recurs in Crat. 410 E; Euthyph. 4; Plut. de Invid. 538 A (*εἰς ἔσχατον πονηρίας ἐληλακότας*). Comp. Euthyd. 294 E, *πόρρω σοφίας ἥκεις*, and tr., 'who are never satisfied with the progress they have made in philosophy,' but wade deeper and deeper into its mysteries. **15** *κατηγόρου τυχὼν πάνυ φαύλου*] Alluding probably to Melitus. See Apol. 36 A B. Anytus, though *μοχθηρός*, would not have been called *φαῦλος*. **16** *θανάτου—τιμᾶσθαι*] Apol. 36 B, *τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου*. The formula is well known. **17** *καίτοι πῶς σοφόν*] We have here at least two lines from the drama: *καὶ πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτ' ἔστιν, εἴ τις εὐφυᾶ Λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτ' ἔθηκε χείρονα*. Some add a third: *μήτ' αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον* [*προσαρκέσαι*]. With Bekk. I have given *εὐφυᾶ*, as the Attic form, for *εὐφυῆ*, which is found in the Bodl. and several other MSS. **22** *ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἄτιμον*] In a state of virtual *ἀτιμία* or disfranchisement: 'to all intents and purposes an outcast.' **24** *ἐπὶ κόρρης*] The blow upon the face with the open hand, opposed to *κονδύλοις*, Dem. Mid. p. 537. See infra on p. 527, note. **25** *ἀλλ' ὦ 'γαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου*] Here Stob. and Olymp. together enable us to restore the text of Euripides with tolerable confidence. Read with Nauck—

.....*ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ·*
παῦσαι [*μελῳδῶν*?] *πολεμίων δ' εὐμουσίαν*
ἄσκει· τοιαῦτ' ἄειδε καὶ δόξεις φρονεῖν·
σκάπτων, ἀρῶν γῆν, ποιμνίοις [*-ων*, Stob.] *ἐπιστατῶν,*
ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφεὶς σοφίσματα,
ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις.

Nauck gets his *μελῳδῶν*, whether fairly or not, from Arist. Av. 1382, and Com. inc. ap. Mein. iv. p. 659. Olymp. tells us that *πολέμων*, not *πραγμάτων*, was in the original, meaning evidently *πολεμίων* (Hesych. *πολεμίων· πολεμικῶν*). For *τοιαῦτ' ἄειδε καί* Hartung proposes *τοιαῦτ' ἄειδ' ὅθεν δ. φρ.* as nearer to Plato's text. But *καί* is found in Stob., who quotes from *τοιαῦτ'* to *σοφίσματα* (Anthol. 56. 13). Those who would know all that is to be learnt of the Antiope, and a little more, are referred to Hartung's

Euripides Restitutus ii. 415. **22** Εἰ χρυσῆν ἔχων] Arist. Rhet. Quatuorv. 174. 15, εἰ χρυσῆν ἐτύγχανεν ἔχων τὴν ψυχήν, οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ καλλίω βάσανον προσήνεγκεν: where the Schol., ἀντιφιλοτιμεῖται τοῖς παραδείγμασι τοῦ Πλάτωνος· ὁ γὰρ Πλάτων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς χρυσᾶς ἔχειν λέγει τὰς ψυχάς. The καλλίω of Arist. illustrates τὴν ἀρίστην in the text.

Page 64. **11** Εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι] 'Sure I am that if I get you to assent to any opinions of which my judgment approves, such opinions may pass henceforth as absolutely true. For I remark that before any one can adequately try a human soul as to its right or wrong living, he requires some three qualifications, all of which exist in you—knowledge, goodwill, and moral courage.' For τρία ἄρα I should propose τρί' ἅττα. Ἅττα is very commonly used with numerals, and the force of ἄρα is but slight in the present context. The interpreters give "tria potissimum," a rendering which answers to ἅττα, but not to ἄρα. Rep. iv. 445 c, τέτταρα δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἅττα ὢν καὶ ἄξιον ἐπιμνησθῆναι; ib. iii. 400 A, ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τρί' ἅττα ἐστὶν εἴδη.....τεθεαμένος ἂν εἴποιμι. So in Arist. Eth. N. x. 10. 9, for the unmeaning αὐτά the context suggests ἅττα. **22** αἰσχυντηροτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος] So presently (D), πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι.

Page 65. **1** Ἄνδρωνα τὸν Ἀνδροτίωνος] He is named among the σοφοί assembled in the house of Callias, Protag. 315 c. Of Tisander nothing seems to be known. The deme of Nausicydes was not Χολαργεύς, as the Schol. gives it, but Χολαργεῖς. He may have been the same person as the Nausicydes mentioned Xen. Mem. ii. 7. 6, and Aristoph. Eccles. 426, as a wealthy meal-merchant (ἀλφιταμοιβός, ἀλφιτοποιός). **2** ἐπήκουσα] So the Bodl. and Bekk. Vulg. ὑπήκουσα, which Heind., strange to say, prefers. The confusion is of common occurrence in MSS. Thus in Arist. Nub. 263, εὐφημεῖν χρὴ τὸν πρεσβύτην καὶ τῆς εὐχῆς ἐπακούειν, the old reading, corrected from the Ravenna, was ὑπακούειν. Ib. Vesp. 318, φίλοι, τήκομαι μὲν πάλαι, διὰ τῆς ὀπῆς Ὑμῶν ὑπακούων (Meineke, ἐπακούων). ἐπακούειν is 'to lend an ear,' 'to listen,' 'to attend to,' ὑπακούειν, 'to answer to a call,' 'to obey': the former always takes the genitive, the latter generally the dative. In Theaet. 162 D, we have, τῆς δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθει, no MS. giving ἐπακούεις, which seems however preferable, if only to avoid tautology. Ib. 255, Ἄθρει δὴ περισκοπῶν, ἵνα μή τις τῶν ἀμυήτων ἐπακούῃ, the MSS. are unanimous, yet Heind. says, "*Malui ὑπακούῃ*," adducing the present passage. Comp. however

Arist. Thesm. 627, *σὺ δ' ἀπόστηθί μοι, Ἵνα μὴ 'πακούσῃς* (sc. *ἐπακούσῃς*) *ὢν ἀνήρ*, where, as in Theaet. l.l., the word implies 'to hear as a bystander who has no right there—to overhear' (nearly as *παρακούειν*, Euthyd. 300 D, *ὁ δέ, ἅτε πανοῦργος ὤν,.....αὐτὰ ταῦτα παρακηκόει*). Add to these exx. Xen. Anab. vii. 1. 14, *ἐπακούσαντες δέ τινες τῶν στρατιωτῶν ταῦτα*, i.e. from Anaxibius, whose words were intended for the *officers*. **8** *μέχρι ὅποι*] So Xen. H. G. iv. 7. 5, *μέχρι μὲν ποῖ πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος ἤγαγεν ὁ Ἀγησίλαος, μέχρι δὲ ποῖ τὴν χώραν ἐδήωσεν*. Hirschig gives the commoner *μέχρι ὅπου*, on no MSS. authority. **5** *εὐλαβεῖσθαι—διαφθαρέντες*] 'to take heed lest if you become wise overmuch (over-educated) you be spoilt ere you are aware,' i.e., as we should say, 'lest you find, when too late, that you are quite unfitted for practical life.' So 484 C, *ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων*. It was in this sense that Socr. was said by his accusers *διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους*. **13** *ἔχει δὴ οὑτωσὶ δῆλον ὅτι*] 'The case then evidently stands for the present thus': *δῆλον ὅτι* being adverbial, as inf. 490 E, *ἀλλ' εἰς ὑποδήματα δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν*. **20** *τῷ ὄντι οὖν*] 'Thus, without exaggeration, our agreement will result in the perfect truth': i.e. any proposition upon which you and I shall agree, is sure to be thoroughly true. *τῷ ὄντι*, like *ἀτεχνῶς*, is used by way of apology for a seemingly hyperbolical statement. **31** *ἐάν με λάβῃς*] If you gain my assent now, and then in time to come find that I fail to practise what I have agreed to, account me a very dolt, an imbecile, and never waste advice upon me again. *βλάξ* implies feebleness both of mind and character. Thus in Xen. Eq. 9. 12, *βλὰξ ἵππος* is opposed to *θυμοειδὴς*. Olympiod. in l., *τὸ βλὰξ ὄνομα γέγονεν ἀπὸ τοῦ μαλακοῦ*. For the interchange of *μ* and *β* compare Buttm. Lexil. No. 108; Donaldson, N. Crat. § 218. Also Curtius, Gr. Etym. pp. 292, 297, 471.

Page 66. **8** *ἐξ ἀρχῆς δέ μοι ἐπανάλαβε*] After a long rhetorical interlude, Socr. resumes his dialectical weapons, and makes a formal attack upon the position taken up by Callicles, sup. p. 484 A. The elenchus is thus managed. The more powerful, the better, and the stronger, mean, according to Callicles, all the same thing. But the Many are more powerful than the One. Hence the laws and maxims of the Many are those of the more powerful, and therefore of the better. By the premisses, therefore, these maxims are by nature beautiful. But it is the opinion of the Many, as indeed Callicles had himself insisted, that equality is just, and also that to do injustice is 'uglier' than to suffer it.

These maxims are therefore 'beautiful by nature,' and not by law or convention only, and law and nature are not contrary the one to the other, as Callicles had maintained; nor had Socr. been guilty of sophistry in ignoring the distinction. A similar dialectical artifice is in the Theaetetus employed against a paradox of Protagoras (Theaet. p. 170). **4** *καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος*] Above, 484 B. **14** *ἀκροᾶσθαι*] Used, as more frequently *ἀκούειν*, in the sense of *ὑπακούειν*, obedire. **28** *ἐπὶ τῷ ἑνί*] As a check upon the one. So Legg. 853 C, quoted by Heind., *τούτων ἀποτροπῆς τε ἕνεκα καὶ γενομένων κολάσεως τιθέναι ἐπ' αὐτοῖς νόμους.*

Page 67. **8** *Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ*] Bekk. retains this old reading. But the *οὐχ* is not found in the Bodl. nor in the majority of MSS., and is omitted by the Zür. and Stallb. With Hirschig I prefer to retain it. 'Is it not true—as in fact you yourself recently maintained—that the majority hold the opinion,' &c. **15** *βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ*] 'that I may henceforth make sure of it on your authority,' *αὐτό*, understood from *τοῦτο*, being the object of the verb. *βεβαιώσασθαι* is a middle transitive, as Heind. remarks, and = 'mihi confirmare.' Compare Rep. 461 E, *ὡς δὲ ἐπομένη τε τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτείᾳ καὶ μακρῷ βελτίστη, δεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο βεβαιώσασθαι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου.* **29** *ὀνόματα θηρεύων*] The "aucupari verba" of Cicero. To give chase to words—to lie in wait for verbal inaccuracies, as a fowler for game. Socr., says Callicles, reckoned a slip of the tongue a very god-send, and of this, at his time of life, he ought to be ashamed.

Page 68. **1** *ἢ οἴει με λέγειν—νόμμα*] 'Or think you I mean that if a rabble be got together,—of slaves and all sorts of wretches, good for nothing unless, perhaps, for feats of physical strength, and these people say this or that,—that these their mere dicta are to have the force of law?' The interpp. differ in the sense they attach to *ἰσχυρίσασθαι*. Heind., "corporis viribus fidere"; Ast, "corporis viribus pollere." The verb has both senses, but the latter suits the context better. Prof. Woolsey quotes Dio Cass. p. 406 (Reimar.), *χαλεπὸν ἰσχυριζόμενόν τι τῷ σώματι φρονιμώτατον ἐκβῆναι.* The same sense is evident in Arist. Eth. N. iv. 3. 26, *εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι φορτικόν.* The article evidently belongs to *σώματι*, not, as Ast supposes, to *ἰσχυρίσασθαι*, which depends on *δυνατοί*, or some equivalent antitheton to *οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι*,—a very common form of the *σχῆμα κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον.* *φῶσιν* standing without a case has scandalized many of the comm., but the remedies proposed are not happy. The best, perhaps, is *ἃ ἂν*

οὗτοι φῶσιν, αὐτὰ ταῦτ' εἶναι νόμιμα. Ficinus, "hos, praeterquam fortasse corporis viribus, esse potentiores: et quae hi statuant, esse jura." From this Van Heusde extracts the following: ἰσχυρίσασθαι, τούτους εἶναι τοὺς κρείττους, καὶ ἃ ἂν φῶσιν, αὐτά, κ.τ.λ. But probably Fic. was merely translating his own conjectural text, as we frequently find him doing. Ast in his larger comm. approves the conj. of Heind., καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν ἅττα, ταῦτ' εἶναι νόμιμα, to which, neat as it is, I prefer the received text. **14** πραότερόν με προδίδασκε—σοῦ] 'Instruct me with more gentleness, lest I leave your school' and seek another master. προδιδάσκειν is said by the Schol. to be equiv. to the simple διδάσκειν, περιττεύει ἡ πρόθεσις Ἀττικῶς. Soph. Phil. 1015, εὖ προυδίδαξεν ἐν κακοῖς εἶναι σοφόν: where Ellendt observes, "Praepositio non alii rei constituta est, nisi ut monita tempore priora esse quam quod inde redundet indicet." But προδιδάσκειν and προμανθάνειν are correlative terms, denoting the relation between master and pupil. Arist. Nub. 966, εἶτ' αὖ προμαθεῖν ᾖσμ' ἐδίδασκεν: Legg. 643 C, δεῖ ἐκ παίδων...τῶν μαθημάτων ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα προμεμαθηκέναι προμανθάνειν. **17** Μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον] οὐ is absent in all the codd., but is added from Hermogenes and the margin of a Florentine cod. by Stallb., who remarks, "aut diserte addenda est negandi particula, aut, si ea omittitur, formula referri debet vel ad praecedentem aliquam interrogationem cum negatione conjunctam, vel ad sententiam subsequentem, quae aut particulam adversantem habeat, aut negandi vi praedita sit." But the usage in Alcib. i. 109 D is exactly in point: σκώπτεις, ὦ Σώκρατες—Μὰ τὸν φίλιον τὸν ἐμόν τε καὶ σόν, ὃν ἐγὼ ἥκιστ' ἂν ἐπιορκήσαιμι· ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἔχεις, εἰπέ, τίς ἔστι; The following passage would fall under Stallb.'s rule: Phileb. 36 A, πότερον ἀλγοῦνθ' ὅλως ἢ χαίροντα;—Μὰ Δί', ἀλλὰ διπλῇ τινι λύπῃ λυπούμενον. But that in the Alcibiades would need alteration as well as the present. It is to be observed that Hermogenes quotes from memory, as appears from his substituting τὸν Ζῆνα for τὸν Ζῆθον (Rhet. Gr. ed. Walz. iii. p. 425; Aldus, p. 155).

Page 69. **1** Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἃ λέγω] Callicles, seeing the absurdity of making physical strength the criterion of justice, declares that he meant by 'the stronger' the better and wiser. It is these who, according to natural justice, ought to govern and 'have more' than their inferiors. The analogies which Socr. suggests, go to prove that the wise man is entitled to more power, but not to a larger share of property than his inferiors. On this

principle the ruling body in the Republic is constituted. The instances adduced are taken as usual from common life, and are not the less apposite for their studied grotesqueness. **11** ἄλλο τι οὗτος] I have followed Bekk. in omitting ἤ, which the codd. insert after τί. **22** [Περὶ] Σιτία λέγεις] The preposition is interpolated. Plato would have written περὶ σιτίων λέγεις. I have therefore followed Hirschig in bracketing it. So 491 A, for περὶ τίνων ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ φρονιμώτερος πλέον ἔχων δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ; it is clear that Plato wrote τίνων...πλέον ἔχων, i.e. if not ἱματίων or ὑποδημάτων. In this latter instance we must have had περὶ τίνα, 'in regard of what?' In one cod. *a* is written over ων, and Heind. remarks, "Rarius loquendi hoc genus πλεονεκτεῖν περί τινος pro περί τι; cujus exemplum non est in promptu." In both cases the preposition mars the idiom of the language; and in the second instance it seems to have come down from the preceding line. Of an interpolated περί I see an instance also in Theaet. 179 E, καὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, [περὶ] τούτων τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων, ἢ ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις Ὁμηρείων, καὶ ἔτι παλαιοτέρων, αὐτοῖς μὲν τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἔφεσον, ὅσοι προσποιοῦνται ἔμπειροι εἶναι, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἷόν τε διαλεχθῆναι ἢ τοῖς οἰστρῶσιν: "Of these Heracleiteans, &c., those at head-quarters (αὐτοῖς) who live at or near Ephesus," as distinguished, for example, from the Heracleiteans at Athens. This seems better than the awkward rendering, "quod attinet ad," or even, as it seems to me, than the more ingenious supposition that Ἡρακλειτείων is the epithet of δογμάτων understood, not of ἀνδρῶν, as the words Ἡρακλείτου ἑταῖροι occurring a few lines before would lead us to suppose. A clear instance, noted by the comm., occurs ibid. 181 D: τὴν μὲν ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ [περὶ] φοράν.

Page 70. **5** Ποῖα ὑποδήματα φλυαρεῖς ἔχων] 'What shoes are you prating about?' Comp. Phaedr. 236 E, τί δῆτα ἔχων στρέφει; Ar. Eccl. 1151, τί δῆτα διατρίβεις ἔχων; Such phrases as ληρεῖς ἔχων, φλυαρεῖς ἔχων are common in Plato and Aristophanes. The force of ποῖος in such cases is familiar. **12** ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν] See a similar retort in Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 6, καὶ ὁ Ἱππίας ἀκούσας ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἐπισκώπτων αὐτόν, Ἔτι γὰρ σύ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκεῖνα τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις, ἃ ἐγὼ πάλαι ποτέ σου ἤκουσα; καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ὅ δέ γε τούτου δεινότερον, ὦ Ἱππία, οὐ μόνον ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν· σὺ δ' ἴσως διὰ τὸ πολυμαθὴς εἶναι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις. Callicles here affects not to see the point of the remark, which is really lost upon *Hippias* (*l.c.*), who answers in apparent good faith, Ἀμέλει,

πειρῶμαι καινόν τι λέγειν ἀεί. Alcibiades shows greater intelligence: Symp. 221 E, ὄνους κανθηλίους λέγει καὶ χαλκέας τινὰς καὶ σκυτοτόμους καὶ βυρσοδέψας, καὶ ἀεὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ταὐτὰ φαίνεται λέγειν, ὥστε ἄπειρος καὶ ἀνόητος ἄνθρωπος πᾶς ἂν τῶν λόγων καταγελάσειε, κ.τ.λ. **14** ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεί] 'You literally never cease from talking,' &c., =it is no exaggeration to say that these topics are always in your mouth, to the exclusion of others. It is difficult to understand Schleierm.'s preference for the ἀτέχνως of the Bodl. The idiomatic use of ἀτεχνῶς, 'actually,' 'literally,' 'without metaphor' or 'exaggeration,' is familiar to all readers of Plato and Aristophanes. **21** Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω] 'why, I have told you long ago.' On this Stallb. remarks, "Callide se simulat Callicles ea, quae nunc dicturus est, jam antea dixisse, quum tandem longe alia proposuerit." This is unjust to Callicles, who had eloquently maintained the superiority of practical talent over the wisdom of the schools, and had stood up for the right of the abler man (φύσιν ἱκανὴν ἔχων ἀνήρ, p. 484) to work his will upon the vulgar herd. The "calliditas" is rather on the part of Socr., who had taken a dialectician's advantage of a rhetorical opponent.

Page 71. **12** Τί δέ; αὐτῶν, ὦ ἑταῖρε] 'Tell me, do you mean rulers of themselves' when you speak of ἄρχοντας? To these words the codd. add variously ἢ τι ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους: τί ἢ τι ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους: Bodl. ἢ τι ἀρχομένους. All this was expelled from the text by Bekk., who is followed by the Zür. and Hirschig. Some attempts have been made to explain or emend these additional words, which however, in all probability, represent an old gloss upon Socr.'s question. The ἢ τι, perhaps, is a corruption of ἤτοι, 'videlicet,' which, like ἤγουν, is found in this sense in scholiastic Greek. Socr. presently states his meaning to be such as I have represented it; and indeed there is evidently no place for ἀρχομένους. Callicles is not familiar with the phrase αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν, which, nevertheless, Socr. declares to be 'nothing subtle or recondite,' but identical with ἐγκρατὴς ἑαυτοῦ, a phrase of current use in general society. **23** Πῶς γάρ; οὐδεὶς—ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγω] This is the reading of Ast and the Zür. The majority of MSS. have πῶς γὰρ οὔ; words which, to avoid the contradiction, Bekk. gives to Callicles. The οὔ however may be accounted for by the following οὐδείς, and we obtain the following reasonably satisfactory sense: *Call.* 'How droll you are! by your temperate men you mean the weak and simple.' Socr. 'How so? every one

must know that that is not my meaning.' *Call.* 'Oh! but it is, Socr.; for how can a man possibly be happy so long as he is in bondage?—I care not to whom or what'; i.e. whether to himself or to another. For an instance of this rather rare use of *πάνυ γε σφόδρα* (which is commonly a strong affirmation, and not, as here, a contradiction), compare Demosth. de Falsa Legat. p. 395, § 191 Bekk., *οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγ' οὕτως ἦν ἄβλιος ὥστε...ταῦτ' οὐκ ἐβουλόμην γίγνεσθαι. καὶ σφόδρα γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.* A different turn is given to the passage, by the reading found in the Bodl., and at least two others. ΣΩ. *Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνοίη ὅτι οὕτω λέγω.* ΚΑΛ. *Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, κ.τ.λ.* This is adopted by Stallb., who gets over the difficulty of making Socr. identify the temperate with the foolish by the remark, "Quod Socrates urbane concedit, ideoque respondet sic: *Quidni vero? quilibet enim intelligat ita me sentire.*" This "urbanity" I cannot but think misplaced; and therefore, though not without reluctance, have preferred in this instance the vulgate to the Bodleian reading. For the sentiment expressed by Callicles compare the conversation of Socr. with Thrasymachus, Republ. 348 C, *οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν* [*καλεῖς*] *τὴν δ' ἀδικίαν κακίαν. Εἰκός γ', ἔφη, ὦ ἥδιστε, ἐπειδὴ καὶ λέγω ἀδικίαν μὲν λυσιτελεῖν, δικαιοσύνην δ' οὔ. Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; Τοὐναντίον, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἡ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κακίαν; Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πάνυ γενναίαν εὐήθειαν.* With which comp. Thuc. iii. 83, *καὶ τὸ εὔηθες, οὗ τὸ γενναῖον πλεῖστον μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν ἠφανίσθη.* **25** *ἐπεὶ πῶς ἄν*] Comp. Lysis 207 D, *δοκεῖ δέ σοι εὐδαίμων εἶναι ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων τε, καὶ ᾧ μηδὲν ἐξείη ποιεῖν ὧν ἐπιθυμοῖ; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε, ἔφη.* Schol., *ἐντεῦθεν ὁ περὶ τῆς τελικῆς αἰτίας τῶν ἠθικῶν λόγος. ἔστι δὲ ἀρχὴ κατὰ μὲν Σωκράτην τἀγαθά, κατὰ δὲ Καλλικλέα αἰσχρὰ ἡδονή.* **32** *ἀποπιμπλάναι ὧν ἂν ἀεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται*] 'to glut each successive appetite with its appropriate food.' Of this, says Callicles, the vulgar are incapable: and hence they condemn the abler few, being ashamed of their own incapacity, and wishing to hide it: i.e. they divert attention from their own defects by abusing others.

Page 72. **9** *ἐπεί γε οἷς*] 'Suppose, for instance, a man is a king's son to begin with, or is able by his own natural genius to get himself appointed to a high office, or to make himself a tyrant or member of an absolute government, what were in truth more disgraceful or more injurious than temperance to persons like these? who, instead of taking their fill of good things without let *or hindrance,* should voluntarily invite the law to be lord over

them, with the idle talk and ill-natured censure of the multitude.' "Cum verbis *νόμον*, *λόγον*, *ψόγον*: conf. Agathonis illud Conviv. 197 D, *ἐν πόνῳ, ἐν φόβῳ, ἐν πόθῳ, ἐν λόγῳ*" (Ast). **12** *τί—εἴη*] The omission of *ἄν* seems justified by Soph. Antig. 604, *τέαν, Ζεῦ, δύναμιν τίς ἀνδρῶν ὑπερβασία κατάσχοι;* Aesch. Choeph. 314, *ἀλλ' ὑπέρτολμον ἀνδρὸς φρόνημα τίς λέγοι;* yet the cases are not precisely in point—see Ellendt, Lex. Soph. p. 125; and "*ἄν* may have dropt out here, as *τί* itself is wanting in ten MSS., both being absorbed, so to speak, by the two last syllables of *δυναστείαν*" (Woolsey). **18** *οἷς ἐξὸν ἀπολαύειν*] For *οἵτινες, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς ἀπολαύειν*. Compare, for sense as well as construction, Rep. 465 E, *οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτου λόγος ἡμῖν ἐπέπληξεν ὅτι τοὺς φύλακας οὐκ εὐδαίμονας ποιοῦμεν, οἷς ἐξὸν πάντα ἔχειν τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχοιεν*. Presently for *εἴησαν* Hirschig gives *εἶεν*, on no authority. The shorter form is preferred by Plato in *εἶμεν, εἶτην, εἶτε*. **22** *ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ*] Schol., *ἢ τὴν ἐκ πλούτου καὶ περιουσίας, ἢ τὴν ἐκ τῆς παρὰ τῷ Καλλικλεῖ καλουμένης φρονήσεώς τε καὶ ἀνδρίας*. The latter is perhaps the more correct view: sup. A, *ταύταις δ' ὡς μεγίσταις οὔσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν*. The end is pleasure, to which valour and prudence are means. In other words, they are the auxiliary forces, the *ἐπίκουροι* of luxury, &c. But he may have meant *ἐὰν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον ᾖ* (Arist. Ethic. i. 10. 15). **23** *τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ'—ἄξια*] Most comm. understand *τὰ καλλωπίσματα* to be the subject of *ἐστί*. 'As for those other matters—the fopperies, the unnatural conventionalities—they are the mere cant of men, and nothing worth.' But I am disposed, with Mr Shilleto, to make *τὰ καλλ.* the predicate: 'As for those other matters (justice and temperance and their like), they are the mere fopperies, the unnatural conventions of society, the prattle of men,' &c. For the sentiment, compare Eur. Cycl. 317,—

> *ὁ πλοῦτος, ἀνθρωπίσκε, τοῖς σοφοῖς θεός·*
> *τὰ δ' ἄλλα κόμποι καὶ λόγων εὐμορφίαι.*

Ibid. 339,—

> *οἳ δὲ τοὺς νόμους*
> *ἔθεντο, ποικίλλοντες ἀνθρώπων βίον,*
> *κλαίειν ἄνωγα.*

27 *ἐπεξέρχει τῷ λόγῳ*] Legg. ii. 672 A, *ἐπεξέλθοι λέγων* 'explicet oratione.' Socr. applauds the courageous frankness with which his opponent avows sentiments which the majority of mankind secretly entertain, but are loth to express.

Page 73. 1 ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν] 'from some source or other.' Restored by Bekk. for ἄλλοθέν γέ ποθεν found in all the MSS. The confusion is very common, as the forms ἀμοῦ, ἀμόθεν, ἀμῇ, ἀμῶς had ceased to exist in the later dialect. See Cobet, Vv. Ll., p. 255, and Schol. in Plat. Sophist. 259 D. In the Attic dialect these words are aspirated. 4 Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται] Xen. Mem. i. 6. 10, Ἔοικας, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου. καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον κράτιστον, τὸ δὲ ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ κρατίστου. Hence correct Olymp. in Gorg. comm. p. 121 (358 Jahn), ὁ οὖν πλήρη ἔχων (sc. τὸν πίθον) θεοῦ βίον ζῇ, for the corrupt θεοῦ διζῇ, by which the editor is baffled. 8 ὧν γε σὺ λέγεις] Vulg. ὡς γε σὺ λέγεις, corr. Badh. This again is a frequent error of copyists. Aesch. Prom. 629, μή μου προκήδου μᾶσσον ὡς ἐμοὶ γλυκύ. Hermann ὧν—which is much better than Elmsley's μασσόνως ἢ 'μοὶ γλυκύ. In Lysias vii. § 31, προθυμότερον ὡς ἠναγκαζόμην, read ὧν ἠναγκαζόμην. The use of ὡς for ἤ after a comparative is a barbarism, though introduced by Prof. Sauppe into the text of the Epitaphius of Hyperides, Col. 14, l. 22. Here ὧν γε σὺ λέγεις is in antithesis to οἱ λίθοι καὶ οἱ νεκροί. 11 τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν] This passage appears to have come from the Polyidus; and is thus completed by the Schol.,—

τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν κάτω νομίζεται;

He is apparently in error when he says, ἐκ τοῦ Φρίξου τοῦ δράματος Εὐριπίδου. The lines in the Phrixus ran thus, according to Stobaeus (Anth. 120. 18):—

τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ ζῆν τοῦθ' ὃ κέκληται θανεῖν,
τὸ ζῆν δὲ θνήσκειν ἐστί; πλὴν ὅμως βροτῶν
νοσοῦσιν οἱ βλέποντες, οἱ δ' ὀλωλότες
οὐδὲν νοσοῦσιν οὐδὲ κέκτηνται κακά.

The sentiment is parodied by Aristoph. (Ran. 1477). Τίς οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν, Τὸ πνεῖν δὲ δειπνεῖν τὸ δὲ καθεύδειν κώδιον; From ib. 1082, καὶ φασκούσας οὐ ζῆν τὸ ζῆν, we may infer that a woman was the speaker in one at least of the Euripidean passages. The idea, though not the precise words, was borrowed from Heraclitus (Philo, Alleg. Leg. 1, fin.): μονονοὺ καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος κατὰ τοῦτο Μωϋσέως ἀκολουθήσας τῷ δόγματι, φησί· Ζῶμεν τὸν ἐκείνων (sc. θεῶν) θάνατον, τεθνήκαμεν δὲ τὸν ἐκείνων βίον· ὡς νῦν μὲν ὅτε ἐνζῶμεν τεθνηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὡς ἂν ἐν

σήματι τῷ σώματι ἐντετυμβευμένης, εἰ δὲ ἀποθάνοιμεν τῆς ψυχῆς ζώσης τὸν ἴδιον βίον. From which the editors of Heraclitus' fragments infer that the well-known σῶμα σῆμα was first said by him. The Heraclitean fragm. is given at greater length by his namesake the author of the Homeric Allegories: ἄνθρωποι θεοὶ θνητοί, θεοὶ τ' ἄνθρωποι ἀθάνατοι, ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, θνήσκοντες τὴν ἐκείνων ζωήν (Ed. Gale, p. 442). A fragment quoted by Sext. Empir. comes nearer still to the words of Euripides: ὁ δὲ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν ὅτι καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς ζῶμεν τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν τεθνάναι καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν τεθάφθαι, ὅτε δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀποθνήσκομεν τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναβιοῦν καὶ ζῆν: "Heraclitus says that both living and dying are in our life as well as in our death: when *we* live our souls are dead and are buried in us, when *we* die our souls revive and live" (Pyrrh. Hypot. iii. 230). But closer than all is the citation in Plutarch, Consol. ad Apoll. 106 E, φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, ταὐτὸ...ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκός... τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνά ἐστι κἀκεῖνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα. The meaning of this probably is, that life and death are part of one and the same process of continuous growth and decay, according to the principle implied in the formula διαφερόμενον ἀεὶ ξυμφέρεται (Plat. Soph. 242 E). It is not however to be supposed that Plato in the present passage refers to Heraclitus. The σοφός whom Socr. affects to quote may have been some Orphic or Pythagorizing speculator of his own day, for we know that both Pythagoreans and Orphics held the notion of a penal incarceration of the soul in the body (Plat. Crat. p. 400 B C, compared with Phaedo, 62 B). On the other hand the words τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο (sc. μέρος) ἐν ᾧ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶν point to the Platonic doctrine of the tripartition of the soul (see Phaedrus, App. i. p. 164), and it might seem that Plato had here committed a conscious anachronism, in attributing the doctrine to some earlier school. Even this would not be inconsistent with the only half-in-earnest tone of the entire passage; for we know how easily the Platonic Socrates could evoke imaginary vouchers for his own views (comp. Phaedr. 275 B, Ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥᾳδίως σύ, κ.τ.λ.). Still as the σοφός in question appears in company with other undoubtedly real personages, I incline to think that some particular speculatist is intended. The comm. give us no light, but content themselves with accumulating passages from Heraclitus and from Plato, as if the difficulty were not rather to account for the juxtaposition of the dogmas of schools so distinct both in time and

character. In suggesting the name of Philolaus, I rest upon the slender data that some rude "partition of the soul is attributed to him on reasonable and good authority" (see Zeller, Phil. der Griechen, i. p. 325, 2te Ausg.). Clemens Alex. quotes a fragment purporting to be his, but which may be only Plato in a Doric dress: *ὡς διά τινας ἁμαρτίας ἁ ψυχὰ τῷ σώματι συνέζευκται, καὶ καθάπερ ἐν σάματι τέθαπται* (Strom. iii. 433 A, ap. Lobeck, Aglaoph. p. 795). A better critic than Clemens, Athenaeus, gives the following important notice, on the authority of Clearchus the Peripatetic: *Εὔξιθεος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος, ὦ Νίκιον, ὥς φησι Κλέαρχος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς ἐν δευτέρῳ Βίων, ἔλεγεν ἐνδεδέσθαι τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ τῇδε βίῳ τὰς ἁπάντων ψυχὰς τιμωρίας χάριν· καὶ διείπασθαι τὸν θεόν, ὡς εἰ μὴ μενοῦσιν ἐπὶ τούτοις, ἕως ἂν ἑκὼν αὐτὸς λύσῃ, πλέοσι καὶ μείζοσιν ἐμπεσοῦνται τότε λύμαις· διὸ πάντας εὐλαβουμένους τὴν τῶν κυρίων ἀνάτασιν φοβεῖσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἑκόντας ἐκβῆναι, μόνον τε τὸν ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ θάνατον ἀσπασίως προσιέσθαι, πεπεισμένους τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τῆς τῶν κυρίων γίγνεσθαι γνώμης*, iv. p. 157 C. Compare Plat. Phaedo, 61 E, where *Philolaus* and 'certain others' are appealed to by Cebes as affirming the unlawfulness of suicide. This evidence in favour of the Pythagorean origin of the speculation in the text seems to me unexceptionable, and we can afford to give up the suspicious fragment of Clemens. Add Cicero de Senect. c. 20, "Vetat *Pythagoras* injussu imperatoris, id est Dei, de praesidio et vitae statione discedere." **18** *ὅπερ ἤδη του ἔγωγε*] The Bodl. omits *ὅπερ* with several other MSS. The original reading may therefore have been *ᾗ δή του ἔγωγε*. **17** *καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν*] 'And it was this part of the soul, we may suppose, that an ingenious person, a Sicilian mayhap or Italian, allegorically styled a jar, in consideration of its persuadable and credulous nature, by a change in the word *πιθανός*, which he made into *πίθος*.' The *Σικελός* was possibly Empedocles, as Olympiodorus and the Schol. assert. To this Karsten, the editor of Empedocles, assents. "Probabile mihi videtur Empedoclem, ut religiosum hominem et mysteriorum patronum, *ἀμυήτους* vocasse dementes et miseros, eosque ut est in Danaidum fabulâ finxisse velut aquam fundentes in dolium perforatum (*πίθον τετρημένον*) quod insatiabilem libidinum cupiditatem significat. Haec fictio ab ingenio poetae (qualis fuit Empedocles) fabulas allegorice interpretantis haud aliena, neque vero e veterum judicio abhorret a fabulae sensu. Similiter in celebri Polygnoti picturâ *praeter multa alia* pictae erant duae mulieres, *φέρουσαι ὕδωρ ἐν*

κατεαγόσιν ὀστράκοις, quibus erat inscriptio εἶναι σφᾶς τῶν οὐ μεμνημένων. Paus. x. c. 31. Caeterum quam misera haberetur in inferis τῶν ἀμυήτων sors, declarant nota Platonis dicta in Phaedon. p. 69" (Empedocl. ed. Karsten, p. 302). Here however we are not to suppose that Empedocles is *seriously* credited with the authorship of the psychological doctrine implied in the words τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί. The particle ἄρα frequently denotes an inference false but specious. Theaet. 171 C, εἰκός γ' ἄρα ἐκεῖνον (sc. Πρωταγοράν) πρεσβύτερον ὄντα σοφώτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι. Rep. 358 C, πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν. Inf. B, τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς ἔφη ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτήν. **18** ἴσως Σικελός τις] Why Σικελός, rather than Σικελικός, which was read by Olymp. and Stobaeus, and is found in some codd.? The answer to this was given by Buttmann, who calls attention to a love-song of Timocreon Rhodius, beginning with the lines, Σικελὸς κομψὸς ἀνὴρ Ποτὶ τὰν ματέρ' ἔφα, ap. Hephaest. p. 40. Hence Σικελὸς κομψὸς ἀνὴρ became proverbial. **19** διὰ τὸ πιθανόν] Of πιθανός used passively we have an instance in Aesch. Ag. 485, πιθανὸς ἄγαν ὁ θῆλυς ὅρος. **21** τῶν δ' ἀμυήτων] Socrates makes ἀμυήτους synonymous with οὐ στεγανούς, 'the contrary of watertight,' deriving the word from μύω 'claudo,' instead of μυέω 'initio.' For this etymology his 'learned friend' is made responsible. Tr. 'But that portion of the uninitiate soul in which the appetites reside, its incontinent and irretentive part, he represented as a leaky jar, figuring thereby its insatiate nature,'—literally, 'using that similitude in consequence of the impossibility of filling it.' **22** οὐ στεγανόν] Compare with this Repub. ix. p. 586 B, ἅτε οὐχὶ τοῖς οὖσιν οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ στέγον ἑαυτῶν πιμπλάντες. **23** ὡς τετρημένος εἴη πίθος] Shakspeare, Cymb. i. Sc. 7, "The cloyed will, That satiate yet unsatisfied desire, That tub both filled and running." **24** τοὐναντίον δὴ οὗτος σοί] 'Thus does my friend set forth to us, in direct opposition to you, Callicles, that of all the dwellers in Hades these, the uninitiated, must be the most wretched, being ever employed in lading water into the leaky jar with an equally leaky sieve.' **27** ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ] The repetition of τετρημένῳ, though suspicious, seems to be supported by Phaedo, 80 D, ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀειδές, το εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον, γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀειδῆ, εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, a passage which also illustrates the foregoing ἐν Ἅιδου, τὸ ἀειδὲς δὴ λέγων. The image is also found in Shakspeare,—

"Yet in this captious and intenible sieve
I still pour in the waters of my love,
And lack not to lose still."
All's Well that ends Well, I. iii. 193.

31 δι' ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην] 'by reason of its fickle and forgetful nature.' Legg. iv. 705 A, ἦθη παλίμβολα καὶ ἄπιστα. Ib. vi. 775 D, ἀνώμαλα καὶ ἄπιστα. **32** ἐπιεικῶς...ὑπό τι ἄτοπα] 'Satis subabsurda,' the only rendering of which these words will admit, is more than 'somewhat absurd.' There seems to be no authority for the meaning of ἐπιεικῶς, assumed by Ast and Stallb., 'freilich,' Eng. 'it must be confessed,' which is rather the force of the particle μέν, nor is the rendering 'sane' given in his Lexicon justified by the passage of the Phaedon there adduced. ἐπιεικῶς can here only mean 'satis,' 'admodum'—as we say, 'absurd enough': so supr. 485, πρὸς σὲ ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς. One might conjecture, ἐπιεικῶς μέν ἐστιν ἢ ὑπό τι ἄτοπα, but this would perhaps be *subfrigid*. And yet few would consent, except in the last resort, to omit ἐπιεικῶς, as Hirsch. following Cobet has done. If either must be sacrificed, it is better to omit ὑπό τι, for which one MS. gives εἰπόντι, if I understand Bekker aright. If this was not originally intended to supplement ἐπιεικῶς, it may represent a different reading from the received. What Olympiodorus found is also doubtful, as his gloss hardly corresponds to the text as we have it. He says, τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους μύθους οὐ πάνυ ἀτόπους καλεῖ ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ποιητικοὺς παραβάλλων, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν βλάπτουσι, Ol. Schol. p. 120. Perhaps he only meant to paraphrase ὑπό τι by οὐ πάνυ in the sense, 'not altogether,' 'not quite.' Meanwhile we may translate the passage thus: 'These details, it is true, are more or less absurd; yet there is no doubt as to the point, by proving which I mean, if possible, to induce you to retract your former preference,—in lieu, that is, of the life of unsated indulgence, to elect that rival life which is characterized by moderation and contentment.' ὅ depends upon ἐνδειξάμενος, 'what having proved, I wish,' and, as Stallb. observes, there is no necessity for admitting the inferior reading ἐνδείξασθαι. It is nearly indifferent whether we take δηλοῖ as impersonal ('patet,' 'liquet'), or construct it as a transitive with ταῦτα. The καί, which in one MS. follows μεταθέσθαι and is admitted by Bekk. and Hirsch., is not needed, as ἐλέσθαι is either epexegetic or may be understood to depend upon μεταθέσθαι. Stallb. prefers the latter view; to me the former seems *the simpler of* the two, and in accordance with Plato's usage.

Page 74. **2** *μεταθέσθαι*] Comp. Rep. 345 B, *ἔμμενε τούτοις, ἢ ἐὰν μετατιθῇ φανερῶς μετατίθεσο, καὶ ἡμᾶς μὴ ἐξαπάτα.* The word, like *θέσθαι* and *ἀναθέσθαι*, may have been transferred from the game of draughts to verbal contests. **6** *μετατίθεσαι*] Equiv. to *μεταθέμενος ἡγεῖ.* "Mutasne ita sententiam ut statuas feliciores esse modestos libidinosis?" Simili *βραχυλογίᾳ μεταγνῶναι* adhibitum a Thucyd. i. 44, *μετέγνωσαν Κερκυραίοις ξυμμαχίαν μὲν μὴ ποιήσασθαι, κ.τ.λ.* Heind. The Bodl. and several other MSS. have *μετατίθεσθαι*, an evident blunder. **9** *Τοῦτ' ἀληθέστερον*] i.e. *ἐκείνου.* No number of such fables will induce Callicles to transfer his preference. **11** *ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν*] 'from the same school with the last,' qu. *τῇ νῦν δή.* The moral of this latter allegory is much the same as that of the former, of which it seems to have been but another version—possibly by a different hand. The Schol. suggests, *ἦν δὲ ἐκεῖνο μὲν τῶν Πυθαγορείων οἰκεῖον, τοῦτο δὲ Σωκράτους, ὡς σαφέστερόν τε καὶ πληκτικώτερον.* Olymp., *ἰστέον ὅτι σχεδὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ ἐπιχείρημα τοῦτο τῷ Πυθαγορείῳ· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ εἶπεν ὁ Σωκράτης ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου.* Empedocles, as an Eclectic, borrowed much from the Pythagoreans, with whom he is sometimes classed, as by Olymp. and the Schol. **16** *νάματα δὲ σπάνια*] 'Suppose that the supplies of these several liquids are scanty and hard to get; in fact, not to be procured without frequent and severe exertion. We will further suppose that one of the two persons mentioned, when he has once filled his jars, does not trouble himself to feed them with fresh supplies, but lets well alone, so far as the vessels are concerned.' The different liquids denote of course the variety in the objects of human desire. All are represented as more or less agreeable to the taste. For the sense of *νᾶμα* compare Phaedr. 235 D, *λείπεται δή, οἶμαι, ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων ποθὲν ναμάτων πεπληρῶσθαί με δίκην ἀγγείου.* **24** *ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας*] 'or else be a prey to the most excruciating pains.' Referring to the uneasiness with which impure pleasures are preceded and accompanied. See inf. 496 C—E.

Page 75. **3** *Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γ'*] 'The more then you pour in, the greater the waste—wide too must be the holes for the liquid to escape by.' **7** *Χαραδριοῦ*] The Schol. favours us with an edifying description of this bird and its habits: *χαρ. ὄρνις τις ὃς ἅμα τῷ ἐσθίειν ἐκκρίνει* (the peculiarity to which Socr. alludes). He adds: *εἰς ὃν ἀποβλέψαντες, ὡς λόγος, οἱ ἰκτεριῶντες ῥᾳον ἀπαλλάτ-*

τονται· ὅθεν καὶ ἀποκρύπτουσιν αὐτὸν οἱ πιπράσκοντες, ἵνα μὴ προῖκα ὠφελῶνται οἱ κάμνοντες.

καί μιν καλύπτει. μῶν χαραδριὸν περνάς;

ὥς φησιν Ἰππῶναξ. The χαραδριός is mentioned by Arist. Av. 1141, among the ποτάμια ὄρνεα, in accordance with the apparent etymology of his name, παρὰ τὸ ἐν ταῖς χαράδραις διατρίβειν, as the Schol. on Aristoph. observes. With him Aristotle agrees, H. A. ix. c. 11, adding, ἔστι δ' ὁ χαραδριὸς καὶ τὴν χρόαν καὶ τὴν φωνὴν φαῦλος· φαίνεται δὲ νύκτωρ, ἡμέρας δὲ ἀποδιδράσκει. He is therefore not the 'lapwing,' as Lidd. and Scott suggest: nor does the φαυλότης of his colour agree with the 'curlew.' Nor is he the same as αἴθυια, as Timaeus in Lex. supposes, for the birds are mentioned as distinct by Arist. H. A. viii. 3. Some species of plover is probably meant; 'charadriadae' being the name given by modern ornithologists to the plover-tribe. Many of these, e.g. the dotterels and golden plovers, are said to be night-feeders, as Aristotle reports of his 'charadrius.' According to Plut. Sympos. p. 681 c, the χαρ. cures the jaundice by catching it himself through the eyes: hence ἀποστρέφεται τοὺς ἰκτεριῶντας, καὶ τὰ ὄμματα συγκλείσας ἔχει,—from which we may conjecture that the experiment had never been fairly tried. The χαραδριός, which is the subject of one of Babrius's fables, is a crested bird, κορυδάλλῳ πρὸς τὸν ὄρθρον ἀντᾴδων. τιν' αὖ σύ] You said the life I approved was no life, but the state of a lifeless body or a stone: and now you in your turn are depicting a life like that of an obscene and ravenous bird. **13** δυνάμενον πληροῦντα] If we are not to adopt Stephen's correction πληροῦν, we must suppose that infinitive understood in connexion with δυνάμενον. The concourse of participles is difficult to render in another language, but it is much in Plato's manner, and here, in particular, is not without force. 'I do acknowledge the existence of the appetites you mention,' says Call.: 'I speak of a man drinking when he is thirsty, and eating when he is hungry; and not only so, but also of one who possesses all the other natural appetites, with the means of gratifying them, and who does gratify them and enjoys it,—and that man, I say, leads a happy life.' As Stallb. observes, Callicles cuts Socrates short in his tedious enumeration of appetites, any or all of which he is prepared to recognize; and then, with characteristic ὕβρις, adds unasked his opinion that he who indulges them all to the top of his bent is the happy man.

18 *εἰπὲ εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα*] 'Tell me whether one afflicted with the itch, who has a perpetual desire to scratch, and who can scratch to his heart's content, and spends his life in scratching, whether it can be said that such a person lives happily?' Obs. *κνῆσθαι* not *κνᾶσθαι* is the Attic form, analogous to *ζῆν, ψῆν, σμῆν, νῆν* for *νήθειν*. See Cobet, N. Lectt. p. 160. So *ψωρῶντας* is better than *ψωριῶντας*, the common form, and found here in the old edd. Phot., *Λιθῶντας τρισυλλάβως, οὐ λιθιῶντας. Πλάτων ια' Νόμων* (p. 916 A)...*ψωρᾶν καὶ βραγχᾶν δισυλλάβως λέγουσι*. So *θανατᾶν*, not *θανατιᾶν*, *δαιμονᾶν* not *δαιμονιᾶν*. Lob. Phryn. p. 80 fol. In *κνησιᾶν* the *ι* belongs to the root, and is to be retained. Presently for *κνησιῷ* (or perhaps *κνησιφῇ*) the codd. give *κνησιοῖ*. The phenomena of pruriency are described with grotesque accuracy in the Philebus, p. 46 D, a passage illustrative of the present in more than one respect. Compare also Democritus, Frag. Mor. 49, ed. Mullach, *Ξυόμενοι ἀνθρωποι ἥδονται καὶ σφιν γίνεται ἅπερ τοῖσι ἀφροδισιάζουσι.* **21** *Ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σ., καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος*] 'How absurd you are! what a thorough mob-orator!' i.e. how thoroughly unscrupulous as to the nature of the arguments you use, stooping, as you do, to the lowest kind of clap-trap. Olymp., *δημηγόρος εἶ· τὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκοντα λέγεις· οὗτοι γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἵποιεν τοὺς τοιούτους εὐδαίμονας.* **25** *σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῇς*] 'I have no fear of *your* being shocked or put to shame.' Inf. 520 D, *οὐδὲν δεινὸν μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ*. Phaedr. 84 B, *οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ*.

Page 76. **2** *καὶ τούτων τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον*] 'and,—to mention the crowning instance of all such—is not, &c.' The object of Socr. in introducing a coarse topic like this, is, as he presently says, to prove that "there are pleasant things which are not good." Callicles was proof against the last instance, but recoils before this, which Socr. calls the *κεφάλαιον*, that in which the argument is 'brought to a head,' or 'reaches its climax.' In Theaet. 190 B, *τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον* denotes the most general form in which a number of particular instances can be summed up. This can hardly be said of the present question, except in a rhetorical sense. **9** *ἀνέδην οὕτω*] 'Broadly, without limitation or exception.' Inf. 509, *ὡς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν οὑτωσί*, 'at first sight.' Arist. Ran. 625, *οὕτω δὲ βασάνιζ' ἀπαγαγών*, 'without more ado.' Soph. Antig. 315, *εἰπεῖν τι δώσεις, ἢ στραφεὶς οὕτως ἴω;* 'without a hearing.' Above, p. 464 B, *τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τῷ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω*, 'I cannot give it one single name.' Also p. 503 D, *οὑτωσὶν ἀτρέμα σκοπούμενοι.* **14** *Ἵνα δή μοι μὴ*

ἀνομολογούμενος ᾖ] 'Just that I may not contradict myself, as I must if I say that the pleasant and the good are distinct, I say that they are the same.' To which Socr. replies, that by such an answer Callicles destroys the force of his first speech (in which he had censured Gorgias and Polus for answering against their conviction), and that if he too says one thing while he means another there is an end of their joint investigation of the truth. ἀνομολογούμενος has the force of an adj. as in Arist. Anal. i. 34, quoted by Heind., ἀνομολογούμενον τοῖς προειρημένοις. So Plat. Legg. 741 A, τὸ ὁμολογούμενον τιμῶντες, 'honouring consistency.' **22** ταῦτά τε γὰρ—ἄλλα πολλά] 'For if this is so—if Good is always Pleasure, and Pleasure Good—there will plainly follow many other disgusting conclusions besides those at which I have just now darkly hinted.'

Page 77. **1** Ἴθι δή μοι] The last elenchus consisted in an appeal to the moral sense. The position of Callicles had been shown to involve consequences revolting to his natural taste and feeling: this he had virtually acknowledged, owning that it was merely for consistency's sake that he still clung to his thesis, ὅτι τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ταὐτόν. The argument which follows is dialectical, as the former was popular. Olymp., τοῦ ἕκτου ἐπιχειρήματος ἐφαπτόμεθα· ὃ διττόν ἐστι, τὸ μὲν κατ' εὐθύ, τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγῆς. He means that there is direct proof of the impossibility of good and evil, which are contraries, existing and ending simultaneously in the same individual. The ἀπαγωγὴ εἰς ἀδύνατον consists in showing the incompatibility of this principle with the proposition ὅτι τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τἀγαθὸν ταὐτόν, which is effected by producing instances in which pleasure and pain do co-exist and end together. ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ] Stephen followed by Hirsch. gives οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ from one MS. But σοι is better absent; 'seeing that it is so ruled,' Lat. 'sic placet,' viz., ἐπιχειρεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ὡς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος. Parmen. 137 B, ἢ βούλεσθε, ἐπειδήπερ δοκεῖ πραγματειώδη παιδίαν παίζειν, ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἄρξωμαι καὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ ὑποθέσεως; In the next ῥῆσις but one ὡς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης Heind. and Bkk. insert ὄν after ἕτερον. So also Hirsch. The instances quoted by Stallb. (though not all in point) establish the legitimacy of the omission even in absolute clauses. Yet I incline with Heind. to suppose that in the present case ὄν has been accidentally absorbed by the preceding word. διελοῦ τάδε. ἐπιστήμην που καλεῖς τι;] 'Resolve me this. I presume you call *something Science*,' i.e. you recognize the existence of a thing

called Science. **20** ἦ ὁμολογεῖ; Οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ] What the Platonic Socr. really thought on this subject he tells us plainly in the Philebus, p. 60, where after stating the opinion of Philebus, that pleasure was the finis bonorum, and that Good and Pleasant were interchangeable terms, he adds: Σωκράτης δὲ πρῶτον μὲν οὔ φησι τοῦτ' εἶναι, δύο δὲ καθάπερ τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ διάφορον ἀλλήλων φύσιν ἔχειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μέτοχον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρας τὴν φρόνησιν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν. **23** τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας... πεπονθέναι] In order to prove that good and evil cannot co-exist in the same individual, he enumerates instances of both states, in which their incompatibility is evident. The induction, though imperfect, satisfies Callicles, who finally admits the proposition in its utmost generality (496 B, Πάντως δήπου). **32** ἀπολαβὼν σκόπει] The participle has the force of an adv. 'Examine separately any part of the body you think proper.' So Rep. 420 C, τὴν εὐδαίμονα (πόλιν) πλάττομεν οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες, ὀλίγους ἐν αὐτῇ τοιούτους τινὰς τιθέντες, ἀλλ' ὅλην, 'not in detail, but in its totality.'

Page 78. 10 Θαυμάσιον...γίγνεται] 'No, for such a conclusion is both startling and absurd.' γίγνεται is equiv. to συμβαίνει, as in 497 A, ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ=Lat. efficitur. Compare Phileb. 55, Πολλή τις...ἀλογία ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι. **14** ἀπολλύει] Hirsch., who agrees with Cobet in banishing the forms in υω from Attic writers, reads of course ἀπόλλυσι. EI and CI are easily interchanged, but there are passages in the comic poets where the metre forbids us to alter the forms objected to. Porson's note on Medea, 744, exhausts the subject: "Hac forma, ea nempe ubi ύω pro υμι in fine verbi ponitur, nunquam uti Tragicos; rarissime veteres Comicos; saepius mediae, saepissime novae Comoediae poetas. Paulatim et parce adhiberi coepta est sub mediam fere Aristophanis aetatem; tantum enim occurrit ὀμνύῃ Av. 1610, συμπαραμιγνύων in ultima ejus fabula Pluto 719. Cetera loca, ubi usurpari videtur, aut emendata sunt, aut emendanda."

Page 79. 3 Μανθάνω] The MSS. here give either καὶ ἐγὼ μανθάνω, or Ἐγὼ μανθάνω. Possibly this was a corruption of another reading, λέγω, or, as Dr Badham suggests, of καλῶ at the end of the last ῥῆσις (ΚΑΓΩ ΚΑΛΩ). Anyhow it cannot be tolerated. **15** τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δήπου ἐστίν;] "In this phrase 'to drink when athirst,' the word 'athirst' is equivalent to 'being in pain,' is it not?" So presently, κατὰ τὸ πίνειν

χαίρειν λέγεις; "it is in respect of his 'drinking' you mean that the drinker feels delight?"

Page 80. 2 †ἔφης† εἶναι] Hirsch. ἔφησθ' εἶναι. Phrynichus: Ἔφης· ἔστι μὲν παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον· τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον ἔφησθα: where Lobeck observes: "Ἔφης tam pauca habet idoneae auctoritatis exempla (Plat. Gorg. 466 E, 496 A, Xen. Cyr. iv. 1. 23, Isocr. Busir. 3. 367), ut Phrynichi mirer verecundiam, praesertim cum affini ἦς, quod nihilo melius est, tam grave subierit judicium." The following φημί inclines me to substitute φής here, as in 466 E, and in Euthyd. 293 C. The passage from the Busiris has been corrected from the MSS. I agree with Baiter in thinking ἔφης inadmissible in Plato. 10 Οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα σοφίζει, ὦ Σώκρατες] Though he has assented to all the premisses, Callicles is unable or unwilling to accept the apparently inevitable conclusion. Even the Platonist Olympiodorus finds a difficulty. Health and sickness, he says, cannot co-exist, because they are contraries: so of well-being and ill-being generally. How then can pleasure and pain co-exist? Are not they contraries also? πῶς λέγεις μὴ εἶναι ἐναντίαν τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν λυπήν; Of this ἀπορία he offers a characteristic solution. But the true key to the difficulty is furnished in the Philebus, where Socr. argues on grounds physical rather than dialectical. The good state of a thing, it is there argued, is its healthy normal state, free alike from ἔνδεια and from πλησμονή, either of which constitutes disease. The perception of ἔνδεια is painful, the process of its removal causes pleasure. So long as the process continues, pain does not cease, though pleasure may predominate. When the want is removed, and the normal state of the body is re-established, pleasure and pain cease together. But the normal is the good state, and as it is that in which pleasure ceases to be perceptible, the good and the pleasant cannot be convertible terms. It is conceivable that the subtle speculations of the Philebus, in which, though there may be occasional defects of analysis, there is no taint of logomachy, may have been suggested by objections raised to the reasoning in this part of the Gorgias: reasoning which is rather unconvincing than illogical. The student needs reminding that the proposition against which Socr. is arguing, is not that Pleasure is or may be good, but that Good consists in Pleasure: that the two words 'good' and 'pleasant' are convertible; that all which is pleasant is good, and all which is good is pleasant. This was the doctrine *of Aristippus*, of which Callicles is a popular, perhaps an un-

conscious exponent. **11** Οἶσθα, ἀλλ' *ἀκκίζει*] The verb *ἀκκίζεσθαι* and its derivative *ἀκκισμός* are used to denote any kind of mock modesty or prudery, especially, though not exclusively, on the part of women. Philippides, Com. ap. Athen. p. 384 E, *τὰ μὲν οὖν γύναια τἄλλ' ἠκκίζετο*, 'pretended to be shocked.' Philemon, ib. 569 D, *οὐκ ἔστ' οὐδὲ εἷς Ἀκκισμὸς οὐδὲ λῆρος*, 'there is no coyness or nonsense here.' Hence the glosses, *θρυπτόμενος*, *προσποιούμενος*, *γυναικιζόμενος*. The grammarians derive the word from a female appellative Ἀκκώ, and add biographical particulars of the lady. These are doubtless apocryphal, for we find from Plutarch that Ἀκκώ was used as a name of fear to terrify children, like Μορμώ, καρκώ (= Λαμία), &c. Plut. de Stoicorum repugnantiis, p. 1040 B, where Chrysippus is said to have derided Plato's doctrine of divine retribution, *ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῆς Ἀκκοῦς καὶ τῆς Ἀλφιτοῦς δι' ὧν τὰ παιδάρια τοῦ κακοσχολεῖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀνείργουσιν*. Hence the word *ἀκκίζεσθαι* may originally have denoted chimerical or feigned alarm, the transition from which meaning to that of affected modesty or niceness is not difficult. The word first occurs in Pindar Frag. inc. 217, *Ἄνδρες τινὲς ἀκκιζόμενοι Σκύθαι Νεκρὸν ἵππον στυγέοισιν λόγῳ*. Hence the proverb, *ὁ Σκύθης τὸν ἵππον*, said of those who affect dislike of what they secretly hanker after. Here the sense is obvious: You know, though you make believe that you don't know. You know perfectly well whither my arguments are leading you, but it does not suit your purpose to acknowledge it. In the sequel the words *ὅτι ἔχων λῆρεῖς* seem to have strayed from elsewhere. Heind. thinks they stood in the place of *λέγεις* in the next reply of Callicles. Others divide the *ῥήσεις* as follows: giving ΣΩ. Οἶσθα, ἀλλ' *ἀκκίζει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις*. ΚΑΛ. *Καὶ πρόιθί γ' ἔτι εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν, ὅτι ἔχων λῆρεῖς, ἵν' εἰδῇς ὡς σοφὸς ὢν με νουθετεῖς*. ΣΩ. *Οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν θ' ἕκαστος ἡμῶν κ.τ.λ.* Even so the clause *ὅτι ἔχων λῆρεῖς* is in the way: nor is there much point in the next clause, *ἵν' εἰδῇς*, &c., as coming from Callicles. In the mouth of Socr. it is an apt retort to *οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα σοφίζει*, as if he had said, You blame me *διὰ τὸ σοφίζεσθαι*, answer a few more questions, and you will discover that *you* are no *σοφός*. Comp. *ὦ σοφώτατε σύ* supr. 495 D. Moreover, the succeeding question of Socr., *Οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν κ.τ.λ.*, comes in abruptly. We should have expected *Πρόειμι δή*, or some such prefatory formula. However the *ῥήσεις* be divided, one thing seems clear, that *ὅτι ἔχων λῆρεῖς* comes more naturally from Callicles, and that, if retained, it ought to be transposed as Heindorf suggests. ΚΑΛ. *Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι ἔχων λῆρεῖς.*

ΓΟΡ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις κ.τ.λ. **18** καὶ ἡμῶν ἕνεκα] i.e. not merely to please Socr., but to save us from the tedium of a protracted discussion. **22** πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή] A proverbial expression, doubtless: but whether τιμὴ is put for τίμημα, 'multa,' 'damnum,' is not so certain. The sense required is, "That is not your affair"—not your reputation, but that of Socr., is at stake in consequence of his objectionable practice of testing your assertions by simple instances. So Olymp., εἴτε κακῶς ἐρωτᾷ εἴτε καλῶς, οὐδὲν πρὸς σέ. We have here a touch of the εἰρωνεία, for which, according to Aristotle, Gorgias was remarkable. Presently ὑπόσχες='permit' as frequently. **25** Ἐρώτα δὴ σύ] 'Proceed then you, sir, with your little cramped questions.' This, says the Schol., was a standing scoff on the part of the rhetoricians against dialectical arguments. Hippias, for instance, called them περιτμήματα, shreds or parings. **27** τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά] supp. μυηθῆναι. The Schol. explains τὰ σμικρὰ of the μυστήρια ἐν ἄστει, the μεγάλα as τὰ ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι. It was necessary, he says, to be initiated in the former before witnessing the latter. The lesser Eleusinia were celebrated at the temple in the suburb Agra: the greater *both* at Athens in the Eleusinium, and at Eleusis itself. See the testimonies in Leake's Athens, p. 250. Symp. 210 A, ταῦτα τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἴσως κἂν σὺ μυηθείης, τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά, ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ οἷός τ' ἂν εἴης. Synesius (Dion. 52 c) seems to understand τὰ μικρὰ of the preliminary rites: δεῖ τὰ μικρὰ ἐποπτεῦσαι πρὸ τῶν μειζόνων, καὶ χορεῦσαι πρὶν δᾳδουχῆσαι, καὶ δᾳδουχῆσαι πρὶν ἱεροφαντῆσαι. But there is no discrepancy between his view and that of the Schol. if we are to believe Plutarch, vit. Demetrii, c. 26 (900 D), τότε δ' οὖν ἀναζευγνύων εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας, ἔγραψεν ὅτι βούλεται παραγενόμενος εὐθὺς μυηθῆναι, καὶ τὴν τελετὴν ἅπασαν ἀπὸ τῶν μικρῶν ἄχρι τῶν ἐποπτικῶν παραλαβεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἦν οὐδὲ γεγονὸς πρότερον. ἀλλὰ τὰ μικρὰ τοῦ Ἀνθεστηριῶνος ἐτελοῦντο, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα τοῦ Βοηδρομιῶνος· ἐπώπτευον δὲ τούλάχιστον ἀπὸ τῶν μεγάλων ἐνιαυτὸν διαλιπόντες. Hence from the μικρὰ to the state of a complete epopt eighteen months would intervene. See, however, Lobeck, Aglaoph. p. 36.

Page 81. **4** Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν] To prove that during the act of drinking the thirsty man is the subject both of pain and pleasure, Olympiod. suggests the experiment of stopping short (ἀναχαιτίσαι ἑαυτόν) before the thirst is slaked: under these circumstances, he says, αἰσθανόμεθα τῆς λυπῆς πάλιν. εἰ δὲ ἐμπλήσομεν

ἑαυτούς, γίνεται ἡμῖν τὸ λεχθέν· πίον τ' ἀκέοντό τε δίψαν. (Il. χ. 2.) **15** καὶ τῇδ' ἐπίσκεψαι] Here begins a new elenchus. If the essence of good and evil be pleasure and pain respectively, those who feel pleasure are better under all circumstances than those who feel pain. But there are circumstances under which the coward feels as much pleasure as the brave man, or more. Wherefore, the brave man being good and the coward evil, under such circumstances the evil man is better than the good man, or at least as good—the good and the bad are put on a level in regard of goodness and badness, or, if there be any difference, the bad man is at one and the same time better and worse than the good. Here again a paradoxical conclusion is shown to follow necessarily from paradoxical premisses.

Page 83. **5** ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοί εἰσιν οἱ κακοί] The meaning of this is explained in the foregoing note. But the reasoning was spoilt by the copyists, who inserted οἱ ἀγαθοί after ἀγαθοί, writing thus: ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοί εἰσιν οἱ κακοί; Routh first perceived the interpolation, which the Zür. edd. expelled from the text. **10** κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν] Hirsch. unnecessarily inserts the article, reading τοὺς κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν. The art. is again omitted in the following clause: κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας.

Page 84. **5** καὶ δὶς γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς] Schol. Ἐμπεδοκλέους τὸ ἔπος, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ἡ παροιμία· φησὶ δέ· καὶ δὶς γὰρ δ δεῖ καλόν ἐστιν ἐνισπεῖν. The proverb is repeated, Phileb. 59 E. Legg. 956 E, καλὸν τό γε ὀρθὸν καὶ δὶς καὶ τρίς. **25** κἂν παίζων] Callicles is driven to the pretext that he was not speaking seriously when he affirmed the identity of good and pleasure. 'As if he did not know as well as any man that some pleasures were better than others.' Contrast with this Phileb. 13 B, πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; οἴει γάρ τινα συγχωρήσεσθαι, θέμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, εἶτα ἀνέξεσθαί σου λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναί τινας ἀγαθὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς δέ τινας ἑτέρας αὐτῶν κακάς; Of course, no consistent Hedonist would make such an admission. But Callicles was no philosopher, but a repeater by rote of dogmas which happened to take his fancy, as furnishing a theoretical ground for his own practice. That practice was probably not so bad as his theory, which he accordingly lays aside as lightly as he had taken it up. The quickness with which he resumes the offensive after his defeat is a happy dramatic touch. Plato evidently intends to contrast his rhetorical address with the οὐδενία he displays as a dialectician.

Noted by Hesych. as a *σχετλιαστικὸν ἐπίρρημα ὡς τὸ φεῦ*. Arist. Plut. 477, *Οὐ δεῖ σχετλιάζειν καὶ βοᾶν πρὶν ἂν μάθῃς.*—*Καὶ τίς δύναιτ' ἂν μὴ βοᾶν ἰοὺ ἰοὺ Τοιαῦτ' ἀκούων;* Both in tragedy and comedy *ἰοὺ ἰού* denote pain, sorrow, or indignation; but in comedy sometimes agreeable surprise. Arist. Equit. 1091, *ἰοὺ ἰού. Οὐκ ἦν ἄρ' οὐδεὶς τοῦ Γλάνιδος σοφώτερος.* Here the interj. has its ordinary sense; Socr. protesting, or affecting to protest, against the ill-usage he has received from Call. This seems obvious, but Heind. says, "Mirantis magis sunt voculae quam indignantis." **31** *τοτὲ μὲν ταῦτα φάσκων*] The Bodl. with others gives *τοτὲ μὲν αὖ φάσκων*. If this is not a mere blunder, probably *αὖ* has been transposed, and we should read *τοτὲ δ' αὖ ἑτέρως*. The Zür. edd. with Stallb. follow the Bodl., but the meaning given by Stallb. is somewhat forced: "Respicit enim Socrates ad ea quae supra cap. xlvi. in. Callicli dixerat, *οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ λέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.*" Others give *τοτὲ μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ* or *ταὐτὰ φάσκων*.

Page 85. **4** *τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν*] 'I must do the best I can.' Generally *εὖ τίθεσθαι*, as in Lucian, Necyom. § 21, *τὸ παρὸν εὖ θέμενος*. But Legg. 959 E, *τὸ δὲ παρὸν δεῖν εὖ ποιεῖν*. Olymp., *διὰ τούτου δὲ σημαίνεται, ὅτι, τὰ ἐκ τῆς τύχης διδόμενα κόσμει. μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεται ὑπὸ* (leg. *ἐπὶ*) *τῶν κυβευόντων. ἐὰν γὰρ ἀριθμὸς νικητήριος πέσῃ, εἴη δὲ καὶ τεχνίτης ὁ κυβεύων, θαυμαστῶς νικᾷ· εἰ δὲ ἡ τύχη μὲν παρέχοι τὰ δεξιά, ὁ δὲ δεχόμενος ἄτεχνος ὢν μὴ εἰδείη χρήσασθαι, οὐδὲν χρηστὸν ἀποβαίνει.* In the first part of the scholium he alludes to the well-known *Σπάρταν ἔλαχες, ταύταν κόσμει.* **17** *εἰ ἄρα—ποιοῦσιν*] The old reading was *ποιοῦσαι. ποιοῦσιν* was adopted by Bekk. from four MSS. **31** *ἐμοί τε καὶ Πώλῳ*] See p. 468 B, *ἕνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες—Φημί.* We must know, says Olymp., that good is not a means but an end: *ἰστέον ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἕνεκά του ἀλλὰ οὗ ἕνεκα· ἕνεκα μὲν γάρ του ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδὸς ἡ ἄγουσα ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος· οὗ δὲ ἕνεκα αὐτὸ τὸ τέλος.* The episodical fight with Call. is now at an end, and Socr. brings the discussion round again to the topics previously under consideration.

Page 86. **3** *ἐκ τρίτων*] 'in the third place,' 'of the third part.' The same periphrasis occurs, Eur. Orest. 1178, *σωτηρίαν σοὶ τῷδέ τ' ἐκ τρίτων τ' ἐμοί.* Also Symp. 213 B. In Timaeus 54 A, we have *ἐκ τρίτου* in the same sense. **14** *ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαί*] "qu'il y a certaines industries," Cousin. *παρασκευή* is a general term, including true *τέχναι*, and those empirical contrivances *which pretend* to be *τέχναι* but are not. The definition of a

τέχνη is, a process or "industry" which aims at good. So Aristotle: πᾶσα τέχνη ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ. The false τέχναι, on the contrary, limit their aim to pleasure. **20** πρὸς φιλίου] sc. Διός. Phaedr. 234 E. Frequent in comedy; as Diodorus ap. Athen. vi. 239 B, ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ φίλιος, Ὁ τῶν θεῶν μέγιστος ὁμολογουμένως. Call. had professed a friendship for Socr.: πρὸς σὲ ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς, 485 E. **23** ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι] 'The subject of our discussion, you perceive, is one which cannot fail to be most interesting to a man of even ordinary intelligence, the question being, after what manner we ought to live: whether in that to which you invite me, in doing man's work, as you call it, speaking in the assembly, and practising rhetoric, and playing a part in politics on the principles now in vogue with you politicians; or,' &c. σπουδάσειε is opposed to the foregoing παίζειν. In the next clause ἐπί, which Hirsch. brackets, is found in all the MSS. It is evidently better absent—πότερον τοῦτον or ἐκεῖνον τὸν βίον ἐφ' ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμὲ (δεῖ ζῆν) ἢ τόνδε τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ. If retained, we can only suppose a confusion of thought produced by the foregoing παρακαλεῖς, from which παρακλητέον may be "understood." But this would surely be bad rather than colloquial writing; and it is equally easy to presume a confusion on the part of the copyist. In τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα lies an allusion to the invective of Callicles, p. 485; δή, as usual, denoting that the sentiment is not that of Socr. but of his opponent. So the Schol., ὁ δὴ συνδεσμὸς ἐμφαντικὸς εἰρωνείας ἐστί.

Page 87. **1** εἰ ἔστι τούτω διττὼ τὼ βίω] An instance of the Schema Pindaricum of the grammarians, the dual however taking the place of the plural. This construction, we are told, is in Attic admissible only when a substantive verb, as ἔστι or γίγνεται, stands at the beginning of a clause. Euthyd. 302 C, ἔστι γὰρ ἔμοιγε καὶ βωμοί. Soph. Trach. 520, ἦν δ' ἀμφίπλεκτοι κλίμακες. Aristoph. Vesp. 58, ἡμῖν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστ' οὔτε κάρυ' ἐκ φορμίδος Δούλῳ διαῤῥιπτοῦντε τοῖς θεωμένοις. In these cases ἔστι answers to the Germ. *es giebt* or Fr. *il y a* or *il est* with plur. Here however ἔστι is apparently the copula, of which τὼ βίω is the subj. and διττώ the predicate, and this seems to distinguish the case from those quoted in the ordinary grammars. 'If these lives are really two,' i.e. diverse and opposite. Stephen, following the Aldine, omitted the article τώ in his text. If we could adopt this reading in defiance of the MSS., the passage would fall under ordinary rules, and we might translate: 'If there really exists such a pair of lives

as that supposed, let us see how they differ,' &c. 8 ἑκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν] 'and that a certain study and preparation go to the acquisition of either.' The next clause, τὴν μὲν—τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, is bracketed by Hirsch. as suspicious. But there is dramatic propriety in the iteration. 11 ἢ σύμφαθι ἢ μή· σύμφης;] Formerly the edd. gave ἢ σύμφαθι ἢ μὴ συμφῇς. Heind. first pointed out the solecism—μὴ prohib. with the subj. present. It is a question whether this συμφῇς was not originally an 'interpretamentum.' Heind. quotes Charm. § 29, ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ βαρύ τε καὶ τὸ κοῦφον τῆς στατικῆς αὐτῆς· ξυγχωρεῖς; But we nowhere meet with such interrogative clause after the formula ἢ φάθι ἢ μή, 'say yes or no,' of which the present is a variety. 16 ἔλεγον δέ που] 'I said, I believe, that cookery is in my view no art, but an expertness—unlike medicine, which *is* an art—arguing that the latter has explored the nature of the subject she has to treat, as well as the causes of the treatment she adopts, and that she, medicine, can give a reasonable account of both: whereas her rival, even in regard of that pleasure which she exclusively cultivates, goes to work in a thoroughly inartistic manner, having never studied either the nature of pleasure or its cause, and without a pretence of reason, without any attempt, one may say, at classification—the creature of routine and practice—she is content with keeping record of what usually comes to pass, whereby in fact she is enabled to provide her various pleasures.' The sentence is irregularly constructed. In the clause, ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς, the genitive is out of construction, its connexion with φύσιν being interrupted by the words κομιδῇ—ἔρχεται. This two codd. seek to rectify by repeating ἡ,—ἡ δ' ἑτέρα, ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς,—but we thus lose the correspondence with the antithetic clause, ἡ μὲν τούτου, which is important, rhetorically speaking. In the sequel τριβὴ καὶ ἐμπειρία are in the nature of epithets rather than of predicates, depending with the participles σκεψ. διαριθμ. upon the finite verb ἔρχεται. σωζομένη, on the other hand, belongs rather to τριβὴ καὶ ἐμπειρία, as if he had said τριβὴ οὖσα καὶ ἐμπειρία, ἅτε μνήμην μόνον σωζομένη, &c. ᾧ δή refers to τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι, οὐδὲν διαριθμησαμένη in the next clause being only a development of ἀλόγως. Rational sciences count and classify their subject-matter, as medicine counts and classifies the diseases of the body. In the Phaedrus, Socr. proposes a scheme of rational rhetoric, which shall undertake διαριθμεῖσθαι (Lat. *dinumerare*) τὰς φύσεις τῶν ἀκουσομένων...καὶ κατ' εἴδη διαρεῖσθαι,

according to the analogy of that rational (as opposed to empirical) medicine, of which Hippocrates and the Coan school were the founders. See Phaedr. 270—273. The popular rhetoric, here compared to cookery, is in the Phaedrus illustrated by the analogy of medical quackery, p. 268 A—C, where see the notes. The subordination of the arts and sciences to an ethical law is peculiar to the Gorgias. The empiric looks only to pleasure, the true artist extends his view to the useful and the good: a distinction which is put in the background in the Phaedrus, where the form of science is in question rather than its practical tendency. **29** *πραγματεῖαι*] Equiv. to *παρασκευαί*, 500 B, 'operations,' 'modes of procedure,' or simply 'occupations.' Presently we have *ἐπιτήδευσις* in the same sense.

Page 88. **8** *συγκατατίθεσαι—τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν*] This is an uncommon usage, *συγκατατίθεμαι* being generally put absolutely, or with a dative. It is very doubtful whether *ψῆφον* is ever to be supplied, as the Lexx. suggest. The Greeks do not say *καταθέσθαι ψῆφον*, but *θέσθαι*. Here, according to the Schol., the phrase = *συγχωρεῖς τὰ αὐτὰ Γοργίᾳ καὶ Πώλῳ*. Hesych., *καταθέσθαι· συναινέσαι*. Rost and Palm quote A. Gellius, N. A. xix. 1, *συγκατατίθεται τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας*, as parallel to the present passage, but the quotation is not accurate, as *φαντασίας* l.l. depends upon 'approbare,' not on *συγκατατίθεται*, which belongs to a subsequent clause. In Isaeus 59, 25, *συγκαταθέσθαι* has the sense 'una deponere,' scil. *γραμματεῖον παρά τῳ*. But this does not support the present reading. In one MS. we find *τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἔχων*, and this suggests the suspicion that *τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἔχεις* may have been an old marginal gloss on *συγκατατίθεσαι*. **10** *Οὐκ ἔγωγε*] Compare note to 453 D. We have the same use of the negative in the next *ῥῆσις* but one. **22** *τὴν αὐλητικήν*] 'Auletic' was one of Plato's favourite aversions. Rep. 399 D, *τί δέ; αὐλοποιοὺς ἢ αὐλητὰς παραδέξει εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἢ οὐ τοῦτο πολυχορδότατον, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμόνια αὐλοῦ τυγχάνει ὄντα μιμήματα;* This illustrates a difficult passage in Philebus 56, where the reading *αὐλητική* is not to be disturbed. The flute was used in religious ceremonies of an exciting and impassioned kind, such as the orgiastic rites of Bacchus and Cybele. It was probably from the associations thus suggested that it derived its ill name; for we must not forget, in estimating the reasonableness of the prejudice, that the dramas of Sophocles and Aeschylus were accompanied by the flute. **26** *ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν*] The latter words

are emphatic, as the Schol. has correctly observed: *αὐλητικὴν μὲν πᾶσαν ἐκβάλλει τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν, κιθαριστικὴν δὲ οὐ πᾶσαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι μόνην· οἷδε γὰρ ἄλλην ἢν σώζειν τὰς πολιτείας νενόμικεν.* He refers to Rep. l.l., *λύρα δή σοι καὶ κιθάρα λείπεται, καὶ κατὰ πόλιν χρήσιμα.* In fact all the fine arts, rhetoric included, are allowed in the Platonic state, but in subordination to the educational purposes for which civil society is supposed to exist. The citharistic practised in the musical contests seemed to Plato an aimless exhibition of manual skill, and therefore an *ἄλογος τριβή*, "*τὸ ξύμφωνον ἁρμόττουσα οὐ μέτρῳ ἀλλὰ μελέτης στοχασμῷ*"—"by rule of thumb," as we should say (Phileb. l.l.). **31** *Κινησίαν τὸν Μέλητος*] Cinesias is mercilessly ridiculed by Aristophanes for the wildness and incoherency of his dithyrambic effusions: Ran. 153, where see Schol., ib. 366. Nub. 333. Av. 1379, &c. The hearty assent of Callicles to the censure in the text seems to prove that Plato and Aristophanes represented the general opinion in regard of this poet.

Page 89. **5** *Τί δὲ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μέλης*] Pherecrates, Com. ap. Schol. Arist. Av. 858, *Φέρ' ἴδω, κιθαρῳδὸς τίς κάκιστος ἐγένετο;* 'Ο *Πειτίνου Μέλης. μετὰ δὲ Μέλητα τίς;* "*Εχ' ἀτρέμ', ἐγῷδα, Χαῖρις.* Presently *ἐκεῖνος*=this last, as in Phaedr. 231 C, *ὅσων ἂν ὕστερον ἐρασθῶσιν, ἐκείνους αὐτῶν περὶ πλείονος ποιήσονται*, where see the note. *πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον βλέπων*] One MS. omits *βλέπων*, which Hirsch. brackets. Though not needed, the participle seems to me innocuous. **12** *Τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ—ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακε*] The order is: *τί δὲ δή (ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο) ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν ἡ σεμνὴ καὶ θ.* 'What of that grave and august personage, Tragedy—what, I say, is the object of *her* ambition?' The repetition of *ἡ* is thus illustrated by Stallb.: "E vulgari ratione dicendum erat: *τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ θαυμαστὴ ποίησις, ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας;* sc. *ποίησις*. Sed eodem modo Herod. vii. 196: *ὁ ναυτικὸς ὁ τῶν βαρβάρων στρατός*. Plat. Symp. 213 E, *τὴν τούτου ταυτηνὶ τὴν θαυμαστὴν κεφαλήν*," &c. The censure which follows is too sweeping even from Plato's point of view, for Euripides at any rate aimed at a moral purpose of one sort or other, and sacrificed to his zeal as an instructor much of the popularity and much also of the poetical beauty of his plays. As a criticism on Sophocles and Aeschylus it is, to modern apprehension, still more deplorable. Compare, or rather contrast, Phaedrus 268 C, a passage which proves that Plato had a thorough perception of poetic excellence, whenever it suited him to forget *his political theories.* **17** *εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει—ὠφέλιμον*] On the

omission of the participle see note to Phaedrus 263 D. Hirsch., as usual, inserts *δν* after *ὠφέλιμον*. **18** *καὶ λέξει καὶ ᾄσεται*] 'he will introduce both in dialogue and in song.' **27** *εἴ τις περιέλοιτο*] 'if we strip any kind of poetry of melody, rhythm, and metre, the residue consists of speeches, does it not?'—where *γίγνονται* agrees with the predicate, as freq. in Plato. All the MSS. but one have *ἄλλο τι ἤ*, but this is a case in which the conjunction is better omitted. This follows from the answer of Callicles—not *οὐδὲν ἄλλο*, but *ἀνάγκη*. For *περιέλοιτο* the Schol. gives *περιέλοι*, and so Ar. Rhet. in a passage copied from this: *εἴ τις τῆς ποιήσεως περιέλοι τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸν ῥυθμόν, δημηγορία δὴ τὸ λειπόμενόν ἐστιν*, Or. Plat. ii. p. 278. But Ast quotes Xen. Cyr. viii. 1. 47, *τὸ μὲν περιελέσθαι αὐτῶν τὰ ὅπλα καὶ ἀπολέμους ποιῆσαι ἀπεδοκίμασε*.

Page 90. **4** *ἢ οὐ ῥητορεύειν δοκοῦσι*] Probably this was more true of the tragic poets of the fourth than of the fifth century. But the rhetorical tendency of Euripides is proverbial, and even in Sophocles there is much which seems to us to need apology on this score. But Socr. means the proposition to be absolute, in which case it becomes untrue; for 'persuasion' is not the end of tragic poetry as of rhetoric. Nor indeed is 'pleasure' the end, but rather a condition of its excellence. In the Laws the 'truest tragedy' is said to be the 'imitation of the noblest and best life' (817 B). **7** *Νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς*] 'So now between us we have discovered a species of rhetoric which addresses itself to a concourse of people comprising men, women, and children, both bond and free, and it is one we are far from admiring.' It follows from this that there was no restriction of age or sex in the admission to tragic spectacles. From the Laws, p. 658 D, we should infer that 'big boys' were allowed to witness comedies; but that women were excluded seems to follow from the classification of the audience in Arist. Pax 50, which includes only males. **10** *κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτήν φαμεν εἶναι*] Tragedy, says the Schol., is a *κολακεία*, because it utters moral sentiments, and talks largely of justice, beauty, and goodness. Stript of its metres, it is a *δημηγορία*, for both are provocative of violent emotions (*παθῶν ὑπερβαλλόντων κινητικαὶ ἀμφότεραι*). Comp. Isocr. Evag. p. 191, *ἦν γάρ τις τῶν ποιημάτων τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα καὶ τὰς διανοίας καταλίπῃ, τὸ δὲ μέτρον διαλύσῃ, φανήσεται πολὺ καταδεέστερα τῆς δόξης ἣν νῦν ἔχομεν περὶ αὐτῶν*. **24** *Οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς*] 'To this question the answer is not single as hitherto: there are

speakers who in what they say have a due regard to the good of their fellow-citizens; and there are also speakers such as you describe.' Early edd. have *τοῦτο ὃ ἐρωτᾷς*, which Bekk. following Heind. corrected from two MSS. The abbreviated construction is neater, and of constant occurrence. Phileb. 29 C, *Τοῦτο μὲν οὐδ' ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον ἐρωτᾷς.* **27** *εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν*] 'If even this is double'; i.e. if rhetoric also has two aspects, like that of which it is a part. Socr. is thinking of his own frequent "dichotomies," especially of that which occurs in this dialogue, 464 B, where sophistic and rhetoric divide between them the psychical branch of *κολακική*. He does not absolutely deny that there is a sound and good rhetoric, but leaves the onus probandi to Callicles, who owns that he knows not where to look for such a rhetoric among the politicians of the day, but reminds Socr. of the four great statesmen of the past. This gives occasion to Plato's celebrated attack on the 'Quatuorviri,' which called forth the elaborate apology of Aristides Rhetor.

Page 91. **2** *τί οὐχί—ἔφρασας*] Equiv. to *φράσον ὅ τι τάχιστα—οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις φράζων;* Menex. 236 C, *τί οὖν οὐ διῆλθες;* Eur. Heracl. 804, *Κἄπειτ' ἔλεξεν, ὦ στρατήγ', ὅς Ἀργόθεν Ἥκεις, τί τήνδε γαῖαν οὐκ ἐᾴσαμεν;* where see Elmsley's note. Here transl. 'Pray lose no time in telling his name.' *καὶ ἐμοί*, 'that I may know as well as you.' Lat. 'Quin mihi etiam quis sit indicas?' **4** *Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔχω*] Aristophanes makes a similar complaint: *Ἡ δημαγωγία γὰρ οὐ πρὸς μουσικοῦ Ἔστ' ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς οὐδὲ χρηστοῦ τοὺς τρόπους, Ἀλλ' εἰς ἀμαθῆ καὶ βδελυρόν*, Eq. 191. Comp. Pax 680. **6** *Τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν κ.τ.λ.*] 'Well, and of the statesmen of the old time, is there one you can name, by whom the Athenians are alleged to have been made better; the improvement dating from his first appearance on the bema, before which they were worse than they afterwards became?' **13** *τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα*] Athenaeus pounces upon this as a gross anachronism. He argues (v. 217 D) that if Archelaus is reigning at this time (supra, 470 D), Pericles has been long dead; and *vice versâ*, that if Pericles is but recently dead, Archelaus is not yet seated on the throne. Casaubon attempts to get out of the dilemma by insisting (valeat quantum) that the death of Pericles was *comparatively* recent 'respectu superiorum.' But two times are pretty distinctly indicated in the dialogue (compare sup. 473 E), and the liberty taken is by no means so great as in the Menexenus, where an *event is alluded to* which notoriously occurred thirteen years after

the death of Socr. Nothing can be more true than the remark of Athenaeus, *ὅτι πολλὰ ὁ Πλάτων παρὰ τοὺς χρόνους ἁμαρτάνει*, nor anything idler than his abuse of Plato on this account. **17** *εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο—μή*] This passage loses its difficulty if we suppose *ἀρετὴ ἀληθής ἐστιν* repeated after *αἱ δὲ χείρω, μή*. 'But if this is not so, but that is true which we were forced to acknowledge later in the discussion, viz. that the fulfilment of those desires which we are the better for indulging, and the restraint of those which make us worse, is true virtue.' In the next clause, whether we read *τοῦτο* with the Bodl. or *τούτου* with the vulg., an apparent breach of syntax remains: *τέχνη τις* for *τέχνην τινά*. Hence Ast ingeniously proposed *τοῦτο δὲ τέχνης εἶναι*. He now assents to Stallb., who conceives Plato to have written as if for the preceding *ἠναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν* the words *ὡμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν* had occurred; and if the text is to stand, we must suppose some such ellipsis. In any case there is no room for the coarse expedient of supposing "*ὅτι* followed by an infinitive," for in that case we must have found *τέχνην τινά*. Neither is *δεῖν* understood after *ἀποτελεῖν*, for we have here a scientific description of *ἀρετή*, not a mere moral maxim. Otherwise it would be better at once to replace *δεῖν* in the text, from which it might easily have dropped, 'absorbed' by the foregoing ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΝ. But if any alteration were needed, I should prefer changing *εἶναι* for the oblique *εἴη*. In an ethical point of view the passage is noteworthy, as it presents in harmony two theories which are generally contrasted, the psychological and the utilitarian. Our actions are to be determined by a consideration of their consequences, but of these consequences those which affect the moral nature of ourselves or others are mainly to be kept in view. Observe also that development is to accompany restraint; the statesman is not only to curb the evil passions of the citizens, but also to foster their nobler impulses, such as the desire of knowledge, beauty, &c. This is the true statecraft; and tried by this standard Themistocles and his compeers are found wanting. They had not the skill to determine what desires were legitimate and what not, nor how to further the one and restrain the other: in a word, they were not *τεχνικοὶ τούτων πέρι*. This is the force of *τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα* in the next clause: we need not understand the question as an insinuation against the private characters, which were very various, of the great men enumerated. **25** *οὐτωσὶν ἀτρέμα*] The majority of codd. give *οὐτωσὶ ἀτρέμα*. So also Bekk. here and in p. 509 A, 510 B. But the *ν ἐφελκ.* is legitimate in

οὐτοσὶν ἐκεινοσίν and their cases ending in s. See the reff. to the Greek Grammarians in Steph. Lex. iii. p. 408 D, ed. Dind., comparing ibid. v. pp. 2432, 2435. The idiom οὐτωσὶν ἀτρέμα has been illustrated in the note to 494 E. Here tr. 'quite at our ease.' **26** ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων] A true political rhetoric, it is urged, must follow the analogy of other arts. It must have a definite object, and select its means and instruments intelligently and with an eye to that object. The craftsman, whether painter, architect, or shipwright, seeks to fashion his materials according to a particular type or form; and his work is done when he has so marshalled the parts that they constitute an orderly and consistent whole. In this order, when realized, consists the excellence of the work. In the human body such order or excellence is called health; in the soul it is virtue. But the soul is the matter on which the rhetorical statesman operates: for rhetoric, as defined in the Phaedrus, is a ψυχαγωγία διὰ λόγων, and the art Politic has already been pronounced to be a θεραπεία ψυχῆς, sup. 464 B. It is therefore the business of the ῥήτωρ or statesman (for present purposes the two being identical) to make his hearers sober, just, and generally virtuous; and that not only by direct encouragement, but by the restraints of law. With this entire passage compare Sophist. p. 228.

Page **92**. **29** εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὄνομα] Crat. 385 D, καλεῖν ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα, where see the instances quoted by Heind. More freq. is ἐπί τινι.

Page **93**. **1** ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν] The appliances for producing order in the body are called salutary or "sanitary," and the result of such means and appliances is health, and the general virtue or excellence of the body. So in the soul, right and law are the means, moral virtue the result. κοσμήσεις and τάξεις are here synonymous, and mean 'processes which produce order,' 'arrangements,' 'ordinances.' **8** ταῦτα δ' ἔστι] Not τὸ νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, which are causes, but τὸ νόμιμον καὶ κόσμιον γεγονέναι, the result of law and regular government, is the same thing as temperance and justice. **14** δῶρον ἐάν τι διδῷ] This may have special reference to the well-known liberality of Cimon: or perhaps to the theoric allowances made to the Athenian demus by Pericles, who might very fairly have argued that the Athenians were, or ought to have been, made better by listening to the plays of Sophocles and his brother-tragedians. **22** Τί γὰρ ὄφελος] *The meaning seems* to be: 'What is the use of administering to a

diseased body a variety of dishes, or the most delicious of drinks or other compounds, when these will frequently be of no more service to it than abstinence and mortification (*τούναντίον πολλῶν σιτίων κ.τ.λ.*), nay, rightly considered, will do it even less good than abstinence?' But there remains a seeming asyndeton in the last clause, which Heind. proposes to remove by reading *ἤ κατά γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον καὶ ἔλαττον*: but Stallb. is possibly right in defending the received text by the analogy of such phrases as *ὀλίγον καὶ οὐδέν*.

Page 94. 14 *Οὐκοῦν τὸ εἴργειν*] The order is, *οὐκοῦν τὸ εἴργειν ἀφ' ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν ἐστίν;* 'to restrain a man from gratifying his appetites is to chasten him, is it not?' The seeming play upon the words *κολάζεσθαι* and *ἀκολασία* in the next question may be represented in English by 'chastisement' and 'unchasteness,' though the latter word denotes only one form of *ἀκολασία*. Punishment is treated by Plato as either exemplary or corrective, never as simply retributive, a view which he distinctly deprecates. See Legg. 934 A, *οὐχ ἕνεκα τοῦ κακουργῆσαι (διδότω) τὴν δίκην, οὐ γὰρ τὸ γεγονὸς ἀγένητον ἔσται ποτέ, τοῦ δ' εἰς τὸν αὖθις ἕνεκα χρόνον ἢ τὸ παράπαν μισῆσαι τὴν ἀδικίαν αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἰδόντας αὐτὸν δικαιούμενον, ἢ λωφῆσαι μέρη πολλὰ τῆς τοιαύτης ξυμφορᾶς.* Comp. ibid. p. 854 B, and see note inf. p. 525 A. **21** *Οὗτος ἀνήρ*] "Behold a man who cannot bear to be improved, or to submit in his own person to that 'chastisement' which is the subject of our conversation." See above, 489 B, *οὑτοσὶν ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν.* **26** *μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν*] 'Do we break off,' or 'are we to break off the discussion?' Some MSS. have *καταλύωμεν*, but the pres. indic. is idiomatic, as in such phrases as *τί; πῶς λέγομεν;* Sup. 504, *ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν;* inf. 513 C, *λέγομέν τι πρὸς ταῦτα;* **28** *Αὐτὸς γνώσει*] 'You will judge for yourself,' i.e. 'that is your affair, not mine.' So Phileb. 12 A, *ἐμοὶ μὲν πάντως νικᾶν ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει, σὺ δ', ὦ Πρώταρχε, αὐτὸς γνώσει.* Olymp., *εἴ τι θέλεις ποίει, ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ μέλει.* **29** *Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους*] 'Nay, they tell us we ought not to leave even tales half told, but ought first to fit them with a head, that our story may not walk abroad headless.' *ἀκέφαλος μῦθος*, a story 'without head or tail,' is a proverbial expression. So in the Laws, 752 A, quoted by Routh, *οὔκουν δή που λέγων γε ἂν μῦθον ἀκέφαλον ἐκὼν καταλίποιμι· πλανώμενος γὰρ ἂν ἁπάντη τοιοῦτος ὢν ἄμορφος φαίνοιτο.* Compare Phaedr. 264, *δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῷον συνεστάναι...ὥστε μήτ' ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν κ.τ.λ.* Phileb. 66 D, *οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν*

ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις. μεταξὺ—καταλείπειν] Isocr. varies the phrase, Panath. § 27, ἀμελήσαντι τούτων καὶ μεταξὺ καταβαλόντι.

Page 95. **9** τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου] We have the line in full, Athen. vii. 308 C, ἐγὼ δὲ|κατὰ τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπίχαρμον| μηδὲν ἀποκρινα-μένου τοῦ κυνός, Τὰ πρὸ τοῦ δύ' ἄνδρες ἔλεγον εἰς ἐγὼν ἀποχρέω— where it may be well to mention that κύων is not a quadruped brought on the stage by Epicharmus, but the Cynic Cynulcus, who is one of Athenaeus' Deipnosophists. Of the original purport of the line the account given by the Schol. is palpably an improvisation. The comedies attributed to Epicharmus contained philosophical dialogues, specimens of which have been preserved to us; and the line in question was possibly the first of a soliloquy immediately succeeding one of such discussions. The change of ἀποχρέω into an Attic equivalent is agreeable to Plato's frequent practice, as remarked on supra, 485 E. **20** ἄν τι φαίνηται] If there be anything in the objections of his opponent, says Socr., he will be the first to concede the point in dispute. For, as he has already informed the company, he is one of those τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, p. 458. **31** τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος] 'The speech of Zethus' is of course the plea for public and active as distinguished from the contemplative life—ὁ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ βίος, sup. 485 E. Socr. has already in some measure answered the arguments of Callicles, but his answer is not yet complete. He has still much to explain: in particular the causes which make it impossible for a righteous man to take part in the administration of an unrighteous polity, such as he considers the Athenian to be. Here ἀπέδωκα has its proper sense of paying a debt; giving an equivalent for value received. Presently ἥτις ἑκάστῳ ἀποδέδοται = 'which is the due of each,' in other words that which is appropriate, or suitable to the nature of any given subject.

Page 96. **3** οὐκ ἀχθέσομαι] The MSS., followed by all the edd. except Hirschig, give the form ἀχθεσθήσομαι, which is elsewhere substituted by copyists for the Attic ἀχθέσομαι. So in Rep. X. 603 E, where ἀχθέσομαι is now universally adopted. **17** Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἥ γε ἀρετή] This passage, most important as determining the scope of the entire dialogue, has already been illustrated in the Introduction, p. xx. Those who delight in parallelisms of ancient and modern authors, will do well to compare Bp Butler's justly celebrated Preface to his Sermons. The "ground-idea" of *his ethical system* will be seen to be rather Platonic than, as he

himself supposed, Stoical. The 'conformity to nature' of the Stoics, though he borrows the phrase, was something different from Butler's. **19** *οὐχ οὕτως εἰκῇ*] 'not by mere haphazard.' So Alc. ii. 143 B, *οὕτως εἰκῇ ψέγειν*. Ib. D. The Zürich reading *οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ*, founded on some MSS., is also admissible. Phileb. 28 D, *τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῇ δύναμιν*. Tim. 34 C, *μετέχοντες τοῦ προστυχόντος καὶ εἰκῇ*. One cod. has *οὕτοι*, and so the 2nd Zür. ed. But *οὕτως* is preserved in the Bodl., which however, with others, omits *οὐχ*. The following *κάλλιστα* is bracketed by Hirschig, but is certainly no interpolation. For, to say nothing of the possibility of the body's attaining health by the operation of natural causes, Plato in many passages admits the idea of a spontaneous virtue in the soul bearing the same relation to the conscious virtue of the philosopher as in the region of the intellect subsists between *ὀρθὴ δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη*. Thus in the Phaedo he speaks of *οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν τε καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελετῆς γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ*, 82 A. The distinction is also brought out in the Laws, i. p. 642 C, where he allows the existence of a natural goodness, produced *αὐτοφυῶς θείᾳ μοίρᾳ*. Compare also a remarkable passage in the Meno, 99 B—D. The qualification is therefore introduced purposely, though for obvious reasons not dwelt on. **23** *Κόσμος—ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων*] This idea is worked out with greater completeness in the Philebus, where the absolute good is found to reside *περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον*, and to manifest itself in *τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ τέλεον καὶ ἱκανόν*, p. 66 A. **29** *Ἡ ἄρα σώφρων ψυχὴ ἀγαθή*] This passage, taken together with the context, clearly identifies *σωφροσύνη* with *ἡ σύμπασα ἀρετή*. 'Temperance' is that capital virtue which includes all others, as courage, justice, and piety. It is, in a word, the right state of the soul, in which all the parts of our complex nature are kept in due subordination, and so organized as to form a harmonious whole. This pre-eminence, as is well known, is in the Republic assigned to *δικαιοσύνη*, the sister virtue; Sophrosyne being there relegated to a subordinate province in the moral economy. But if this theory is less mature than that in the Republic, it is an advance upon the speculations pursued in the Charmides, where Socr. is made to arrive at the merely negative conclusion that *σωφροσύνη* is *not* a mode of *ἐπιστήμη*. This has been taken to prove that when he wrote the Charmides Plato was dissatisfied with the Socratic definitions of

the virtues, and was feeling his way to some more satisfactory theory: a state of mind of which, in my opinion, there are indications in the Protagoras, at the end of which dialogue Socrates stands self-convicted of inconsistency.

Page 97. 1 *εἰ ἡ σώφρων ἀγαθή*] 'If the temperate soul is (eo nomine) good, the soul which is in a condition directly opposed to temperance is evil. But this, as we have seen, is none other than the insensate and dissolute soul.' We cannot in Eng. give the antithesis between *σώφρων* and *ἄφρων*, which even in Greek is a false one, for the true antitheta are *ἄφρων* and *ἔμφρων*. The force of the imp. *ἦν* is nearly the same as in the familiar formula *τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα*, but it retains more of its past signification. In later writers the past sense seems to disappear, and *ἦν* is used for *ἐστί* in general propositions. Hence we may explain the Aristotelian formula *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*. 3 *Καὶ μὴν ὅ γε σώφρων*] This introduces an idea quite foreign to our notion of 'temperance.' The *σώφρων*, the man of orderly well-regulated mind, will not be content with abstaining from evil: he will be inclined to the performance of all positive duties both towards men and towards gods. *σωφροσύνη* is thus seen to include conscientiousness, an idea which associates itself much more naturally with *δικαιοσύνη*. The theory of Duties, it may be observed, which fills so large a proportion of our modern treatises, is very slightly touched by Plato and Aristotle. The scholion of Olympiodorus on this passage, though evidently much blundered by the student who took it down, is curious and worth quoting: *ὁ σώφρων καὶ δίκαιός ἐστι καὶ ἀνδρεῖος· ὁ γὰρ ὑποτάττων τὰ χείρονα τοῖς κρείττοσι καὶ μὴ ἑῶν ἡττᾶσθαι τὸν λόγον ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ* (read *τῆς ἐπιθυμίας*, coll. Rep. iv. 430 E), *οὗτος ἀνδρεῖός ἐστιν. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ἔχει καὶ τὸ ὅσιον, θεῷ γὰρ ἀρέσκει ὁ τοιοῦτος.* "Thus," he continues, "the different virtues are concurrent (*συντρέχουσιν ἀλλήλαις*), and we are enabled to solve the well-known *ἀπορία* with regard to divine providence: viz. that if virtue is sufficient for happiness (for *αὐτάρκης ἡ εὐδαιμονία πρὸς ἀρετήν* read *αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν*), virtuous people ought not to offer prayers and supplications to heaven, but rather to acquiesce in their lot. To this we reply, that the *σώφρων*, as before remarked, desires to acquaint himself with the higher powers and to give them pre-eminence: for this is a duty of piety, and hence we are bound to pray. For prayer is a sign that we know the higher powers and invoke their aid. So that *prayer*, through its being pious, is included even in the list of

moral virtues." ὁσιότης, it will be remembered, is added by Protagoras to the received list of cardinal virtues, Protag. p. 329 c. **8** οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοίη] 'He would not deserve to be called temperate if he did what he had no business to do.' This is, to say the least, a very popular kind of reasoning, and scarcely equal to sustain the conclusion that the σώφρων, *qua* σώφρων, will perform all his duties—all the things that concern him. If Socr. had said μὴ τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων, the syllogism would have been good, though the premiss might seem doubtful. But the parallelism between the σώφρ. of this passage and the δίκαιος of the Republic is kept up. For the δίκαιος also is one ὃς τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττει, Rep. p. 433 B. In the immediate sequel all the special virtues are subordinated to σωφροσύνη, as in the Rep. to δικαιοσύνη. Plato must have felt that none of the popular terms were quite adequate to express his own more comprehensive idea of Virtue as a state or constitution of the inner man. For it must be owned that some of the functions of δικαιοσύνη, as described in the larger dialogue, are more appropriate to the sister virtue; and the truth may be that in each case he has selected the one which best served his immediate purpose. This union of εὐχέρεια in the use of terms with elaborate clearness in the elucidation of ideas is characteristic of the author. See Theaet. 184 B, τὸ δ' εὐχερὲς τῶν ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτου ἐναντίον ἀνελεύθερον. There is a palpable sneer at Plato in Isocrates, Encom. Helenae init., as one who καταγεγήρακε διεξιὼν ὡς ἀνδρία καὶ σοφία καὶ δικαιοσύνη ταὐτόν ἐστι, καὶ...μία ἐπιστήμη καθ' ἁπάντων ἐστίν. **11** οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώφρονος—φεύγειν ἃ μὴ προσήκει] Hence the δειλός is one ὃς τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα φεύγει τε καὶ διώκει. The old Socratic definition would rather be, ὃς οὐκ οἶδεν οὔθ' ἃ διωκτέον ἐστὶν οὔθ' ἃ φευκτέον. Plato's includes both the knowledge and the disposition (the ἦθος as well as the ἐπιστήμη), and is therefore more true to nature. **19** τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριον] This, which seems a sophism founded on the double sense of εὖ πράττειν, is in fact a cherished paradox. It was a point of honour with the Platonists to preface their letters with the salutation εὖ πράττειν instead of the more usual χαίρειν. Ep. iii. init., Πλάτων Διονυσίῳ χαίρειν ἐπιστείλας ἆρ' ὀρθῶς ἂν τυγχάνοιμι τῆς βελτίστης προσρήσεως; ἢ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν συνήθειαν γράφων εὖ πράττειν, κ.τ.λ. Comp. Charm. p. 172 A, ὀρθότητος δὲ ἡγουμένης ἐν πάσῃ πράξει ἀναγκαίων καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν τοὺς οὕτω διακειμένους, τοὺς δ

εὖ πράττοντας εὐδαίμονας εἶναι. So Alc. i. 116 B, ὅστις καλῶς πράττει οὐχὶ καὶ εὖ πράττει; We find a similar ambiguity in Arist. Eth. N. vi. 2. 5. **31** οὗτος ἔμοιγε] 'This, as I think, is the mark on which we should fix our gaze through life; to that we should bend all our powers and all the powers of the state, and so act that Justice and Temperance shall be our portion, as they must be if we would be truly blest.' The οὕτω πράττειν is illustrated by Phaedr. 253 B, ἀλλ' εἰς ὁμοιότητα αὐτοῖς καὶ τῷ θεῷ ὃν ἂν τιμῶσι, πᾶσαν πάντως ὅ τι μάλιστα πειρώμενοι ἄγειν οὕτω ποιοῦσιν (equiv. to οὕτω ποιοῦσιν ὥστε ἄγειν). Phaedo 67 E, γελοῖον ἂν εἴη ἄνδρα παρασκευάζονθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὄντα τοῦ τεθνάναι οὕτω ζῆν (=οὕτω ζῆν ὥστε εἶναι). Presently ἀνήνυτον κακόν (an evil of which there is no end—a sort of 'vicious circle') is intended to recall the simile of the Danaids with their sieve, p. 493. Ast quotes Legg. iv. 714 A, ψυχὴν ἔχουσα ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀρεγομένην καὶ πληροῦσθαι τούτων δεομένην, στέγουσαν δὲ οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἀνηνύτῳ καὶ ἀπλήστῳ κακῷ...ξυνεχομένην. The 'brigand's life' is explained in the immediate sequel as that of one who by his excesses cuts himself off from communion with gods and men, as an outlaw does. Olymp., λῃστοῦ δὲ βίον ζῇ ἐπειδὴ...τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐρᾷ· ἐπέρχεται οὖν καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ χρήμασι, λάθρα δὲ ταῦτα ποιεῖ ὥσπερ λῃστής.

Page 98. **8** οἱ σοφοί] According to Olymp. the Pythagoreans, and Empedocles, who said τὴν φιλίαν ἐνοῦν τὸν σφαῖρον. Comp. Emped. v. 94, Karst., Ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα, Ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ δίχ' ἕκαστα φορεύμενα νείκεος ἔχθει, with ibid. v. 59, Οὕτως ἁρμονίης πυκινῷ κρύφῳ ἑστήρικται Σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς μονίῃ περιηγέϊ γαίων. In the semi-Pythagorean system of Empedocles, Φιλία, φιλότης, Ἀφροδίτη represented the conservative principle of the universe (τὸ ὅλον, σφαῖρος), as Νεῖκος stood for the principle of change and dissolution. See Cic. de Amic. vii. The Pythagoreans, according to ancient tradition, first called the universe Κόσμος, and the word in that sense occurs in a frag. attributed to Philolaus ap. Stob. Ecl. Phys. p. 420, ἧς ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἐξ αἰῶνος. **15** ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρική] This 'geometric,' as distinguished from mere arithmetical equality ($\alpha=\beta$), is what we call Equality of Ratio or Proportion ($\alpha : \beta :: \gamma : \delta$). Aristotle, in a well-known passage of the Nic. Ethics, defines "distributive justice" as the rendering to each citizen according to his merits, adding, ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι...καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί, ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ συμβαίνει

καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἑκάτερον, B. v. 3. 8. So Olymp., ἰστέον ὅτι τρεῖς εἰσιν ἰσότητες, γεωμετρική, ἀριθμητική, ἁρμονική. καὶ ἡ μὲν γεωμετρικὴ ἰσότης ἐστίν, ὅταν ἀναλογία φυλάττηται...ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν γεωμετρία πρὸς διανομὰς συμβάλλεται...καὶ γὰρ στρατηγὸς λάφυρα διανέμων στρατιώταις οὐ πᾶσι τὸ αὐτὸ παρέχει ...καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς γοῦν φησιν· Ἔσθλὰ μὲν ἐσθλὸς ἔδυνε, χέρηα δὲ χείρονι δόσκεν (Il. xiv. 382). The idea is fully developed in the Laws, p. 757, where the legislator is taught to distinguish between simple and proportional equality, and to enforce the latter—τὴν δ' ἀληθεστάτην καὶ ἀρίστην ἰσότητα οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον παντὶ ἰδεῖν. Διὸς γὰρ δὴ κρίσις ἐστὶν—τῷ μὲν γὰρ μείζονι πλείω τῷ δὲ ἐλάττονι σμικρότερα νέμει...ἔστι γὰρ δή που καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἡμῖν ἀεὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον. Following this rule, Lycurgus, according to Plutarch, "expelled from Lacedaemon arithmetical equality, holding it to be democratic and levelling in principle, and introduced the geometric, as best suited to a temperate oligarchy and monarchy." Mor. p. 719 B. **27** τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι] Among the impugners of this splendid paradox is Aristides Rhet., whose spirited but wordy tirade is to be found, T. iii. p. 103, ed. Cant. In his Epist. ad Capitonem (ibid. p. 533) he produces with great glee a passage from the Laws (829 A) which he conceives to be inconsistent with the doctrine laid down in the Gorgias. **28** καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα] This passage is quoted with approbation by Quintilian, ii. 15. 28.

Page **99**. **1** ἃ σὺ ἐμοὶ ὀνειδίζεις] He refers to the warning of Callicles, p. 486. Presently, in εἰμὶ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτιμοι τοῦ ἐθέλοντος, Hirsch. brackets τοῦ ἐθέλοντος as an interpolation. But the pleonasm is surely not unexampled. The two phrases mean of course the same thing—I am at the mercy, or in the power, of any one who chooses to molest me, just as an outlaw is at the mercy of the first comer—τοὐπιόντος. Heind. quotes Legg. iv. 707 E, πότερον ἐξ ἁπάσης Κρήτης ὁ ἐθέλων...οὐ γάρ που τὸν βουλόμενόν γε Ἑλλήνων συνάγετε: and Stallb. a passage from Xen. Anab. i. 4, ὅπως μήποτε ἔτι ἔσται ἐπὶ τῷ ἀδελφῷ. Add Rep. v. 460 A, τὸ πλῆθος τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι ποιήσομεν. **6** τὸ νεανικὸν δὴ τοῦτο] 'To quote that spirited phrase of yours.' Callicles had apologized for the roughness of the expression: εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον εἰρῆσθαι, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντά σε κ.τ.λ., p. 486 C, where see the note. Socr. softens down the ἀγροικον of Callicles into νεανικόν, 'bold,' 'smart.' In apologizing for the vigour of his own language, he presently adopts the stronger epithet ἀγροικότερον, inf. 509 A. νεανικόν is one of those epithets

which may imply either praise or censure; and on that account commends itself to an εἴρων such as Socr. was. **20** ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω] 'These statements, which were before shown in the course of our past discussion to be as I say, are, however uncouth the expression may sound (however harsh the metaphor), held firmly and tied fast by a chain of argument strong as iron or as adamant.' The expression ἄνω ἐκεῖ could not have been introduced by way of gloss upon the more usual ἐν τοῖς πρόσθε λόγοις, as Hirsch., who brackets them, would seem to imagine. The conclusion Socr. has just drawn (ἐνθάδε) had been shown ἐκεῖ, in another place, farther back in the discussion, to follow from the premisses. It is conceivable that ἐν τ. πρ. λ. may have been added as a marginal explanation of ἄνω ἐκεῖ, as ἔμπροσθεν occasionally appears after νῦν δή when it is not wanted: but on this I do not insist, as the redundancy is not without its rhetorical effect in the present instance. πρόσθε for the vulg. πρόσθεν occurs in the Bodl., and is retained by Bekk. and Hirsch., though condemned as un-Attic by Lobeck, Phryn. p. 284. The constant occurrence of πρόσθε in the comic poets, in places where the metre forbids πρόσθεν, makes it unlikely that it would grate on Athenian ears when occurring in prose. **23** ὡς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν οὑτωσίν] 'as would seem, at any rate on a *primâ facie* view': that is, unless proved to be otherwise.

Page 100. **4** πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ταύτην] 'It cannot fail but that this is the power it is most shameful to be without—the power of rendering aid' &c. ταύτην ἐ. τὴν αἰσχίσ. βοήθ. is put by 'attraction' for τοῦτο εἶναι αἴσχιστον, μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν. Properly it is not the βοήθεια but its absence which is disgraceful—ἡ αἰσχίστη ἀδυναμία τοῦ βοηθεῖν, as Heind. puts it. The most disgraceful form of helplessness is, not to be able, after wrong done, to render oneself up to justice: the second, not to be able to preserve oneself from doing wrong: the third, to be unable to defend self or friends from wrong done by others. This paradox of course must rest on the principle that punishment, and nothing besides punishment, has a medicinal effect upon the offender: which being granted, it follows that it is, if possible, worse for a man to 'continue in sin' by escaping punishment, than to sin in the first instance; and that if worse, it is more disgraceful. The fallacy seems to lie in the assumption that a man has no other means of purifying his soul from the taint of wickedness than that implied in the words διδόναι δίκην. For though διδόναι δίκην might admit

the milder meaning of 'making amends' to the person injured, that is not Plato's meaning here. Again, it can by no means be conceded that the shame of not performing an act of heroic virtue is proportional to the glory of performing it, as the sequel would seem to imply. Shame and glory are rather in inverse than direct proportion in such cases: for it is never glorious to perform an act which it is very disgraceful to omit. No one, for instance, ever thought himself a hero for supporting his wife and family, or again, for abstaining from murder or theft. Nor does any stain rest on the Roman name, because Curtius alone dared to leap into the gulf. But the words *κακόν* and *ἀγαθόν*, as used in this argument, referred to the effect of a man's conduct on his spiritual nature, and this is a matter to which the consideration of judicial penalties is in reality irrelevant. Plato's reasoning involves the principle of punishment 'pro salute animae,' which he avows in more places than one, but nowhere perhaps so distinctly as in the Laws, viii. 862 D, E. The 'medicinal' nature of punishment is recognized also by Arist. Eth. N. ii. 3. 4, (*αἱ κολάσεις*) *ἰατρεῖαί τινές εἰσιν.* **15** *τί οὖν ἂν παρασκευασάμενος*] A new question is here started: wrong-doing and wrong-suffering being evils, and wrong-doing a greater evil than wrong-suffering, how is a man to procure himself the advantage of exemption from either? As regards the former it is argued that, inasmuch as no man does wrong willingly, his wrong-doing must be due to want of power, not to want of will to avoid it. He must therefore procure this power or art by instruction and exercise—by such discipline, we may suppose, as we find prescribed in the Republic. But to avoid suffering wrong there are but two methods possible: either a man must make himself absolute ruler in the state, or else he must make friends with those in power (inf. 510): and that can only be done by making himself like them (ibid. E). He who succeeds in doing this is safe; he who refuses is in jeopardy every hour. **30** *μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν*] Olymp., *ἐνταῦθα ἀναφαίνεται Πλατωνικὸν δόγμα, τὸ λέγον ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα ἀκούσιά ἐστιν...καὶ ἔστι παράδοξον.* The *ἀπορίαι* suggested by this paradox are discussed at length Legg. ix. 861 sqq.

Page 101. 2 *διαπεράνῃ*] The Bodl. and one other have *διαπερανῇ*. Edd. *διαπερανῃς*. The middle aor. is sufficiently common, and here, perhaps, better than the active. **3** *Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο—ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσομεν*] Codd. *ἀδικήσωμεν*, corr. Heind. The correction was indispensable. Such verbs as *ὁρᾶν, σκοπεῖν*,

παρασκευάζειν, μηχανᾶσθαι, &c., are followed by ὅπως with the fut., not with the conj. The reason is obvious: ὅπως in such a context retains its original sense 'quomodo.' So inf. D, παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὅ τι μάλιστα ὅμοιος ἔσται ἐκείνῳ. 513 A, ὅρα...ὅπως μὴ πεισόμεθα, where the codd. give the solecistic form πεισώμεθα (for πάθωμεν). **17** οἱ παλαιοί τε καὶ σοφοί] So in the Lysis this trite proverb is said to be found "in the writings of the very wise," who it would seem are οἱ περὶ Ὅμηρον. Od. xvii. 218, ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον. Aristotle gives a list of proverbs with this meaning. Rhet. i. 11. 25, ὡς ἡλιξ ἡλικα τέρπει, καὶ ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον, καὶ ἔγνω δὲ θὴρ θῆρα, καὶ ἀεὶ κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιόν. But 'birds' of this 'feather' are heard in all languages. **20** Οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννος] These words have been supposed to contain a covert allusion to a passage in Plato's private history; his sojourn at the court of Dionysius I., and its disastrous termination. If this is so, this dialogue must have been composed after B.C. 388. But the epithet ἀπαίδευτος is hardly applicable to a man of such literary accomplishments as the elder Dionysius, who is moreover credited with σοφία by Plato himself, and contrasted in that respect with his successor, Ep. vii. 332 C, D. And in any case the supposition is gratuitous: for Plato had enjoyed ample opportunities of acquainting himself with the characteristics of the τύραννος even before he left Athens. See the same Epistle, p. 324 D. **22** καὶ τούτῳ ἐξ ἀ.] 'And to him, the tyrant, he, the virtuous man, could never in his heart of hearts be a friend.' That there is this change of subject in the sentence appears from the next ῥῆσις of Socr., where the implied predicate to οὗτος is οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο φ. γεν. Parallel instances are accumulated by Heind. and Stallb., the latter referring to Liv. i. 50, "Ne id quidem ab Turno tulisse tacitum ferunt [sc. Tarquinium]; dixisse enim [h.e. Turnum] Nullam breviorem esse cognitionem" &c., where the student will find the notes in Drakenborch's ed. worth attention. In Greek a good instance is that in Rep. ii. p. 359 E, τούτου δὲ γενομένου ἀφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι (sc. τὸν Γύγην) τοῖς παρακαθημένοις, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς περὶ οἰχομένου (sc. τοὺς παρακαθημένους). **28** ὡς πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσειεν] As σπουδή denotes warmth, earnestness, σπουδάζειν πρός τινα (comp. Lat. 'studere alicui') signifies esteem, affection, or attachment. In Rep. iii. 403 C, we find πρὸς ὃν τις σπουδάζοι said of the attachment of an ἐραστής. The tyrant *might amuse* himself in the society of a man worse than

himself, but could never feel for him the esteem and affection due to a friend.

Page 102. **1** *οὗτος μέγα—τοῦτον οὐδείς*] So Persius, Sat. ii. 37, "*Hunc* optent generum rex et regina, puellae *Hunc* rapiant, quicquid calcaverit *hic* rosa fiat." Comp. the double *ἐκεῖνος* in Eur. Bacch. 243, *ἐκεῖνος εἶναί φησι Διόνυσον θεόν, Ἐκεῖνος ἐν μηρῷ ποτ' ἐρράφθαι Διός*, where the repetition implies contempt instead of honour. Presently *ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει* refers not to Athens, but to the *πόλις ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἄρχων κ.τ.λ.* sup. B. **13** *ὡς ὁ ὑμέτερος λόγος*] 'As you and your friends would say.' This refers especially to *μέγα δύνασθαι*, which Socr. himself would of course refuse to predicate of the person described. Sup. 466 B, *ἐλάχιστόν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες*. But the general doctrine that in order to rise in a state it is necessary to share the spirit or *ἦθος* which animates such state was a commonplace both with philosophers and orators. So Demosth. c. Androt. p. 613 (§ 79), *τὸν ὑπὲρ πόλεως πράττοντά τι δεῖ τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἦθος μιμεῖσθαι*. Compare Timocr. p. 753, where the bright side of the Athenian *ἦθος* is exhibited. Isocr. Nicocl. 21 A, *τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης ἦθος ὁμοιοῦται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν*, is the converse of the proposition. **14** *διαπεπράξεται*] 'will have been achieved': i.e. after he has thus schooled himself into sympathy with the ruling powers, he, the aspirant just mentioned, will have attained to the much-coveted power and security from wrong. In the Laws, viii. 829, we read, *τὸ μὲν (μὴ ἀδικεῖν) οὐ πάνυ χαλεπόν, τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι κτήσασθαι δύναμιν παγχάλεπον, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸ τελέως σχεῖν ἄλλως ἢ τελέως γενόμενον ἀγαθόν*. In the sequel of this passage the principle is applied to international relations, in a manner not uninteresting to the citizens of a non-intervening state. **19** *οἷόν τε εἶναι—καὶ ἀδικοῦντα*] The change of case is justified by 492 B, *ἐπεί γε οἷς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρξεν ἢ βασιλέων υἱέσιν εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς τῇ φύσει ἱκανοὺς κ.τ.λ.* Of the MSS., however, one gives *οἷόν τε*, and several *ἀδικοῦντι*. The same variation is found 525 B, *ἢ βελτίονι γίγνεσθαι...ἢ παραδείγματι* (al. *παράδειγμα*) *τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι*. **27** *ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι*] 'or do you need to be told that our imitator will slay your non-imitator, if he have a mind, and will spoil his goods?' *ὁ μιμούμενος* is transitive, though foolishly supposed to be passive by Thomas Mag., in v. *μιμοῦμαι*, as if it referred to *τύραννος*—the person imitated. The imitator will have this power, *ἅτε μέγα δυνάμενος ἐν τῇ πόλει*.

Page 103. **3** Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δή] Germ. Tr. "Ist nun nicht

eben das das Empörende?" "And is not this the very thing that makes one so indignant?" viz. that a *μοχθηρός* should take the life of a *καλὸς κἀγαθός*? This is the sense required in order to give point to Socr.'s reply. The 'irrisio' which Ast and Stallb. discover is out of place here, for Callicles was quite earnest in the warning he addressed to Socr. Comp. 486 B, *κατηγόρου τυχὼν πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ, ἀποθάνοις ἄν, εἰ βούλοιτο θανάτου σοι τιμᾶσθαι.* **5** *ἢ οἴει δεῖν τοῦτο*] Socr. proceeds to show, with an affectation of inductive reasoning, that if forensic rhetoric has the life-preserving power claimed for it, it does not therefore follow that it is a liberal or dignified art. Exaggerated as this may seem, Plato's deliberate convictions pointed this way. Thus in the Laws, his latest work, he says, "The union of soul and body is in no wise a better thing than their dissolution, as I should say, and that with perfect seriousness." And accordingly he enjoins that public honours be paid to Pluto every twelfth month, adding, *καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον πολεμικοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὸν τοιοῦτον θεόν, ἀλλὰ τιμητέον ὡς ὄντα ἀεὶ τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένει ἄριστον*, 828 C, D. **18** *οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς σώζει*] Olymp., *ψυχὰς νῦν καλεῖ τὰς ζωάς.* True, no doubt; but what becomes of the antithesis *ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα*? This refers to the 'bodies' of other members of the passenger's family—*παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας* named presently after. The pilot's art saves not only the lives of passengers, but the persons and chattels belonging to them. **20** *προσεσταλμένη*] Said properly of a close-fitting dress—vestis oppressa corpori—or of skin or other integument which adheres tightly to the body. Galen, *προσστέλλεται τῷ χρωτὶ τὸ δέρμα.* Arist. Hist. An. 9, *θρὶξ προσεσταλμένη.* Hence in its applied sense *προσεστ.*=plain, humble, modest. *συνεσταλμένος* is used in nearly the same manner, as Isocr. p. 280 D, *συνεσταλμένην ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν, ὥσπερ χρὴ τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας.* Opposed to *ὀγκώδης* or *ἐπαχθής.* **21** *οὐ σεμνύνεται ἐσχηματισμένη*] 'She does not plume herself on her performance, making believe that it is some dazzling achievement.' Tim. Gl., *σχηματιζόμενος, προσποιούμενος.* Phaedr. 255 A, *οὐχ ὑπὸ σχηματιζομένου τοῦ ἐρῶντος ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς τοῦτο πεπονθότος.* Ach. Tat. p. 148, *ἀκκίζῃ καὶ σχηματίζῃ πρὸς ἀπόνοιαν.* 'Your mincing and affectation are intolerable.' **24** *δύ' ὀβολούς*] This very modest fare had been greatly increased in Lucian's time. Navig. 15, *ἐς Αἴγιναν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς Ἐνοδίας τελετὴν...πάντες ἅμα οἱ φίλοι τεττάρων ἕκαστος ὀβολῶν διεπλεύσαμεν.* Here, on the contrary, *the two oboli* are paid for the entire party. See Boeckh, Staatsh.

i. p. 166, 2te Ausg. **25** *ἐὰν πάμπολυ ταύτης τῆς μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας*] Supply *πράττηται*, and comp. Eriphus, Com. ap. Athen. 84 B, *τούτων μὲν ὁβολόν, εἰ πολύ, τίθημι*. Also Apol. 26 D, *ἔξεστιν, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς πριαμένοις κ.τ.λ.* The utmost she ever asks for this great service is two drachms, for saving the goodman, his children, his money, and his womankind. *ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι*, 'with unassuming carriage,' without pomp or parade. *σχῆμα*, as Stallb. points out, is not 'vestitus,' but 'habitus'; 'port,' 'bearing,' 'general aspect.' So Soph. Ant. 1169, *καὶ ζῇ τύραννον σχῆμ' ἔχων*. Lucian, Timon, c. 54, *οὗτος ὁ τὸ σχῆμα εὐσταλής, καὶ κόσμιος τὸ βάδισμα, καὶ σωφρονικὸς τὴν ἀναβολήν*.

Page **104**. **3** *λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ*] The negative belongs properly to the second limb of the sentence, *τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστί*. The meditative skipper cannot tolerate the inconsistency of supposing that *if* a man labouring under an incurable bodily disease had better perish at sea and have done with it, one whose soul is a mass of vice and corruption ought to live on, and will be greatly the better for his preserver's exertions. Hirsch. unaccountably brackets *οὐκ*, but Stallb. properly compares 516 E, *οὔκουν οἵ γε ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν ζευγῶν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ θεραπεύσωσι τοὺς ἵππους.....τοτ' ἐκπίπτουσι*. 'We cannot suppose that skilful drivers, who are not thrown out when their team is raw, will be unable to keep their footing when driving well-broken steeds.' In *τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσειεν*, there is apparently a change from direct to oblique, as Tim. 18 C, *μηχανώμενος ὅπως μηδεὶς τὸ γεγενημένον γνώσοιτο, νομιοῦσι δὲ πάντες κ.τ.λ.* Conversely Menex. 240 D, *διδάσκαλοι...γενόμενοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄμαχος εἴη ἡ Περσῶν δύναμις, ἀλλὰ πᾶν πλῆθος...ἀρετῇ ὑπείκει*. So Stallb., but he translates *ὀνήσειεν* as if it were potential, 'juvari posse.' In which case we must read *ὀνήσειεν ἄν*, or *ἂν ὀνήσειεν*, as Heind. suggests. I am not aware of any certain instance in Attic prose of the omission of *ἄν*, where the so-called optative is evidently potential. That quoted in Heind.'s note is not in point, being an ordinary case of oratio obliqua. Rep. 352 C, quoted by Kühner (Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 426, Obs. 1), is equally wide of the mark, for there the *ἄν* is merely not repeated. **18** *μή σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι*] 'You would not think of bringing him, the engineer, down to the level of a mere advocate?' Symp. 211 D, *ὃ* (sc. *αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν*) *ἐάν ποτε ἴδῃς, οὐ κατὰ χρυσίον τε καὶ ἐσθῆτα καὶ τοὺς καλοὺς παῖδας καὶ νεανίσκους δόξει σοι εἶναι*. **22** ἱκανὰς γὰρ

αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος] Germ. Tr. "denn an Gründen würde es ihm nicht fehlen." Better than Stallb.'s "Nam larga ei dicendi copia." λόγος is the theme or argument taken up by the supposed engineer, who will find plenty to say about it. We might say "his theme is a fruitful one." In the previous clause there is an apparent pleonasm, ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίγνεσθαι for ἐπὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι. Tr. 'arguing and preaching up the duty of becoming engineers—no other profession being worth anything.' **24** ὡς ἐν ὀνείδει ἀποκαλέσαις ἄν] The comp. ἀποκαλεῖν generally implies the ὡς ἐν ὀνείδει, as Theaet. 168 D, χαριεντισμὸν ἀποκαλῶν. Demosth. F. L. p. 417, λογογράφους τοίνυν καὶ σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλῶν τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ ὑβρίζειν πειρώμενος, αὐτὸς ἐξελεγχθήσεται τούτοις ὢν ἔνοχος. So in Xenophon, Sophocles, Euripides. But in the spurious Sisyphus we have ἀποκαλοῦσιν εὐβούλους, and it may be observed that in later Greek generally, ἀποκ. is used in a neutral or laudatory, as well as in the vituperative sense, which is the only one noticed by Dr Donaldson, N. Crat. § 184, who accounts in an ingenious manner for the *bad* sense of the compound.

Page **105**. **1** καταγέλαστός σοι ὁ ψόγος] Callicles seems from the context to have been a man of rank. A citizen of the middle class would scarcely have disdained to ally himself with a physician, whatever he might think of a μηχανοποιός. In Greece the medical profession was esteemed 'liberal.' See Bekker's Charicles, p. 281, Transl. **5** μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μέν, τὸ ζῆν ὁπόσον δὴ χρόνον] 'For the question of living a few years more or less is one, I apprehend, which he who is really and not in name only a man, will do well to dismiss from his thoughts.' An objection was taken by Buttmann to the construction μὴ—ἐστί, following μὴ ᾗ. He accordingly proposed καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο μέν, but afterwards recanted. The use of μή interrogative or dubitative with the indic. is recognized by grammarians. Alc. ii. 139 D, ὅρα μὴ οὐχ οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχει. Soph. Trach. 551, ταῦτ' οὖν φοβοῦμαι μὴ πόσις μὲν Ἡρακλῆς Ἐμὸς καλεῖται, τῆς νεωτέρας δ' ἀνήρ. Thuc. iii. 53, νῦν δὲ φοβούμεθα μὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἡμαρτήκαμεν. Isocr. ad Phil. p. 85 E, ἐξεπλάγησαν μὴ διὰ τὸ γῆρας ἐξέστηκα τοῦ φρονεῖν (Bekk. ἐξεστηκὼς ὦ). Theaet. 196 B, ἐνθυμοῦ μή τι τότε γίγνεται ἄλλο, where see Heind. In all these cases μή denotes doubt or misgiving concerning the present rather than fear for the future. Hence the frequent use of μήποτε in Aristotle, where an ἀπορία is suggested. Eth. N. x. 1. 3, Μή ποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. From this the transition to the later meaning 'perhaps' is very easy. For

ὁποσονδή the MSS. give ὁπόσον δέ or δεῖ, the former being retained by the Zürich edd. The emendation εὐκτέον for ἐατέον may be passed over in silence; but C. F. Hermann's ἡ δὺ μὲν τοῦτο τὸ ζῆν, ὁπόσον δὲ χρ. κ.τ.λ., deserves to be mentioned for its curiosity. Stallb.'s μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μέν, τὸ ζῆν· ὁπόσον δὲ χρόνον κ.τ.λ. appears to me very lame. He interprets his text thus: "noli enim putare istud quidem, videlicet ut vivas, honestum atque bonum esse: imo quamdiu (vivat) id eum, qui vere vir sit, curare non oportet," &c. **8** πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξίν] Routh appositely quotes Cic. N. D. i. 20, "Quanti haec philosophia aestimanda est, cui tanquam aniculis et his quidem indoctis fato fieri videntur omnia." τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ='in the next place.' "Adverbii loco adhibetur τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, τὸ ἐπὶ τῷδε velut τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. Apol. 27 B, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἀποκρίναι, ἔσθ' ὅστις etc." Heind. **12** καὶ νῦν δὲ ἆρα δεῖ σέ] 'And whether at the present time it is not your special duty to make yourself as like as possible to the Athenian demus, if you would make friends with it, and acquire great power and influence in the state.' ἆρα='all things considered.' The clause depends on σκεπτέον, as if πότερον had followed with a finite verb, instead of ἆρα with a participle. **15** ὅπως μὴ πεισόμεθα] So Heind. for the solecistic πεισώμεθα of earlier edd. The emendation is confirmed by the Bodl. Before ὅπως, ὅρα is virtually repeated, and the following ἔσται is in apposition with πεισόμεθα. 'See that we do not suffer the supposed fate of those witches of Thessaly who bring or try to bring the moon down from the sky. See, I mean, that the choice of that political power we spoke of, do not cost us all that we hold most dear.' The Comm. quote Virg. Ecl. viii. 69, "Carmina vel caelo possunt deducere Lunam." Arist. Nub. 749, where Strepsiades proposes to purchase a Thessalian hag possessed of these accomplishments, for the purpose of defrauding his creditors—for, as he observes, εἰ μηκέτ' ἀνατέλλοι σελήνη μηδαμοῦ, Οὐκ ἂν ἀποδοίην τοὺς τόκους. Lucan (Phars. vi. 438 sqq.) describes with his usual diffuseness the black arts of the Thessalides. In particular see line 499, "illis et sidera primum Praecipiti deducta polo: Phoebeque serena Non aliter, diris verborum obsessa venenis, Palluit, et nigris terrenisque ignibus arsit, Quam si fraterna prohiberet imagine tellus." The superstition that the exercise of supernatural influence is dearly purchased by the adept has survived to modern times. It is expressed in the Greek proverb (Paroemiogr. ii. p. 417, Leutsch.), ἐπὶ σαυτῷ τὴν σελήνην

καθέλκεις· ἐπὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῖς κακὰ ἐπισπωμένων. αἱ γὰρ τὴν σελήνην καθελκούσαι Θετταλίδες λέγονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τῶν ποδῶν στερίσκεσθαι. For the idiom σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις, comp. Xen. Cyr. iii. 1. 34, σὺν τῷ σῷ ἀγαθῷ τὰς τιμωρίας ποιεῖσθαι. Stallb. quotes Hom. Il. iv. 161, σύν τε μεγάλῳ ἀπέτισαν, Σὺν σφῇσιν κεφαλῇσι, γυναιξί τε καὶ τεκέεσσι. **23** οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ εἶναι] 'It will not do,' says Socr., 'merely to copy the ways, whether of the Athenian Demus, or the Demus of Pyrilampes; you must be radically like them if you would make any real progress in the affections either of the former, or, by heaven, of the latter either.' τούτοις refers to the Athenians: the 'Demus of Pyrilampes' being an after-thought. But it is difficult to render the passage intelligibly without some such prolepsis as that adopted in the translation. **32** Λέγομέν τι] The more usual λέγωμεν is found in five codd. named by Bekk. But the best give λέγομεν, which, as Heind. remarks, is justified by the common formula ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;

Page 106. **2** τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος] An example of this πάθος is found in the admission of Meno, αὐτὸς ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα· τότε μέν μοι δοκοῦσι, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ, Men. 95 C. Compare the well-known passage in Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 11. 24, "dum lego assentior; quum posui librum.....assensio omnis illa elabitur": the 'liber' being the Phaedo of Plato. **5** ἐὰν πολλάκις ἴσως] "In Cod. Reg. a manu recente superscriptum ἴσον." Heind. This seems to have been done on the supposition that ἐὰν πολλάκις was used in the sense 'si forte,' and that ἴσως καὶ βέλτιον ('equally well or better') went together. But it is better with Heind. to regard ἴσως as transposed, as if we had found ἀλλ' ἴσως, ἐὰν πολλάκις καὶ βέλτιον...διασκοπώμεθα, πεισθήσει. For διασκοπώμεθα some codd. have the un-Attic διασκεπτώμεθα. **7** δύο ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευάς] See p. 464 B foll. **21** ἐπιχειρητέον—θεραπεύειν] literally: 'ought we not so to set to work upon the city and its citizens in order to their tendance, as to try to make them as good as they can be made?' Here the inf. θεραπεύειν is epexegetic, as in the passage quoted by Stallb. from Rep. iii. 416, ἐπιχειρῆσαι τοῖς προβάτοις κακουργεῖν. Comp. Phaedr. 242 B, καὶ νῦν αὖ δοκεῖς αἴτιός μοι γεγενῆσθαι λόγῳ τινὶ ῥηθῆναι. **31** πράξοντας] I have given this on the authority of a few codd. The best seem to give πράξαντες. So Bodl.; but according to Gaisford, "o suprascriptum a manu recente." πράξοντας is equiv. to ὡς πράξοντας, as 521 B, κολακεύσοντα ἄρα με παρακαλεῖς. Stallb. defends πράξαντες

because it is equiv. to *ἐπιχειρήσαντες πρᾶξαι*. This I am unable to understand. Buttm. *πράξοντες*. For the genitive *πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων*, comp. Rep. iv. 445 D, *κινήσειεν ἂν τῶν ἀξίων λόγου νόμων τῆς πόλεως*.

Page 107. 12 *πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἴδια ἡμῶν*] "Dictum ut *ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν*," Heind. Bekk., Stallb., and Hirsch. have *ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἡμῶν*, the preposition occurring in but one MS. *ἰδίᾳ*, though better supported, is inappropriate here. It is properly opposed to *δημοσίᾳ*—'in a private' as distinguished from a public or official capacity. But a work done under the eye of a master (*μετὰ διδασκάλων*) may be done *ἰδίᾳ*, though it is not *ἴδιον τοῦ μαθητοῦ*, as an independent performance is. **14** *οὕτω μὲν διακειμένων*] 'If we had fulfilled these conditions, we might with prudence venture on the public works, otherwise it were absurd to attempt them.' After *ἀνόητον ἦν* the *ἄν* is omitted. Soph. Oed. T. 255, *οὐδ' εἰ γὰρ ἦν τὸ πρᾶγμα μὴ θεήλατον, Ἀκάθαρτον ὑμᾶς εἰκὸς ἦν οὕτως ἐᾶν*. With this idiom the Latin coincides: Ovid, Am. i. 6. 34, "Solus eram, si non saevus adesset Amor." Virg. Georg. ii. 132, "Et, si non alium longe jactaret odorem, Laurus erat." See instances from Plato in Ast, Lex. P., p. 136. **23** *δημοσιεύειν*] See the note on p. 455 B. 'Before we set up for state-physicians,' says Socr., 'we ought to have had considerable and successful private practice, otherwise we shall be acting like a potter's apprentice, who should try his unpractised hand on a wine-jar, instead of some smaller and less costly vessel—we shall begin in fact where we ought to have ended.' **29** *ηὑρίσκομεν*] The rare augmented form has been replaced by Bekk., following the Bodl. See L. Dindorf in Steph. Lex. iii. col. 2420, who defends the augment by reference to an inscription dating from the 95th Olymp. Comp. Elmsley on Heracl. 305, and see inf. 515 E.

Page 108. 4 *ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν*] This proverb in effect answers to the adage, "Fiat experimentum in corpore vili," and to the Greek *ἐν τῷ Καρὶ ὁ κίνδυνος*. See Laches 187 B. So taken by most writers. See Paroemiogr. Gr. i. p. 73, Leutsch, where an alternative explanation is cited from Dicaearchus: *τὴν μελέτην ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ποιεῖσθαι, ὡς κυβερνήτης ἐπὶ τῆς νηὸς καὶ ἡνίοχος ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων*. An instance of this application is given in the note l.l. **27** *ὅπως ὅ τι βέλτιστοι οἱ πολῖται ὦμεν*]. 'That we the citizens may be as good as possible': unless the *οἱ* be a careless repetition of the last two letters of *βέλτιστοι*.

Page 109. 14 *Οὐκ ἴσως δή*] So Legg. 965 C, Οὐκ ἴσως ἀλλ'

ὄντως. Bekk. retains δεῖ, the reading of the best MSS., which may perhaps be defended by Theaetet. 184 A, δεῖ δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὧν κυεῖ περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειρᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ μαιευτικῇ τέχνῃ ἀπολῦσαι. But δεῖ and δή are not unfrequently confounded, as Phaedr. 261 A, τούτων δεῖ τῶν λόγων, vulg. τούτων δή. In either case we may translate: "There is no room for a 'perhaps'; it follows necessarily from the premisses," &c. **21** λάλους] In the Ranae of Aristophanes, Euripides claims the credit of having made the Athenians garrulous: Ἔπειτα τουτουσὶ λαλεῖν ἐδίδαξα. Αἰσχ. Φημὶ κἀγώ. How Pericles can have made the Athenians 'cowardly,' it is not easy to understand. Aristides is justly indignant at the imputation, and asks with great force, τί λέγεις; δειλοὺς Περικλῆς, ὦ θεοί, δειλούς; ὃς καὶ δημηγορῶν εὐθὺς ἐνθένδε ἤρξατο, Τῆς μὲν γνώμης, ἔφη, τῆς αὐτῆς, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀεὶ ἔχομαι, μὴ εἶκειν Πελοποννησίοις, ὅ τίς τῶν εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν εἰσάπαξ εἰπεῖν ἐθάρρησεν; De Quatuorv. p. 136, Jebb. εἰς μισθοφορίαν—καταστήσαντα] Pericles introduced the practice of paying dicasts. Arist. Polit. ii. ad fin., τὰ δικαστήρια μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς. It was he also who persuaded the Athenians to pay their soldiers, who had previously served at their own expense (Boeckh, Staatsh. i. 377, 2te Ausg.). The theoricon does not so properly come under the head of μισθοφορία, but Plato may have had it in view when he added ἀργία to the vices which he supposes Pericles to have fostered. **23** Τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγότων] 'You hear this from the men of bruised ears,' i.e. from those who are addicted to pugilistic exercises, a sign of Laconism. Protag. 342 B, ἐξηπατήκασι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι Λακωνίζοντας, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὰ ὦτά τε κατάγνυνται μιμούμενοι αὐτούς, καὶ ἱμάντας περιειλίττονται καὶ φιλογυμναστοῦσι καὶ βραχείας ἀναβολὰς φοροῦσιν, ὡς δὴ τούτοις κρατοῦντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. Theocr. xxii. 45, δεινὸς ἰδεῖν, σκληραῖσι τεθλαγμένος οὐατα πυγμαῖς. The affectation of Laconian manners, ridiculed in the Protag., is however attributed to Socrates himself by Aristoph. Av. 1281, Ἐλακωνομάνουν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι τότε Ἐκόμων, ἐπείνων, ἐῤῥύπων, ἐσωκράτων. Laconism was affected by the oligarchs, whose prejudices Callicles accuses Socr. of having adopted. **26** ηὐδοκίμει] So the Bodl. and Vat. 1. Vulg. εὐδοκίμει. **29** ἐγεγόνεσαν] Found in the Bodl. &c. γεγόνεσαν Bekk., Heind., Stallb., from inferior MSS. But in Symp. 173 B all give παραγεγόνει. **30** κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο] Thucydides mentions only the fine, without specifying the pretext under which it was inflicted, ii. 65, οὐ μέντοι πρότερόν γε οἱ ξύμπαντες ἐπαύσαντο ἐν ὀργῇ

ἔχοντες αὐτὸν πρὶν ἐζημίωσαν χρήμασιν. ὕστερον δὲ αὖθις οὐ πολλῷ, ὅπερ φιλεῖ ὅμιλος ποιεῖν, στρατηγὸν εἵλοντο καὶ πάντα τὰ χρήματα ἐπέτρεψαν. It would have been fairer if Socr. had noticed the change of feeling on the part of his countrymen, and the handsome amends they made to the statesman whom they had injured: fairer also if he had made some allowance for the effect of unexampled calamity in disturbing their judgment. Meanwhile it is clear that Plato disbelieved the charge on which Pericles was condemned, else he would not have brought it forward in proof of the supposed deterioration of the Athenians under his government. I assume that Plato and Thucydides allude to the same charge, though Heind., and with him Stallb., suppose that the κλοπῆς δίκη is that in which Phidias had been implicated before the Peloponnesian war. But it does not appear that Pericles was condemned or even brought to trial on this charge. In fact, the malicious report that he "blew into a flame" the warlike passions of the Athenians, in order that they might be diverted from inquiring into his proceedings (Plut. Per. p. 169 F), coupled with the absence of any testimony as to the fact of the trial or its result, is a proof that it never took place: unless, indeed, we suppose that the old charge was revived on the occasion alluded to by Thucydides. But this we are nowhere told, and it is more probable that the pretext for the latter attack was misappropriation of money entrusted to him in his capacity of strategus (κλοπὴ δημοσία, Legg. 857 B). This supposition is not inconsistent with the narrative of Plutarch, p. 171 D, E, and is even suggested by the emphatic words of Thucydides, στρατηγὸν εἵλοντο καὶ πάντα τὰ χρήματα ἐπέτρεψαν. Lastly, Plato's phrase, ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου, seems of itself to fix the date of the transaction. The words ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἐτίμησαν may be an exaggeration, for they are not confirmed by the historians; but with this possible abatement, there seems no reason to impeach the accuracy of Plato's story. The amount of the fine inflicted was very large: 15 talents according to the lowest, 50 and even 80 according to other estimates. See Grote, H. G. vi. p. 226, note (1). Boeckh, Staatsh. i. p. 506, who supposes that the larger sum represents the damages fixed by the accuser, the smaller those actually recovered.

Page 110. 3 Ὄνων γοῦν ἂν ἐπιμελητής] The same homely comparison is put in the mouth of Socr. by Xenophon, Mem. i. 2. 32, Εἰπέ που ὁ Σωκράτης ὅτι θαυμαστόν οἱ δοκοίη εἶναι, εἴ τις, γενόμενος βοῶν ἀγέλης νομεὺς καὶ τὰς βοῦς ἐλάττους τε καὶ χείρους ποιῶν, μὴ

ὁμολογοίη κακὸς βούκολος εἶναι, ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστότερον, εἴ τις, προστάτης γενόμενος πόλεως, καὶ ποιῶν τοὺς πολίτας ἐλάττους καὶ χείρους, μὴ αἰσχύνεται μηδ' οἴεται κακὸς εἶναι προστάτης τῆς πόλεως. This is said in reference to the administration of the XXX.—After λακτίζοντας several MSS. insert ἑαυτόν, in which there is obviously an error. See later, p. 519 C. Others give αὐτούς, which is more tolerable, and Aristides Rhet. αὐτόν. **22** ἥμεροι ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος] No such words of Homer are extant in our copies. The nearest approach to the sentiment is in the lines quoted by Routh from Od. vi. 120; ix. 175, Ἦ ῥ' οἵγ' ὑβρισταί τε καὶ ἄγριοι, οὐδὲ δίκαιοι, Ἠὲ φιλόξεινοι καί σφιν νόος ἐστὶ θεουδής. **26** εἰς αὐτόν, ὃν ἥκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο] For εἰς ὃν ἥκιστ' ἂν ἐβ. This ellipse Heind. justifies by p. 453 E, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγομεν ὥνπερ νῦν δή. Phaed. 76 D, ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν ᾧπερ καὶ λαμβάνομεν, where however the best MSS. give ἐν ᾧπερ. More to the purpose is Lysias adv. Andoc., p. 255, Reisk., ἔθυσεν ἐπὶ τῶν βωμῶν ὧν οὐκ ἐξῆν αὐτῷ.

Page 111. **6** οὐκ ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτόν] Cimon's ostracism took place B.C. 461. He was recalled at the instance of his rival Pericles, B.C. 456, more than five years before the completion of his term of exile: οὐδέπω πέντε ἐτῶν παρεληλυθότων, as we learn from a fragment of Theopompus. Both his banishment and recall were owing to political causes; and Plato ought to have mentioned the reparation as well as the supposed injury, as Aristides has justly remarked, Quatuorv. p. 158. Comp. Grote, H. G. v. p. 443. **8** Θεμιστοκλέα—φυγῇ προσεζημίωσαν] This statement is quite correct, as the final sentence was passed during the ostracism of Themistocles. Thuc. i. 135, τοῦ δὲ Μηδισμοῦ τοῦ Παυσανίου Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρέσβεις πέμψαντες παρὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ξυνεπητιῶντο καὶ τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα, ὡς εὕρισκον ἐκ τῶν περὶ Παυσανίαν ἐλέγχων, ἠξίουν τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς κολάζεσθαι αὐτόν. οἱ δὲ πεισθέντες (ἔτυχε γὰρ ὠστρακισμένος καὶ ἔχων δίαιταν μὲν ἐν Ἄργει, ἐπιφοιτῶν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Πελοπόννησον) πέμπουσι μετὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἑτοίμων ὄντων ξυνδιώκειν ἄνδρας οἷς ἔρητο ἄγειν ὅπου ἂν περιτύχωσιν. Thucydides adds, c. 138, that he could not be publicly buried in Attica, ὡς ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ φεύγων. With Plato, he omits to mention the heavier penalty of confiscation to which Themistocles as a traitor was subject, Plut. Them. c. 25. The language of Thucydides (ὡς εὕρισκον κ.τ.λ.) does not prove either his belief or disbelief in the truth of the charges alleged by the Lacedaemonians; but the flight of Themistocles and his friendly reception at the Persian court could not fail to convince the Athenian people of his guilt,

and ought to be taken in justification of the second sentence. **10** *τὸν* [*ἐν*] *Μαραθῶνι*] I have bracketed the preposition, not being satisfied of its admissibility. The stereotyped formula is *τὸν Μαραθῶνι*, as may be seen from the following passages of Aristophanes, in some of which *ἐν* is excluded by the metre, while in not one is it required. Arist. Eq. 781, *σὲ γὰρ ὃς Μήδοισι διεξιφίσω περὶ τῆς χώρας Μαραθῶνι*, where the Ravenna Cod. inserts *ἐν* in violation of the metre. Ibid. 1334, *καὶ τοῦ Μαραθῶνι τροπαίου* (al. *τοὐμμαραθῶνι*). Ach. 696, 697. Vesp. 711. Thesm. 806, *πρὸς ἐκείνην τὴν Μαραθῶνι*. And such in the majority of cases is Plato's usage, according to the codd. Comp. Arist. Rh. 1. 1. p. 196, *Μιλτιάδης πρῶτον Μαραθῶνι, καὶ Παυσανίας ὕστερον Πλαταιᾶσι*: whence we see that *Μαραθῶνι* is in effect an adverb of place. On the other hand, no doubt rests on the reading *τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι* in Arist. Eq. 785. And in Isocr. Philipp. p. 112, we find *ἐκ δὲ τῆς Μαραθῶνι μάχης καὶ τῆς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίας*. But we sometimes find *Σαλαμῖνι* alone, as in Menex. 245, *τὰ τρόπαια τά τε Μαραθῶνι καὶ Σαλαμῖνι καὶ Πλαταιαῖς*—though more frequently *ἐν Σ.* or *περὶ Σαλαμῖνα*, where the battle is spoken of. So *ἡ ἐν Ἀρτεμισίῳ*, or *περὶ Ἀρτεμίσιον ναυμαχία*—never *ἡ Ἀρτεμισίῳ*, for an obvious reason. It would therefore be wrong to banish the preposition from all such formulae, as Cobet seems to recommend, Vv. Ll. p. 204. Hirschig has not scrupled in the present instance to cut the knot by proposing to expunge *τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι* as a gloss. But the words have considerable rhetorical force as 'augentia invidiam.' *εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν*] The crime imputed to Miltiades was, that he had deceived and injured the Athenian people by employing the forces entrusted to him in prosecuting a private quarrel. We find from Xen. Hell. i. 7. 20, that there was *ψήφισμα Καννώνου ἰσχυρότατον, ὃ κελεύει, ἐάν τις τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ἀδικῇ, δεδεμένον ἀποδικεῖν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ· καὶ ἐὰν καταγνωσθῇ ἀδικεῖν, ἀποθανόντα ἐς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβληθῆναι*. The psephism of Cannonus was passed, no doubt, later than the time of Miltiades, but it refers to an existing punishment. There is, therefore, no antecedent improbability in the account given by Plato, though confirmed only by the Scholiast on Aristid. Rhet. p. 232, who says, *ἠθέλησαν αὐτὸν κατακρημνίσαι. ὁ δὲ πρύτανις εἰσελθὼν ἐξῃτήσατο αὐτόν*. According to Herod. vi. 136, the charge against Miltiades was capital: (*Ξάνθιππος*) *θανάτου ὑπαγαγὼν ὑπὸ τὸν δῆμον Μιλτιάδεα ἐδίωκε τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀπάτης ἕνεκα*, a statement which by no means excludes the former. The Prytanis mentioned by Plato and the

Schol. was doubtless the Epistates or Chairman for the day, who had the power of refusing to put an objectionable motion to the vote. Herodotus, it is true, gives the people the credit of refusing to allow Miltiades to be punished capitally. But their wishes may have been carried out by the Prytanis in the exercise of his lawful power; and Plato may be guilty of unfairness in imputing to the Athenians at large a sanguinary proposal emanating from a personal enemy of the accused. But more probably he only repeats a tradition of the anti-democratic clique in which he was brought up. The *βάραθρον* is explained as an *ὄρυγμα* (Tim. Lex. in v.), or *χάσμα φρεατῶδες* (Schol. Arist. Plut. 431), into which condemned malefactors, or more probably their bodies after execution, were thrown. The proposal would therefore, in the case of Miltiades, amount to a denial of the rites of sepulture. The Lacedaemonians, as we read in Thucydides i. 135, had designed to throw the dead body of Pausanias into the Caeadas (a pit or chasm corresponding to the *βάραθρον* at Athens), but afterwards relented and gave it burial. The Schol. on Aristides appears however to have thought that the Athenians, but for the Prytanis, would have had the victor of Marathon thrown down the pit alive (*κατακρημνίσαι*), and such may have been the practice in early and barbarous times. We are told by Pausanias, iv. 18. 4, that the Lacedaemonians thus punished their captives taken in one of the Messenian wars, and this sanguinary view of the uses of the barathrum seems to have found favour with scholiasts generally. Comp. Schol. Arist. Plut. 431, *ἐν δὲ τῷ χάσματι τούτῳ ὑπῆρχον ὄγκινοι, οἱ μὲν ἄνω οἱ δὲ κάτω.* So the Schol. Arist. Eccles. 1089, in giving his version of the psephism of Cannonus, alters the words of Xenophon from *ἀποθανόντα εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβληθῆναι* to *εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβληθέντα ἀποθανεῖν.* But from a well-known passage in Plato's Republic (iv. 439 E) it appears to have been the practice to expose the bodies of criminals for some time after their execution. The executioner would afterwards probably throw the remains into the *βάραθρον*, if, as I suppose, that is the same thing with the *ὄρυγμα*, from which the functionary in question derived his euphemistic name of 'the man at the pit' (*ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὀρύγματι*), by which he is known to the orators. The Schol. on Plutus l.l. even states that the original barathrum was filled up by the Athenians in mythical times. This amounts to saying that the punishment of *κατακρήμνισις* had long been obsolete at Athens.

13 *οὔκουν οἵ γε ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι*] The force of the negative in this

sentence is explained in the note to 512 A. **25** *ὥστε εἰ οὗτοι ῥήτορες ἦσαν*] The final cause of the true rhetoric is to make men better, that of the false to gratify their inclinations. But the statesmen in question had not attained either object, and therefore, if rhetors in either sense, they were not masters of their craft. Callicles is unable to evade the dilemma, but says that, bad as they may have been, it will be long ere any of the statesmen of the day accomplish such feats as the worst of the four mentioned. **28** *πολλοῦ γε δεῖ—μή ποτε*] The usual construction of *πολλοῦ δεῖ* is with the infinitive, as the Comm. observe. Plato might have written *οὐ μήποτε ἐργάσηται, πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ*, of which the construction in the text is a kind of abridgment. For *ὃς βούλει*, comp. Cratyl. p. 432, *ἢ ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμός*. **31** *ὡς γε διακόνους εἶναι*] 'Viewed as servants of the state,' says Socr., 'I disparage them no more than you do; on the contrary, they seem to me to have been more serviceable, certainly, than their successors of the present day.' Complaints of the falling off of the public men succeeding Pericles occur in the comic poets, Arist. Eq. 191. Eupolis, *Δῆμοι*, Fr. xiii. and xv. Mein. But Plato probably intended the remark to apply to the times in which he was himself writing, as well as to those in which the dialogue is supposed to take place. The idiom *ὡς εἶναι* is familiar. Herod. ii. 135, *μεγάλα ἐκτήσατο χρήματα, ὡς ἂν εἶναι* Ῥοδῶπιν, i.e. considering she was but a hetaera.

Page 112. **2** *ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν*] 'But then in the art of turning the desires of their countrymen into other channels, instead of giving them free course,—leading them by persuasion or force to measures likely to make them better,—in this the men of old were little superior if at all to our own contemporaries.' Aristides has an ingenious argument to show that the Athenians did gradually improve under the auspices of the Four. *Πῶς, ὦ μακάριε; εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἀληθὴς ὁ σὸς λόγος ὡς Μιλτιάδην γε μικροῦ εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐνέβαλον, πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἤδη φαίνεται, ὁ μὲν Θεμιστοκλῆς ἀγριωτάτους παραλαβὼν ἡμερωτέρους ποιήσας, τὸ γοῦν ἐξοστρακισθῆναι, καὶ πρός γ', εἰ βούλει, φυγῇ ζημιωθῆναι, κέρδος παρ' ἐκείνην τὴν συμφοράν. πάλιν δ' ὁ Κίμων ἐξωστρακίσθη μέν, φυγῇ δὲ οὐ προσεζημιώθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατῆλθε πρὸ τοῦ χρόνου, οὕτως ἔτι πρᾳοτέροις οὗτος ἐχρήσατο. ὁ δ' αὖ Περικλῆς ἔτι τούτου μετριώτερα δυστυχήσας κ.τ.λ.* Quatuorv. p. 284 (367, Dind.). It is obviously quite untrue that Pericles had no skill in bridling the passions of the multitude, and the greatest sacrifice the Athenians ever made was instigated by

Themistocles. In fact of all the four Cimon alone seems to have been open to the imputation of unduly flattering and cajoling the populace. Pericles and Themistocles led quite as much as they followed the tendencies of the public mind. **9** Πρᾶγμα οὖν γελοῖον ποιοῦμεν] Socr. here reminds Callicles that he had assented to premisses of which he rejects the logical conclusion: the premisses being contained in the original dichotomy of θεραπεία and κολακική (464 C, and note), and the assumption that statesmanship as vulgarly practised falls under the psychical branch of the latter. This admission Callicles wilfully forgets, perpetually coming round again to his own point of view, that of common sense and the received opinion. In this passage κολακεία is softened down, or rather generalized, into διακονία—ministration—a somewhat less invidious word, but equally available for Plato's purpose. Comp. inf. 521 A, where διακονεῖν is made equivalent to πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλεῖν, and then to κολακεύειν. **18** ἐὰν δὲ ῥιγῷ] Moeris (corrected by Buttmann), Ῥιγῶν, Ἀττικῶς, ῥιγοῦν κοινῶς. Ῥιγῷ Ἀττικῶς, ῥιγοῖ Ἑλληνικῶς. This precept of the grammarians is frequently but not always confirmed by the codd. Its meaning is that ῥιγόω makes ῥιγῶν instead of ῥιγοῦν in the infin., and ῥιγῷ for ῥιγοῖ in the conj.; the opt. ῥιγῴη being formed after the analogy of other verbs in οω. Comp. Arist. Vesp. 446, ὥστε μὴ ῥιγῶν ἑκάστοτ'. Av. 935, ἀλλά μοι ῥιγῶν δοκεῖς. But the common form ῥιγοῖ occurs in Phaedo 85 A, and ῥιγοῦν in Rep. 440 C. These ought probably to be corrected, as well as Arist. Nub. 442, where the codd. have ῥιγοῦν, Meineke ῥιγῶν. The form in ων is Doric, and analogous to πεινῆν, διψῆν, &c. **24** σκυτόδεψον] Schol. Olymp. p. 171, ἀττικώτερον τὸ σκυλόδεψον, ἐπειδὴ τὰ σκῦλα, ὅ ἐστι τὰ νεκρὰ σώματα καὶ δέρματα, ἐψῶνται (sic). The forms σκυτοδέψης and σκυλοδέψης are more common, but τὸν σκυλόδεψον occurs in Demosth. c. Aristog. p. 781. In the two best MSS. σκυτόδεψον is accented as in the text; all the others, followed by the edd., make the word oxytone. The reasoning in the passage is explained by reference to the earlier portion of the dialogue, 464 seq., in which the θεραπεῖαι of the body and of the soul are classified, and distinguished from the κολακεῖαι which simulate them. But the argument is vitiated by the confusion of arts which minister to utility, such as those of the ὑφάντης or ἔμπορος, with those of which mere sensual indulgence is the object. Statesmanship implies the power of making provision for the physical well-being, as well as for the

mental culture of the people; but this is quite another thing from pandering to licentious appetite, whether mental or corporeal. But Socrates is made to identify *διακονία* with *κολακεία*, wherein he is by no means justified even on his own premisses. It is, besides, very perverse to represent Pericles, who reorganized the Athenian commonwealth, as a mere *διάκονος*, even if we take that word in its least contemptuous sense. He was at any rate a *νομοθέτης* on a large scale, and therefore, from Plato's point of view, a *παιδοτρίβης* or *ἰατρός* of the soul, however bad his therapeutic may have appeared to critics of aristocratic leanings.

Page 113. 14 *Θεαρίων ὁ ἀρτοκόπος*] Athens was famous for the excellence of its bread. Archestratus ap. Athen. p. 112 B, *τὸν δ' εἰς ἀγορὰν ποιεύμενον ἄρτον Αἱ κλειναὶ παρέχουσι βροτοῖς κάλλιστον Ἀθῆναι.* The baker Thearion is mentioned by two comic poets, Antiphanes and Aristophanes. Athen. ib. D, E, *Ἀριστοφάνης ἐν Γηρυτάδῃ καὶ Αἰολοσίκωνι διὰ τούτων Ἥκω Θεαρίωνος ἀρτοπώλιον Λιπὼν ἵν' ἐστὶ κριβάνων ἐδώλια.* So Antiph. in Omphale l.l., *ἄρτους—οὓς δημόται Θεαρίων ἔδειξε*, whence we conclude that Thearion was an Athenian citizen. The form *ἀρτοκόπος* is recognized as more Attic than *ἀρτοποιός*, Lobeck on Phryn. p. 222. *Μίθαικος ὁ τὴν ὀψοποιΐαν συγγεγραφώς*] 'Siculae dapes' were proverbial. Rep. iii. 404 D, *Συρακοσίαν δὲ ὦ φίλε τράπεζαν καὶ Σικελικὴν ποικιλίαν ὄψου...οὐκ αἰνεῖς.* In Epist. vii. 326 B, Plato speaks of the excessive luxury at the court of Dionysius: *βίος Ἰταλιωτικῶν καὶ Συρακοσίων τραπεζῶν πλήρης.* Comp. Athen. p. 25 E, *Σικελικὰς καὶ Συβαριτικὰς καὶ Ἰταλικὰς τραπέζας, ἤδη δὲ καὶ Χίας.* Mithaecus, according to Maximus Tyrius, Diss. vii., was a Syracusan, as great in *ὀψοποιία* as Phidias in sculpture. He was expelled from Sparta, where he had begun to exercise his skill, but welcomed by all other cities that he visited. Possibly his was the first cookery-book. It does not however seem to have survived to the time of Athenaeus, who would not have failed to quote, had he known it. Of Sarambus, as the copies have it, or Sārăbus, as the name ought to be written and pronounced (*Σαραβικῶν κοπίδων συνομώνυμε*, Achaeus ap. Athen. p. 173 E), we learn from another comic poet that he was a Plataean, and his reputation one of the very few things on which that small city could plume itself. Posidippus, Fr. inc. iii., Meineke iv. p. 525. Jul. Poll., vii. 193, explains the business of the *κάπηλος* to have included the mixing of wines for the table: *κάπηλοι οὐ μόνον οἱ μεταβολεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ τὸν οἶνον κεραννύντες· ὅθεν καὶ Σάραβον ὁ Πλάτων*

κάπηλον ὠνόμασεν, ἐπαινῶν αὐτὸν ἐπ' οἰνουργίᾳ (for the vulg. Σαράβωνα). The true form Σάραβος also lurks in a MS. reading of Athen. 112 E, καὶ σάραμβος ὁ κάραβος ὁ κάπηλος: doubtless a duplex lectio—Σάραμβος (ἢ Σάραβος). From the γεγόνασι which follows, we may infer that these three worthies were dead when the Gorgias was written. **19** Ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἠγανάκτεις] 'Now, I dare say you would have been indignant if I had said, Friend, you know nothing of Gymnastic; you tell me of fellows who are mere ministers and caterers to the desires, destitute of all sound and right views concerning them,' i.e. concerning the desires, and their fitness or unfitness to be gratified. Comp. p. 501 B, ἥτις δὲ ἢ βελτίων ἢ χείρων τῶν ἡδονῶν οὔτε σκοπούμεναι οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς ἄλλο ἢ χαρίζεσθαι μόνον. **25** προσαπολοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας σάρκας] These quacks will not only add no new flesh to the bodies they cram and pamper, but will eventually cause them to lose the flesh they had. They may grow fat for a time, but repletion will bring in its train disease and ultimate emaciation, having been effected without regard to sanitary rules.

Page 114. **5** καὶ φασι μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτούς] Comp. Thuc. ii. 65, ἐγένετο ἐπ' ἐκείνου μεγίστη. People pretend that the statesmen of old have made Athens great, not perceiving that she is tumid from disease, and rotten at the core—all in consequence of those men and their measures. They have glutted the city with all the appliances of material prosperity, without teaching her to use them temperately and righteously; and hence, when the disease shall come to a head, blame will be thrown on whoever shall happen to be her advisers, instead of on the true authors of her woe. ἡ καταβολὴ αὕτη is the πλησμονὴ νόσον φέρουσα just mentioned. καταβολή is a medical term for the 'access' of a periodic or intermitting fever, which leaves the patient apparently well in the interval. The metaphor is not uncommon. Thus Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 118, in speaking of the insidious approaches of the Macedonian power, says, ὅτι γε ὥσπερ περίοδος ἢ καταβολὴ πυρετοῦ ἤ τινος ἄλλου κακοῦ καὶ τῷ πάνυ πόρρω δοκοῦντι νῦν ἀφεστάναι προσέρχεται, οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ. Comp. Hipp. Min. 372 E, νυνὶ δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι μοι ὥσπερ καταβολὴ περιελήλυθε.....σὺ οὖν χάρισαι, καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς ἰάσασθαι τὴν ψυχὴν μου. Socrates having said that he was liable to vacillation—to hot and cold fits of opinion—on a certain doubtful question. **15** καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου] This part of the prophecy was fulfilled, for the fall of Athens was very generally attributed to

the rashness of Alcibiades in urging on the Sicilian expedition. The admirers of Pericles might justly complain of his being thus made responsible for a step the most directly opposed to his own policy. Thucyd. l.l. § 6 seq. The present passage seems to imply that Alcibiades was still in Athens. If this is so, and we assume 405 B.C. for the date of the conversation (473 E), Plato is guilty of an anachronism, for Alcibiades left the city for the last time B.C. 407. But he was probably aware of the inconsistency, and indifferent to it. **19** *αἰσθάνομαι—λόγος*] "When the state," says Socr., "deals with any of our public characters as wrong-doers, I hear of their being indignant and loudly lamenting the injustice they are made to suffer: 'So, after all our valuable services to the state, we are perishing unrighteously at her hands'—such is the language they hold." This version shows the force of *ἄρα*, which has its usual inferential sense, though placed somewhat late in the sentence. Of this however there are other examples. Symp. 199 A, *ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἤδη ἄρα τὸν τρόπον τοῦ ἐπαίνου.* Ibid. 177 E, *ταῦτα δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄρα ξυνέφασαν.* "But in this," proceeds Socr., "there is not one word of truth, for there can be no such thing as a ruler of a state perishing unrighteously at the hands of the state he rules. For I fancy the case is much the same with professed politicians as with professed sophists or teachers of wisdom. Such teachers, wise as they are in all other respects, are in one point guilty of gross absurdity: pretending to be teachers of virtue, they not unfrequently accuse their pupils of wrong-doing in withholding their fees," &c. This may be a fair 'argumentum ad hominem' against a sophist who should give out that virtue is capable of being taught, and that he can teach it; in fact, we know that it was a common taunt against such persons. See Isocr. c. Soph. §§ 4, 5, 6. No such boast however was made by Pericles or his successors; and the principle Socrates endeavours to establish is an extravagant paradox, quite unsupported by the analogy he alleges. 'To make men good' may be the final cause of statesmanship, but it is an end which in the nature of things can only be partially accomplished, even under the most favourable circumstances. In practice such professions are usually a cloak of tyranny, as Plato might have learned from the case of his relative Critias. His Sicilian experiences were probably not yet purchased. **21** *ὡς ἀδικουσι σφᾶς*] I agree with Bekker in thinking *αὐτούς* inadmissible. *ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς αὐτούς* would mean 'they, the pupils, are

wronging themselves,' 'ipsi se injuria afficiunt.' The following *τούς* easily explains the origin of the error. See above 506 A; also 520 B, *ὡς πονηρόν ἐστιν εἰς σφᾶς*. A similar error has been corrected in Xen. Hell. iii. 2. 6, *ἐπιστεῖλαι δὲ σφίσιν* [*αὐτοῖς*] *τοὺς ἐφόρους*.

Page 115. 5 *ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ ᾧ οὐκ ἔχουσιν*] In Socratic language, *ἀδικίᾳ οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἀδικοῦσιν*. **7** *Ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν*] Callicles had said, *Ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὤν*. Socrates quotes his words, and tells him that his declamatory style is this time compulsory. Callicles had the remedy in his own hands; he had but to answer the questions proposed to him, and the long harangue would be exchanged for dialogue. **11** *νῦν γοῦν—λόγων*] Heind. quotes Protag. 329 A, *καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες οὕτω σμικρὰ ἐρωτηθέντες δολιχὸν κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου*. But in his note on that passage, he alleges that the cases are not parallel. However this may be, the phrase *συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων* is scarcely to be distinguished from the ordinary *συχνοὺς τείνω τοὺς λόγους*. 'It would seem,' says Socr., 'that I *can* get on without such assistance—for now, at any rate, the speeches I make are prolix enough.' "In sequentibus *ἔπειτα πονηρός ἐστιν*, positum *ἔπειτα* pro *ὅμως*, usu frequentissimo." Heind. **20** *ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδενὸς ἀξίων*] This is a good dramatic touch. Callicles, an admirer of the pure rhetoricians, adopts their tone of contempt for the sophists, who professed to teach virtue. See in particular the curious fragment of Isocrates, *κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν*, in which he describes those who make such professions as *λίαν ἀπερισκέπτως ἀλαζονευόμενοι—μόνον οὐκ ἀθανάτους ὑπισχνούμενοι τοὺς συνόντας ποιήσειν*, §§ 1, 4. In this Isocrates follows the traditions of his master Gorgias, as appears from Menon, p. 95 C. Socrates presently maintains that if a comparison be made between rhetoric and sophistic, the latter must be preferred: just as legislation is a higher art than dicastic, and the art which keeps the body in health superior to that which removes sickness. But here again the analogy fails; for the political rhetor (*δημηγόρος*) *is* on occasion a *νομοθέτης*, and is not eo nomine a pleader in the courts (*δικαστικός*). As a public speaker, it is true, he may have to rebuke as well as to exhort; but to make that his principal or only duty is surely perverse. **24** *ὅταν τύχωσιν*] 'when occasion serves,' as when they are unjustly punished, ostracized, or the like.

Page 116. 2 *τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι*] Not exclusively 'the people,' as Ast puts it, but the people in the case of the orators,

their pupils in that of the Sophists. πρᾶγμα and χρῆμα are not unfrequently applied to persons. Aristoph. Eccles. 441, γυναῖκα δ' εἶναι πρᾶγμ' ἔφη νουβυστικόν. Eubulus, fr. Chrys. ii. ap. Mein. iii. 260, κακὴ γυνὴ Μήδεια, Πηνελόπεια δὲ Μέγα πρᾶγμα. With a genitive, Criton 53 C, οὐκ οἶει ἀσχημον φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα. **7** Καὶ προέσθαι γε δήπου] Sophists and public men, if their professions had been worth anything, could alone afford to trust those whom they benefit. A trainer would have less reason to complain if his pupil, when he had learnt to run fast, should refuse to pay him—supposing he had left the question of payment open, instead of stipulating for a fee to be paid down as nearly as possible at the time of imparting the desired accomplishment. προέσθαι—to trust a customer, to leave the time or amount of payment to his honour—occurs in much the same sense, Legg. 849 E, ὁ δὲ προέμενος ὡς πιστεύων, ἐάν τε κομίσηται ἐάν τε μή, στεργέτω ὡς οὐκέτι δίκης οὔσης τῶν τοιούτων πέρι συναλλάξεων. Xen. Anab. vii. 7. 47, πιστεύω σε οὐκ ἀνέξεσθαι τούς σοι προεμένους εὐεργεσίαν ὁρῶντά σοι ἐγκαλοῦντας (sc. ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέδωκας). Our modern honoraria answer in theory to the suggestion in the text. **17** Οὐκοῦν εἴ τις] 'Whoever then can remove injustice from the soul, need be under no apprehension of ever being wronged: for him alone it is safe to bestow this boon unconditionally.' For μόνῳ it would have been more correct to say μόνην. In the next clause Socrates intimates scepticism as to the reality of such pretensions. 'If indeed there were any one capable of making men good.' The Comm. speak of the sophists Protagoras and Prodicus as the objects of these satirical remarks. But it is to be observed that Plato's contemporaries the Cynics made the same profession, and to them the description in Isocrates, κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν, § 4 seq., is applicable in all its features. Doubtless also there were sophists unattached to any sect who followed the example. The rhetors, who did *not* teach virtue, consistently demanded payment in advance. This we gather from Demosth. c. Lacritum, p. 938, together with the information that the amount of the fee was ten minae. Evenus the Parian, an educator of the ethical school, was content with five, Apol. 20 B. The formula οὐδὲν δεινὸν μή occurs Apol. 28 B, οὐδὲν δ. μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῃ.

Page 117. **12** δίκαιος γὰρ εἶ, ὥσπερ ἤρξω] 'As you spoke your mind freely from the first, I have a right to expect you to be consistent and to tell me now what you really think.' In the

next speech of Socrates the construction κολακεύσοντα παρακαλεῖν is rare, and many edd. prefer ὡς κολακεύσοντα, which has no MS. authority. But the sense is the same whether we prefix ὡς or not. We may say, for instance, indifferently, παρακαλεῖν εἰς κολάκευσιν, and παρακαλεῖν ὡς εἰς κολάκευσιν, and so too, I conceive, where the participle is used. See above, 514 A. **18** Εἴ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν] The Comm. have given themselves much needless trouble with this passage, which is perfectly clear when seen by the light of the context. Socrates had asked Callicles whether he would have him come forward as the ἰατρός or as the διάκονος of the Athenian people.—'As the διάκονος certainly.' 'In other words, as its flatterer.'—'Yes,' answers Callicles, 'its flatterer, if you prefer to use the most opprobrious word you can think of. If you are too proud to flatter—' you must take the consequences. The prov. Μυσὸν καλεῖν hangs together with Μυσῶν ἔσχατος, Μυσῶν λεία. The Mysians, like the Carians, were regarded as the refuse of mankind. Hence Μυσὸν καλεῖν = to call names. This the Greek interpreter Olympiodorus has understood, but it was hidden from all the edd. preceding Bekker. It should be observed that the word κόλαξ (later παράσιτος) is much more invidious than our 'flatterer.' 'Toad-eater,' or even 'pander,' would better convey its force to an English reader. (See Plaut. Amphitr. i. 3. 17.) Compare also the description of the κόλαξ in Eupolis (κόλακες, Fr. i.) with that of the παράσιτος in Diodorus Com. (Ἐπίκληρος, Mein. iv. 543). Another comic poet records of Socrates that starved as he was he never stooped to be a κόλαξ—οὗτος μέντοι πεινῶν οὕτως οὐπώποτ' ἔτλη κολακεῦσαι, Ameipsias, Connus, Fr. i. **22** πονηρός γε ὢν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα] For the full force of these words in the mouth of Socrates, compare Apol. 30 D. **27** Ὡς μοι δοκεῖς] 'How confident you seem that nothing of this kind will ever happen to you—as if you dwelt apart and were not liable to be dragged into court—it may be by some wretch of the vilest character.' Possibly Plato aimed this at Meletus, who seems to have been a bad man as well as an indifferent poet. Mein. Com. Gr. ii. p. 1126.

Page 118. **2** περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων] "Videlicet de *capite et bonis:* quae ante commemoraverat Callicles." Stallb. **18** τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα] We must suppose this a quotation. Callicles had adjured Socrates to abandon philosophy—ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείς—and Socrates retorts by calling the arts of the rhetor τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα. Sup. 486 C. The next sentence is an amplifi-

cation of 464 D. A philosopher in a court of justice is like a physician accused by a confectioner before a jury of school-boys. ὀψοποιός stands of course for the rhetor who accuses him. **22** πώματα] The codd. give πόματα, some few πέμματα. Pors. on Hec. 392, καὶ δὶς τόσον πῶμ' αἵματος γενήσεται. "πόμ' MSS. et edd., sed haec forma Atticis erat incognita. Quod hoc uno argumento satis probatur. Multa sunt loca in quibus metrum πῶμα flagitet; nullum ubi πόμα postulet; pauca, ubi admittat." It may be added that the codd. sometimes give πόμα where the metre convicts them. Thus in Alexides Com. πόματος is made to end a senarius, in a frag. cited by Athenaeus, p. 28 E. **24** τί ἂν οἴει—ἀπολῃφθέντα] 'What would the physician find to say, think you, under these desperate circumstances?' ἀπολῃφθ., shut off as it were from all aid and sympathy—'driven into a corner,' as we say. Menex. 243 C, ἀπειλημμένων ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ τῶν νεῶν. Euthyd. 305 D, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις ὅταν ἀπολῃφθῶσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον κολούεσθαι—said of a fluent rhetorician brought to bay by a skilful controversialist. **27** πόσον οἴει] This rests on the authority of a single MS. All the rest have ὀπόσον, and so every ed. but Hirschig. Several instances of the oblique for the direct interrogation occur in Plato, if the codd. are to be trusted; as ὁπότερος, Lysis 212 C, Euthyd. 271 A. ὁποῖος, Alcib. i. 110 C. But in Charm. 170 B, for ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ὅπως εἴσεται; the edd. now give πῶς on the strength of one MS. The other instances are not improbably neoterisms introduced by copyists. No example has been adduced from an Attic poet, where the oblique form in the direct sense is required by the metre, and till this is done the legitimacy of the usage may be doubted.

Page 119. **1** Τοιοῦτον μέντοι] Compare the exordium of the Apologia, where Socrates disavows the δεινότης attributed to him by his accusers. **6** ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα] He alludes of course to the effect produced by his cross-questioning. This could not be made an article of impeachment by his accusers, but Socrates points to it in the Apol. as one principal cause of his unpopularity, p. 23. The Comm. quote Menon 79 E, Theaet. 149 A. **9** πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο] 'Herein I am acting in your interest, not in my own.' Apol. 31 B, he makes the same assertion: τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἠμεληκέναι...τὸ δ' ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἀεὶ... πείθοντα ἕκαστον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. Similar is the expression, 455 C, κἀμὲ νῦν νόμισον καὶ τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν. After οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν supply of course ἔξω εἰπεῖν. **15** Εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε [ἐν] αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι] The

omission of *ἐν* is suggested by Heind. Stallb. defends the prep. on the insufficient plea that *ὑπάρχοι* has the force of *ἐνείη*. The phrase *ὑπάρχειν τινί* seems invariable. "I think it *would* be well with him if he stood on that vantage-ground which you have frequently acknowledged in the course of our argument. I mean if he had 'helped himself' by abstinence from injustice to men and gods, whether in word or deed. For this is a kind of self-help which we have more than once allowed to be of all the best." With *βοήθεια ἑαυτῷ* comp. Apol. 30 A, *τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν*. Ib. D, *περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν*. **24** *ἀγαανακτοίην ἄν*] In the Apology, after his condemnation, he says, *τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο*, 35 E. **27** *αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν*] Apol. 28 B, *οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, εἰ οἴει δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος κ.τ.λ.*

Page 120. **3** *Ἄκουε δή, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου*] Here, as in the Republic, after he has proved that, irrespectively of consequences, Justice is better than Injustice, Socrates adds a mythical account of the rewards of the righteous and the punishments of the wicked after death. This in the Republic he prefaces by the apologetic remark, that to dwell on the subject of rewards is free (*ἀνεπίφθονον*) only to those who have shown on independent grounds the superiority of suffering virtue to prosperous wickedness, the thesis which it was the professed object of that dialogue to defend, x. 612. In the Gorgias he has a different audience to deal with, and therefore makes no apology for thus shifting his ground. Still it is surprising to find him expressing his belief in the myths he is about to relate: *ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν*. What however Plato meant to convey, we may see in Phaedo 114 D, where, after a recital differing from that of the Gorgias in its scenery and accessories, he adds, *τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί, ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπεί περ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν*. And with this passage agree others, in which Plato gives us hints of what he intends by his mythical narrations. It may be observed that of the three myths referred to, that in the present dialogue is much the simplest, and least removed from the accepted popular mythology. This difference may be due to considerations of

dramatic propriety; but it is not easy to believe that Plato would have written the recital in the Gorgias after those in the Phaedo and Republic were before the world. The passage from Ἄκουε δή to ἀπ' ἀλλήλοιν, 524 B, is quoted by Plutarch in the Consolatio ad Apollonium, c. 36; the entire myth by Eusebius in the Praeparatio Evang. xii. p. 577, and by Theodoret, Graec. Affect. Cur. For φασί Plut. has φησί. But φασί refers to the conventional beginning Ἄκουε δή, which recurs in Tim. 20 D. So Arist. Equit. 1014, Ἄκουε δὴ νῦν καὶ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν ἐμοί. The words following are given by Plut. in a slightly different order: ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μῦθον. ἐγῷμαι, for the vulg. ἐγὼ οἶμαι, is restored from Euseb. and Theodor. **6** Ὥσπερ γὰρ Ὅμηρος λέγει] In the 15th Book of the Iliad, 186 fol., Τρεῖς γάρ τ' ἐκ Κρόνου εἰμὲν ἀδελφεοὶ οὓς τέκετο Ῥέα, Ζεὺς καὶ ἐγὼ τρίτατος δ' Ἀΐδης ἐνέροισιν ἀνάσσων, Τριχθὰ δὲ πάντα δέδασται, ἕκαστος δ' ἔμμορε τιμῆς. **15** τούτων δὲ δικασταί] 'These, in the reign of Cronus and even in the early days of Zeus, were tried while yet alive by living judges, who judged them the very day on which it was their fate to die.' Plutarch has οἱ δικασταί, which is clearly wrong. For κακῶς οὖν κ.τ.λ. he gives ἔπειτα αἱ δίκαι πως οὐ καλῶς ἐκρίνοντο. "In Aegypto, referente Diodoro, i. c. 92, judicia de mortuis ad sepulturae diem haberi solita sunt. Et multa Orpheus, si modo verum narraverint Aegyptii, ex hac regione transtulit in Graecorum fabulas. Hinc igitur originem suam traxisse poterat commentum istud." Routh. Without putting faith in the veracity of the Aegyptians, we may think it probable that Plato was indebted for this and other features of his story to the Orphic poets. **19** οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ ἐκ μ. ν.] The second οἱ is supplied from Plutarch. Without it Pluto would be represented as coming from the same region as the 'overseers of the Isles of the Blest.' Presently for φοιτῷέν σφιν Plut. has φ. σφίσιν, which is much more usual in prose. But in mythical narrative we sometimes find these semi-poetical forms. ἑκατέρωσε means, of course, 'to either place,' to that of reward and to that of punishment. **32** ἐπίπροσθεν] Plut. ἐπιπρόσθησις, a word found in Aristotle, but unknown to Plato. ἐπίπροσθεν has nearly the sense of ἐμποδών, as Legg. i. 648 D, τὸ τῆς αἰσχύνης ἐπίπροσθεν ποιούμενος.

Page 121. **8** καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ—αὐτῶν] 'This power orders have already been given to Prometheus that he cause to cease in them'—'this power of theirs he has had orders to suppress.' Prometheus as the giver of foresight could also take it

away, according to a received principle in Greek theology. Plato may also have remembered the line in the Prometheus 248, *θνητούς γ' ἔπαυσα μὴ προδέρκεσθαι μόρον*, i.e. as he explains, by making them hope against hope: *τυφλὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας κατῴκισα*. For *αὐτῶν*, the reading of the best codd., some give *αὐτόν*, others *αὐτὸ αὐτῶ*, whence Steph. *αὐτὸ αὐτῶν*. But the construction of the genitive is usual enough, though it seems to have perplexed transcribers. **12** *δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας*] Both Minos and Rhadamanthys were born in Crete, which we must therefore understand Plato to class with the Asiatic islands. According to the perhaps interpolated passage in the Iliad, xiv. 322, they were sons of Jupiter and Europa, the daughter of Phoenix. Plato's contemporaries seem to have recognized only two capital divisions of the earth's surface. Isocr. Paneg. p. 78, *τῆς γῆς ἁπάσης τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ κόσμῳ κειμένης δίχα τετμημένης, καὶ τῆς μὲν Ἀσίας τῆς δ' Εὐρώπης καλουμένης*. Aegypt and Libya were according to this division parts of Asia; but I know no passage except that in the text where Crete is so represented. Olympiodorus indeed says, *ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τοὺς γεωγράφους τοὺς διαιροῦντας εἰς δύο τὴν καθ' ἡμᾶς οἰκουμένην εἰς Ἀσίαν καὶ Εὐρώπην, καὶ ἡ Λιβύη καὶ ἡ Κρήτη τῆς Ἀσίας εὑρίσκετο*, but he gives no authority for this statement, nor for the stranger one that Rhadamanthys *Λίβυς ἦν*. **15** *ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ*] The topography of the corresponding scene in the Republic is slightly different. The ghosts are there brought *εἰς τόπον τινὰ δαιμόνιον, ἐν ᾧ τῆς τε γῆς δύ' ἐστὶ χάσματα ἐχομένω ἀλλήλοιν, καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὖ ἐν τῷ ἄνω ἄλλα καταντικρύ*. The *λειμών* is in the spurious Axiochus converted into *πεδίον ἀληθείας*, concerning which see note to Phaedrus 248 B. For *τριόδῳ* comp. Virg. Aen. vi. 540. **18** *Μίνῳ δὲ πρεσβεῖα δώσω*] Minos enjoys this precedence as *Διὸς μεγάλου ἀριστῆς*, Od. xix. 179. See the Minos, p. 319 seq. Of Rhadamanthys it is said, *Ῥαδάμανθυς δὲ ἀγαθὸς μὲν ἦν ἀνήρ, ἐπεπαίδευτο μέντοι οὐχ ὅλην τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην, ἀλλ' ὑπηρεσίαν τῇ βασιλικῇ, ὅσον ἐπιστατεῖν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις. ὅθεν καὶ δικαστὴς ἀγαθὸς ἐλέχθη εἶναι· νομοφύλακι γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐχρῆτο ὁ Μίνως κατὰ τὸ ἄστυ*. Ib. 320 B. Minos is accordingly made a 'judge of appeal' in doubtful cases. In the Apol. 41 A, Socrates adds to the three the name of an Attic hero Triptolemus, whose duty it would be to try departed Athenians. **27** *ἐπειδὰν δὲ διαλυθῆτον ἄρα*] 'And when accordingly they are separated the one from the other, each retains with little alteration the *condition* it had while the person lived; the body preserving its

natural characteristics, and the results of training or accident all still traceable upon it—for instance,' &c. The apodosis to τε seems to be forgotten, but is represented by ταὐτὸν δή μοι δοκεῖ inf. D. παθήματα denotes the effects of impressions from without, θεραπεύματα those of self-treatment, whether in reference to health or appearance. **32** ἢ ἀμφότερα] 'or in both ways.' This adverbial use of ἀμφότερα is illustrated by Heind. on Charm. 303 D (where however ἀμφοτέροις is found in nearly all the codd.). Laches 187 A, πείθωμεν ἢ δώροις ἢ χάρισιν ἢ ἀμφότερα. See above 477 D, ἀνίᾳ—ἢ βλάβῃ—ἢ ἀμφότερα. Different but analogous is the Homeric usage with ἀμφότερον. Od. xiv. 505, 'Αμφότερον, φιλότητι καὶ αἰδοῖ φωτὸς ἑῆος. Comp. Il. iii. 179. οὐδέτερα and ὁπότερα, as Stallb. remarks, are used in the same manner, Theaet. 184 A, Gorg. 469 A.

Page 122. **4** μαστιγίας αὖ] 'Once more, if he was some wretched gaol-bird who bore traces of the blows he had received when alive, whether inflicted with the lash or otherwise, in the shape of scars upon his body.' μαστιγίας answers to 'knight of the post.' Germ. 'Galgenstrick.' **18** ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας] 'Rhadamanthys causes them, the spirits from Asia, to confront him (has them up before him), and inspects each one separately,' &c. κατεῖδεν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὄν—'he finds there is no soundness in it —that it is seamed all over and covered with scars, the effect of perjuries and wrong-doing—the foul traces left upon the soul of each man by his past conduct.' Presently we have ἀκρατίας, an old form. Euseb. ἀκρατείας, perhaps rightly, for this seems the favourite form in Plato, who nowhere uses ἀκρασία, which is common in later Attic. See Lobeck, Phryn. p. 525. With this picture of a mind diseased may be compared the image of the battered and weedy sea-god, Repub. x. 611 C. Also the well-known passage in Tacit. Ann. vi. 6, "Neque frustra praestantissimus sapientiae firmare solitus est, si recludantur tyrannorum mentes, posse adspici laniatus et ictus; quando, ut corpora verberibus, ita saevitia, libidine, malis consultis, animus dilaceretur." **30** εὐθὺ τῆς φρουρᾶς] 'straight to the place of custody.' Olympiodorus, and, according to Ast, the Cod. Vind. 1 have εὐθύς, a v. l. not noticed by Bekk. The distinction is familiar. Phryn. Ecl. p. 144, Εὐθύ· πολλοὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ εὐθύς. διαφέρει δέ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τόπου ἐστίν· εὐθὺ 'Αθηνῶν, τὸ δὲ χρόνου. He ought rather to have said φορᾶς or μεταβολῆς τόπου ἐστίν. Lysis, init., ἐπορευόμην ἐξ 'Ακαδημίας εὐθὺ Λυκείου. εὐθὺς is very

frequently topical, as Thuc. vi. 96, *χωρίου...ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως εὐθὺς κειμένου*, where *εὐθύ* would have been incorrect. On the other hand, most of the passages in which *εὐθύς* is put for *εὐθύ* either have been or may easily be corrected. Perhaps the only certain instance of this kind is the well-known line, Eur. Hipp. 1197, *τὴν εὐθὺς Ἀργους κἀπιδαυρίας ὁδόν*. *φρουρά* for *δεσμωτήριον* or *δικαιωτήριον* occurs Phaedr. 62 B. **32** *Προσήκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμ. ὄντι*] Plato recognizes no other uses of punishment than the corrective and the exemplary. See note to 505 B, and compare Critias init., *δίκη δὲ ὀρθὴ τὸν πλημμελοῦντα ἐμμελῆ ποιεῖν*. The same was the opinion of Protagoras, if we may draw that inference from its occurrence in the speech, Protag. 324 A, *εἰ ἐθέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὸ κολάζειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας τί ποτε δύναται, αὐτό σε διδάξει, ὅτι οἵ γε ἄνθρωποι ἡγοῦνται παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πρὸς τοῦτῳ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα, ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ὅστις μὴ ὥσπερ θηρίον ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται· ὁ δὲ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἕνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται—οὐ γὰρ ἂν τό γε πραχθὲν ἀγένητον θείη—ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὖθις ἀδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς οὗτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα*. And this is the view which seems to have commended itself to the civilized Greek mind generally. The notion of 'satisfaction' shows itself however in some of the details of the myths at the end of the Republic, 615 B.

Page 123. **6** *ἁμάρτωσιν*] Three codd., according to Bekk., give the solec. *ἁμαρτήσωσιν*. **8** *οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄλλως*] This and similar passages in Plato doubtless laid the foundation of the theological idea of a purgatory, which seems to have been alien from the native Hebrew mind. **15** *ἀτεχνῶς*] As usual, the particle apologizes for a strong expression. 'Literally hung up as warnings in that dungeon down in Hades.' Olympiodorus refuses to take *τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον* literally, and understands by the words the *μέγας ἐνιαυτός*, or period in which the heavenly bodies recover their relative position: *τοσαῦτα ἔτη κολάζεται ὅσα ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὴν συναποκατάστασιν*. Comp. Phaedr. 256 E. **18** *Ἀρχέλαον*] So in the similar myths, Rep. X., *Ἀρδιαῖος ὁ μέγας* is mentioned by name as one of the hopelessly lost, 615 C. Kings and potentates, temporal and spiritual, occupy prominent places in the Judgment-pieces of the Catholic painters, as particularly in those of Fra Angelico. **29** *οὐ γὰρ—ἐξὴν αὐτῷ*] We must *understand* *μεγάλα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνειν*. Whatever may have

been the animus of Thersites, his power, fortunately for himself, was limited by reason of his low estate.

Page 124. 10 *Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου*] On this passage Olymp. makes the following curious remark: *ὅτι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς (ὁ Ἀριστείδης) οὐκ ἦν εἰς ἄκρον πολιτικὸς δῆλον, ὅτι καὶ κακῶς ἔπαθε, καὶ ὅτι ἡ κωμῳδία φησὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἐπὶ Ἀριστείδου δίκαιον οὐδὲν οὐδαμοῦ γέγονε νεόττιον.* The comic line is omitted in Meineke's collection. The poet seems to have meant that, righteous as Aristides may have been, his example was not followed by the youth of his generation. **17** *ἐπισημηνάμενος, ἐάν τε*] 'denoting by a mark whether he may think him curable or incurable'; i. e. distinguishing the curable from the hopeless cases by separate marks. A similar detail occurs in the Rep. l. l. p. 614 C, *τοὺς δικαστὰς...τοὺς μὲν δικαίους κελεύειν πορεύεσθαι τὴν εἰς δεξιὰν...σημεῖα περιάψαντας τῶν δεδικασμένων ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν· τοὺς δὲ ἀδίκους τὴν εἰς ἀριστερὰν...ἔχοντας καὶ τούτους ἐν τῷ ὄπισθεν σημεῖα πάντων ὧν ἔπραξαν.* **20** *ἰδιώτου—τὰ αὐτοῦ πράξαντος*] Readers of the Republic are aware that a special meaning is there given to the phrase 'to mind one's own business.' B. iv. p. 433 A, *ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλων τε πολλῶν ἀκηκόαμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν.* The righteous man acts always in conformity with the law of his nature, which subordinates appetite and passion to reason. He therefore in the truest sense *τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττει.* But here Plato may use the phrase to denote the single-minded devotion to his calling which distinguished Socrates. Comp. Apol. 31 E, where, after pointing out the causes which made it impossible for him to take part in public affairs, he adds, *ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.* **25** *ἑκάτερος—νέκυσσιν*] This passage Ast and Heind. agree in thinking an interpolation, but, as it seems to me, on quite insufficient grounds. The quotation is from the Odyssey, xi. 569. **31** *σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι*] 'I study how I shall present my soul to the judge's eye in the healthiest possible condition.' *ἀποφ.* as a middle transitive is extremely common; not so as a middle neuter. Hence the folly of the old interpolation *ἔχων*, inserted before *τὴν ψυχήν*, as if *ἀποφανοῦμαι* were used for *φανοῦμαι.*

Page 125. 5 *ἀντιπαρακαλῶ*] Callicles had exhorted Socrates to the rhetorico-political life, p. 521 A. Socrates replies by an invitation to a life of self-culture in preparation for a contest

which, as he affirms, outweighs in importance all the contests of the dicastery. **11** χασμήσει καὶ ἰλιγγιάσεις] 'Before that tribunal you shall gasp and be ready to swoon, even as I might before a human court.' In the next clause Heind. suspects ἐπὶ κόρρης, and Cobet καί and ἀτίμως, Vv. Ll. p. 341. It is true that a blow ἐπὶ κόρρης of itself implies ἀτίμωσις, but to object to so slight a redundancy seems to me hypercritical. The καί is supplied from the best MSS. It would in strictness have come before τυπτήσει, but the transposition is far from unprecedented. Socrates here retorts upon Callicles his own words, Ἰλιγγιᾷς ἄν καὶ χασμῷο οὐκ ἔχων ὅ τι εἴποις, 486 B. τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον εἰρῆσθαι, ἐξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην, ib. C. With the entire passage compare Theaet. 175 D, where the rhetorician is represented as suffering in a similar manner in presence of the philosopher. **22** ἐκεῖσε] 'in the other world, when we get there.' Presently ἠρεμεί = 'stands its ground,' 'remains unshaken.' ἠρεμεῖν is in other dialogues opposed to ῥεῖν or κινεῖσθαι, and equiv. to ἑστάναι. Soph. 248 E, τὴν οὐσίαν...κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσχειν, ὃ δὴ φαμεν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι περὶ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν.

Page 126. **3** ἀκολούθησον ἐνταῦθα] 'Go with me in pursuit of that which when attained will secure your well-being in either state of existence.' ἐνταῦθα with verbs implying motion is very common in Plato, e.g. ἐνταῦθα ἐληλύθαμεν, Rep. iv. 445 B. **7** καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία σύ γε] 'Nay, fear not to let him inflict upon you that last indignity, the blow with the open palm.' ἔασον must of course be supplied before πατάξαι. The proposed πάταξαι, 'let yourself be struck,' is a mere barbarism introduced by Stephen on next to no authority, and was properly expelled from the text by Routh, though afterwards patronized by Van Heusde. The latter quotes, in illustration of τὴν ἄτιμον πληγήν, Lucian Necyom. p. 481, κατὰ κόρρης παιόμενος, ὥσπερ τῶν ἀνδραπόδων τὰ ἀτιμότατα: with which we may compare Plato's language in p. 508 C, εἰμὶ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτιμοι,...ἄν τε τύπτειν βούληται...ἐπὶ κόρρης. Readers of the Midias will remember the blow ἐπὶ κόρρης which Alcibiades inflicted upon Taureas, Demosth. p. 562. Add Chrysostom on S. Matth. v. 39, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὴν μάλιστα δοκοῦσαν εἶναι πληγὴν ἐπονείδιστον, τὴν ἐπὶ σιαγόνος, καὶ πολλὴν ἔχουσαν τὴν ὕβριν τέθεικε.

APPENDIX.

THE FRAGMENTS OF GORGIAS.

THE fragments of Gorgias have been collected by his biographer Foss, by Spengel in his Artium Scriptores, and by Mullach, in the second volume of his Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum. Few as these are, enough remains to enable us to form a judgment of the truth of Plato's representations of his style, both in the Phaedrus and in the elaborate imitation contained in the Symposium. The most considerable by far, and in every way the most important of these fragments, is preserved in the Scholia to the treatise *περὶ ἰδεῶν* of the Greek rhetorician Hermogenes[1]. This writer (who lived in the time of Hadrian), in his chapter *περὶ σεμνότητος*, after citing with measured praise certain bold Demosthenic metaphors, contrasts with them an instance of counterfeit sublimity taken from a speech of Gorgias, whom however he does not name: *παραδεῖγμα τούτου Δημοσθενικὸν οὐκ ἂν λάβοις, οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστι. παρὰ δὲ τοῖς ὑποξύλοις τουτοισὶ σοφισταῖς πάμπολλα εὕροις ἄν. τάφους τε γὰρ ἐμψύχους*[2] *τοὺς γύπας λέγουσιν, ὥνπερ εἰσὶ μάλιστα ἄξιοι, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ψυχρεύονται πάμπολλα.* In a later passage, too, he censures "Polus and Gorgias and Menon" for their pompous and pretentious way of writing: *φαίνεται δὲ λόγος δεινός, οὐκ ὢν*

[1] Rhetores Graeci, ed. Walz, iii. pp. 226, 362, compared with v. p. 548.

[2] The author of the treatise *περὶ ὕψους*, c. iii. 2, attributes the metaphor to Gorgias.

τοιοῦτος...ὁ τῶν σοφιστῶν, λέγω τῶν περὶ Πῶλον καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Μένωνα κ.τ.λ. (περὶ ἰδ. β΄.). On this his annotator Planudes remarks: Διονύσιος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ χαρακτήρων περὶ Γοργίου τάδε φησίν, ὅτι τῆς ἰδέας τῶν αὐτοῦ λόγων τοιοῦτος ὁ χαρακτήρ· ἐγκωμιάζει δὲ τοὺς ἐν πολέμῳ ἀριστεύσαντας τῶν Ἀθηναίων. "Τί "γὰρ ἀπῆν τοῖς ἀνδράσι τούτοις ὧν δεῖ ἀνδράσι προσεῖναι; τί δὲ "καὶ προσῆν ὧν οὐ δεῖ προσεῖναι; εἰπεῖν δυναίμην ἃ βούλομαι, "βουλοίμην δὲ ἃ δεῖ, λαθὼν μὲν τὴν θείαν νέμεσιν, φυγὼν δὲ τὸν "ἀνθρώπινον φθόνον. Οὗτοι γὰρ ἐκέκτηντο ἔνθεον μὲν τὴν ἀρετήν, "ἀνθρώπινον δὲ τὸ θνητόν· πολλὰ μὲν δὴ τὸ †παρὸν[1]† ἐπιεικὲς "τοῦ αὐθάδους δικαίου προκρίνοντες, πολλὰ δὲ νόμου ἀκριβείας "λόγων ὀρθότητα, τοῦτο νομίζοντες θειότατον καὶ κοινότατον νόμον, "τὸ δέον ἐν τῷ δέοντι καὶ λέγειν καὶ σιγᾶν καὶ ποιεῖν[2], καὶ διὸσὰ "ἀσκήσαντες μάλιστα ὧν δεῖ, γνώμην *καὶ ῥώμην*[3], τὴν μὲν "βουλεύοντες τὴν δ' ἀποτελοῦντες, θεράποντες μὲν τῶν ἀδίκως "δυστυχούντων, κολασταὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδίκως εὐτυχούντων, αὐθάδεις "πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, εὐόργητοι πρὸς τὸ πρέπον, τῷ φρονίμῳ τῆς "γνώμης παύοντες τὸ ἄφρον *τῆς ῥώμης*[4], ὑβρισταὶ εἰς ὑβριστάς, "κόσμιοι εἰς τοὺς κοσμίους, ἄφοβοι εἰς τοὺς ἀφόβους, δεινοὶ ἐν "τοῖς δεινοῖς. μαρτυρίας δὲ τούτων τρόπαια ἐστήσαντο τῶν "πολεμίων, Διὸς μὲν ἀγάλματα[5], τούτων δὲ ἀναθήματα, οὐκ "ἄπειροι οὔτε ἐμφύτου Ἄρεος, οὔτε νομίμων ἐρώτων, οὔτε ἐνοπλίου "ἐρίδος, οὔτε φιλοκάλου εἰρήνης, σεμνοὶ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τῷ "δικαίῳ, ὅσιοι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς τοκέας τῇ θεραπείᾳ, δίκαιοι πρὸς τοὺς

[1] παρόν obviously is corrupt. The easiest remedy, so far as the letters go, would be to substitute πρᾶον, and this was suggested by Spengel and adopted by the Zürich edd. rightly, as I think. Mullach adopts the ingenious conjecture of Foss, παριέν ('indulgent,' 'yielding'), which gives an apt sense, though I should like to see another example of this adjectival use of the active participle. The perf. παρειμένον would give nearly the same sense, and is more accordant with usage.

[2] Here, in order to create a second antithesis, Sauppe has introduced into the text the words καὶ ἐᾶν, and that, or something equivalent, seems to be required. Perhaps καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν.

[3] καὶ ῥώμην. These words do not occur in the codd., but were introduced, not without necessity, by Foss. The antithesis of γνώμη and ῥώμη occurs Aristoph. Av. 637.

[4] τῆς ῥώμης, introduced into the text by Sauppe.

[5] Διὸς μὲν ἀγάλματα. Comp. Eurip. Phoen. 1473, ὡς δ' ἐνικῶμεν μάχῃ, Οἱ μὲν Διὸς τρόπαιον ἱστασαν βρέτας. Heraclid. 936, βρέτας Διὸς τροπαίου καλλίνικον ἱστασαν.

"ἀστοὺς τῷ ἴσῳ, εὐσεβεῖς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους τῇ πίστει· "τοιγαροῦν αὐτῶν ἀποθανόντων ὁ πόθος οὐ συναπέθανεν, ἀλλ' "ἀθάνατος ἐν †οὐκ† ἀσωμάτοις[1] σώμασι ζῇ οὐ ζώντων." Σεμνὰς γὰρ ἐνταῦθα συμφορήσας λέξεις ὁ Γοργίας ἐννοίας ἐπιπολαιοτέρας ἐξαγγέλλει, τοῖς τε παρίσοις καὶ ὁμοιοτελεύτοις καὶ ὁμοιοκατάρκτοις καλλωπίζων διόλου προσκόρως[2] τὸν λόγον.

In reading this fragment of the Epitaphius (probably its peroration), we are disposed to concur on the whole in the censure of the Scholiast, echoing that of Hermogenes. The ideas are, with some exceptions, 'superficial,' the assonances tedious, and the sacrifice of sense to sound, perspicuity to point, manifest throughout. Yet there runs through the whole a certain loftiness of sentiment which seems to take Gorgias out of the category of "gingerbread sophists[3]" to which Hermogenes condemns him. Some of the antitheses, as those of ἐπιεικές and δίκαιον, νόμος and λόγος, are true, and were possibly new: and though others are little more than verbal, the same may be said of many of the antithetic clauses which stud the earlier speeches in Thucydides. We can well understand that the historian should have incurred the blame of 'Gorgiasm' at the hands of the ancient critics: and it seems probable that the funeral oration which he puts in the mouth of Pericles, admirable as it is, may have owed some part of its spirit, as well as its style, to the earlier effort of Gorgias[4]. And though there can be no comparison between

[1] So 3 codd. Al. ἀθ. οὐκ ἐν ἀθανάτοις. Ald. οὐκ ἐν ἀσωμάτοις. If we read as in the text, the οὐκ ἀσώματα σώματα must refer to the ἀγάλματα named above. Walz prefers ἀ. ἐν οὐκ ἀθανάτοις σώμασιν, the meaning of which escapes me. ἐν ἀσωμάτοις σώμασιν was proposed by Hermann, which, though enigmatical, is perhaps best of all. I should refer it to their "bodiless forms" still haunting the minds of the survivors.

[2] So Walz. Al. πρὸς κόρον. But the adverb is found in Hermogenes, who also frequently uses προσκορής, as does Aristotle in the Rhet.

[3] ὑποξύλοις. Hermog. ubi supra. Literally "plated" as opposed to solid metal; "tinsel," or, more exactly, "Brummagem," would be the English equivalent.

[4] See Dionys. Halic. de Lysia, p. 458, Reiske. Philostratus, Epist 13, Κριτίας δὲ καὶ Θουκυδίδης οὐκ ἀγνοοῦνται τὸ μεγαλόγνωμον καὶ

the sparkling ingenuity of the Sicilian rhetorician, and the vivid and penetrating intellect of the historian—that "philosopher not of the schools"—it is something to have aided in the formation of a style like that of Thucydides, which was itself the model of that of the first of Attic orators. In general there can be little doubt that the excesses of the early rhetoricians, like those of the euphuistic writers of the time of Elizabeth, tended both to refine and invigorate the language of prose, and to render it a more adequate vehicle of thought than it had hitherto been[1].

It should further be observed that this fragment enables us without hesitation to condemn as spurious the two entire, or nearly entire speeches which under the name of Gorgias used to stand in editions of the Oratores Attici, beginning with the Aldine[2], under the titles *Παλαμήδους ἀπολογία*, and *Ἑλένης ἐγκώμιον*. Of these the former has none of the peculiarities of Gorgias' style[3]: the second, though abounding in alliterations, verbal antitheses, and other characteristics of the Sicilian school, has little or nothing of the pomp and splendour of the author of the fragment. Neither is mentioned as a work of Gorgias by any ancient writer, and the absence of such notice in the Helenae Encomium of Isocrates[4] has been taken as evidence that there was no work of Gorgias bearing that title.

Another fragment of the Epitaphius is preserved by

τὴν ὀφρὺν παρ' αὐτοῦ κεκτημένοι, μεταποιοῦντες δὲ αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ὁ μὲν ὑπ' εὐγλωττίας, ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ ῥώμης.

[1] See on this subject some judicious remarks of Mure, Critical Hist. iv. p. 121.

[2] They are given in the Zürich edition, p. 132, not however as genuine.

[3] Nor even of his dialect, for it is written in new Attic, the Encomium Helenae affecting the old forms.

[4] Isocrates refers to a declaimer on the subject, whom he does not name; but it has been sagaciously inferred from the tone of the passage that it refers to a then living writer, who cannot however have been the author of the declamation attributed to Gorgias, which is written in *old* Attic. It is curious that in the same speech Gorgias is referred to by name as the author of the well-known work *περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος*, and this is a proof that Isocrates would not have scrupled to *name the author* of the speech, had he been Gorgias.

Philostratus, from whom we learn that it was delivered in Athens—

"Τὰ μὲν κατὰ τῶν βαρβάρων τρόπαια ὕμνους ἀπαιτεῖ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων θρήνους[1]."

He had harped on the same string in his Olympicus, where he endeavours to persuade the Greeks "ἆθλα ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ὅπλων μὴ τὰς ἀλλήλων πόλεις, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων χώραν." Ibid. This was a favourite theme of Isocrates, and probably a common-place in the rhetorical schools.

A Pythicus of Gorgias is also mentioned by Philostratus, with the fabulous addition that on the altar or pedestal from which he spoke, a golden statue of the orator was set up ἐν τῷ τοῦ Πυθίου ἱερῷ.

Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 14. 11, quotes the initial clause of his ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἠλείους· "Ἦλις πόλις εὐδαίμων," at the same time censuring the speaker for rushing *in medias res*, without any prelusive sparring (οὐδὲν προεξαγκωνίσας).

From another passage of the Rhetoric we may infer the existence of a fourth panegyric oration, "in praise of Achilles," from which however Aristotle gives us no extract. It resembled, he tells us, the epideictic speeches of Isocrates, in the complimentary episodes with which it abounded (τῷ ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἐπαίνοις). A fragment preserved by the Scholiast on Iliad iv. 450 may have belonged to this speech: ἀνεμίσγοντο δὲ λίταις ἀπειλαὶ καὶ εὐχαῖς οἰμωγαί.

Whether Gorgias, like his countrymen Tisias and Polus, wrote a τέχνη, or formal treatise on rhetoric, has been disputed[2]; but there can be no doubt that the precept recorded by the Scholiast on Gorg. 348 is a genuine fragment from some written work of his, whether strictly a τέχνη or not, "(δεῖ) τὰς σπουδὰς τῶν ἀντιδίκων γέλωτι ἐκλύειν, τὰ δὲ γελοῖα

[1] It is difficult to imagine that this sentiment can have been introduced with propriety into a speech in honour of Athenians who had died fighting against Peloponnesians; yet we do not hear of Gorgias visiting Athens before the year 427; for the statement that Pericles was his disciple is probably a late fable. Possibly the fragment may have belonged to the speech next mentioned, and Philostratus' memory may have failed him.

[2] See note on Phaedrus, 261 c.

ταῖς σπουδαῖς ἐκκρούειν," and it is to this doubtless that Aristotle refers in the Rhetoric, iii. 18. 7, δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν κ.τ.λ. The remark is one which could not have been made by an ordinary man, and the sentence is too nicely balanced for a mere colloquial dictum.

The definition of rhetoric given by a Scholiast on the Στάσεις of Hermogenes[1], under the title Ὅρος ῥητορικῆς κατὰ Γοργίαν, is evidently only a compilation from the Platonic dialogue (comp. 450 E, 455), though it is given by the Zürich editors as an extract from Gorgias' τέχνη.

The remaining fragments it is impossible with certainty to refer to any one speech or treatise in particular. Some of them were doubtless taken from his writings, but others, and those not the least characteristic of the man, seem to have been orally delivered, probably in conversation. Of the former class one has already been quoted: 1. γύπες ἔμψυχοι τάφοι—a metaphor which shocked the taste of Hermogenes, and drew forth, as we have seen, a malediction upon its author.

2. Longinus, or whoever was the writer of the well-known treatise on the Sublime, quotes a similar metaphor of Gorgias: Ξέρξης ὁ τῶν Περσῶν Ζεύς. This does not appear to our modern taste either very 'ridiculous,' or particularly revolting: though we may accede to the remark that it and the foregoing are rather "high-flown than lofty[2]."

3. Other more or less violently metaphorical phrases are quoted by Aristotle, Rhetoric iii. 3. 4, οἷον Γοργίας "χλωρὰ καὶ ἄναιμα[3] τὰ πράγματα· σὺ δὲ ταῦτα αἰσχρῶς μὲν ἔσπειρας, κακῶς δὲ ἐθέρισας." These he condemns because they are "too grand and tragic," the former also because "obscure and far-fetched." To us the metaphor of reaping and sowing is a mere common-place, and it is used by Plato in the Phaedrus without offence. But "pallid and bloodless

[1] Rhet. Gr., ed. Walz, t. vii. p. 33.

[2] π. ὕψους, c. iii. 2, τὰ τοῦ Λεοντίνου Γοργίου γελᾶται, γράφοντος, Ξέρξης ὁ τῶν Περσῶν Ζεύς, καί, γύπες ἔμψυχοι τάφοι... ὄντα οὐχ ὑψηλὰ ἀλλὰ μετέωρα.

[3] Vulg. and Bkk. ἔναιμα. But ἄναιμα is well supported, and cannot *but be right.*

affairs" is a phrase which would need apology even from a modern.

4. In the same chapter of the Rhetoric, Gorgias is censured for using extraordinary compounds: *τὰ δὲ ψυχρὰ... γίγνεται κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐν...τοῖς διπλοῖς ὀνόμασιν...ὡς Γοργίας ὠνόμαζε, "πτωχόμουσος*[1] *κόλαξ," "ἐπιορκήσαντας καὶ κατεπορκήσαντας."*

5. In the Convivium of Xenophon (c. 2. 26) we are presented with what Socrates calls a *Γοργίειον ῥῆμα—ἦν δὲ ἡμῖν οἱ παῖδες μικραῖς κύλιξι πυκνὰ ἐπιψακάζωσιν*, where the last word, or possibly the last two, may be assigned to Gorgias.

On the whole, the charges of tumour, affectation, and "frigidity" may be taken as 'proven' against the Sicilian rhetor; though the less fastidious taste of the moderns, accustomed to use unconsciously phrases which to an Attic ear would have appeared startling metaphors, may sometimes disagree with that of the ancient critics. There is, however, a passage of Aristotle in which he seems to compare the grandiloquence of Gorgias with that of Plato in the more poetical parts of the Phaedrus, defending both as 'ironical[2].' We can discover no trace of irony in the inflated passage recorded by the Scholiast: and we should be at some loss to account for Aristotle's phrase, but for an amusing instance which he has happily preserved for us in the same chapter of his Rhetoric in which he censures the tragic pomp of the Sicilian school and its founder.

[1] This can hardly mean 'arm an dichterischer Begabung,' as Rost and Palm explain. Liddell and Scott give with greater probability "living (or rather starving) by his wits." It might also mean, "one whom poverty inspires" (cui ingeni largitor Venter). Wit and poverty are the hackneyed attributes of the Greek parasite, and in a comic poet the epithet would probably have been thought happy. A similar compound, *πτωχαλάζων*, is quoted from Phrynichus Com. (Meineke, C. G. ii. p. 582). Foss, not too happily, changes *κόλαξ* into *κόραξ*. De Gorg. p. 53.

[2] Rhet. iii. 7. 11. After observing that poetical language is admissible in oratory when the speaker has succeeded in raising his audience to the proper pitch of passion or enthusiasm, he adds: *ἢ δὴ οὕτω δεῖ, ἢ μετ' εἰρωνείας, ὅπερ Γοργίας ἐποίει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ.*

6. Τὸ δὲ Γοργίου εἰς χελιδόνα, ἐπεὶ κατ' αὐτοῦ πετομένη ἀφῆκε τὸ περίττωμα, ἄριστα τῶν τραγικῶν· εἶπε γὰρ "Αἰσχρόν γε, ὦ Φιλομήλα[1]." ὄρνιθι μὲν γάρ, εἰ ἐποίησεν, οὐκ αἰσχρόν, παρθένῳ δὲ αἰσχρόν. εὖ οὖν ἐλοιδόρησεν εἰπὼν ὃ ἦν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅ ἐστιν[2]. That Gorgias had a sense of humour appears even from Plato, and will appear in sayings hereafter to be quoted; but we may conclude from the Aristotelian passage that whatever gift of pleasantry he may have possessed, whether ironical or otherwise, he reserved for conversational use.

7. Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Λεοντῖνος, τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δ' εἰρωνευόμενος, ἔφη, καθάπερ ὅλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὁλμοποιῶν πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιούργων πεποιημένους· εἶναι γάρ τινας Λαρισοποιούς. Arist. Pol. iii. c. 1.

This saying has been understood as a reflection on the undue facility with which strangers obtained the franchise at Larisa. Whether in its original form it was spoken or written we have no means of determining; but it seems to have been called forth by some political arrangement which fell under its author's notice during his long sojourn in Thessaly[3].

8. Besides his rhetorical course of instruction, Gorgias

[1] What poet first transposed the names of Procne and Philomela is not quite certain. In all Greek authors, so far as I know, 'Philomel' is the name of the swallow, and Procne of the nightingale (Arist. Aves 665). The Latins generally reverse this: but Varro de L. L. and Virg. Ecl. vi. 81 adhere to the Greek version of the story.

[2] The same story is told, but less neatly, by Plutarch, Sympos. viii. 7. 4.

[3] The conjecture suggests itself, that more may have been meant by Gorgias. From the passages presently to be quoted it is clear that he shrunk from, or was incapable of, wide ethical generalizations. This dictum about Larisa and its institutions may have been intended as a scoffingly evasive answer to a question in political science, What constitutes a citizen?—a question which Aristotle takes so much pains to answer. The conjecture that there may be a play on the two words σαρισοποιός and Λαρισοποιός is not improbable; in my opinion, less so than the notion propounded by Schneider, that the ambiguity lies in the twofold sense of Λαρισαῖος, which may mean either a Larisaean man or Larisaean kettle, in which case it would be necessary to substitute Λαρισαισποιούς in the text of Aristotle. See Anthol. Pal. vi. 305, τὼς Λαρισαίως κυτογάστορας ἐψητῆρας. But it seems unlikely that Λαρισαῖος without a substantive would have suggested any other notion than that of a man of Larisa.

seems to have entertained his Thessalian admirers with ethical discussion. As he disowns the imputation of professing to "make men better," these lucubrations were probably of a purely speculative or perhaps sceptical character. The question, What is virtue? raised originally in Attica, had apparently troubled the grosser wits of the Thessalian landowners, one of whom is represented as answering it in the sense if not the words of Gorgias[1], and of course as failing to defend his thesis when subjected to a course of Socratic cross-questioning. Aristotle, who seems to have had a better opinion of Gorgias' understanding than of his taste, gives us the following account of the philosopheme in question: *καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτούς, ὅτι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετή, ἢ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων. πολὺ γὰρ ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὁριζομένων.*

Waiving the question of the consistency of this opinion with Aristotle's treatment of Virtue in the Ethics, we may observe that the passage obviously refers to an opinion advanced by Gorgias' admiring disciple Meno in the dialogue bearing his name. The context proves that Plato intends to criticize the master rather than the pupil[2], and independently of this circumstance it is plain that the *ἐξαρίθμησις τῶν ἀρετῶν* which Aristotle commends is that given in the Meno, viz. an enumeration of the different virtues corresponding to differences of sex, age, and condition—*καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστιν*[3]. It seems probable, though it cannot perhaps be proved, that Gorgias denied the possibility of any more general definition, such as that which Socrates professes to seek[4]: or it may be that he felt the same difficulty in

[1] See Meno, p. 71 B foll.

[2] Meno, 71 D, *ἂν φανῇς σὺ μὲν εἰδὼς καὶ Γοργίας.*

[3] In these concluding words we seem to perceive the hand of the master. Compare with the repetition, *ἑκάστην—ἕκαστον—ἑκάστῳ*, the language of Polus, p. 448 C, especially *ἄλλοι—ἄλλων—ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων—οἱ ἄριστοι.*

[4] Gorgias, we know, ridiculed the pretensions of Protagoras and other sophists who professed to teach Virtue. Possibly therefore this

apprehending the nature of Definition which Plato elsewhere attributes to many of his speakers, and here in particular to Meno. However this may be, Virtue, according to Gorgias, amounts to much the same thing as Efficiency—a defensible and not un-Socratic view of the matter. In what work these speculations were contained is a question we have no means of determining: but whatever may have been its title, to it probably belonged the two apophthegms which follow.

9. Ἡμῖν δὲ κομψότερος[1] μὲν ὁ Γοργίας φαίνεται, κελεύων μὴ τὸ εἶδος ἀλλὰ τὴν δόξαν εἶναι πολλοῖς γνώριμον τῆς γυναικός. Plutarch, Mulierum Virtutes, c. 1; Moralia, p. 242 E.

10. Οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἀληθὲς ο λέγει Γοργίας· ἔλεγε δέ· τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἀφανὲς μὴ τυχὸν τοῦ δοκεῖν, τὸ δὲ δοκεῖν ἀσθενὲς μὴ τυχὸν τοῦ εἶναι. Proclus, Schol. in Hesiodi Opp. l. 758 (Gaisford, Poet. Min. iii. p. 340).

This is probably a literal quotation, and may have been a continuation of the foregoing. To the same treatise we may not improbably refer—

15. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἀπεφαίνετο Γοργίας, αὐτῷ μὲν ἀξιώσει τὰ δίκαια τὸν φίλον ὑπουργεῖν, ἐκείνῳ δ' αὐτὸς ὑπηρετήσει πολλὰ καὶ τῶν μὴ δικαίων. Plutarch, Mor. p. 64 C.

This maxim, more generous than just, may have occurred in the description of "The Virtue of a Friend"; but though in substance doubtless a true quotation, the phraseology has probably been altered. It is far less easy to admit the

treatise of his contained a proof of the thesis ὅτι οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή, and as part of that proof he may have insisted that there is no general conception answering to the word, but that there are as many separate virtues as there are classes of human beings and departments of human activity.

[1] 'Finer,' that is to say, than an opinion of Thucydides just referred to by Plutarch: ὁ μὲν γάρ, ἧς ἂν ἐλάχιστος ᾖ παρὰ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ψόγου πέρι ἢ ἐπαίνου λόγος, ἀρίστην ἀποφαίνεται· καθάπερ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὔνομα τῆς ἀγαθῆς γυναικὸς οἰόμενος δεῖν κατάκλειστον εἶναι καὶ ἀνέξοδον. The words of Thucydides, ii. 45, are not repeated, but his meaning is fairly given. So probably in regard of the citation from Gorgias.

genuineness of the following fragment, omitted, whether by oversight or design, in Mullach's Fragmenta:—

16. Γοργίας ὁ ῥήτωρ ἔλεγε τοὺς φιλοσοφίας μὲν ἀμελοῦντας περὶ δὲ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα γινομένους ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς μνηστῆρσιν, οἱ τὴν Πηνελόπην ἐθέλοντες ταῖς θεραπαινίσιν αὐτῆς ἐμίγνυντο. ὁ αὐτὸς τοὺς ῥήτορας ἔφη ὁμοίους εἶναι βατράχοις· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὕδατι κελαδεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἐν τῇ γῇ. (In Spengel's Artt. Scriptores, p. 70 note, from an inedited Munich MS.) The former of these dicta, if not too witty, is too wise for its reputed author, being rather in the manner of Plato than of Gorgias, to whom it seems an anachronism to attribute the distinction of supreme and ancillary sciences. The word ἐγκύκλιος, in the sense here given to it, is also of later date[1]; and it is difficult to believe that the author of the sceptical or rather nihilistic treatise περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος can have thought thus highly of philosophy. Still less can we believe that he would have disparaged the practitioners of his own art, as he is made to do in the second quotation.

17. Ἔτι τοίνυν Γοργίας μὲν ὁ Λεοντῖνός φησι, τὸν Κίμωνα τὰ χρήματα κτᾶσθαι μὲν ὡς χρῷτο, χρῆσθαι δὲ ὡς τιμῷτο. Plut. Cim. c. 10. This fragment, which has every note of genuineness, may possibly have come from the Epitaphius, as Mullach supposes.

The dicta which follow, though not fragments from his writings, illustrate the personal character of Gorgias in an interesting manner.

18. Four sayings are preserved, which, whether written

[1] First so used by Aristotle, as Eth. N. i. 5 (3), where Michelet observes: "Philosophia Aristotelis temporibus reliquis a scientiis nondum distinguebatur; quamobrem ii ipsi, qui proprie philosophi neque erant neque fieri cupiebant, philosophicas materias docebantur, sed aliter ac philosophantes, nempe eo modo, quo vulgi auribus et intellectui accommodatae erant. Illae scientiae quibus omnes Graeci imbuebantur, qui πεπαιδευμένοι esse vellent, nominabantur λόγοι ἐξωτερικοί, ἐγκύκλιοι, ἐν κοινῷ γενόμενοι, ἐκδεδομένοι, τὰ ἔξω μαθήματα, quibus opponuntur λόγοι κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν." ἐγκύκλ. μαθήματα were therefore those sciences or parts of sciences which entered into the ordinary curriculum of liberal instruction—'popular' as opposed to 'exact.'

or only spoken, are not improbably authentic[1]. Gorgias is said to have been the author of a phrase adopted by Aristophanes: ἓν τῶν (Αἰσχύλου) δραμάτων μεστὸν Ἄρεως εἶναι, τοὺς ἑπτὰ ἐπὶ Θήβας. Plut. Sympos. vii. 10. 2. In a similar vein is the following: Γοργίας τὴν τραγῳδίαν εἶπεν ἀπάτην, ἣν ὅ τε ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος, καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατηθέντος. Ib. de Audiendis Poetis, c. 1.

Πόσῳ τούτων βελτίων Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντῖνος περὶ οὗ φησιν ὁ αὐτὸς Κλέαρχος ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ τῶν βίων, ὅτι διὰ τὸ σωφρόνως ζῆν σχεδὸν ὀγδοήκοντα ἔτη τῷ φρονεῖν συνεβίωσε. καὶ ἐπεί τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο τίνι διαίτῃ χρώμενος οὕτως ἐμμελῶς καὶ μετὰ αἰσθήσεως τοσοῦτον χρόνον ζήσειεν, Οὐδὲν πώποτε, εἶπεν, ἡδονῆς ἕνεκεν πράξας. Δημήτριος δὲ ὁ Βυζάντιος ἐν τετάρτῳ περὶ ποιημάτων "Γοργίας, φησίν, ὁ Λεοντῖνος ἐρωτηθεὶς τί αὐτῷ γέγονεν αἴτιον τοῦ βιῶσαι πλείω τῶν ἑκατὸν ἐτῶν, ἔφη, Τὸ μηδὲν πώποτε ἑτέρου ἕνεκεν πεποιηκέναι." Ib. de Gloria Athen. c. 5.

Of these sayings the first three need no comment, but the fourth is more obscure. The French translation, "Jamais je n'ai rien fait par complaisance pour autrui (contre ma santé)," is countenanced by a passage of Lucian which seems a paraphrase rather than a quotation: ὃν (sc. Γοργίαν) φασὶν ἐρωτηθέντα τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ μακροῦ γήρως καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, εἰπεῖν διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε συμπεριενεχθῆναι ταῖς ἄλλων εὐωχίαις. Macrob. c. 23. Meineke however takes the words ἑτέρου ἕνεκεν in their most general sense, as an avowal of mere selfishness, which he thinks it incredible that Gorgias should have made. He therefore (Philologus xiii. p. 242) proposes to read, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν πώποτε ἐντέρου ἕνεκεν πεποιηκέναι—"er habe nie *der sinnlichen Lust* gedient." The word ἔντερον is once used by Archilochus[2] in an indelicate sense, but the emendation is not justified by the passage

[1] It is quite possible that they may have formed part of the celebrated Epitaphius, in which they might have found a place as easily as in Plutarch's treatise de Gloria Atheniensium. The words ὡς Γοργίας φησίν, in the latter passage, rather imply that the dictum came from a written work.

[2] *Frag.* Lyr. 141 Bergk.

adduced, nor, it seems to me, is it necessary to alter the text, if we accept the interpretation above given[1]. A critic in the Rhenish Museum for 1860, p. 624, censures Meineke for his bad taste, thinking that the reply of Gorgias really contains a playful admission of his habitual "Egoismus," though exaggerated for the sake of effect. But neither Meineke nor his opponent has noticed the illustrative passage of Lucian, where the word *συμπεριενεχθῆναι*[2] bears out the "par complaisance" of the French interpreter.

A different version of the same reply is given in Stobaeus, Anthol. 101. 21, *Γοργίας ἐρωτηθεὶς ποίᾳ διαίτῃ χρώμενος εἰς μακρὸν γῆρας ἦλθεν· Οὐδὲν οὐδέποτε, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡδονὴν οὔτε φαγὼν οὔτε δράσας.* Also in Valerius Maximus, viii. 13, "Gorgias Leontinus...cum centesimum et septimum ageret annum, interrogatus 'quapropter tam diu vellet in vita remanere': 'Quia nihil,' inquit, 'habeo, quod senectutem meam accusem.'" Equally characteristic of the man were his last words—

19. *Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντῖνος ἐπὶ τέρματι ὢν τοῦ βίου, ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καταληφθείς, κατ' ὀλίγον εἰς ὕπνον ὑπολισθάνων ἔκειτο· ἐπεὶ δέ τις αὐτὸν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἤρετο τί πράττοι, ὁ Γοργίας ἀπεκρίνατο· Ἤδη με ὁ ὕπνος ἄρχεται παρακατατίθεσθαι τἀδελφῷ.* Stob. Anth. 118. 23, from Aelian, V. H. ii. 35.

20. The following is given on the authority of Arsenius[3], who certainly did not invent it: *ὁ αὐτὸς* (sc. *Γοργίας*) *ἤδη γηραιὸς ὑπάρχων, ἐρωτηθεὶς εἰ ἡδέως ἀποθνήσκοι, Ἥδιστα, εἶπεν, ὥσπερ δὲ ἐκ σαπροῦ καὶ ῥέοντος συνοικίου ἀσμένως ἀπαλλάττομαι.*

The treatise of Gorgias *περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος*, though it is important in a history of philosophy, as a kind of *reductio ad absurdum* of the Eleatic method, is preserved to us only in

[1] Another conjecture, *γαστέρος ἕνεκα*, is approved by Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. i. p. 737, note (5).

[2] "Comiter se dare, alicui morigerum esse," Budaeus, quoted in Steph. Lex. s. v. *συμπεριφέρειν*. *συμπεριφέρεσθαι* is frequently used in this sense of "going with the multitude," but only in late writers.

[3] In the "Praeclara Dicta Philosophorum," an early-printed and once well-known compilation by a Greek Archbishop, son of Michael Apostolius, a Byzantine refugee of the fifteenth century.

epitome. For that reason, and because it throws no light on the personal or purely literary characteristics of its author, and is therefore of no direct use to a student of this dialogue, I have thought better to omit it. The best edition of the Aristotelian critique is, so far as I know, that of Mullach in the first volume of his "Fragmenta Philosophorum" in Didot's series.

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